all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate. — AmadeusD

The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything.

But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them? — AmadeusD

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all).

What are we discovering when we come across moral facts? — AmadeusD

We are discovering moral facts. You seem to be asking me to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts. Moral facts can't be reduced to non-moral facts. See Hume.

The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything. — Michael

I do not agree. It’s a fictional sentence referring to nothing and so does not carry truth (is my take).

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all). — Michael

What supports your contention that it's true?

I take your other response as a tautology and can’t say much about it ‍:halo:
Morality exists in the mind, only. It isn’t discovered (is my position). See Hume :nerd:

I’m kidding. Enjoying the exchange

I didn't give an actual definition of "moral realism", but just a raw, very simplified description, just enough to present my views. And what I said agrees with its actual definition, at least as given by the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad."

Please don't intervene except if you have something useful to say. I think I have told you that again.

Decide for yourself. — Wayfarer

The whole point of objectivism or realism is to go beyond decision-making altogether.

You misunderstand what that is saying.

Moral realism claims that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which are wrong.

Moral realism doesn't claim that these actions are right and that these actions are wrong.

One can be a moral realist and claim that moral sentences are truth-apt and describe objective features of the world without commenting on whether or not abortion is wrong.

This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism – like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory – is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics.

You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics. — Michael

My apologies.

As is typical with me sometimes, I packed way too many things in that post without enough connective tissue, so to speak. I understand what you are saying. I understand the distinctions between kinds of ethics, and what academia categorizes as moral statements(utterances of ought). I also understand that current convention divides all theories of meaning into two categories, both of which presuppose symbolism.

Do you disagree with my saying that all meta ethical endeavors share the same basic elemental constitution... thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour?

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, so I wouldn't say they are even normative facts: it is a hypothetical imperative--i.e., it is a subjectively utterance of obligation. Moral facts are about obligations which are true independently of what a subject obligates themselves to do (viz., independently of what they decide to promise or not). What do you think? — Bob Ross

What you claimed to be your problem has nothing to do with what I wrote. I've no problem at all with the statement you focused on. I agree that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, nor do they need to be in order for there to be moral facts and true statements and/or sound judgments about those facts. Facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.

As I said, my position is that all facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.

When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).

They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. — creativesoul

Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.

But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such)

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all). — Michael

No it's not.

How do you respond to that?

I undestand what you say. Indeed, I ignored the part of "there are facts of the matter", which plays a role in moral statements. However, this does not change the main point of what I'm saying, i.e. saying this is bad and this is good, as objective statements, in an absolute way, as being the truth, etc. is like using rules, recipes of moral behaviour. Even if you restrict the statement "It is wrong to kill" by adding a condition like "if one is not under threat", it is still a moral rule. Even more statements of more specific nature, like "Greed is a vice", "Abortion is a bad thing", etc. act as moral rules.

As far as "normative ethics" are concerned, which you have brought up, the difference between normative statements and the above moral statements is that they are evaluations that are relative to some standard instead of being absolute. And I was certainly not talking about anything like that. Therefore your remark was out of point.

I understand: you are arguing that either moral realism is true or error theory is true. However, as I noted before, although intuiting what language is trying to express is important, you just bluntly presuppose that moral statements express objective facts at the outset (#1), which insufficiently precludes moral subjectivism.

I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration, it makes me unimpressed with the argument (simply because it didn't address all available options).

A moral realist who doesn't accept ordinary language philosophy will offer a different argument. — Michael

:up:

:up: :up:

I prefer moral naturalism to "moral realism", Bob, because the latter concerns 'the meaning of moral statements about states-of-affairs' (semantics) whereas the former (a subset or kind of moral realism) more precisely concerns, in effect, 'defeasible reasons for moral statements about natural beings' (praxis). These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective. No doubt just as one can use mathematics or chemistry subjectively, one can also use 'moral statements about natural beings' subjectively; however, such unwarranted subjectivization (or relativization) tends to be incoherent and vacuous.

Anyway, simply put: (1) it is a fact of the matter that every natural being is inseparable from the natural world; (2) natural beings capable of normativity require reasons (i.e. facts/evidence-based claims) for doing things as a rule and for not doings as a rule; (3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ – take care of³ – (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.

(NB: A rule itself does not compel compliance, however; 'following a rule' is usually a habit acquired through practice for which, at best, there is a compelling reason independent of that rule.)

We can have reasons to believe something, to do something, to have some desire or aim, and to have many other attitudes and emotions, such as fear, regret, and hope. Reasons are given by facts, such as the fact that someone's finger-prints are on some gun, or that calling an ambulance would save someone's life. It is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the phrase 'a reason' means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But 'counts in favour of' means roughly 'gives a reason for'. The concept of a reason is best explained by example. One example is the thought that we always have a reason to want to avoid being in agony. — Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1

re: Some h. sapiens' defects (which are self-evident as per e.g. P. Foot, M. Nussbaum): vulnerabilities to

- deprivation (of e.g. sustanence, shelter, sleep, touch, esteem, care, health, hygiene, trust, safety, etc)

- dysfunction (i.e. injury, ill-health, disability)

- helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, or fear-terror of being vulnerable)

- stupidity (i.e. maladaptive habits (e.g. mimetic violence, lose-lose preferences, etc))

- betrayal (i.e. trust-hazards)

- bereavement (i.e. losing loved ones & close friends), etc ...

... in effect, any involuntary decrease, irreparable loss or final elimination of human agency.

This sketch (influenced by Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, C. Rosset, A. Murray, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, O. Flanagan, P. Foot et al) supports only one type of 'moral realism', Bob, and rejects error theory / moral nihilism (etc) as well as all forms of moral supernaturalism (e.g. divine command theory).

As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong.

I would say that moral realism is a three pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments are expressing something objective.
3. There are at least some (or one) true moral judgment.

Making a list of things that are right and wrong is compatible with anti-realism as well (I would say).

So, can such a moral(ity) system be applied to life as a whole and with all its versatility and multifacetedness?

Of course not.

I agree in the sense that a lot of common moral realist positions tend to be too deontological simply because they are not fully thought-out; but I don’t think your critique actually targets moral realists (in general): there are plenty of moral realist that agree that:

An moral (I prefer the term "ethical") system must be founded on a basic principle, based on which other principles can be formed and ethical behavior and acts can be determined, allowing also for judgment to take place, based on rational thinking and facts, i.e. considering the conditions under which acts take place.

Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.

When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? Because, then I think we may just be semantically disagreeing and (I would say) you are a moral anti-realist for the sake of the contemporary discussion of metaethics (although I could be misunderstanding).

With respect to promises, a promise is a subjective obligation that one sets out to do, which can be transcribed into a hypothetical imperative—because it is not categorical. I don’t have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do X—its not a moral fact that I ought to do X. Instead, I can say “if I ought to help my neighbor, then I should make promises to do X in situation Y” (or something like that) and then affirm the antecedent. If there are no moral facts (in at least the sense that I described), then every obligation is hypothetical.

Likewise, the obligation to fulfill the promise, if you are agreeing that the promise itself is not a moral fact, is also a hypothetical imperative. If I ought to fulfill my promises, then I must do X because I promised X. If I promise X but reject the antecedent of the former hypothetical, then I can rationally and legitimately promise X and not be obliged to do X. Without grounding it in a normative fact-of-the-matter, this is what is left (I would say).

Just to throw a curveball out there, Stanley Cavell makes the claim that it is our shared lives that are normative, in that we have (implicit) criteria to judge each other, which come from what we are interested in (as a culture), what matters to us as a society. So, our actions are not constrained by facts, but conformity. That is not to say that others’ judgment is our moral condition. A moral situation is just when we run out of rules and norms (the “ought”), in which case our responses dictate our character; we are morally obligated, responsible as a (real) fact of the limitation of knowledge.

Can we know what is best ahead of time? No. Does anything anyone decides or argues for have power over what we do? No. Nevertheless, we act and learn, excuse, refine, better ourselves, and these things are not individual, necessarily based on whim, emotion, irrationality, unintelligibility—it is “real” in that it matters and is subject to judgment. Those are facts of our human condition, but outside the realism/anti-realism distinction, which is just the desire to avoid our responsibility for our acts by making it about just doing what is right, what we “ought” to—made certain (apart from me) by “facts”.

:100:

/.../Those are facts of our human condition, but outside the realism/anti-realism distinction, which is just the desire to avoid our responsibility for our acts by making it about just doing what is right, what we “ought” to—made certain (apart from me) by “facts”. — Antony Nickles

What do you mean here by "responsibility"?
Legal responsibility?

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? — Bob Ross

No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.

I don’t have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do X—its not a moral fact that I ought to do X. — Bob Ross

I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here. Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot. Odd that you keep arguing against stuff I've not said nor does it only follow from what I have said.

A question...

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.
— creativesoul

Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.

But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such) — AmadeusD

Truth is correspondence between what's happened or is happening and thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. Facts are events(what's happened or is happening).

"Telling the truth" is actually a very misleading phrase or way of speaking, but it's for another thread. But yes, one could be telling the truth, if that means stating what one believes to be true, and say something that runs counter to what happened, is happening, or will happen but has yet to have done so.

From the SEP's article on moral realism...

It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide).

The debate between moral realists and anti-realists assumes, though, that there is a shared object of inquiry—in this case, a range of claims all involved are willing to recognize as moral claims—about which two questions can be raised and answered: Do these claims purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false? Are some of them true? Moral realists answer ‘yes’ to both, non-cognitivists answer ‘no’ to the first (and, by default, ‘no’ to the second) while error theorists answer ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second. (With the introduction of “minimalism” about truth and facts, things become a bit more complicated. See the section on semantics, below.) To note that some other, non-moral, claims do not (or do) purport to report facts or that none (or some) of them are true, is to change the subject. That said, it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate....

What do you mean here by "responsibility"? — baker

Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make excuses for it, etc. That words not only do not stand outside of the circumstances in which they are spoken, but that an expression is an event that has an afterwards, to which you are tied.

Hello 180 Proof!

I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond!

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are advocating that “concerns ...[about] species’ defects … of natural beings” is equivalent to moral concern/judgment because such concerns (about species’ defects) provide compelling reasons (“independent of that rule” which was formulated from them) for doing or not doing specific actions: am I on the right track here?

If I am, then let me expound some of my prima facie concerns. Firstly, I can see how species’ defects can provide compelling reasons to perform specific actions, and thusly help inform us of what we ought to be doing, but I am failing to see how those obligations are factual. For example, imagine you are explaining all the relevant defects of a specific human being (relative to the species) to someone else: once you get done, what moral fact has been exposed? You explain to me that this person has a disability, and I in no way can infer that I ought to help them from that (in and of itself): I must import some non-factual moral judgment that informs me how that I should help them (perhaps: be kind to others? Etc.). To me, I see species’ defects as certainly relevant to my moral consideration, but they seem to me to be non-moral facts that supplement the moral judgments—e.g., I say one should not smoke because it is unhealthy and one ought to be healthy, and ‘it is unhealthy’ does not, in itself, inform me that I shouldn’t do it.

Perhaps this is a difference in our views of ‘facticity’ and ‘morality’: I would say that ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘facticity’ is about ‘statements which correspond properly to reality [such that what it references about reality agrees with reality with respect to it]’. What would you say?

In short: I am not seeing how natural analysis about species’ defects contains within it any statements which indicate ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘correspond to reality [such that...]’.

Which leads me to my second worry:

These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective.

To me, you have explicated quite clearly here my worry that moral facts (i.e., ‘moral reasons’) are only objective insofar as their properties are about natural beings: but isn’t there a gap between the way an organism may be (in relation to a standard organism within their species) and a normative judgment about how we ought to treat that organism? If there isn’t, then I am not seeing it.

Alas, my final worry pertains to:

No doubt just as one can use mathematics or chemistry subjectively, one can also use 'moral statements about natural beings' subjectively; however, such unwarranted subjectivization (or relativization) tends to be incoherent and vacuous.

It seems as though, and correct me if I am misunderstanding, you consider mathematical facts (and similar areas of study) to be analogous to moral facts, such that if a moral ‘reason’ isn’t factual then neither is a mathematical ‘reason’: I think there is a difference between ‘using mathematics subjectively’ and ‘mathematics being subjective’. Math has facts because the propositions correspond accurately to states-of-affairs in reality (of which I would ground it in our faculties of cognition); whereas, I don’t see how that is the case with morality (especially if the moral facts are essentially only factual insofar as they are dependent on non-moral facts about species/organisms).

Let me know what you think!

I don't see how this is a form of moral realism, which I think you may be agreeing with me here. Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. I think you described a form of moral subjectivism or perhaps a moral realist position called moral relativism (but I simply disagree with the latter).

No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.

Yes, but it seems like you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events—e.g., I think I ought to help a poor person and I do, that’s an event, that’s therefore a fact (under you view), and since it is an event about a moral act it is a moral fact. I am trying to explicate that this is no way implies that moral realism: a moral subjectivists 100% can agree with my example above.

Another way of thinking about it, perhaps, is that the act of being obligated subjectively to help a poor person is an event, but it is not a moral event because it stemmed from that person’s psychology.

I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here

I apologize if that is the case: I must be misunderstanding you.

Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot.

Ok, so what is the moral fact-of-the-matter then (under your view)? Is it just an event that has moral signification (such as my example of helping the poor)? What would it mean for an event to be ‘moral’ under your view?

A question...

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises.

:up:

I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape.

...you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events... — Bob Ross

No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises. — Bob Ross

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape. — Bob Ross

Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?

I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond! — Bob Ross

:up:

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are advocating that “concerns ...[about] species’ defects … of natural beings” is equivalent to moral concern/judgment because such concerns (about species’ defects) provide compelling reasons (“independent of that rule” which was formulated from them) for doing or not doing specific actions: am I on the right track here?

I do not recognize what I argued here in your 'paraphrase' above, so my guess is that you're not on the right track.

In short: I am not seeing how natural analysis about species’ defects contains within it any statements which indicate ‘what one ought to be doing’ and ‘correspond to reality [such that...]’.

I don't see this either, which is why I did not make such an argument. If you're interested, Bob, go back and re-read the second paragraph (4 points), and then the parenthetical note on 'following a rule', and lastly the Derek Parfit quotation.

Even if we take natural language philosophy seriously, there is a nuance of natural language that seems to be missing in your analysis: Statements can be "objectively" true in one context, but false when that context is absent.

"One cannot move pawns backwards."

Is "objectively" true, but only in the context of playing a game of chess. Once that context is removed, it is objectively false: after all, I can move the piece backwards just as easily as any other direction. But note that the form of the sentence is no different than:

"One cannot transmute lead into gold."

Which is not dependent in its truth on any particular context.

So the question is, are the truths of moral statements context dependent or context independent? To satisfy a moral arealist such as @Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. But either way, the form in which the statements are posed cannot tell you that.

Do you believe in social realities? I can guarantee you behave as if you do. After all, nation, money, property, family, company, are all social realities, and it would be a difficult life indeed that didn't acknowledge any of them. So even if morality were "only" a social reality, that would still perhaps be a more formidable reality than you are giving it credit for.

And what if morality had a biological origin? Unlike say money, which is purely a social construct (yet can literally move mountains), what if morality is rooted in an elemental, biologically predisposed notion of justice (as it is, imho)? If so, would it count as "real"?

Ultimately I think the whole "is it real" question is just too vague. You have to specify what kind of "real" you are looking for. If you are talking about physically real (as the question tends to implicitly, and unjustifiably, slide towards), then no, of course morality isn't real. But then, there are more things in heaven and Earth, physicalist, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

"One cannot transmute lead into gold." — hypericin

You might have chosen a better example.