2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist. — Aaron R

It seems possible to be directed towards an end that does not exist. Firemen heading towards a non-existent fire for example.

3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind. — Aaron R

I have the goal of keeping safe and that goal most definitely exists in my mind.

Also, he has missed the possibility that ends exist in material minds (of finite creatures). No need for an infinite mind at all...

1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends.
2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.
3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.
5. This infinite mind we call "God". — Aaron R

What is the proof of 1)?
2) If? 2) is ordinary syntax, but in fact is a real tangle, a knot that needs to be untied. What, exactly, does it mean to say,"directed towards ends"? When that's dealt with you can take on "exist."
3) Who says? See 1)
4) False alternative.
5) Hmm.

What is not generally grasped is that all of these "proofs of God" are neither real proofs nor intended to be. Both writer and intended audience already accepted God as an absolute presupposition of their understandings and beliefs. The arguments are just reasonings based on what was already accepted.

Also, thinking about God is no simple subject. In fact it is thinking about thinking about an idea labeled "God." People who may claim that it is simple are not talking about thinking, so much as monumentalizing their beliefs in some structure that pleases them.

The important part of the "proof" above is the "infinite mind." Early Christian thinkers were clear that what ever God might be, He is unconceivable. Which in a way is to show that existence is indemonstrable. It's best and certainly wisest with Thomas and others to understand what in fact they were about, and not what you or I might ignorantly suppose they were about.

1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends. — Aaron R

I think we need to get a good understanding of what is meant by this. It is only to the extent that anything, (animate or inanimate), is engaged in activity, that it can be said to be directed towards an end. It is by the fact that it is active, that a thing becomes a means to an end. We might say that it has a function, it acts for a purpose. So I think we need to keep in mind when discussing the fifth way, as expressed in the op, that we are talking about the activities of things. Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end.

Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed. This is my interpretation of what Aquinas is claiming.

What is the proof of 1)? — tim wood

I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends.

What exactly, does it mean to say,"directed towards ends"? — tim wood

I believe that being “directed toward an end” means something like “tends to do some things rather than others with consistent regularity”. The “ends” refer to those “things” or “outcomes” that the inanimate object’s behavior tend toward.

3) Who says? — tim wood

I think Aquinas would argue that the ends of inanimate objects don’t exist in material nature because this would require those ends to exist in the future. This was a common criticism of Aristotle’s account of final causality with respect to inanimate objects.

Likewise, they couldn’t exist in human or animal minds because that would require that the outcome of every instance of physical causation within the universe exist in some human or animal mind, which Aquinas thinks is absurd.

4) False alternative. — tim wood

What is the other alternative?

It seems possible to be directed towards an end that does not exist. Firemen heading towards a non-existent fire for example. — Devans99

I think Aquinas would reply the in the case of firemen heading towards a non-existent fire, the content of their belief in the existence of the fire provides the end toward which their behavior is directed. But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality.

I have the goal of keeping safe and that goal most definitely exists in my mind. — Devans99

Yes. Aquinas would not deny that. But I think he would say that in the case of arbitrary physical events involving inanimate objects occurring at remote locations throughout the universe, you (or any other finite being) certainly don’t have their ends in your mind. That claim seems absurd.

Also, he has missed the possibility that ends exist in material minds (of finite creatures). No need for an infinite mind at all... — Devans99

Yes. But again, I think this is why Aquinas was focused specifically on inanimate things. His claim is that their behavior has ends as well, and it seems absurd to say that all of those ends exist in the minds of animals and humans as noted above.

@Aaron R

I was writing other points, but I can't get the past the fact that I don't understand how "ends" is being used in premise #1

Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end. — Metaphysician Undercover

(MU I quoted you to help with my question to Aaron R - I am happy for you to clarify when I am wrong, but I don't think I am asking you anything directly)

This paragraph helped a little (thanks MU), but all I can do is substitute "purpose" or "goal" for "end", and that doesn't seem like the intended meaning?

In the phrase, "the ends justify the means", "ends" would mean results (I think). But from a philosophical/divine/universal perspective it seems impossible to draw a line and say something resulted or ended (when does a child become an adult?). We can create definitions to define ends that exist in our temporal reality (all I mean by that is humans live for 100 years +/-). In that time, the sun is the sun (or a taco is a taco). But in billions of years the sun will have changed into something else.

So I guess I can agree with this portion of premise #1:

All inanimate things are directed — Aaron R

but I would just finish the sentence with "by the 4 fundamental forces (and possibly more/less as our understanding is incomplete)"

I struggle to see a goal, purpose, or even end results (do we call our current reality "results {ends}" or just more "transition"?). My understanding of Philosophical jargon is limited at best, so perhaps there is another potential meaning. Or, maybe I am overly hung-up on semantics like every other time I have posted here :grimace:

I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends. — Aaron R

How is this statement more true than "if inanimate things DID act toward ends, then we would observe pure chaos. But we don't, so things must NOT act toward ends." I have always found logical proofs to be cumbersome and incomplete, so I am happy to learn why I cheated and you did not :grin:

I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends. — Aaron R

So Thomas buys into the notion of universal natural law, a proposition that sounds simple, but in fact is not at all simple, as it takes in Greek conceptions of nature and begins to try to solve certain problems that the Greeks could not. And which conception of universal natural law is in fact part of what he meant by "God." God for him being in part a personification of the idea of universal natural law.

And there's the question of, if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. Why not just action in accord with being? Do you begin to discern the presuppositions of Thomas's argument?

I believe that being “directed toward an end” means something like “tends to do some things rather than others with consistent regularity”. The “ends” refer to those “things” or “outcomes” that the inanimate object’s behavior tend toward. — Aaron R

Let's channel Obi-wan Kenobe. "There is no try. You do, or you do not." What makes you think there is any "tendency"? A rock simply is, unless something comes along and changes it. It itself doesn't tend toward anything; it's not involved with outcomes.

I think Aquinas would argue that the ends of inanimate objects don’t exist in material nature because this would require those ends to exist in the future. This was a common criticism of Aristotle’s account of final causality with respect to inanimate objects.

Likewise, they couldn’t exist in human or animal minds because that would require that the outcome of every instance of physical causation within the universe exist in some human or animal mind, which Aquinas thinks is absurd. — Aaron R

So Thomas invoked God, problems solved. There's nothing wrong with this. The error arises when other people who do not understand the nature and function of presuppositions suppose them to be true and a matter of fact, when no one claims that they are - except those same people making the mistake.

4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind. — Aaron R

False alternative. The other alternative is that they do not exist. And with 5) he is not identifying God, but rather suggesting that an answer to a problem he has in giving an account and having that account make any of the sense he would like it to make, is achieved by invoking an unconceivable concept that he will just call "God."

Arguing this is a path to nowhere, because at the outset is a profound non-understanding of the function of the argument. Thomas is in effect preaching to the choir. You're questioning his basic assumptions. Perfectly ok if you're challenging his thinking in your terms, but fatal to your understanding of his thinking on his terms.

1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends. — Aaron R

False.

2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.

False.

3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.

False.

4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.

False.

At least without arguing towards any of those better, defining the terms better, etc.

There are two levels on which we might apply reason here.

One would be to apply a logical analysis to the points presented.

Another would be to stand back from the points presented and ask whether it's logical to present them.

This paragraph helped a little (thanks MU), but all I can do is substitute "purpose" or "goal" for "end", and that doesn't seem like the intended meaning? — ZhouBoTong

I agree, "purpose", and "goal' are reasonably synonymous with "end". I don't think I'd agree with Aaron in the following quote, because I think Aquinas believed that the reason why we need to assume God, outlined in the fifth way, is because inanimate things are directed by intention toward their ends.

But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality. — Aaron R

In the phrase, "the ends justify the means", "ends" would mean results (I think). — ZhouBoTong

You ought to be careful here because the end really is the goal, the intention, and the results are not necessarily consistent with the intention. That's why good intentions sometimes have bad results, especially in the case of mistake.

You ought to be careful here because the end really is the goal, the intention, and the results are not necessarily consistent with the intention. That's why good intentions sometimes have bad results, especially in the case of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I am fine with this. I was just testing every potential meaning of ends. If we say ends are goals or purposes then I am fairly comfortable saying I have seen zero evidence that "all inanimate objects are directed toward ends" (or even a reason to begin making the assumption).

if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. — tim wood

I agree with this line of thinking.

If we say ends are goals or purposes then I am fairly comfortable saying I have seen zero evidence that "all inanimate objects are directed toward ends" (or even a reason to begin making the assumption). — ZhouBoTong

I think the argument would be something like this. If inanimate things behave in an orderly way (a way describable by laws of physics for example), then they must have been ordered to behave in such a way. If inanimate things have been ordered to behave in a particular way, then they must have been ordered with intent, towards some end.

Ends can exist in finite minds. I don't see why he has said they don't, nor do I follow to the same conclusion of there being an "infinite mind" from the given premises. Every cause has an effect, to this I agree, but I don't see how that can be used as a valid premise to reach a sound conclusion that God exists.

In any case I appreciate this post because it familiarizes me with an argument for God's existence I wasn't familiar with. Anselms ontological argument is much harder to refute or shoo away, but that's not part of the discussion at hand.

I think the argument would be something like this. If inanimate things behave in an orderly way (a way describable by laws of physics for example), then they must have been ordered to behave in such a way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't get it. Why does that "then" follow from the "if"? The same laws of physics that suggest order would also be the cause of that order.

If inanimate things have been ordered to behave in a particular way, then they must have been ordered with intent, towards some end. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought plenty of experiments have been done that show ("show" may be too strong, but certainly "suggest") that order can emerge from chaos (absent intent or interference of any kind - obviously QM might say just observing is interfering). Why does order require intent?

Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention?

I am not sure if you entirely buy Aquinas' argument, but I appreciate your attempt to explain it to me either way :smile: .

An apple tree would still produce apples in the absence of humans. It does so due to its nature. It is naturally inclined to do so. But, according to Thomas, it is God's providence that is responsible for the nature of finite (or created) things. — Πετροκότσυφας

I appreciate the explanation and it was making sense until there is a massive leap from "humans can't be responsible for trees bearing fruit" to "so it must be God". You mention a potential objection, but why do I need one? There is zero logic or evidence pointing toward that conclusion (My beef is with Aquinas, not you, I always appreciate people providing two sides to an argument). There is logic and evidence suggesting people are not responsible for trees making fruit, but that no more suggests a god than aliens, fairies, magic, talking rabbits, computers, or the craziest of all, the laws of physics.

I don't get it. Why does that "then" follow from the "if"? The same laws of physics that suggest order would also be the cause of that order. — ZhouBoTong

Laws of physics are the way we describe order, they are not the cause of that order. The idea is that if there is order, which we can describe with laws, then there must be a cause of that order.

I thought plenty of experiments have been done that show ("show" may be too strong, but certainly "suggest") that order can emerge from chaos (absent intent or interference of any kind - obviously QM might say just observing is interfering). Why does order require intent? — ZhouBoTong

There is logic which shows that order cannot emerge from chaos. it's basically the cosmological argument. If there ever was a time without actual existence (actual existence being an intelligible order), at that time there would only be the potential for actual existence. But a potential requires an actuality to be actualized, it cannot actualize itself. So if there was ever only the potential for actual existence, there would always only be the potential for actual existence. However, we observe now, that there is actual existence, therefore there was never only the potential for actual existence without any actuality. I've heard of people suggest that order could emerge from chaos, but it doesn't make any sense to me, and I don't see how one could set up such an experiment, because such a set up would be an actual order.

Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong

I think you get the point here. No reality can be conceived of which does not include some type of order. Therefore the idea that order can emerge from chaos is unrealistic. The question of why intention is assumed is much more complex. A physical object is an orderly, or ordered existence, it is something apprehensible, intelligible. We notice that physical objects have a beginning in time, they come into existence, and are necessarily caused (actualized as explained above). We conclude by inductive reasoning that all physical objects have a beginning, and are caused. By the principle of plenitude, and the temporal nature of "cause", there must be a time before any physical object. Therefore there must be a non-physical cause of physical existence. We also notice that intention is the cause of existence of many physical objects. And, intention is non-physical. Since intention is a non-physical cause of physical objects, and no one has demonstrated any other type of non-physical cause of physical objects, we assume that intention is the only non-physical cause of physical objects.

I am not sure if you entirely buy Aquinas' argument, but I appreciate your attempt to explain it to me either way — ZhouBoTong

What I think is that there is a hole in our understanding of the non-physical. We know that the non-physical is very real in two distinct ways, one being in human thought and intention, the other being as required to account for the cause of physical existence. The hole in understanding is the relationship between these two, and this is where God has been posited to fill that gap.

Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong

Hi ZhouBoTong, I realize this question was directed at Metaphysician Undiscovered, but I'll jump in as well to see if I can help clarify.

To say that things are directed to ends is not to say that are driven by a goal or a purpose, but that they are directed to certain outcomes. A simple example would be that a match, when struck against an appropriate surface, will tend to light on fire, rather than freeze. This will happen pretty much without fail unless hampered by some other condition.

Chaos is, by stipulation, the absence of order, so, no, it is not just another type of order. It may be the case that pure chaos is unimaginable, but I'm not sure I'd agree that it's inconceivable.

In any event, the reason why the mind of God is invoked is because these "ends" or "outcomes" are understood by Aquinas to be the final causes of inanimate objects, and in order for something to act as a cause it must exist with respect whatever it affects.

For Aquinas, these cannot exist in material nature because then they would have to exist in the future, which is, according to him, absurd (Aquinas is a presentist). They can't exist in the finite minds of creatures of any kind (material or immaterial), because that would imply that all the outcomes of events taking place across the entire universe somehow exist in the minds of finite creatures, which seems implausible. So they must exist in some other mind that is vast enough to conceive of the (potentially infinite) number of causal outcomes within the entire universe.

End-directedness needs some kind of intelligence, — Πετροκότσυφας

The idea is that if there is order, which we can describe with laws, then there must be a cause of that order. — Metaphysician Undercover

these "ends" or "outcomes" are understood by Aquinas to be the final causes of inanimate objects — Aaron R

Thank you all for the explanations. I was about to go through my usual delve into semantics and make sure we are all using "order" or "chaos" in the same way. But instead, I just put one line from each of you to highlight what I see as irreconcilable differences.

Your positions seem well -thought out and at least mostly logical/rational, but you have accepted certain "truths" that I can only see as possibilities at best. I am far from convinced I am right, but I cannot see the certitude of your positions - I apologize lumping you all together, I know there were subtle and not so subtle {are "ends" goals or results?} differences in your positions...but I think they are all closer to each other than anything I am suggesting.

Thanks again, I look forward to disagreeing with you all on future threads, and even more so to those rare times when we will all agree :grin:

Things are directed to certain outcomes, precisely because they're driven by a goal, which is (i.e. the goal) characteristic of intelligence. — Πετροκότσυφας

The inanimate thing is not driven toward a goal, by desire, spirit, or ambition within it, as human beings are, It is "directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence".

Things are driven to certain outcomes. That's the significance of intelligence and knowledge here. It has intentions, it can set goals and these goals act as causes. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't thing this is correct. Inanimate things are not "driven" in the sense of setting their own goals, or having their own intentions, they are "directed" by the Will of God.

But instead, I just put one line from each of you to highlight what I see as irreconcilable differences. — ZhouBoTong

I don't see how these differences are irreconcilable. I said there is order, and there must be a cause of order. Aaron says the "end", which is the final cause, the goal, desired outcome, or intention, is that very cause. The one whose name I don't know how to pronounce, says that intelligence is required for end-directedness (intention). Each statement seems consistent with the others, but whether or not they are true, or acceptable to you, is another issue.

The way you expressed it makes it seem as if these outcomes just come about. Which, in turn, make it seem as If Thomas believes that order could be a product of chance. But I think that the words that I've put in bold leave little doubt that outcomes don't just come about, they are achieved. — Πετροκότσυφας

I agree with you. The reason I expressed it as I did was to clarify the fact that these outcomes are not understood by Thomas to be the purposes or goals of the inanimate thing itself. You are right to say that Thomas thinks there must be something that pushes inanimate things toward some ends rather than others, and that this something cannot be chance. Nor could it be anything in material nature, nor could it be something in the minds of finite creatures.

God — Πετροκότσυφας

Define this term, please.

And there's the question of, if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. Why not just action in accord with being? Do you begin to discern the presuppositions of Thomas's argument? — tim wood

How is "action in accord with being" different from what Thomas is claiming?

What makes you think there is any "tendency"? A rock simply is, unless something comes along and changes it. It itself doesn't tend toward anything; it's not involved with outcomes. — tim wood

In one sense, it's true that a rock simply is, but a rock is also always changing. This is because it is subject to a constant bombardment from wind, sand, heat, water and other agents of erosion. Generally speaking, rocks don't spontaneously explode, or burst into flames, or melt into puddles, or grow into acorn trees when subjected to these agents. Instead, the rock slowly, but surely, erodes. That is the outcome toward which it is directed through the action of the various efficient causes that bombard it.

The other alternative is that they do not exist. — tim wood

But, Aquinas will argue, if they didn't exist, then regularity would not be possible, and we should expect to experience pure chaos (or, really, to not exist at all). But we don't experience pure chaos, and we do exist. Therefore, ends must exist.

I don't see how these differences are irreconcilable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oops. My fault, I was not clear. You are right, there are NOT irreconcilable differences between those 3 statements. I was using each as containing some aspect that I fundamentally disagree with (or at least fundamentally cannot agree with). And as each is more logic based than evidence based, I feel it is going to be very difficult to convince me, because if I also found those statements entirely logical (rational? correct? not sure the exact meaning I am going for), then we would have no disagreement.

I didn't say they are. — Πετροκότσυφας

Sorry, my mistake then. I interpreted "driven", as an internal force, a drive like inspiration, spirit, or ambition, which causes one to go in this way or that, and I interpreted "directed" as an external force which causes something to go this way or that. Do you not distinguish between these two?

I take him to hold that things act according to their own nature (the internal force), which, in turn, is dictated by God (the external force). — Πετροκότσυφας

I see this as contradiction under Aquinas' principles. God, and a thing's own nature are two distinct things. Either the thing acts as it does due to its own nature, or the thing acts as it does due to the will of God. Aquinas is not pantheist, so we need to maintain a separation between the thing with its behaviour, and God as the cause of its behaviour. If the thing acts toward an end, as directed by God, then we cannot say that it is acting according to its own nature, because it is acting according to the will of God, which is distinct from its own nature.

1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends.
2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.
3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.
5. This infinite mind we call "God". — Aaron R

I notice the other responses mostly focus on points # 1 - #3 of your condensation, Aaron.

My problem with the matter has to do with #4 and #5. I take issue with those last two points in all five of Aquinas' Five "proofs."

His "therefore" is gratuitous...not the result of logic.

#4 & #5 can just as logically be stated:

Therefore they must exist in some other way...and that "some other way" we call "some other way."

To call the some other way" "god" is purely gratuitous.

He might just as well have written, "God exists"...and left out all the other stuff.

Aquinas wanted to arrive at the necessity of a god. His proofs were motivated by that...and he essentially wrote a C...and then invented rather elaborate, self-serving P1 and P2 to (sorta) arrive there.

Doesn't work.

Fact is, most of the work done to support the notion of a god...or prime mover...

...can be more logically resolved into: I do not know!

Yeah. But, no. Nowhere did I say that a thing's own nature and God are the same thing nor that Aquinas is a pantheist. And, I'm fairly confident that, it is you who thinks that if a thing acts toward an end, as directed by God, then it can't be said that it is acting according to its own nature. Aquinas, as far as I'm concerned, thinks and says that it can. Examples: — Πετροκότσυφας

From your quoted passages, would you agree, that according to Aquinas, a thing's activity is according to its nature, and its nature is its form, and this is given to it by God?

What is at issue though, is the thing's end, and it is stated that the thing does not set its end, God sets the thing's end. So what I am arguing is that since the end is a cause, in the sense of final cause, then the cause of the thing's actions are God. If you say that the thing's own nature is the cause of its activities, then the thing's nature must be something separate from the thing, existing in the mind of God.

Aaron:"For Aquinas, these cannot exist in material nature because then they would have to exist in the future, which is, according to him, absurd (Aquinas is a presentist)."

Aaron, do you know where in the corpus does Aquinas:
1. argue against backwards causality
2. argue that the final cause or end "must exist in some way" before the agent begins its operation?

Many Thomist commentators make this argument, but so far I have not found it explicit in the works of Aquinas himself. It may be implicit, or a later "repair" or expansion of his arguments from governance, but is it explicit in his work?

Aquinas wrote: By their nature they are determined to one result... act according to the mode of their nature. Etc. — Πετροκότσυφας

I am questioning the consistency of what Aquinas wrote in your quoted passages. When things like human beings act towards their own ends, they freely choose their ends. This is why their actions may be good or bad relative to God's Will. We have free will, which means we choose our ends. If an inanimate thing is determined by God to act toward God's end, then there is no freedom of choice, and the thing is not acting according to its own end, it is acting toward God's end.

So the issue is what is meant by a thing's "nature". In the quoted passage, it is said that "by their nature they [things] are determined to one result". But there is no "end" within the thing's nature, because the thing does not freely choose ends, there is only an "end" in relation to God, the thing acts for God's end. God gives the thing its "nature", in order that the thing may be directed to His end.

This creates a separation between the thing's "end", and the thing's "nature". In order that the thing is what it is, the thing that it is, its nature must be proper to itself, by the law of identity. The thing's nature inheres within the thing itself. But the thing's end, and this is what orders its activities, is not proper to the thing itself, it is proper to God. Therefore the thing's end cannot be part of the thing's nature. The thing's end is separate from the thing's nature, unless the thing's "nature" is proper to God together with the thing's end, but then the thing, as a thing, would either be part of God (pantheism), or else the thing would be other than its nature.

What I was pointing out, is that we cannot say that a thing acts by its nature toward an end, and that end is God's end, unless a thing's nature is part of God (pantheism). This is because the end of a thing is related to the thing's activities, and is distinct from a thing's nature, because a thing, as itself, is distinct from its relations to other things (its activities). So if God gives a thing its nature, the end remains God's end, and does not become part of the thing's nature, as if it were the thing's end.