If a 'universal' physical property exists, where does it exist?

Keep in mind that I'm not totally confident in my opinion on universals. I dislike the Platonistic "second world" of abstract objects.

Rather, these universals are more like particulars themselves, like tropes. Aristotle might have been a trope theorist by today's standards. They are the fundamental particles that allow matter to act in the way it does. All other universals, like the ones mentioned above, would merely be describing how matter acts. It's not that matter possesses these properties, it's that matter acts in a certain way, dictated by fundamental tropes, tropes that exist in the world.

I don't have a fantastic understanding of quantum mechanics, but from what I do know, these elementary particles all have an opposite (other than the higgs). It's almost as if they are just logically necessary and unanalyzable (whatever the hell that means).

We could look at properties in terms of sets. The extension of tallness is the set of instances of it. Do you accept the existence of sets?

I suppose I am rather basic and haven't outgrown Wittg-ness. Metaphysically we encounter resemblance and difference. From these we build. How we classify our elaborations doesn't greatly matter as long as, given who we're talking with about what at the time, we understand each other. I don't see why micro-physical properties matter any more than forms of love, or any given classification of species, taking a wider view.

I'm sympathetic to the view, since it's central to trope theory, which I'm also sympathetic to.

This problem exists as much with particulars; for example where does the object we can all see exist? By this I mean not 'where in relation to the other objects in its surroundings?' but 'in what absolute space?'. This seems to be a problem because 'your space' is not coterminous with 'my space'. Of course we naturally (and rightly, I think) assume that each phenomenological space is a perspective on a common space, but it remains the case that the location of the tree cannot be established except relatively to an arbitrarily chosen perspective, the absolute location just like the absolute space and the absolute object are formal indeterminables.

I think it is likewise for properties; they are formal 'entities' indeterminably located in a shared logical space. That logical space can be conceptualized in terms of sets or in terms of substances and properties. Either of these ways of conceptualizing becomes problematic when questions regarding substantive existence are asked in relation to them. I suspect such questions are simply based on category errors, on our equivocal notions of 'existence'.

If a 'universal' physical property exists, where does it exist? — mcdoodle

It doesn't exist anywhere, it just exists. There's no reason to assume that everything has a location. Spacetime exists; where is it?

It doesn't exist anywhere, it just exists. There's no reason to assume that everything has a location. Spacetime exists; where is it? — Pneumenon

The questions can spiral inwards a bit though if one uses the word 'exists'. For some reason when I hear the word 'exists' I reach inside my space-time continuum. I quite take your underlying point.