Comments

  • Where is the truth?
    (drawing on memory, expectation, language, symbolism, etc) which are not meaningfully 'inside' the brain;Wayfarer

    Memory, expectations, meanings and the semantic aspect of symbolism are only in the brain. Just like the projection of a drama is only in the TV. You're trying to say that the projection is in the filming, etc. too. That's wrong.
  • The Shoutbox
    It's quite simple, really, and not worth debating. They simply don't mean the same thing (and this can very easily be demonstrated with a number of examples) just as "black" doesn't mean "white", "yes" doesn't mean "no", and "you're an idiot" doesn't mean "I love you". Hence your lengthy and overcomplicated defence is quite farcical.

    Sometimes you should just concede, and this is one of those times. If any of you ever catch me being so obviously wrong, please promptly give me a metaphorical bitch slap.
    Sapientia

    <eye roll>
  • Octopus Mind Uploading
    Anecdotally, I heard otherwise on an episode of RadioLab, where a guy had to be fed from a device because of a hole in his intestines which the doctors couldn't surgically repair. He developed the most intense cravings for food that nearly drove him crazy. At one point, he ended up in some stranger's backyard, taking over their grill, just because of the smell of the food.Marchesk

    Yeah, he had a hole in his intestines. That's not evidence of his intestines amounting to mental content, haha.

    Also, there's evidence that the bacteria in your gut influence your mood.Marchesk

    And neither is that. The idea is that it changes the chemical balance in your body, including your brain.
  • Moral awareness - How?
    I don't see why reference to a law or custom, which restrains or modifies how an individual feels about some action, isn't tantamount to a kind moral awareness.Nils Loc

    Well, it's certainly awareness of other persons' views re morality. But even following social moral norms (as opposed to just being aware of them) isn't indicative of moral judgments being social or of people receiving their morality from those social norms. People often follow social norms for pragmatic reasons, where they privately disagree with those social norms. You don't want to be jailed, killed, socially ostracized, etc., so you play along as you must to avoid those things, but your personal moral views might be very different than the behavior in question.
  • Dreams
    For people for whom their dreams seem just like what they consider their waking phenomenal experience, this must surely be confusing, and I'm not sure what the solution to the problem would be for them.

    For me, however, my dreams don't at all seem just like my waking phenomenal experience. My dreams are completely qualitatively different than my waking experience, and when I'm dreaming, I almost always know that I'm dreaming.

    My dreams have more the character of "free movies that I'm imagining." They're more or less similar to daydreams--which don't at all qualitatively seem like veridical experience to me. It's just that when I'm sleeping and I do the "daydream" thing, I can do it a lot more elaborately--more complete storylines, more details, etc. That's probably because perceptual and other mental phenomena are not interferring.
  • Octopus Mind Uploading
    I don't believe there is any evidence to suggest that neurons elsewhere in the body have anything to do with mentality--lots of folks have had gastrointestinal problems where they've ended up with parts of their gastrointestinal system damaged or removed and there's no evidence that that's affected anything mental in those individuals.

    Beyond that, I don't know why people so readily buy the core ideas of functionalism, but unfortunately it's almost considered gauche to question those assumptions.
  • Where is the truth?


    Space and time have locations, it's just that it's not only one location.

    But that shouldn't be confusing.

    You don't think that, say, Picasso paintings don't have a location just because there are thousands of them, do you?
  • Idealism and "group solipsism" (why solipsim could still be the case even if there are other minds)
    From my idealist perspective, reality consists of two fundamental kinds of things: experiencers and experiences.lambda

    This is an aside, really, but I'm curious about this:

    If only ideal things exist in your view, and experiencers are different than experiences, then just what are experiencers ideally? They can't be some set of experiences, because experiences are different than experiencers on your view. So what are they? What sort of ideal thing is it that experiences?
  • Emotions, values, science & nihilism.
    I am concerned here with going from any fact to any ought's not just moralAndrew4Handel

    Okay, but there's no way to oversome the is-ought problem. Objective facts simply do not imply any (foundational) oughts.

    I'm not even sure at this point, though, just what you're trying to do in this thread. Just what are you asking, or proposing, or wondering about?
  • "The meaning of life is to give life meaning"
    Well if that's true then ANYTHING can be a source of meaning for ones life, which plain ludicrous.intrapersona

    Whether it seems ludicrous to you or not, it's true.

    Also, you seem to be conflating different senses of "meaning." The sense of "meaning" used in "the meaning of life" isn't the same as the sense of "meaning" used when we say "what is the meaning of 'sidereal time'?"
  • Sellars' Empiricism & The Philosophy of Mind
    I don't think this works, because the physics will not agree with that (it's the same wavelength in all cases, and nothing has changed on the object's surface), and you have optical illusions where we see color that isn't there at all.Marchesk

    It's not just the object's surface that's pertinent. It's the whole "system" in question--the object's surface, the light traveling from it, the way the light interacts with the atmosphere, the wavelengths at a particular point in space (the surface of your eye for example). Hence his "from a particular perspective."

    It's important to remember that EVERYTHING we say is from a particular perspective, and there are no objectively privileged perspectives.
  • Sellars' Empiricism & The Philosophy of Mind
    right, but then the idea of veridicality is going to be incoherent as well - if you can't understand the one, you can't understand the other.csalisbury

    I don't at all buy that idea in general--that one can only understand (or think etc.) some x if one can understand (or think etc.) not-x or x's "opposite."

    Someone could easily think that sense data necessarily get non sense data right a fortiori because it isn't even coherent to suppose that they could not get sense data right. For a hypothetical justification of this, imagine if someone were to think that sense data determines, in a causal way, what the non-sense data world is like, and that the non sense-data world couldn't even be otherwise. The idea of non-veridical sense data could thus be incoherent to them--it wouldn't even make any sense to them to try to imagine that the world could be otherwise, because it's so obvious to them that that's how the world works. Thus they take talk of non-veridicality to be completely vague nonsense that other people engage in.

    You wouldn't be able to, for the sense daa theorist.csalisbury

    Right. Hence when we talk about veridical and non-veridical "seeing a red and triangular object" we're talking about veridical and non-veridical sense data when we're talking about sense data theorists.

    It's what he claims the archetypal sense data theorist claims (or at least implicitly believes)csalisbury

    Right--that's Sellars' claim. But I don't know why we'd be claiming that any sense data theorist believes that, as there doesn't seem to be any reason to claim that. In other words, it's extremely dubious that any sense data theorist actually believes that.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    I am sorry but it does not make sense to say that physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic.m-theory

    And indeed, no one said this.

    A great many physicalist philosophers have attempted to justify physicalism with formal logic.m-theory

    So you say, but you can't give a single example.
  • The Shoutbox
    Yes, I understand what they believe, meaning the same thing as I understand why they believe this. — Terrapin Station


    Lolwut?
    Sapientia

    Unless we're positing and talking about underlying psychological motivations that the person doesn't explicitly connect with the belief(s) in question, why someone believes something is part of what they believe, no? So if you understand what they believe about x, then you understand why they believe it.

    For example:

    Murray believes that his car is parked on Main Street, because when he returned home yesterday, he parked on Main Street and he has no reason to believe that anyone moved his car--he was parked in a legal space, no one else has access to his car, etc., and chances are that it's not stolen.

    That's all what Murray believes, and it includes why he believes it. Why Murray believes what he does is part of what he believes. "When I returned home yesterday I parked on Main Street," "I was parked in a legal space," etc. are all beliefs, and they're the supporting beliefs for "My car is parked on Main Street." Understanding what he believes includes understanding all of that--otherwise you don't understand what he believes.

    Now, if we're wondering about underlying psychological reasons that Murray believes that when he returned home from work yesterday, he parked on Main Street that's another issue. And this is especially pertinent when there is reason to think that Murray doesn't have good reasons to believe what he does, as in that case, some people who are familiar with what Murray believes might not know offhand the underlying psychological reasons simply by understanding what he believes. For example, maybe Murray is actually institutionalized, and he has no job, no car, etc., so that the underlying reasons that Murray believes what he does is that he's highly delusional, etc. For that sort of knowing why someone believes what they do, we need to have more detailed personal information about them, so that we have some clues about their psychological dispositions, quirks, etc. But that's probably not what was meant in the case at hand.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    Man I don't have ability to link you to any author who has made formal arguments for physicalism.m-theory

    -fixed-

    You should probably browse the entire article or skip to the references and begin browsing there for examples of the tradition of physicalism and formal logic.m-theory

    Aka the wild-goose-chase-that-will-hopefully-lead-to-you-just-forgetting-about-the-ridiculous-claims-I-made gambit.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?


    LOL--there are three disconnected formal sentences there (though not expressed strictly formally at that):

    S entails S*

    If S then S*

    If S & S# then S*

    There's not even any formal logical argument of any sort there.

    How is that you believe there is no formal method for justification of physicalism yet you claim to be a physicalist?m-theory

    If you're asking how that's possible, it's because physicalism isn't a thesis about or that depends on formal logic in any procedural way,

    Aside from that, I don't take formal logic to be a justification for much outside of strictly formal logical concerns (and then it's still relative to the particular species of logic at hand). Formal logic is purely an invented language for thinking and talking abstractly about relations, where much of it is a game of extrapolation, an erector set resting on the basics of the invented language.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?


    I don't find it odd that when I asked you what the formal logic was that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology," you didn't respond with the formal logic in question. Rather, I completely expected that.
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?
    You are silly if you think there is no formal logic that justifies the position of physicalism ontology.m-theory

    What is the formal logic that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology"? (Is English your first language?)
  • How do physicalists explain 'intentional content'?


    You're saying utter nonsense about physicalism being a thesis re whether there's a formal logical "effective decision procedure" about the ontological status of mentality.