It evidently hasn't - "I can't explain it." — Isaac
It's the object of "can't explain.". — frank
If reason is reserved for conscious processing, which is granted, and if much of the modeling is unconscious, how can such modeling be said to be acting like reason? — Mww
that modeling is utterly irrelevant to a separate system that models itself absent all those terms in its purpose, even while operating in conjunction with it. — Mww
Who’s we? The teeny-tiny fraction of intellectually specialized humanity that even considers the new system a better explanatory device? — Mww
So, technically, you’ve replaced nothing, but only attacked a common opponent.....ignorance.....from a different direction, and with a much smaller hence potentially less effective force, using experimental weapons. — Mww
I suspect there to be many senior firefighters, soldiers, and these days, nurses’ aides, boldly scoffing at that. A few of ‘em.....the more senior.....rolling on the ground, even. The most insulted, the most senior, would look at you with that, “what....you wouldn’t do your damn job???” expression, and immediately proceed to ignore, if not regret, your very existence. — Mww
Some preliminary conditions for reason are subconscious, but these are not decisions. — Mww
That's my question to you: how do you know that it isn't? — Luke
It's private because I've never known or experienced anyone else's sensations except my own. — Luke
My argument for privacy is that you cannot have other people's experiences/sensations; you can only have your own. — Luke
There are the inner sensations and the outer expressions, and you can never see or experience or verify what other people's sensations feel/are like. — Luke
All you will get is a (verbal) behaviour. You still won't be able to see or access their sensations. — Luke
How can I not have access to my own feelings of pain? — Luke
I have conceded that we could all have the same experiences. That wasn't my point. As I said: "We could all have the same experiences, but do we? Probably, but who knows? How can we know?" — Luke
The point of Wittgenstein's Eiffel Tower example is — Isaac
I'm not familiar with that example. Do you have a reference? — Luke
Accuracy is irrelevant to my argument. It's the fact that we cannot access other people's sensations in order to compare them. — Luke
You can only know of your pain sensations by being conscious of them — Luke
I have direct access to my pains when I feel them. — Luke
The very sentence "One cannot talk about it" would be self contradictory by that approach. — Isaac
Well, if that's all there is to it, what do you think of
Semantics. What difference does it make if we lump all the sensations which hurt into one general category? The matter at hand is the subjective nature of the sensations. — Banno
If a model of brain function identifies a region as associated with some function, and the association is suitably strong in all cases thus far, then when we look at that component in our alternative model running 'in conjunction with it' we should find it correlates. — Isaac
If it doesn't (correlate) then either there's something wrong with one of the models or they are no longer 'in conjunction'. — Isaac
I wonder how much of Kant would be scoffed at by firefighters. — Isaac
On the one hand they're some immutable private thing embedded in your body (and so inaccessible to others), but on the other they're whatever you currently think they are, which seems easily communicated. — Isaac
That is true, when you think about it. But is that how you feel about it? Isn't knowledge ultimately a feeling of conviction that you don't need to fight, but to refine, until it becomes as good as possible under preconceived criteria, a set of virtues conveyed without need for justification. Isn't all life an impulse. It is as useless to fight your faith in objective knowledge, as it is futile to fight one's sensible doubt in it. I am fully justified in doubting whether you feel or are as real as I am. But how do I know that I am actually real, if not through the impulsive realization that I am, through the trust in the conviction that fact and perception are joined. Can I rationally justify that perceiving you is equivalent to the sense of proof I get from perceiving myself? No. But do I ever rationally justify that I perceive any two things the same way? No. Not even perceiving myself in my different aspects. Are they all real, or are some more real then others? I relate perceptual realizations instinctively. I am bound to, compelled to. I have faith in the property of relatability, between myself and between appearances in general. But I am also equally emotionally compelled to doubt them, because my reason fights my conviction, and I have conviction in my reason. I am also instinctively compelled to discover how you emulate your reaction of my emotion, by observing the apparent image of your neurological construction as it is presented to me. And then, I am similarly emotionally compelled to be appreciative of the apparent closeness between our responses and to respect the meaning of this closeness, as I feel it, whatever it might be.Here is where Witt’s #246 plays, insofar as it is false for you to claim knowledge of my pain, or sensations in general, and it is nonsense for me to claim knowledge of my pain or sensations in general. — Mww
Here is where Witt’s #246 plays (......)
— Mww
That is true, when you think about it. But is that how you feel about it? — simeonz
Isn't knowledge ultimately a feeling of conviction that you don't need to fight, but to refine, until it becomes as good as possible under preconceived criteria, a set of virtues conveyed without need for justification. — simeonz
I should irrationally believe my convictions until a stronger, more convincing instinct makes itself available from experience. — simeonz
It's private because I've never known or experienced anyone else's sensations except my own.
— Luke
You might have done. You've not given an account of the origin or nature of 'sensations' under your model — Isaac
Perhaps there's not such thing as 'your own' sensations at all, by your definition. — Isaac
There are the inner sensations and the outer expressions, and you can never see or experience or verify what other people's sensations feel/are like.
— Luke
Again, that is the matter under discussion, so it doesn't help to pull it in as evidence for a conclusion therein. — Isaac
In what way is the verbal behaviour not a form of access to their sensations? Is a ruler not a form of access to a thing's height? — Isaac
I thought I explained that. There's this equivocation over what constitutes 'your feelings of pain'. On the one hand they're some immutable private thing embedded in your body (and so inaccessible to others), but on the other they're whatever you currently think they are, which seems easily communicated. — Isaac
People generally use the term 'my feelings, or my memories, or my opinion...' to refer to some fixed object as if it were stored in their brain somewhere. That model is wrong. Those things are created in real time, not retrieved from some mental filing cabinet. If you don't have that model, such that when you refer to 'my pain' you mean 'whatever feeling, or memory of a feeling I happen to be creating at this very moment', then my description of your lack of access to it does not apply to you. The consequence, however, of that model is that it's a chimera, which you can never talk about because it changes in the very act of doing so. — Isaac
But behavioural consequence is a property of your sensations - the behaviour they cause, the language used, the neural activity associated... These are not only real properties of your experience, but they're the only properties we have to measure. — Isaac
Just like we look to make and model to determine if you and I have 'the same' phone. We look to behavioural consequence, associated neural activity etc to see that you and I have 'the same' experience. — Isaac
You can only know of your pain sensations by being conscious of them
— Luke
See here you equivocate. Previously you assume direct access to your 'pain' by denying my model of inference. Now you're again describing your pain sensations as if they were some fact of the matter that you become aware of. Which is it to be? — Isaac
And again here. If you're going to talk about your 'pain' as being just exactly that which you feel at some given time, and not that which is inferred from some other physiological trigger, then there is no 'access' at all. You make it up at the time, you're not 'accessing' anything. The only sense in which 'access' is coherent is a model where 'pain sensations' are a physiological thing which you 'seek out' by introspection. — Isaac
But we never deal with the statements in the abstract, but with their evaluations in some terms, even if syntactic terms. We deal with analysis, conjectures, assertions, objections. Sensation itself does not prompt reaction. Reason itself does not prompt conclusions. We infer and react. Being compelled by reason is feeling of trust in reason. Reason, as we abstractly define it, is not emotional, but being under rational influence is itself, I think, an emotion. Having faith in reason, for me, is an emotion. A preconception. Empiricism, is emotional preconception. But not every emotional preconception is empirical.Simply put....there are no feelings intrinsic to a purely empirical statement, in the same way I do not have a feeling about the water I may or may not put to some use. — Mww
But is knowledge direct result from sensations, or is it reaction to sensations. A conviction that emotionally stems, possibly through reason, from those sensations.#246 is an empirical statement, for, on the one hand it has to do with the perceptions of someone else and the knowledge possible from them, and on the other, it has to do with the sensations that belong to me alone, from which follows the possibility of my own knowledge. — Mww
I think..., that thinking is ultimately a drive, by which I mean, a kind of emotion, not some undisputed fact. It isn't any more or any less reality automatically, but the properties of conviction by reason are particular in some sense, as every emotion has particular qualities, whose relevance is instinctively conveyed to the subject. When I argue with you, I am not being impartial. But I don't mean, merely because of my conviction in my assertions, but more so through my sense of justification by reason and experience. I believe in my methodology. But my methodology (of being reasonable, critical, objective, argumentative, etc.) is not rooted in immutable reality without right of objection. Reason has particular qualities that make it a commendable feeling to have, because I feel it to be. But, ironically, reason is also critically interested in all feelings, because they are its only subject in application. And, somewhat ironically, thinking doubts feeling, for a good reason. Thinking doubts thinking, for a good reason.You hinted at it yourself: truth is in what you think, then to ask of a feeling about the same thing, implies the truth is not in that. — Mww
But sensibility and reason are a variety of persuasion. Are you not persuaded to trust them? I think that it would be mistake to assume that people should treat all of their persuasions the same. And it will be mistake to oppose different kinds of persuasions to each other. We trust our senses, we trust our reason, and we trust even our instinct in general. We don't use our senses, reason, and general instinct in the same way. We relate them to each other, and they complement each other. The end product, however, is still a persuasion. The question is, not whether we should follow our innate convictions, and not even which innate convictions we should follow, but how do innate convictions relate to each other best, in our experience, and how we best relate them between us, in discourse.Post-modern convention says that may be the case. I agree, speaking from my well-worn armchair, that knowledge, and here we’re talking empirical knowledge, the kind with which #246 concerns itself, is a relative conviction, but not a feeling of being convinced. That condition reduces to mere persuasion, and we not persuaded to knowledge, but convinced upon arriving at it. But with respect to what you’re asking here, I would deny that empirical knowledge follows from virtue, which makes conveyance sans justification moot. A set of virtues conveyed without need of justification, is called interest. At the same time, I would affirm that knowledge is by definition already as good as possible iff knowledge is taken to mean certainty under the preconceived criteria from which it arises. But not necessarily so, insofar as there may be no preconceived criteria, re: experience, in the event of new knowledge. — Mww
My point is... an opinion is never merely held. It is held by someone having personal investment in it. Reason is a personal investment. Sensory experience is a personal investment. Being a spoiled child, being in need of ice cream, is still a personal investment. We can relate between the virtues of our personal investments, because they are compelled to relate naturally (not necessarily unambiguously). We can relate between each other our personal investments, as best as we can. There is nothing more to do. We arrive at more investments as we experience life. That is what I meant by instinct. Something that is triggered automatically by involvement, not so much the biological term of being innate at birth.Your comment is commendable, anthropology aside that is, but epistemically I’d take issue with....
.....one doesn’t irrationally believe a conviction, but rather, a persuasion, which reduces to merely holding with an opinion;
.....instinct doesn’t make itself available from experience, but from lack of it, manifest in sheer accident or pure reflex, or congruent circumstances wherein reason is otherwise supervened. — Mww
And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. "I have a pain in my hand" is not like "I have an iPhone in my hand"; it is more like "Ouch!" — Banno
Then he asks of our use of "the language which describes my inner experience" (§256), — Banno
If one were to treat of a private, subjective world, it seems one may not be able to name items therein. — Banno
But I will continue to reject any primacy that might be given to supposedly private sensations, such that they form the basis for inter-subjectivity. Such an account is arse-about; we start with what is public, not with what might be private. — Banno
Such an account is arse-about; we start with what is public, not with what might be private. — Banno
Sensation itself does not prompt reaction. Reason itself does not prompt conclusions. We infer and react. — simeonz
But sensibility and reason are a variety of persuasion. Are you not persuaded to trust them? — simeonz
I think that it would be mistake to assume that people should treat all of their persuasions the same. — simeonz
We trust our senses, we trust our reason, and we trust even our instinct in general. We don't use our senses, reason, and general instinct in the same way. We relate them to each other, and they complement each other. The end product, however, is still a persuasion. — simeonz
an opinion is never merely held. It is held by someone having personal investment in it. Reason is a personal investment. Sensory experience is a personal investment. — simeonz
And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. — Banno
"...that by which each human knows them..."? You continue in the belief that there is a meaning for each word, to be found in one's private subconscious.The objects named by words are not private to a subjective world, but that by which each individual human knows them, most certainly is. — Mww
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