I'll read the essay later if you don't mind but for a start,

Seeing virtue in the suffering of the victim of cruelty becomes for Shklar an escape from misanthropy. — Banno

bears a striking resemblance to theodicy. In both cases some of us would rather say no to the obvious conclusion from evil/cruelty in the world and opt for saving the phenomena i.e maintain the integrity of the belief that god/people are good.

I suppose there's more going on in such an attitude, psychologically speaking, than people know or care to admit. Clearly it ain't something a reasonable person in faer right mind would think.

Interesting read, thanks.

I'm not sure what to make of it yet. It's seems a plausible psychological account for what "putting cruelty first" would entail, at face value.

What is interesting to me though is the idea that cruelty has to be a vice, and born out of vice... out of psychological deformities. Because in Montaignes world it's not only the zealot that is cruel, everybody is cruel... it's just that it is especially damning for Christianity because it is considered a vice there too. Hence the misanthropy.

If everybody is cruel, wouldn't that entail, given the idea that cruelty is a vice, that everybody is psychologically deformed. What then would be the cause of that deformity?

Culture could be one answer, but that seems like a difficult case to make considering that the culture was Christian and Christianity considers cruelty a vice. So it seems rather that culture is unsuccessful in rooting out something that is already there. Or maybe you would have to invoke some other opposing cultural influence as the cause, or maybe Christianity having a particularly inverse effect here?

But if not culture, then that would mean that we are cruel naturally, which would mean that we are psychologically deformed naturally. This seems problematic too, by itself. And while maybe you could make an argument for this, it would presumably have to entail some kind of supra-natural standard, from which you can evaluate that nature?

So while I definitely have the same intuition as Montaigne, I'm not sure how you would argue the point from a psychological descriptive point of view, not in the least because a certain Moustache, I will not invoke his name, gives a psychological account for cruelty at base precisely not being born out of deformity.

Placing cruelty first, the most evil of all evils, is incompatible with the faith of the zealot. — Banno

That. Or it means you were pretty darn sure you'd succeed... wouldn't want to be caught on the opposing end of that dynamic. However, seeing as history is written by the winners anyway, the most virtuous could be caught up in said dynamic regardless of their virtue or cruelty.. as some people like to attest.. "damned if you do, damned if you don't."

Besides, what is cruelty, really? Allowing a child to grow up in a broken home, more or less alone? Perhaps. Though, if said caregiver knew they wouldn't be around to raise them, an argument can be made that provided the child ended up growing up with "grit and gristle", able to fend for themselves before adulthood, and able to withstand the torrents of pain, despair, and loneliness without losing hope or at the very least purpose.. compared to babying someone who in this world truly has no such luxury and would find this out in due time... assuming both facts are known, what act would really have been the most cruel?

I had a dog once. Truly a great friend who got me through many a rough patch in my adolescence. As I got older, life got hectic, things got crazy. One day while I was busy working at home, I noticed he seemed to have been in the same spot for several hours. When I came up to him I noticed as he attempted to rise to greet me, his back legs buckled and could not support him. I was unsure as what to do. Veterinarian surgery was not an option at the time, and the consensus was it was probably time to put him to sleep. I had a gun, and could have asked the vet to do it humanely. Both possibilities anguished me. I waited for some time, purchasing a few items to allow him to walk around more or less the same. He survived for a decent amount of time after. But was he happy? It's a question I don't particularly care to ponder.

I just skimmed through the article and so I'm uncertain whether Shklar touched upon the point I feel is pertinent to her taking an exception to putting cruelty first. Hell, if memory serves, in its current incarnation as a place of eternal torture is the handiwork of religions; before religions hell was simply a world for the souls of dead people whether good or bad. Cruelty, in the form of hell, enjoys the support of nearly all existing faiths and if so what's implied is cruelty, as odd as it sounds, can't be a sin let alone first among sins for even the all-good creator permits and even commands it (in hell).

Besides, what is cruelty, really? — Outlander

"It was simply a matter of exposing the triviality of the excuses offered for the enormous harms inflicted on primitive peoples."

The article can certainly be read as a critique of Nietzsche.

Shklar's great knowledge of the Enlightenment contrasts Machiavelli to Montaigne and Montesquieu. — Banno

How would Machiavelli know about Enlightenment? For a philosopher who built her career in Post-WW2 American academics in one of the most famous Ivy League Universities, it's obviously a more easier task.

Basically, Machiavelli wrote The Prince for basically a ruling Mafioso.

So what kind of instructions and guidelines would Pablo Escobar or the current leaders of the Mexican drug cartels value in their reality in which they live? Would Shklar be useful to them for practical guidelines in their day-to-day work? Both Pablo and Judith lived in the same time, so it would have been theoretically possible.

Basically my point here is that we never should take a philosopher out of his time, place and context when we look at what he says. Or at least the author should remind the reader that when and where a philosopher lived and how different were those circumstances. In fact when the circumstances are noted, then truly revolutionary or groundbreaking thinking can be found. Machiavelli or Hobbes come to mind when people compare them to later philosophers, but whenever Machiavelli is referred to I come a bit critical. Niccolo is a low bar in my view to paint as the bad guy and to take an intellectual whack at him.

(And anyway, a good politician should never admit reading or even knowing anything about Machiavelli. It's such an obvious and typical way to attack and smear someone as being Machiavellian.)

She contrast Machiavelli to Montaigne, who were not that far apart, and to Montesquieu who live a bit later, but there she does make note of differences in cultural contexts.

Also, it's not about painting Machiavelli a bad guy in some kind of moralistic sense, read the article and you'll see, it's not that long.

There has been in recent years a considerable literature on Machiavelli, most of
it admiring his most ‘realistic’ pages. I have tried to present the views of those
who rejected him, not because they were moved by religious or moral illusions,
but because they were more realistic, had read Plato’s remarks about dirty hands
more carefully, and were more honest.

More honest, more realistic, when there has been in "recent years a considerable literature on Machiavelli, most of it admiring his most ‘realistic’ pages". :brow:

I think that still Judith is hitting Niccolo...or others of saying something positive about him.

Yes, I think that quote is in line with what I said, usually Machiavelli is dismissed because of some moral evaluation, he is bad/immoral because of this and that. But that is usually not all that convincing because he is not really making normative claims, he sticks to a-moral description and prediction. She tries to make an argument on his terms, i.e that his description and the conclusions he draws from them are not really realistic... if she succeeds is another matter, but it's at least an argument that is aimed at the right place.

In The Liberalism of Fear, Shklar posits the following definition of liberalism:

Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without fear or favour about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every other adult.

It's an excellent definition of liberalism. For my part I might replace "freedom" with "welfare", but the basic theme seems undeniable, given basic rational concerns of coherence and consistency.

Liberalisms foundation is, for Shklar, to be found in the abhorrence of cruelty:

..the deliberate infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group by stronger ones in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible, of the latter.

It is contrasted with the Kantian liberalism of conscience, the (US) Constitutional liberalism of Rights, the Liberalism of self-expression, which last I might compare with the capabilities approach of Nussbaum.

The liberalism of fear is not bound to theism, nor to atheism. It is not bound to scepticism, nor is it in essence scientific. But each of these is a fellow-traveler. It stands against class distinctions.

The liberalism of fear might better have been called the liberalism of valour.

(A better PDF would be advantageous...?)

Haven't read the two articles yet, just glossed over a few paragraphs.

Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without fear or favor about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every other adult. [...] Apart from prohibiting interference with the freedom of others, liberalism does not have any particular positive doctrines about how people are to conduct their lives or what personal choices they are to make. — The Liberalism of Fear by Judith N Shklar

Just FYI, there is some history to this take on liberalism/liberty/freedom. Elements can be found in the Cortes of León (1188), the Codex Holmiensis (1241), ..., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), this one in particular (which Thomas Jefferson aided in putting together):

Article IV – Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the fruition of these same rights. These borders can be determined only by the law. — Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789

The French Revolution was nasty business, but they did seem to flesh some things out well for the future — only equal freedom in principle limits individual freedom.

Embedding morals in political codes doesn't seem easy, but restricting freedom to non-cruelty is certainly intuitive. Looking forward to actually reading the articles. (y) :)

Thanks for the read.

“Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without fear or favour about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with the like freedom of every other adult.”

It's an excellent definition of liberalism. For my part I might replace "freedom" with "welfare", but the basic theme seems undeniable, given basic rational concerns of coherence and consistency.

I’m curious why you would replace “freedom” with “welfare” when the root word of “liberalism” suggests one but not the other. It seems to me that limiting one’s freedom to only that which is compatible with the like welfare of others is not liberalism, perhaps something more like “welfarism”.

A certain level of well-being is required in order to to enjoy autonomy. We are all slaves to our basic needs. Where there is no security, there is no freedom. This understanding was gained from labor struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries.

It may appear that masters of capital are free, but they aren't in the sense that was important to Abraham Lincoln. He saw freedom as the recognition that one is not defined by the role one is playing in the world. True freedom is demonstrated by social mobility. When a society stratifies, everyone becomes locked into their roles. Lincoln would say that when people get used to having someone else do their work for them, they lose sight of the meaning of freedom.

Lack of access to food, education, and employment opportunities doesn't just rob people of well-being. It robs them of social mobility. It robs them of freedom.

Oh, I'm not advocating liberalism. Indeed my reading these articles is in part my seeking to delineate that separation. The capabilities approach, comparable to the liberty of self-expression, appeals more. Folk group together in order to achieve more, both for themselves and for others.

Cruelty is denying someone that of which they are capable. It's not enough to fear cruelty. We can do the opposite to being cruel, by building on folk's capabilities.

It is true that a certain level of well-being is required to enjoy autonomy, and there is a strong moral argument that we should care for the well-being of others. I also agree that one must secure his freedom, with force if necessary.

But these to me are moral considerations, best left to the decisions of free people. Just as people such as yourself should have the freedom to act on your moral beliefs, others should have the freedom to do otherwise, and for the same reason.

Thanks for the clarification.

I would say liberalism allows such an approach, though, to the point of it becoming institutionalized or even generally accepted.

yo TPF persona non grata dude - are you into dictators?

No. Are you?

nah. You don't think trump had designs on that path? (Wrong thread I know)

I do not, no, and his presidency has proven that to be the case.

and the end of his presidency proved it to be the case.

usually Machiavelli is dismissed because of some moral evaluation, he is bad/immoral because of this and that. But that is usually not all that convincing because he is not really making normative claims, he sticks to a-moral description and prediction. She tries to make an argument on his terms, i.e that his description and the conclusions he draws from them are not really realistic... if she succeeds is another matter, but it's at least an argument that is aimed at the right place. — ChatteringMonkey

We simply shouldn't forget that even ages ago people understood to whom you are talking defines the message.

It's not just that Machiavelli isn't making normative claims, it's to whom he is talking. And so is with Montaigne, a politician of his era. I just reason that someone that says " it was more efficient for a self-made ruler to govern cruelly or leniently, and had decided that, on the whole, cruelty worked best." simply isn't talking to the greater public or making a portrayal of himself.

Montaigne published his Essay to record "some traits of my character and of my humours." Or the way the net puts it:

Montaigne's stated goal in his book is to describe himself with utter frankness and honesty ("bonne foi"). The insight into human nature provided by his essays, for which they are so widely read, is merely a by-product of his introspection. Though the implications of his essays were profound and far-reaching, he did not intend or suspect that his work would garner much attention outside of his inner circle, prefacing his essays with, "I am myself the matter of this book; you would be unreasonable to suspend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a subject."

It's obvious when someone is basically cleaning his image, he would say as Shklar referred "that
the sight of cruelty instantly filled him with revulsion." Montaigne lived during the brutal Wars of Religion in France and being a politician during that time, a courtier of Charles IX among other jobs, a king that allowed the cruel massacre of St Bartholomew's Day, is the era that affected Montaigne's experiences. Montaigne, it should be noted, tried to be a moderator between Catholics and Protestants. But his essay wasn't written as advice to Charles IX or his successor.

If everybody is cruel, wouldn't that entail, given the idea that cruelty is a vice, that everybody is psychologically deformed. What then would be the cause of that deformity? — ChatteringMonkey

if everyone is psychologically deformed, would that not suggest, rather than a deformation, everyone has a certain , unappealing, aspect or proclivity to cruelty? How is it a deformity if it is universal?

It's an excellent definition of liberalism. For my part I might replace "freedom" with "welfare", but the basic theme seems undeniable, given basic rational concerns of coherence and consistency. — Banno

Yet doesn't Shklar also note in "Liberalism of Fear" that:

No form of liberalism has any business telling the citizenry to pursue happiness or even to define that wholly elusive condition

Because replacing freedom with "welfare" seems quite a specific agenda, if telling to pursue happiness is something that Shklar rejects as unwanted interference from the powers at be.

It is true that a certain level of well-being is required to enjoy autonomy, — NOS4A2

Yep. So a free society takes measures to secure the basic well-being of it's citizens.

But these to me are moral considerations, best left to the decisions of free people — NOS4A2

We won't have free people unless we look after well-being. This isn't a moralistic insight.

The late Judith Shklar begins by showing how Montaigne and Montesquieu, although there are subtle differences between the two, are of the view that cruelty is universal as a practice, transcending all boundaries that carve people up into different camps whatever these may be based on.

It's probably the case that Shklar herself was neither the first nor the last to discuss cruelty but what I find intriguing is how she focuses not on cruelty itself but on its ranking among evils. That's a fresh point of view on the issue as far as I'm concerned.

Why should cruelty occupy the top slot among evils? or, of more significance, what are the consequences of treating cruelty as summum malum?

If cruelty is the worst form of evil, we must give up the cherished idea that we're better than and must come to terms with the bitter truth that we're, in fact, the worst of the lot. Just as I suspected.

Furthermore, according to Shklar we're in the unenviable position of being torn between private and public life and I'm only guessing here but she thought the latter,as a public figure, puts us in situations that may force us to act with cruelty even though as an individual, as a private person, one may have a touch of reservation behaving that way. From this point on I suggest you fill in the gaps...

Yep. So a free society takes measures to secure the basic well-being of it's citizens.

I disagree. Kind, paternalistic people such as yourself should secure the basic well-being of your fellow citizens and have the freedom to do so. Some will even desire your help. Others will prefer to pass on that, or otherwise refuse when someone wishes to tinker with the conditions of their well-being.

We won't have free people unless we look after well-being. This isn't a moralistic insight.

I completely disagree.

Do you support laws against child labor?

Not really.