I of course have repeatedly said that the way to make sense of mind~matter duality is to re-frame your inquiry as one based on the semiotic symbol~matter distinction instead. That then allows you to see how - causally - mind is just life. A more complex version of the same modelling relation. And even material existence can be accounted for pan-semiotically. — apokrisis

Where, according to your pan-semiotic theory, does qualitative experience reside? It doesn't seem like a process, because I can identify specific qualitative feelings.

Evidently we can, for example, when we talk about the mind, and share insights into the minds of different speakers. Therefore, the mind is not isolated.
— jkop

This is merely communication and inference. There's a reason behaviorism was so popular back in the day: mind is literally cut off from observation and thus it was seen as unfit for scientific inquiry. — darthbarracuda

Of course, jkop's post probably didn't completely answer your initial question. But tossing it out might be a little hasty, imho. It could help us to understand any possible less "physical" types of communication by starting with basic communication. (And i use the word "communication" in its usual general meaning: to give or receive information. Whether such exchanges of information are intentionally directed to a particular person is another matter. For example of indirect, non-particular communication: someone tuning a radio receiver to hear a communication in the form of music or talking.)

Would not a theoretical direct mind-to-mind transmission still be a type of communication?
Yes, that is quite a stretch to posit the existence of direct transmission or telepathy. But i am not the first to posit the possibility of such. Please note that i am merely imagining its theoretical existence, and not claiming it as a fact.

Let us imagine a linear scale of human communication. Say it is a scale of 0-100. At the zero point rating, there would be no communication of any kind. At the 100 point rating, there would be complete mind-reading ability. Ordinary verbal communication would be at about 50 points. In this example, two people engaged in conversation could possibly be at different ratings on the scale. And there are subtler levels of nonverbal communication, of course. Like when you walk into the room with your spouse/SO, and without a word you know exactly how they are feeling, what caused it, and how the rest of the night is going to turn out (while sleeping on the couch). This would be at around 75 points. Much further above that would be getting into psychic territory, about which some might remain unconvinced.


"So we have what I see to be the definitive and essential property of mind: subjective isolation, and we also have a tension between the rather strange nature of mind and the surrounding context which it (apparently) emerged. Where does mind come from? Is it really plausible to say that mind has "always been" or is "poofed" into existence by an act of the divine? But if substance monism/dualism is unpersuasive, how else do we account for the subjective isolation of the mind? What else could account for the impossibility of "going into" someone else's mind, except by an actual metaphysical barrier of sorts, the same barrier that makes such theories seem ad hoc?"


I don't know. Subjective isolation as "the definitive and essential property of mind"? That is really swinging for the fences, which i can appreciate. But that seems like it is prioritizing "subjective isolation" over every other single characteristic of the mind. And that seems subjective, rather than objective. Maybe it happens to be a prominent characteristic of your current state of mind. Or maybe not. But in any case, at least that statement seems to be a reach.

Your effort is most appreciated though, and is very interesting. Otherwise, I'd have no response. For what it is worth, the main philosophical/spiritual question that interests me is how one can transcend their own consciousness and make genuine connections with the world and with others, even if temporarily. The idea of identity seems integral to this. When i identify with everything around as much as possible: the gravel, the people, bugs, the clouds, the litter, the birds; freedom from the prison of the self is experienced. Tat tvam asi, you are that (as the saying goes). So... to identity with everything (and not just sports teams) is the goal. While still paying the bills, brushing my teeth, and obeying the speed limit. Imho, the highest belief in our culture (that on which everything else rests) isn't democracy, or beauty, or truth, or pleasure, or religion, or family, or possessions, or love, or even money, fame and power. It is the Self, endlessly fascinated with itself (what else?). Yet the walls of its palace become a prison. An over-ripe individualism becomes an isolation from which we struggle to escape.

Where, according to your pan-semiotic theory, does qualitative experience reside? — darthbarracuda

Let's not jump ahead of the game. You have yet to understand why this question doesn't even make good sense in terms of the ontic commitments of pan-semiosis.

I am questioning your use of words like "my experience", or "experience residing". You are simply presuming the dualistic mind~world framing that becomes the locked cage of your thoughts.

My argument is that to start unpicking that paradigm, a good place to start is to seriously address the issue of what might make life and mind actually different in your scheme of things? As a biological process, where does any claimed divergence in terms of causality arise?

You seem at least persuaded consciousness is a biological phenomenon rather than a theistic one. So you should be happy enough that this question is legitimate even within your ontological framework.

So again, what's your own answer? If you understand life according to some notion of causality, is there some essential difference that marks it off from mind? And if so, what is it?

To simply repeat "subjectivity" is to retreat back into Cartesian dualism and abandon your tentative naturalism here. And even in the end to reject naturalism, you would first have to demonstrate understanding of its best case.

I am questioning your use of words like "my experience", or "experience residing". You are simply presuming the dualistic mind~world framing that becomes the locked cage of your thoughts. — apokrisis

Certainly I am supposing the phenomenological experience of being a self of sorts. But I don't really have an ambitious metaphysical structure of the world. I find idealism to be theoretically satisfying but not entirely believable in some sense, while I see a real, external world as probably existing in some form or whatever. A giant abyss of darkness, with matter bouncing into matter on the macro-scale and random events happening on lower levels. But basically I hold a position I suspect most people do: the universe is a spatio-temporal container and we are one of its many contents.

My argument is that to start unpicking that paradigm, a good place to start is to seriously address the issue of what might make life and mind actually different in your scheme of things? As a biological process, where does any claimed divergence in terms of causality arise? — apokrisis

Well, I said that then existence of a nervous system would be a starter. I mean, unless we have good reasons for believing so, there is no contextual or inferential evidence to support the claim that mind is identical or somehow intrinsically connected to life. And then there's the problem of distinguishing life from non-life. Are viruses life? Apparently not, since they don't die in the normal way organisms do when detached from their host. No sheer cut-off implies vagueness, and vagueness implies cross-over. Or perhaps prior existence, a la idealism/panpsychism.

To simply repeat "subjectivity" is to retreat back into Cartesian dualism and abandon your tentative naturalism here. And even in the end to reject naturalism, you would first have to demonstrate understanding of its best case. — apokrisis

I don't see how subjectivity is non-naturalist. And you of all people should know that "naturalism" is such a vague buzzword that it literally is meaningless outside of esoteric circles.

Certainly I am supposing the phenomenological experience of being a self of sorts. But I don't really have an ambitious metaphysical structure of the world. I find idealism to be theoretically satisfying but not entirely believable in some sense, while I see a real, external world as probably existing in some form or whatever. A giant abyss of darkness, with matter bouncing into matter on the macro-scale and random events happening on lower levels. But basically I hold a position I suspect most people do: the universe is a spatio-temporal container and we are one of its many contents. — darthbarracuda

So your ontic commitments amount to a bob each way. Cool. :-}

Well, I said that then existence of a nervous system would be a starter. — darthbarracuda

Yes. But why? What difference does that make?

And you of all people should know that "naturalism" is such a vague buzzword that it literally is meaningless outside of esoteric circles. — darthbarracuda

Did you mean outside philosophical circles? Being immanent and not transcendent, being holist and not atomist, seem to be fairly clearcut and familiar ontic commitments to me.

So your ontic commitments amount to a bob each way. Cool. :-} — apokrisis

I never said it was ambitious, in fact I said the opposite. So spare me the pretension.

es. But why? What difference does that make? — apokrisis

Well because the nervous system controls movement and bodily processes, and so does consciousness.

Did you mean outside philosophical circles? Being immanent and not transcendent, being holist and not atomist, seem to be fairly clearcut and familiar ontic commitments to me. — apokrisis

TO YOU, but perhaps not others. You have given some descriptions of naturalism, but this is not ubiquitous. Defining your terms helps immensely.

Well because the nervous system controls movement and bodily processes, and so does consciousness. — darthbarracuda

What? Do they take turns or something?

Presumably not, which is why I favor neutral monism in that respect. Or property dualism.