I don't see why we should expect that a physicist in say 400 years' time will see universals as the same as we do now. It certainly hasn't worked out that way so far. — mcdoodle

There's a difference, though, between what universals exist, and whether or not universals even exist in the first place. For the metaphysician it doesn't really matter what the different universals are, what matters is whether or not we can identity a property as a universal. For metaphysical positions are largely empirically equivalent: whether or not universals exists, things at least appear to be similar.

How universals, if they exist, are instantiated in the world would be a job more suited for science: we can see how hierarchies evolve, how systems communicate, how the general structure of the world emerged from a heat bath in order to dissipate entropy. But I don't see how any of this would ever be able to change our views on the existences of universals. Nothing changes if I adopt a trope theoretic position or a nominalist position, because metaphysics is not an empirical science in the sense that physics is. Its goal is to explain what's "going on behind the scenes" so to speak, outside of the immediate reach of scientific instruments, the features of reality that everyone is exposed to in every second of their conscious awareness. These questions are "epistemically metaphysical".

I'm hesitant to say this but I doubt the vast majority of practicing physicists know or care of the various positions on similarity and constitution. It's the job of philosophy of science and metaphysics to elucidate these prior theoretical devices, because physicists have more important things to work on.

The correct argument though, for our world is just one of many possible ones. We are just lucky it's the we live in rather than one of the countless possblities without us.

That our world works the way it does is a feature of itself, not "universal rules of constraint" which sit outside of it. Our world is a lucky accident.

Far from being "optimistic" speculation, we know this to be true for else we fall into the incoherence of defining the world based on logic rather than what exists. Else we assume that because we have seen the world work one way (the "universal"), that it must necessarily do so.

It's classical materialism's error of concreteness repeated--an assumption there is one "equation" ("the universal") which predicts whatever we might encounter in the world.

Nothing changes if I adopt a trope theoretic position or a nominalist position, because metaphysics is not an empirical science in the sense that physics is. — darthbarracuda

You miss the point of science talking a hierarchical naturalistic view on the question. It does mean you can go out and measure universality in terms of generalised simplicity vs particularised complexity - gravity vs sparrows.

So the debate about universals carried on "metaphysically" in the hands of scholastic realists vs nominalists. Meanwhile science continued on with Aristotle's natural kinds metaphysics where universals were really various grades of a genus~species dichotomy.

Peirce in particular took this forward by identifying the universalising tendency in nature with constraints or habits. So the naturalness of hierarchical organisation is explained by the naturalness of developmental/evolutionary processes. Which in turn, is explained by symmetry breaking structural principles.

So the conventional metaphysical debate is non-naturalistic in being between the platonic idealists and the hardline social constructionists. The Aristotelean tradition is the metaphysics that science has cashed out with great success via Pragmatism - even if Reductionism/Scientism/Positivism is a further modern anti-universals tendency (being that part of science's success that quixotically wants to reject its own philosophical grounds for social reasons.)

I don't believe I proposed that at all. I'm just opposed to the opposite naturalistic thesis: that our present-day categories reflect the way the world that we move through is ordered. — mcdoodle

But if our categories and hierarchies are not merely arbitrary then they do "reflect the way the world that we move through is ordered." Of course, I am not claiming that the reflection must be perfect, just that there must some reflection if our categories and hierarchies are not to be completely arbitrary.

Of course, it I am not claiming that the reflection must be perfect, just that there must some reflection if our categories and hierarchies are not to be completely arbitrary. — John

Another ontological point that distinguishes Pragmatic naturalism here is that it indeed embraces the arbitrary along with the necessary.

So the traditional Platonic conception of universals (and natural laws) is they are necessitating or determining principles. Universal causation applies because every effect must have its prior cause.

However Peircean pragmatism was explicit in saying universal causation may be the generalised habit, yet there is also actual spontaneity or arbitrariness in life. And this claim was made on the basis of the emergence of probalistic thinking in science, particularly in thermodynamics and evolutionary theory. Of course, this doctrine of tychism also foreshadowed quantum theories demonstration that existence is fundamentally spontaneous in this fashion.

So Aristotle got it right at the beginning in accepting brute accident in nature, as well as the fact of nature being organised by a hierarchy of increasingly generalised constraints or lawful habit. And that more subtle metaphysics is what Pragmatism picked up on, and post-quantum science is now really driving home.

The scholastic argument about realism vs nominalism seems hugely quaint in that light. It is of historical interest having become such a familiar part of the general culture of the humanities. But metaphysics/science has long ago moved on to much more sophisticated conceptions.

(Even if, as I say, most scientists have their own rather culturally wonky take on these philosophy of science issues because - in usual dialectical fashion - science seeks to define itself as other to the humanities, returning the favour.)

Why is nominalism incompatible with this narrative? There might be a historic narrative of universalism, but nominalism, albeit clunky, isn't totally out of the question. There doesn't seem to be anything against a scientific nominalism except for a tendency to associate tradition with truth.

(being that part of science's success that quixotically wants to reject its own philosophical grounds for social reasons.) — apokrisis

You talking about sexual ethics essentialism here?

You miss the point of science talking a hierarchical naturalistic view on the question. It does mean you can go out and measure universality in terms of generalised simplicity vs particularised complexity - gravity vs sparrows. — apokrisis

This strikes me as a scientific model. The star is condensed and then explodes in a supernova. The pupa transforms into a butterfly. The tree goes from complexity to degeneracy as it decomposes. And generalised simplicity becomes particularized complexity - none of these actually tell us whether or not universals exist because all of this can happen under a nominalist scheme, because neither are empirically weighted.

Generalised simplicity and particularized complexity seem to require properties themselves, namely, generality, simplicity, particularity, complexity, etc. These might not be real properties, only descriptions of a state of affairs. But the state of affairs is general, simple, particular, or complex or what have you depending on the history of events, and events transpire depending on what properties exist. Explaining how generalised simplicity becomes particularized complexity doesn't really tell us whether or not universals exist, because at any moment of time, a property is instantiated in virtue of the fact that something exists.

The scholastic argument about realism vs nominalism seems hugely quaint — Apokrisis

I think what matters about the medieval debates was, as I said before, a fundamental change in metaphysical attitudes, the consequence of which was ultimately the undermining of reason. How so? The essay I linked to puts it like this:

With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality.

Now, certainly, a great deal about medieval scholasticism is indeed quaint, but there is an issue here which remains important.

Explaining how generalised simplicity becomes particularized complexity doesn't really tell us whether or not universals exist, because at any moment of time, a property is instantiated in virtue of the fact that something exists. — darthbarracuda

Generally I'm not following your post (sexual ethics essentialism???).

But I draw attention to the synchronic supposition upon which you try to argue your case. For you it is natural to talk about what exists at some moment in time. But it is fundamental to my position that spatiotemporal scale is itself what is hierarchically organised. And this is now standard physics - as in lightcones, event horizons and quantum events.

So generality is defined by it being the very largest possible spatiotemporal scale over which action is being integrated - that is, the visible universe in the case of physical law.

A sparrow is made up of protons and electrons. Those parts are standard across a universe over a scale defined by the particle horizon and the electro-weak symmetry breaking temperature.

But the organic chemistry that is the sparrow is a far more local and specified state of affairs - generic only over about a billion or so years.

Then the genomic sparrowness of the sparrow is information that impinges on a location in a substantial way (such as we would say - there's a sparrow) over perhaps a few million years of evolutionary memory forming.

And so we could continue on to what makes this particular sparrow about to spread its wings and have the property of being scared (the sight of the lurking cat).

So you make pointing at particulars seem like something we can freely do at any chosen moment. But that is to confuse epistemology and ontolology if you are hoping to talk about the complicated and hierarchical structuring of nature that sees a sparrow emerge as a natural kind - a genus - let alone produces some particular bird before us.

So you make pointing at particulars seem like something we can freely do at any chosen moment. But that is to confuse epistemology and ontolology if you are hoping to talk about the complicated and hierarchical structuring of nature that sees a sparrow emerge as a natural kind - a genus - let alone produces some particular bird before us. — apokrisis

Where does this sparrow emerge from? How is this "ancestral" generality not a particular? The fact that we can identify it and communicate about it shows that it's something. Maybe not like a sparrow, a chair, or a hydrogen-fusing hypergiant star, but something regardless.

(sexual ethics essentialism???). — apokrisis

Yes, you said that many today are disregarding universalism because of social issues - universalism is closely tied to essentialism, and essentialism has a rather blotchy history of labeling non-conformers as dysfunctional.

Today, our deepest understanding of the laws of nature is summarized in a set of equations. Using these equations, we can make very precise calculations of the most elementary physical phenomena, calculations that are confirmed by experimental evidence. But to make these predictions, we have to plug in some numbers that cannot themselves be calculated but are derived from measurements of some of the most basic features of the physical universe. These numbers specify such crucial quantities as the masses of fundamental particles and the strengths of their mutual interactions. After extensive experiments under all manner of conditions, physicists have found that these numbers appear not to change in different times and places, so they are called the fundamental constants of nature.

Luke Barnes

Could such 'fundamental constants of nature' be considered as analogous to universals?

Another ontological point that distinguishes Pragmatic naturalism here is that it indeed embraces the arbitrary along with the necessary.

So the traditional Platonic conception of universals (and natural laws) is they are necessitating or determining principles. Universal causation applies because every effect must have its prior cause.

However Peircean pragmatism was explicit in saying universal causation may be the generalised habit, yet there is also actual spontaneity or arbitrariness in life. And this claim was made on the basis of the emergence of probalistic thinking in science, particularly in thermodynamics and evolutionary theory. Of course, this doctrine of tychism also foreshadowed quantum theories demonstration that existence is fundamentally spontaneous in this fashion. — apokrisis

This is a different sense of 'arbitrary' than what I was referring to, though. In agreement with Peirce (and Whitehead, with whose philosophy I am more familiar) find the idea that, at the level of the very small as well as ever-increasingly in the (self) organizationally complex, there is genuine spontaneity, more plausible than the idea of universal and rigid determinism.

Perhaps (at least some of) the invariances of nature themselves evolve, which would be in keeping with the idea that human scientific understanding has changed,and will probably continue to change. I am not making a claim that the changing history of science is due to changing laws of nature, though.

The scholastic argument about realism vs nominalism seems hugely quaint in that light. It is of historical interest having become such a familiar part of the general culture of the humanities. But metaphysics/science has long ago moved on to much more sophisticated conceptions.

(Even if, as I say, most scientists have their own rather culturally wonky take on these philosophy of science issues because - in usual dialectical fashion - science seeks to define itself as other to the humanities, returning the favour.)

Most people do tend to think in terms of the law of the excluded middle, though. So, on that view, our models either do or do not reflect the nature of things. I am convinced that they do, if only because we are part and parcel of nature; and it beggars belief that our incredibly complex modern sciences that form a more or less unified body of understanding about nature with great predictive power could be so unified, so successfully predictive and so technologically efficacious purely by chance. If that is right then nominalism is false, and some form of realism obtains.

I think science is "other than the humanities", that is that there is a valid distinction between them and their methodologies, although the differences consist in a continuum, not a sharp dividing line between the humanistic and the scientistic extremes.

Could such 'fundamental constants of nature' be considered as analogous to universals? — Wayfarer

It could go either way. The big problem for fundamental physics is that the constants seem instead to be the most contingent of all particulars. So they just are brute numbers that are true of our universe by some kind of random accident. That view of the constants is why there are multiverse theories. If the constants are particulars, then there is no reason to limit the values they take and no reason for there not to be an infinity of universes.

The other view is that the constants instead represent some kind of deeply rooted equilibrium balance or geometric ratio. So - if we had a theory of everything - they would pop out of that as the only possible ratios, in just the same way that pi, phi, e and Feigenbaum's constant are all explained as straightforward ratios that result in these really arbitrary seeming numbers.

So most physicists would lean to the idea they are contingent particulars. The more interesting alternative would turn out to be that they express a pure geometric relation that we might one day discover.

Where does this sparrow emerge from? How is this "ancestral" generality not a particular? The fact that we can identify it and communicate about it shows that it's something. Maybe not like a sparrow, a chair, or a hydrogen-fusing hypergiant star, but something regardless. — darthbarracuda

The sparrow emerges from the capacity of information to organise a dissipative flow of matter into an anticipated, purpose-serving, structure. It's negentropy and entropy, constraints and freedom - the usual systems story.

And sure we can say something about a sparrow. But again, don't mix synchronic epistemology and the diachronic ontological issue of universals.

Yes, you said that many today are disregarding universalism because of social issues - universalism is closely tied to essentialism, and essentialism has a rather blotchy history of labeling non-conformers as dysfunctional. — darthbarracuda

What? Are you saying a liking for systems thinking is like homophobia?

The sparrow emerges from the capacity of information to organise a dissipative flow of matter into an anticipated, purpose-serving, structure. It's negentropy and entropy, constraints and freedom - the usual systems story. — apokrisis

Not to take this away from this universals topic, but I just wanted to see your reply to the idea that semiotics has an already-baked-in observer which still has to be accounted for in the problem of philosophy of mind. The interpretant is essentially the already-baked-in observer here. Whence interpretation? My prediction is you will say that we cannot go any further than this semiotic ground and thus just a brute fact. If that is the answer, I would then reply that this is still leaving the observer/awareness aspect unsolved and just taking it as a brute fact, thus begging the question.

What? Are you saying a liking for systems thinking is like homophobia? — apokrisis

No.

And sure we can say something about a sparrow. But again, don't mix synchronic epistemology and the diachronic ontological issue of universals. — apokrisis

The metaphysician isn't concerned with how universals evolved. He's concerned with whether or not universals exist. The evolving structure narrative can be explained without universals.

The metaphysician isn't concerned with how universals evolved. He's concerned with whether or not universals exist. The evolving structure narrative can be explained without universals. — darthbarracuda

So metaphysics doesn't include process philosophy in your book. Great. You win.

Well I think processes are dependent upon a hypostasis. It doesn't make any sense to talk of structure, vagueness, proto-objecthood, process, or what have you without an underlying hypostasis.

The interpretant is essentially the already-baked-in observer here. Whence interpretation? My prediction is you will say that we cannot go any further than this semiotic ground and thus just a brute fact. — schopenhauer1

That's a good point. And it is the point of the semiotic view to generalise or universalise the notion of the observer.

So in the panpsychic view, this is done by spreadiing mind about everywhere, over every scale of being. But who knows what this "mind" is? It is a concept without causal structure or useful meaning.

In the pansemiotic view, it is interpretance or the sign relation that is spread around every scale of being. And so observation is modelled in terms of an ontic process.

Of course that is just a broad brush sketch. Then you have to cash it out in more useful ways. Which is what modern thermodynamic/information theoretic descriptions of the Universe have been doing.

This infodynamic perspective for instance adds formal and final cause - the story of the top-down constraints - to the bare science. The development of structured being is granted an entropic shape, direction and purpose. The universe becomes "mindful" in this self-organising regard. The universe can be considered a dissipative structure that is dissipating hot quantum uncertainty so as to produce a cool realm of robust classicality.

So the panpsychist starts with a reified notion of "mind" and simply imagines diluting it - thinning out its substance until it is there in fundamental particles in some deaf, dumb and blind fashion. The basic question of "what is observation" is simply brushed under the carpet by fading it away to nothing except the regular physics of mechanical masses and forces.

Pansemiotics is part of the new information revolution where observerhood is defined at the Planck grain in terms of "the questions that could even be asked" of a physical locale. Quantum uncertainty is due to the fact of hitting a physical limit where you can no longer ask all the questions you need to to precisify the state of a locale. So the breakdown of observation is exactly determined. Hence the beginnings of (classically certain) observation is also made physically measurable and theoretically tractable.

Once you can say where things stop and start in terms of concrete existence, you are away. And that is what physics can now do.

Every physical constraint is a sign. It is information to be read as a constraint on free dynamics. And information theory can account for both the negentropy of constraints and the entropy of degrees of freedom.

That view of things is now being take back into mind science to account for the kinds of things that brains do in terms of forward modelling or Bayseian information uncertainty reduction.

Consciousness becomes not the generalised substance of panpsychism but instead a massive ensemble of accessible modelling states - a massive ensemble of particulars. In any moment, the brain could be in any number of states that represent a meaningful observer~observables modelling relation. The fact that just one state is selected, the rest suppressed, is what gives brain consciousness its exceptional adaptive variety.

So in pansemiotics, the observer is the interpretance, which is the habits, which is the constraints, which is the negentropy. That is how you go from the highly complex specificity of observing brains to the most simple, universal and fundamental level of observation that is the basic entropic condition of the Universe described through dissipative structure theory.

Well I think processes are dependent upon a hypostasis. It doesn't make any sense to talk of structure, vagueness, proto-objecthood, process, or what have you without an underlying hypostasis. — darthbarracuda

Thanks for restating your conventional reductionist understanding of reality. But assertions aren't arguments.

If what I said is an assertion, then everything you said is an assertion as well. I'm coming from a certain view point, and you are coming from a different one. At this point we're both talking past each other.

Give me a understandable explanation of why my reductionism is wrong, preferably without using unnecessary jargon, and I'll change my views. I'm not opposed to systems and processes, but I don't think they are the underlying reality. They're second-order phenomena. Why should I abandon this hypostasis view and adopt your position, and what does your position hold that is different from mine?

The biggest reason why I have so much difficulty discussing things with you is that I have no idea what the hell "vagueness" is supposed to mean or be, nor "structure" in the metaphysical sense, or what the evolution of space and time means outside of an empirical phenomenon happening within space and time.

So there's processes in nature, like a fish tank filled with water and other stuff. But the fish tank isn't a process in the same way a ripple on the water is a process, or the hum of the filter is a process. For each time we postulate a process, we need to postulate a stage in which this process is occurring. Otherwise we're left with a vague and empty term that we cannot possibly imagine. Which in fact was the definition of Substance - that which is predicated upon but cannot be predicated itself. We can't imagine substance, we can only use analogies and appeals to logical necessity. And so if we can't conceptualize Process, then it becomes the exact same thing as Substance - both are the hypostasis of reality. There's no point in calling it Process, then, because it only brings confusion, since Process is something we can conceptualize (like a wave, or system, or what have you) and if the underlying hypostasis cannot be conceptualized, then there's nothing similar between a wave and the so-called primordial Process.

Of course we can say "everyTHING is in flux", and claim that no concrete particular is static. We can say that the entire universe is ever-changing and moving. And so we begin to fall into Heideggerian metaphysics.

And it is the point of the semiotic view to generalise or universalise the notion of the observer. — Apokrisis

Aha! So there's the 'implicit mind' in semiotics. Knew it was there somewhere. ;)

Quantum uncertainty is due to the fact of hitting a physical limit where you can no longer ask all the questions you need to to precisify the state of a locale. So the breakdown of observation is exactly determined. Hence the beginnings of (classically certain) observation is also made physically measurable and theoretically tractable. — Apokrisis

I think this has a counterpart in the idea of 'making manifest'. Up until the point of measurement, you're dealing with something like a latency or a potential; but at that point of measurement, the entity 'becomes manifest'.

Quantum Physics And The Need For A New Paradigm Ruth Kastner:

Werner Heisenberg...stated that a quantum object is "something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality." Heisenberg called this "potentia," a concept originally introduced by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle.

Aha! So there's the 'implicit mind' in semiotics. Knew it was there somewhere. ;) — Wayfarer

Yep. Except to access that, you would have to redefine your notion of "mind" in radical fashion. And you would still want to argue that mind is something transcendent and substantial, no?

For each time we postulate a process, we need to postulate a stage in which this process is occurring. — darthbarracuda

And you find this a self-evident and undeniable truth because? .... [please fill in blank].

I mean has science found some such ultimate basis? Surely what science is finding that wind the clock back to beginnings and it all goes quantum vague (indeterminate).

And is it even an intelligible clam? Just because most of what we know from our own scale of being seems to have a substantial underpinning, how can it be turtles all the way down? How can there be a first definite stuff with no cause? Doesn't that do the ultimate violence to the very notion of causality you hope to employ.

So a more radical alternative is already demanded as reductionism can't ground itself. We should accept the fact and move on, opening our minds to the other alternatives out there.

Peirce's semiotic approach - which grants that beginnings can be vague, an unstructured sea of fluctuation - is the one that fits a generally informational and developmental metaphysics (of the kind to be found in physics and cosmology today).

you would still want to argue that mind is something transcendent and substantial, no? — apokrisis

'transcendent' in the Kantian sense, not in the sense of being 'beyond', but in the sense of being 'that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience'. (But, off topic.)

And you find this a self-evident and undeniable truth because? .... [please fill in blank]. — apokrisis

Because it's what makes sense to me. I've stated my reasons and tried to make it as clear as I could.

I mean has science found some such ultimate basis? Surely what science is finding that wind the clock back to beginnings and it all goes quantum vague (indeterminate). — apokrisis

I view metaphysics as the study of being qua being. Essentially it speculates about what cannot be observed. Indeed, it speculates upon the necessary conditions for observation to even occur. Being, not beings.

A shadow cannot exist without a body blocking out the light. The properties of the world are like shadows and depend upon a body that has no properties.

And is it even an intelligible clam? Just because most of what we know from our own scale of being seems to have a substantial underpinning, how can it be turtles all the way down? How can there be a first definite stuff with no cause? Doesn't that do the ultimate violence to the very notion of causality you hope to employ. — apokrisis

That's the point of Substance. It can't be turtles all the way down, under this scheme. There needs to be a first definite "stuff" out of logical necessity, similar to the logical necessity of God in Aristotle and Aquinas' theology. It's why asking "what caused God?!" misses the entire point of the argument - under the metaphysical scheme from which they are operating, God is a necessary component. So the issue here is to explain how the metaphysical scheme is problematic, not necessarily attempting to dissolve an issue within the framework.

Peirce's semiotic approach - which grants that beginnings can be vague, an unstructured sea of fluctuation - is the one that fits a generally informational and developmental metaphysics (of the kind to be found in physics and cosmology today). — apokrisis

This is what I'm talking about. What the hell does an "unstructured sea of fluctuation" mean apart from poetry? How can something fluctuate without structure? What does it even mean to be vague, and why did this vagueness suddenly break?

If you want to identify this vagueness as Substance, then you're on my side. Vagueness is the hypostasis of reality, from which all beings are birthed from like an "apeiron" as you like to say. But this immediately runs into problems, I'd say, because there's no explanation as to how this vagueness exists, as if its vagueness isn't dependent upon anything else and is just floating around somewhere in non-spacetime. And if you accuse me of misusing the term "floating" (since there's no space or time in which to float in), then this point equally applies to you're use of an "unstructured sea of fluctuation".

We don't need to do cosmology or physics to understand that there needs to be a fundamental Being.

Vagueness would then be the phenomenologically-closest thing to describe Substance as, since Substance can't even be ascribed any properties like vagueness. Our knowledge of Substance would only be out of logical necessity and not out of direct empirical observation, as this would be impossible. It would be out of a narrowing of possibilities, just as Aristotle and Aquinas narrowed the possibilities and came to the conclusion that a God exists.

So a more radical alternative is already demanded as reductionism can't ground itself. — apokrisis

On the contrary, metaphysical reductionism is a necessity. Scientific reductionism, probably not. But we shouldn't confuse the two as the same thing.

A shadow cannot exist without a body blocking out the light. The properties of the world are like shadows and depend upon a body that has no properties. — darthbarracuda

Ye gods. Outright mysticism.

It's why asking "what caused God?!" misses the entire point of the argument - under the metaphysical scheme from which they are operating, God is a necessary component.

So it is necessary there is a first cause. And it must be a first substance indeed. Otherwise your hypostatic reductionist framework is in deep shit. Isn't that a rather personalised invocation of final cause?

I'd say, because there's no explanation as to how this vagueness exists, as if its vagueness isn't dependent upon anything else and is just floating around somewhere in non-spacetime.

Well the obvious retort is that vagueness exists vaguely. And we can speak about that intelligibly as being the antithesis of the crisply formed world from where we ask such questions.

So sure, one has to use a little poetic licence to introduce the idea. But it is of no real interest unless it can be mathematically modelled. Just like quantum foam, virtual particles, zero point energy, spontaneous symmetry breaking and the many other useful physical concepts that depend on a notion of "pure fluctuation".

I mean do you think our 4D Universe "floats" in anything? Do you think the modern maths of curvature only makes sense if you re-introduce a pre-Goethean embedding space? Do you think infinity only exists if someone has counted all the way to its limit?

You are raising quibbles that have long been left behind in science and math informed metaphysics.

Ye gods. Outright mysticism. — apokrisis

You're calling Plato a mystic. OK.

Otherwise your hypostatic reductionist framework is in deep shit. Isn't that a rather personalised invocation of final cause? — apokrisis

I adopted the hypostasis view because it makes sense and then adopted the necessary components like substance later.

I hear a bark, I believe there to be a dog. I recognize metaphysical reductionism, therefore I believe there to be a prime substance. It would be silly to not recognize the existence of a dog. So why is it silly to recognize the existence of prime substance? It's existence is narrowed down by what it is not, and the stuff we see around us are like "echoes" to to speak of its existence, just as the bark is an "echo" (notification) of the existence of the dog.

In the Neo-Platonic view: if what is meant to explain something is complex, it requires further explanation. That's the reductionism I'm speaking of here. It can't be an infinite chain of complexity. There has to be something simple in which everything emerges from.

So again I'm not against systems or processes. I recognize that a spider web cannot exist without its structural integrity from all its lines and nodes. But I also recognize that these lines and nodes are complex in themselves and cannot exist without silk.

And so the point of metaphysics is to inquire about what the most simple basis of reality is. Its joints.

Well the obvious retort is that vagueness exists vaguely. And we can speak about that intelligibly as being the antithesis of the crisply formed world from where we ask such questions. — apokrisis

At what point does something go from vague to crisp? Is it vague, vague, vague BOOM crispness? Why does this happen? And how does this happen outside of time?

So sure, one has to use a little poetic licence to introduce the idea. But it is of no real interest unless it can be mathematically modelled. Just like quantum foam, virtual particles, zero point energy, spontaneous symmetry breaking and the many other useful physical concepts that depend on a notion of "pure fluctuation". — apokrisis

What is poetry and what is not?

Why is it of no real interest? Because you don't find it exciting or personally interesting? Because it's not useful?

If these concepts depend upon pure fluctuation, then this pure fluctuation needs to be explained further. Otherwise you're resting science on poetry.

You are raising quibbles that have long been left behind in science and math informed metaphysics. — apokrisis

What I don't understand is, if this great narrative of naturalized metaphysics was so successful, why it's not well known today. You would think that this kind of thinking would have been implemented early if it was indeed sophisticated and coherent.

So either it was ignored in a millennia-old intellectual conspiracy, or it didn't make sense. That, or it's a recent trend emerging from the chaos of 19th and 20th century theoretical physics and the subsequent loss of orientation. Or everyone is lazy and screwing everyone else over with their bullshit so they can keep their tenures (both naturalized and non-naturalized philosophers). Or, if it's because this movement exists within an (esoteric) circle, it's not the fault of everyone else that they don't get it. Coherent communication is key.

Are these quibbles actually answered or are they left behind, pushed into the corner and forgotten about? What seems to be the case is that these people you speak of have literally left behind these questions in favor of ones that are more useful or stimulating while continuing to use the term "metaphysics" when they're really doing philosophy of science or science itself. They're not concerned with the debate over universals, they're concerned with how similar behavior emerged regardless of universalism or nominalism. These questions aren't relevant to what they wish to study. Which is fine. But it's confusing when you say that this is metaphysics when the overwhelming literature surrounding metaphysics does not match with what they do.

You want Spinoza's Substance. Not a cause of state of the world, but rather a logical expression of all states. A God that doesn't exist.

Apo's "Vaugness" is unsatisfying because it's trying to pose it as an empical state. Obviously, this doesn't work because it doesn't place anything in existence. Substance which doesn't exist lacks this problem-- by definition to has no empirical form, not even an absence. Nothing empirical could ever be said about it, as vauge as you can get.

because it's trying to pose it as an empi[ri]cal state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Exactly. Phenomenologically, substance is vague. But it isn't actually "vague".

Although I'm sympathetic to the idea that vagueness is a real feature of reality. Just not the hypostasis. The hypostasis is always there. Vagueness is a contingent feature of the empirical, and thus observable, world.

Also Spinoza is bae.