Yet we dismiss a guy sitting on clouds causing thunder. In any case, primitive societies are animists. I remember reading good psychological investigation into animism — like how we see faces on rocks and clouds even though there are no faces —, without any appeal to the actuality of those beliefs. — Lionino

Sure. And these are quite interesting to discover out psychological constitution which could bear fruit in other areas of inquiry.

You are changing your terms. Empirical evidence doesn't go against the unicorn, there is a lack of empirical evidence for the unicorn. Likewise, there is a lack of evidence for a being outside of space and time. — Lionino

Ha, now I think this is semantic. Ok, there is lack of evidence for the mental entity unicorn. So it is a fiction, fine with that.

How do you know there is no evidence for something outside space and time? Can we go to this place to verify or reject such a claim?

Are you sure there is no heaven? It is outside of space and time as we know, too. — Lionino

The Christian tradition posits a person who raised from the dead and said there was a heaven. In this world, I do not know of any cases in which a dead person has come back to life after several days.

Ergo, I do not believe there is something called heaven based on this tradition. Such a person today would be called a charlatan, correctly.

Am I certain there is no heaven? I don't reach certainty, but if you like, I'd say I think there is a 99.9% chance that heaven does not exist.

You can't give me certainty. So let's just say we are agnostic about everything and call it a day. Deal? — Lionino

That's too hasty. But if forced between certainty and agnosticism, I think agnosticism is a safer bet. I cannot go outside myself, much less outside of space and time to see what may or may not exist.

Primitive cultures believe thunders are caused by a god's will. We know today it is not the case. — Lionino

Yes. The point is that there seems to be an innate mechanism that causes us to believe in these things, which is why I do not think they should be dismissed that easily.

I don't understand this. — Lionino

You said:

let's take a universalist generic theist: "I believe a personal creator beyond the universe exists — Lionino

This creator is personal, meaning applies to one person, the one who believes? Or does this refer to people who claim a creator creates everything?

These are not the same.

The first claim is significantly weaker than the second one.

In my understanding, this concept is of a mind (so it is personal), it is outside of space and time (and by that of course I am excluding hippie distortions like "the universe is god", not to be confused with Spinoza's pantheism), and it is the cause of the world we see — I think my rendition of the concept is minimal to all theistic religions. — Lionino

So it's a mental concept, which postulates something outside of space and time. Ok, a mental concept, is a mental concept if we can apply it to something empirical, we can either affirm or dismiss the claim.

If a person believes in Unicorns, but we find no unicorns in the world, then this belief is a fiction, because empirical evidence goes against such a claim.

If you speak of a being outside of space and time, how are we to verify or dismiss it? I don't know how, so I don't know if such a being exists.

If in addition to this a theist says, I believe this being is all good and all powerful then we have plenty of evidence to show that this claim is false, we show them the world.

My point is simple, this insistence on agnosticism applies not just to the God question but to most questions. Yet we reply to most questions with "yes" or "no". There are those that reply "I don't know", surely, but we don't say the people that said "no" are being unreasonable, especially when "yes" would be more unreasonable then. That much says that you are applying a special ad hoc epistemic standard to God. — Lionino

Most people say yes or now to these questions, but I don't think most people care much about epistemology, or if they do, it's to a quite limited range. But you are asking for certainty, I cannot give you that.

From B and D, when we ask someone whether they believe in God they should say yes or no, the uncertainty of the topic is already implied, stating whether you are an agnostic theist/atheit is redundant, and any gnostic theist/atheist has an almost impossible-to-meet burden of proof, so I say the gnostics here are either lying or confused. The agnostic label should be reserved for those who are truly divided (even if the evidence sways their mind in another direction) and prefer to suspend judgement in the await for more evidence. — Lionino

As I said, if you are speaking about the Abrahamic tradition, of which I belong to and whose arguments I understand to some degree, then I am an atheist. I don't believe in heaven, I don't believe in hell, I do not believe a person rose from the dead, etc. Those are rather specific claims, which are capable of being shown to be wrong.

As to whether there is such a thing as "God" or a higher being, I do not know, I cannot verify or deny this. Ergo, I am an agnostic on the God question.

Let's run the argument. "We don't know if god does not exist". The same argument applies just as well (more strongly in fact) to the theist. Ignore Christians or Baha'i, let's take a universalist generic theist: "I believe a personal creator beyond the universe exists". The atheist claims such a being does not exist. The UGT claims such a being exists. Who is more reasonable here?
Let's then say that "we don't know". Here is the problem: you don't whether you will wake up tomorrow, you don't know whether your HS history teacher was really licensed, you don't know whether your dad is really your dad, you don't know whether NASA is really saying the truth, you don't know whether you are dreaming as you read this, and yet you give a good, single-worded, definitive answer when you get asked about all of these matters. But somehow the God question is one of the very few questions where people feel the need to pontificate that we are aren't really sure. — Lionino

The goal is to seek better understanding. Perhaps the topic of God is not as simple as the "New Atheists" take it to be, for we know that most primitive cultures believe in such a "being" or "beings", so maybe there is a room for nuance here which would be slightly more problematic than claiming that I do not know if my father is really my father, of which more could be said.

If by God you are speaking about a "personal creator", by this you mean a being that has the power to give life to people? If that's what is being argued, then I do not think it is a strong argument.

If you mean that there is "personal creator" of some higher being who created the universe. Well, I would like to know some of the properties of said being. A higher being or a higher power is a very nebulous term, people like to hand-wave when asked about it.

But if it is given precision, maybe we can work it out.

Back to the problem of my father, yes, you are correct, I do not know with 100% accuracy that he is my father. I have plenty of evidence to suggest that he is, but pictures of me being a baby could be faked, maybe the baby in the picture is not me, etc.

Given the options I have, then I opt to believe that my father is my real father with, say, 99% accuracy. Hence, I have no good reason to be agnostic about this issue, because what my father is, is much better defined than God, or a higher being.

But God isn't an empirical hypothesis. It is how you frame your life. What God means, according to the religions, is how one should (try to) live one's life. (What science means is not just the philosophy of science, but how you do it in practice.) Admittedly, how that works out in practice can be a bit puzzling to outsiders, but that's how the ideas work. (The same is true of science) To put it another way, if you start by defining God, that may turn out not to be a hypothesis, but an axiom. And there's no arguing with axioms, except by their results. In this case, the argument has to be about what life the believer leads. — Ludwig V

It's not so clear to me, many people treat God as if it were something explanatory, sometimes even empirical, in the broad meaning of the term (which includes personal experience). Why did I get a bonus at work? God is gracious. What caused my existence? God. Etc.

But I do not think that asking for some properties or attributes or facets of God is asking for too much. The more which can be given, the better we can proceed. If it is limited to a Great Being, or a supreme force, then I do not know what this means, or at least, it is very nebulous.

So I think we can have arguments about God, even if there may be no chance of getting each other to agree.

But we would have way to check if this proposition is true, we can send a telescope to Jupiter, or several of them.

If you say that this donkey is immune to being captured by satellites, or that it is shy and only shows up once a year to one person who looks up at Jupiter at very specific instances, then someone is pulling my leg.

First, define what God is, then we can say if we know enough to say, with certainty, that such a thing exists or does not. Maybe we can't reach certainty, in that case we shift to probabilities.

I don't think it's illogical per se, in fact, today, maybe it's more logical that standard institutionalized religion, maybe not.

The issue is that it's a certainty claim: God does not exist.

If we narrow that down to saying something like, the Abrahamic tradition of God does not exist, then I think it makes sense to say one is an atheist in regard to that.

But to say that one is an atheist about any possible notion of God (which is very often very ill defined) assumes more than one can know.

I think agnosticism is better, with atheism being applied in specific instances.

That was remarkably well written M, even by your standards (of which I've always considered to be extremely high).

There's A LOT that could be said here in reply to what you said S and K and the unknowable and - I would add - even Hume and Locke, but, then we go back to Plotinus and even further back to Plato and then we don't get anywhere.

As I've said I think K's conclusions about the unknowable were very much anticipated and discussed very interestingly by others prior to him, though I suspect they did not notice the importance of what they were saying.

But. But. The emphasis Kant made on the given point of the unknowable was strong enough that the previously mentioned observations (made in a different manner), were finally taken to be as deep and as important as they should have been taken. Plus, all the other stuff Kant said about the synthetic unity of apperception, the synthetic a-priori and the law like nature of the "ought" among other things were also quite deep.

My own feeling is, that those who came after K (not S) were honestly more than anything bloated showmen, who sometimes said an interesting thing here and there, but otherwise presented other things so obscurely it was passed off as Hidden Truths.

As for the will not doing the job S wanted it to do, I would agree with you, tentatively.

Thanks for the clarification.

So you do like that Schopenhauer wrote what he did, or would have you preferred him not write?

I once thought I read you saying something along the lines of, Schopenhauer should've stayed quite or something along those lines.

But, you are also ironic so, it might have been that.



There's a lot of stuff in Schopenhauer and one need not take it whole. I think his pessimism has a grain of truth to it, maybe more than a grain, but I think he also exaggerates a little. I don't think life is THAT bad. But it can be very bad.

As for his metaphysics and epistemology, there's a lot of it which I personally find very insightful. However, having read Hume later than I should have, I am torn between S' views on the nature of the will and causality as opposed to Hume's.

So, it's complex. He is one of the last best system builders and one can only admire his honesty about many topics; while maybe thinking he was a not-so-nice person.

Yeah, I think so. My feeling is that we are by default Meaning Giving creatures, it's just what we do, we find it everywhere. So, to go on to say that such a thing is completely absent goes against our nature, in some respects.



At least a Pyrrhonian can be a big nuisance to other philosophers, which is always fun. :cool:

Solipsism is intellectually interesting, but as Borges pointed out, it admits of no reply but produces no conviction (echoing Hume's remarks on Berkeley.)

Nevertheless, I do think there is a connection between nihilism and depression and nihilism and anti-natalism too. The latter group especially are adamant that personal psychology has no bearing on the truth of the argument. Literally true, but misleading. If a person has a (decently) happy life, feels fulfilled and engaged, then that person would rather have life than not have it, if everyone had this view, who would think to come up with these "negative" argument in the first place?

This applies to nihilism too, while psychological states do not tell us if an argument is right or wrong, it does tell us about the motivation for such an argument. If one has not felt profound moments of meaninglessness for long stretches of time, or if one has not felt that life is just one damn sludge of pain, boredom and suffering, then who could imagine framing this argument?

It wouldn't occur to anybody to say these things. Still, I do think nihilism is more merits more respect than anti-natalism, because I do believe that most people have felt periods of meaninglessness, without going all the way to claiming that the whole of life is meaningless.

The Philosophical Writing of Richard Burthogge by Richard Burthogge and Margaret W. Landes

Wow. Only read 15 pages so far, but damn was Chomsky not joking when he said that Kant's ideas were very much articulated, by the Cambridge Platonists.

Awesome stuff, will update when finished.

Indeed. When it came to New Atheism, he was by far the best one. Not that the others were too good, but, he was much more kind which counts.

Ah, missed that.

Thanks for sharing.

They have and there are several ways to interpret that section.

But the main point is that when we try to "catch" the self in real time, we never quite do so. We mention the "I", but one has a very strong intuition that the self goes significantly beyond that word.

Do dogs have limits? Apes? Fish? Tigers or Elephants?

Are we a part of nature or are we an exception to nature, not subject to its whims?

Since I take it that we are natural beings, we have natural limits.

May be a cop-out but Hume's famous phrase here merits a mention:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."

Notice this does not claim, as is often said, that he denies that a "self" exists, only that he cannot catch it. It plays a fundamental role in perception, but when we inquire as to what it is, we stumble around it.

These people can speak about their thoughts despite having no corresponding mental language (ie, their mentation is not linguistic - not 'there is no mental language per se' - it could be a language of feeling, or otherwise (as discussed by another poster earlier)). — AmadeusD

And in speaking about such non-linguistic thoughts, only the linguistic portions get communicated. If someone could attempt to describe in some manner, non-linguistic thought, it would be interesting to see. But the issue here is, are we discussing thought (whatever thinking is) or something else? Until we have a better notion of linguistic thought, we are going to remain stuck.

It doesn't come from your brain. It comes from your linguistic faculties (larynx, tongue etc..) as a symbolic representation. Again, if you call that Direct, that's a side-step of convention. Fine. Doesn't really address the issue here, though. It's 'as good as', but it isn't — AmadeusD

Come on man. People can use sign language, or sight, as was the case with Hawking, to express thought. But it does come from the brain, not from the tongue or the eyes...

I disagree. We have (arguably, more than half) of people describing non-linguistic thoughts. We're good. And we know the results. It doesn't differ from expressing linguistic thoughts in any obvious way until the speaker is interrogated. — AmadeusD

Describing non-linguistic thoughts how?

Because it is, to me, clearly the reason for your position. You ahven't addressed this, and so I'll continue to push it until such time as an adequate response has been made. This isn't 'at you'. This is the position I hold. It seems coherent, and I've not yet had anyone even deny it. Just say other stuff. — AmadeusD

If you want to call it convention, call it convention. I don't have a problem with direct and mediated. You take mediation to mean indirect.

I will once again say, we only have the human way of seeing things, not a "view from nowhere", which is where I assume you would believe directness could be attained.

I believe it makes more sense to argue that we directly see objects (mediated by our mind and organs) than to say we indirectly see an object, because it is mediated. "We indirectly see an apple." is just a strange thing to say, because the left-over assumption is that there is such a thing as directly seeing an apple, but on the indirect view, this is impossible, heck, there would be no apple nor object to say that remains when we stop interacting with it.

This left over aspect does not make sense to me. I think it is false.

Nevertheless, so that we may not continue this to infinity, I will readily grant that I am using a particular convention, because I think it makes more sense.

More important to me than direct/indirect is mediation, which I assume you would say is what indirectness is about. Fine.

And if Kant was wrong? As many, many people think? — AmadeusD

I think one can have issues with things in themselves (noumenon in a positive sense) for instance or may think that his specific a-priori postulates are wrong or disagree with his morality, sure, but to think his entire framework is wrong, well I think this is simply to dismiss what contemporary brain sciences say, not to mention common sense.

In the language you are using, I have to accept this because this does not suppose any kind of phenomenal experience and so doesn't adequately describe all of what matters.
But If what you're saying is the eyes directly receive the light, I accept that.
You'll notice that nothing in this is the object, or the experience, or the subject. So we're still indirectly apprehending. Hehe. — AmadeusD

Sure - we have an issue here too, what is an object? It's not trivial. Is it the thing we think we see, is it the cause of what we think we see or is it a mere mental construction only? Tough to say.

Convention rears it's head again. You're also describing a process of allocation. That isn't apt for the distinction we're talking about. I could definitely tell a biologist they are not directly perceiving the distal object of a phloem. What their response is has nothing to do with our discussion. Your point is taken, but it speaks to conventions. — AmadeusD

I will grant this as stated. I actually don't think that we disagree all that much on substantial matter, more so the way words are used. And I admit I am using direct in a manner that goes beyond the usual framing as "naive realism", which if anyone believes in that, they shouldn't be in philosophy or science, or I would wonder why they would bother with this.

100%, we're in the same boat. This is exactly why I noted you answered your own question. You have described, exactly, and with great clarity, why both communication and phenomenal experience are indirectly achieved. Nice (yes, I am being cheeky here). — AmadeusD

Yes, these are expressions of thought - they form a crucial part of it - that part that connects to the quite obscure aspect of non-linguistic thought with linguistic thought, but it is the linguistic aspect that gets discussed virtually everywhere. The linguistic expression of thought is direct, it comes from my brain and I articulate to you that aspect of thought which is capable of expression.

You have just used thinking/mentation with a practical meaning other than this, and linked it to why it is not identical, or even similar, to you conveying an expression of your thought through the air (or whatever) to me, another mind. So, this, on your own terms, is false. I agree. — AmadeusD

We don't know enough about unconscious brain processes to say if non-linguistic thought is, or is not, language like.

When speaking about thought, the best we can do is to be practical about how we express ourselves about it, I have used thought in saying that it has likely has a non-linguistic basis, but this amounts to saying very little about it.

It's not what i require. THis is what meets the standard of 'Direct' in any other context. No idea why this one requires some massaging of that to make people comfortable. ONly discomfort with concluding that we do not directly communicate thoughts could require that weird side-step (on my view). Happy to hear another reason. One hasn't been presented so far. — AmadeusD

You really enjoy pushing the idea of discomfort.

I've said several times Kant's point, that the world is empirically real but transcendentally ideal. In empirical reality, we directly perceive objects, in virtue of our mode of cognition. Indirect would be something like attempting to find out a persons brain state if they are paralyzed, here we have to use some kind of experiments to figure on what's going on in the brain, absent this person speaking about his symptoms or sensations.

. It is using plain language as it is used elsewhere, in this context. If there's some special definition of Direct which includes indirectness, all good. But, you can see where that's going.. surely. You've not actually addressed the supporting discussions, I note, which are the empirical facts I am consistently mentioning, but are being ignored in favour of idea-fiddling. — AmadeusD

Plain language? Tell a biologist studying animals or plants and let them tell you that they are indirectly separating flowers based on colors. They will tell you they are directly identifying an object by its colors, even if colors are no mind-independent properties.

Claiming that we have to use the term 'direct' because there isn't a sufficient example of 'indirect' despite you having used that concept to describe X and Y. — AmadeusD

Not sufficient example is not the issue, it's the coherency of the argument. There are situations in which we do indirectly study things: coma patients, looking at the sun, etc.

Your thoughts aren't your statements. They are not identical. You are factually not directly conveying your thoughts. That is the nature of speech. I am entirely lost as to how you could call it anything else. It factually isn't direct, so your use of 'direct' must be a matter of your preference. This is why i keep coming back to "Why the discomfort?", That something isn't satisfying doesn't make it untrue. — AmadeusD

I don't recall saying that thoughts are statements.

Statements are an expression of thought, it's the only kind of thought we have acquaintance with, whatever else goes on prior to articulation, call it thought, call it mental activity, is not something that can be expressed and it is even doubtful it is open to introspection.

You are telling me that I am not conveying my thoughts because my statements are not identical to my thoughts, I say I am telling you what I think, in so far as we can use "think" to have any practical meaning at all. What you are requiring be given, in order to admit "direct" thought, is something that cannot be provided, as even the subject matter is extremely obscure.

Here it doesn't have much to do with discomfort, it seems as if you have defined thought in a way in which it must be indirect. Fine, if you want to do that. If so, then I think you would need to add that one does not have access to ones own thoughts, because when we express them, we are leaving out what matters.

But, it's not the thought. It literally is not the thought. You cant claim a direct transmission of your thought. That option isn't open. — AmadeusD

By this standard, as mentioned previously, I don't have access to my own thoughts. Then I think we would need a better conception of what this "thought" is which you insist we are not able to express or get across.

You've answered your own Q. This is exactly like asking "Why is something that has been made not-dry wet?". It serves as an analytical statement, essentially. — AmadeusD

If you say so.

I take it that mediation and directness (or indirectness) are different things, again with Kant: empirical reality, transcendental ideality.

Direct means there is no mediation. NO way-points. NO stops along the way. That is not hte case either with receiving external data to create a phenomenal experience or in communicating thoughts. They are necessarily indirect. — AmadeusD

If this is how directness is defined, then nothing is direct.

But then indirectness loses any meaning, there is no contrast to it, for even speaking about directness is indirect.

The issue here is insisting that mediation must mean indirectness. I don't see this as following.

Why would it indicate that? If there is not a way to directly apprehend something (i.e literally have it enter you mind without mediation) that doesn't mean we just give up and say ah well, closest we can get should be called Direct then. That is shoddy thinking, frankly. Somewhat cowardly, in the sense of retreating from the facts. If the case is that your communication is mediated and therefore indirect, we can then just call that direct and get on with it outside of day-to-day living(ie, this discussion is outside of that) — AmadeusD

No. We only have our concepts and our mode of cognition to interact with the world, there are no other avenues available to us. This has nothing to do with giving up, this is facing our situation as human beings. A flower (or whatever it is absent us) "in itself" is nothing without something that gives it some significance. "Closest we can get?" The only thing we get. Maybe there are intelligent aliens with a more sophisticated mind than ours, they would then see a flower in a different manner from us, perhaps see aspects of it we cannot.

This does not remove the fact that we deal with the world the only way we can.

This is not a consideration in this discussion. If it is, it is. Benefits are not relevant to whether something is the case. — AmadeusD

Maybe it is not for you. I consider the ability to form sentences to express whatever it is that goes on in my head to be a direct process. I can't make sense of such statements as I indirectly state my thoughts in my sentences. I can say I'm expressing a thought that needs elucidation, but I wouldn't call it an indirectly expressed thought, unless I am purposively saying one thing to mean another thing and am being obscure about it.

I don't understand how its possible disagree, without being plain incoherent, that something heavily mediated is indirect. The definition of direct seems to preclude a mediated system to be claimed as direct from one end ot the other. — AmadeusD

Why is something heavily mediated indirect? Why? In other words, how does mediated necessitate something to be indirect? If I follow that route, I am going to end up saying I indirectly mediated my view of this thing.

Because I have mediation, I directly saw this thing, without mediation I cannot see anything. Again, this is in empirical reality, I am not talking about "ultimate natures", or the "ground of things" - not even physics attains this.

If I said, because of mediation I indirectly saw a flower indicates to me that there is a single proper way to see a flower, but this is false: knowledge is perspectival and relational.

I certainly don't accept naive realism; nor do I know of any scientist who does.

We accept that communication (of thought) is necessarily indirect. I don't see why that's so unsatisfactory, myself.
I suppose 'progress' would depend on whether you take an 'idea' to be different to a 'thought'. Thoughts are specific instances of ideas, surely. I just don't know if that adequate teases out separate concepts for each. — AmadeusD

I don't think it is. I see why you may want to say that and the reasons for it aren't bad, but I also don't see any evident benefits from saying that communication is indirect. Speaking for myself, I don't see a need for it, I think it causes more confusion than clarification, though we agree that there is something going on prior to language, so the issue here is one of preference as I see it.

I don't know quite well what an "idea" or a "thought" is, or how they differ. Yes, I have said that people can write down what they think, but this leaves the precise question of what "thought", which is very hard to clear up. And that's no surprise, it's been a problem for the philosophers for thousands of years.

That is, to my mind, clearly indirect on any conception of the word 'indirect' that I am aware of, and is coherent. I just don't have any discomfort with it! I can't understand that discomfort others have with concluding hte above (obviously, assuming it were true). — AmadeusD

I just don't see how this doesn't boil down, at bottom, to an issue of taste, I don't see substantial disagreements other than what word we use to describe specific processes. We agree on mediation but disagree on how mediation plays into a direct/indirect framework.

I am unsure you are being generous here. Some, and on some accounts, most people do not think in words. They have to translate, essentially by rote learned language, their thought to be intelligible to others. So, it's not clear to me that it matters whether we think linguistically, to define thought. I do think it nearly impossible to define 'thought' though. There's no way to extricate each thought from the other, so is it just a mess of mentation? — AmadeusD

Yeah sure, but if we want to make something clear to us or to others, we use language, if we don't articulate to ourselves what we are thinking, we can't say anything about it much less express it to other people.

But then you'd count what goes on prior to articulation as thought and expression as a form of mediation, which thereby makes it indirect. If you want to say that you can do so, but it then becomes semantic, because I am calling what I am doing know directly expressing my thoughts to you and you will reply by saying that I am using language to express my thoughts and hence it is indirect communication.

One is a factual claim: do things happen prior to articulation? Yes. The other is the point of contention and hence terminological: either I am directly telling you what I think about this subject, or I am not, because language is mediation and hence indirect.

But since we have no other way of discussing thought, I don't see how we progress here.

I probably was having a thought about that. But i couldn't be thinking that. It is external to my thought, and cannot be identical with it. Also, was I thinking of the photo, or the flower (this is irrelevant, but quirky and worthy noting)? Any way you slice this, my thought is indirectly of any given external thing, and my utterance to you is representative of my thought. It strikes me as bizarre that people are so resistant to this obviousness. It's not really a matter of 'certainty'. There is no room for 'uncertainty' about those relations, given the words we have invented for different relations. — AmadeusD

Technically correct, especially the "having a thought about". I directly see a flower as given to me, a human being, not a tiger nor an angel.

There is no access to objects absent mediation, but I don't think mediation is equivalent to "indirectness". If we remove mediation, we are left with a mere postulate.

As Kant put the matter, one can be an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist.

I disagree, but thats important. This does nothing for the discussion. If there is no better way to 'hear someone's thoughts, all we're doing is concluding that Direct Perception isn't possible wrt to another's thoughts, in these terms. It doesn't mean we have to call it Direct because we can telepathise. That seems to be a semantic issue — AmadeusD

What terms? Do you mean being inside another person's head? If so, then I would caution the point I made previously, we are "inside" our heads, but could be misleading ourselves constantly and if this could be the case, and I think it happens often, but can't specify how often, then we would have no reason to believe that being in someone else's head would be more informative than being in ours.

I'm unsure that's true. What of Automatic writing? Stream-of-consciousness? Is it a matter of degree? I have written things down months after thinking them (in the proper sense) and only recalled the thought I had initially. Is my writing an accurate depiction of the thought? I think not (hehe). — AmadeusD

I mean you are expressing your thoughts right now by posing these questions. And these are direct questions, unless you are attempting to hint at something hidden.

We have an issue here, we need to offer a definition of thought. This has been a massive problem in the history of the field. Specifically, we can attempt to articulate what a thought is absent language, that is, non-linguistic thought, but we don't have a clue on how to do that. We end up expressing our thoughts with words.

You could present to me an image of a flower, and say, I was thinking about this, and point to the flower, indicating a kind of visual thinking. But I take that your "thinking about", was about the phenomenon flower, but it must be expressed linguistically.

Of course, one can change one's mind, but that doesn't mean that at the moment you wrote something down, you weren't thinking about these things.

If someone tells me what they are thinking, how could I possibly know that this represents their thought? Well, actually, I know that it doesn't. They have told me the thought the had about telling me about their thought. Not their thought. See what I mean? — AmadeusD

I believe you may be trying to get at something like LOT (Language of Thought), but this is not available for introspection. If I am trying to clear up a notion, like we are doing here, I am telling you what I am thinking. You can reply by saying that I am not telling you what I am thinking, that I am telling you what I thought I was thinking, or something along these lines.

I don't believe I am.

I quite strongly disagree, and think this framing is a mere convention to avoid people constantly doubting the honesty of an interlocutor. As an example of why I think your account (this specific one) fails, is because I could be lying to you. — AmadeusD

Sure, but why would you in this case? Are we trying to clear up an issue or are we merely playing games with no purpose?

I wasn't referring only to myself. I have observed many times that people know what their partners or close friends will think about certain things. This is simply because they know them well, no special powers required. — Janus

I suppose what is noteworthy here would be to ascertain just how well you "got" what the other person was thinking. One thing is to have a general indication of what they may be thinking, the other is those moments of knowing exactly what they are thinking. But sure, point taken.

Fair. "Telepathy is the purported vicarious transmission of information from one person's mind to another's without using any known human sensory channels" — AmadeusD

Ok, so it is an unknown sensory channel, which renders it open to investigation.

I think I get it, as you've said before, being able to read a person's thoughts as they are having it.

Well, this isn't accessing someone's thoughts Directly or Indirectly. This is accessing someone's writing. Unsure how to relate it... — AmadeusD

I believe that the best way we know what we think is when we write it down in propositional form. If someone thinks (not you per se) that writing down your thoughts doesn't count as "reading" someone's mind, then we have a stumbling block. I know of no better way of knowing what someone thinks than reading what they think.

Though some people are able to speak quite well too.

We should be able to say that, at least at the time of writing Sam or Sarah thought what they wrote.

I am. That's inference (using your example to inform me of context - I think is simplistic and under other criteria you can indirectly know something (the shape of something causing a shadow)). You infer from someone's body language that maybe their utterance is veiled, or sarcastic or whatever. Indirect. Agreed. But, it's an inference, not knowledge of anything (you would need to directly confer with S to confirm their actual meaning). — AmadeusD

Alright, so here's an option. I can say I directly see how a person is behaving and using this information, I can directly ascertain what they are thinking. If a behavior contradicts what a person is saying, I use contextual information to ignore the behavior or what they are saying, to get what they are intending to say. It's all direct.

Another option is to say, I indirectly see how a person is behaving based on my mental architecture I have (I am a human being, not God) to try to get what the other person is indirectly thinking - since I have no access to any mind but my own, thus everything is indirect.

Or the common view: I directly see behavior, but I indirectly see mental states. I don't see why an honest report of what a person is thinking is not direct.

There is zero space or time between the thought of the other and yours. They are one and the same. No perception involved. This is, as far as I can tell, the only apt version of Telepathy. All others are just further mediation - so, I actually 'agree' with you, but think your example is misleading. — AmadeusD

Ah. Well, if we are going to speak of thoughts absent space and time, we are going to enter very abstract territory indeed.

Could you outline 'direct' communication on your terms (let us simply jettison telepathy for this exercise)? I'll see if, as you likely allude in your concluding passage, that this disagreement is an error in terms rather than in ideas. — AmadeusD

What you and I are doing right now. This is direct communication between my thoughts and yours. I am writing down what I am thinking at the moment I am writing these words, and you read them in real time and respond with what's in your mind.

If you speak of indirect communication, I would have something in mind like saying something and meaning something else, given an uncomfortable situation, or living in a totalitarian society. To be honest, I kind of have trouble thinking of too many examples of indirect communication at this moment.

You may be a good mind-reader. Or you have special powers!

But it isn't even close to telepathy or 'knowing another's thoughts'. It is guessing based on familiarity. — AmadeusD

We have to give a good account of telepathy before saying something is or is not like it. If you say that telepathy is akin to "hearing" someone's thoughts like I hear (or know) mine, I can only guess that other people are similar to me in this respect, but they could also differ in substantial ways.

I suppose that reading someone's diaries is as close as one can get, right? Then direct/indirect does not arise here.

To be clear, I am not deciding the terminological issue of stating a preference for "direct" or "indirect" realism, I am only pointing out what I think are issues with how these issues are discussed.

I don't deny that there is such a thing as indirectly knowing something, say, somebody is saying one thing while hinting at another thing given the tone they have, or the face they make, or that it would be quite a bad idea to look at the sun directly, because it can ruin one's eyesight, hence telescopes and such filters...

I'm not sure what this is in reference to, but given I don't take Telepathy as obtaining, I agree. There is mediation in every case of human perception. — AmadeusD

It pertained to the idea - not said by you, but could be assumed by others, that if we had the ability to enter someone's heads, like we are inside ours, we would have "pure" access to thought: mediation is a must, so we agree here.

I am aware that this is how communication works. It's indirect. Could you outline what the bit to be discussed is? — AmadeusD

Communication can be indirect, but often is not - of course, we have norms of behavior and the like which we frequently employ.

I see the terms used and the associated meanings, but ultimately, I frankly don't understand the problem behind the direct vs. indirect distinction, it seems to me that at bottom it is semantical, not substantial. "Direct" or "indirect" can be used in such a way that both are true in a straightforward manner.

I do not think this has ever occurred. It is not possible, as best I can tell, or as far as I know. More than happy to be put right here, though. It would be very exciting! But, forgive any skepticism that comes along with.. — AmadeusD

Really? That's a bit surprising. It's been my experience that if you know someone for some length of time, it can happen that you can tell what they are thinking given a specific situation. Not that it's super common, but not a miracle either.

So, in the Telepathy case, 'perception' retrieved or received data directly from another's mind with no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium - but the brain still has to make that into an experience of hearing words (or whatever it might be). So, for this part whether or not something is Direct, or Indirectly perceived is irrelevant. But I don't think that's been the issue at hand. I am sorry if i'm misunderstanding here. — AmadeusD

There is always mediation though, even in our own case.

He could not. He could tell you what his interpretation, as a physical mode of communication required, of his thought into an intelligible medium for traversing space and time. You can see here exactly why this is indirect vs telepathy proper. Some argue that speech is telepathy - but this misses the point, i think. — AmadeusD

I don't follow. What we "hear" inside our heads is not "pure" either, it's due to some processes in the brain of which we have no access to. If a person is angry or upset or is sharing an idea about something interesting or whatever, they can do what we are doing right now, putting into words what we think.

It's an interesting case, though I think we should keep in check that brains are assumed to be very complex objects with an extremely rich - and largely unknown - inner structure. One could say that the same logic follows about ordinary objects, but I think this analogy is not quite accurate.

If telepathy followed, I don't think direct realism would stand (nor indirect to be fair, I don't think for most cases these terms are too helpful). We have instances, rare to be sure, in which we can read exactly what we had in each other's mind, but we would expand these instances to it being accurate or "on" all the time.

We could expand telepathy to mean something like, getting into somebody else's inner dialogue (in as much as it is a dialogue, which if looked at closely, it's not, it's much more fragmented than that.). So let's grant this power.

We still have no clue how the brain causes these inner thoughts to arise. Something important is hidden from us, but direct/indirect does not enter:

You can say I inferred he was thinking X because he was behaving like Y (in this sense it can be called "indirect", but Y behavior can also tell us directly what the person is thinking or feeling), but he could also tell me exactly what he is thinking, if he's being honest.

It's a good issue to raise.

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

How would this follow?

I think we have good reasons to give that show that our waking life is not the same as a dream, at least, a great deal of the time.

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

You can say that, sure. But how would we know that whatever is at the bottom of our subjective perceptions is directly perceived? Why would be inclined to take as true whatever physics says?

Either the direct/indirect part applies to everything, or something is off about its formulation. At least that's how it feels like to me.

The issue that would be helpful to have clarified is what would "directly" perceiving an object imply? How would it differ from what we have (whatever its epistemic status may end up being) ?

Once upon a time everything was philosophy. After all, it didn't make much sense to say that separate things existed as several disciplines, logic, politics and astronomy all studied the same world, and educated people could be experts on everything.

Then came the scientific revolution during the 17th century and our knowledge of the world drastically increased, to such an extent that in little over a century, a person went from being well versed in everything to being primarily a chemist, historian or an economist, etc.

Today things are so specialized that you can dedicate your life on focusing on one specific sub-section of a subsection of a subsection, say, studying one type of mushroom, or the cells of jellyfish or specializing on a single video game or a type of whisky or a genre of literature on YouTube.

The areas where we have made progress stopped being called "philosophy" and became "science". Those very questions which belong to the ancient tradition but could not yet (or maybe ever) be made into a science, remain in philosophy.

It's a matter of the degree of specialized knowledge one has as opposed to the considerations of the bigger picture in any single field of knowledge, hence, philosophy of film, philosophy of history, philosophy of art, etc.

There's still overlap however, in areas where a science is not fully matured such as linguistics, neuroscience and psychology, as well as those areas in which our best science can provide no satisfactory answer: foundations of physics, cosmology, implications of biology, etc.

The issue is that "belief" is rather an English locution, which carries with it strong connotations of "absent evidence", related to the religious use of the term.

I think a simpler term is to use "thoughts" instead, which does not carry such associations. So, are thoughts knowledge? I do not know, because I can't say what knowledge is, or is not.

The term is too vague, imprecise and nebulous, that it's very hard to pin down what it is. Though to be fair, this is not limited to "knowledge" but applies to almost all words of which philosophers are interested in.

In a certain sense, perhaps.

But it's also part of being in this field. To try to contextualize (not mere) words, but concepts associated with the words.

Wayyy too late. You hath been judged :razz:

Is there a unified language for science? You can say there is a unified language for physics or biology or some other sub-field, but there is no unique language for science, because it covers too much territory.

Likewise, I don't think we should expect the same in the fields of philosophy. Another issue, closely related, is if there should be a unified language for philosophy of mind or some other area.

It might help. But we have the additional problem that we don't tend to agree in the meaning of most of the words we discuss.

↪Manuel Or we can accept skepticism and carry on from there without stressing about certainty, knowing that we will die is as likely or less than that we were born. — Lionino

Stressing about Skepticism is futile, agreed. If Hume cannot overcome it and Kant cannot defeat it, what hope do mere mortals have?

Still, it's worth keeping it in mind as a problem. For ignoring it completely defeats the point of what is right about it, that we cannot attain certainty - in this world at least.

:up:

That's a good approach, among others. Skepticism can't be defeated merely kept in check occasionally.

If we play the game of skepticism, then we will not go anywhere, for there is nothing which is 100% certain in the empirical world.

If we loosen our restrictions a bit (leave aside skepticism), then we can say that we were born. Death would be a close second, assuming no afterlife.

They do, many beliefs (not all of them, I don't think) will change the world to some degree, some more than others. The issue is, how can we accommodate beliefs which are specific to some individuals (ghosts and fairies), versus other beliefs which are agreed by everybody: rocks, rivers, grass, people, etc.

I'm not clear on how belief in trees and rivers change the world for anybody, especially when compared to ghosts and fairies.

I'd like mention a related though perhaps side issue. Often, I think, it is assumed that if a belief is rational, then one can present enough evidence to convince people in general. I don't think that holds. We all have rational beliefs in things that we cannot demonstrate are correct to others. Of course, for many people these are things that others might consider possible, but we cannot prove the exact instance happened. But given that beliefs can form rationally from individual experiences, not all rational beliefs are going to be demonstrable to others. — Bylaw

Sure, and I think this applies quite widely. Part of the issue, which is far from trivial, is that we can't exactly say what "rational" is. We all assume and frequently act in a rational manner, but if one asks what is it that is "rational", people often given examples of what rational behavior is: If you see a man with a gun, stay away from him, or make yourself not noticeable or minimally so, etc.

Now, when it comes to having particular perceptions, it could be something like ghosts or a visual hallucination, such as seeing an oasis, the perception itself is neither rational nor irrational. It just is.

It's a popular issue, yes. But the attitude many determinists have in relation to free will matches the attitude of those who disbelieve in ghosts. They dynamic is the same. And, again, this was in relation to the idea that we shouldn't discuss this issue. You've now clarified that you don't believe that. — Bylaw

It is. It's a kind of stubborn attitude. And this connects to the previous issue of rationality, we will eventually find ourselves having specific philosophical positions for which we can give no further arguments for our belief in it, this is very noticeable in the case of free will.

I'm still responding to your saying they shouldn't bring it up in philosophical contexts. I haven't said that you, for example, should say they are real. — Bylaw

Not so much that it shouldn't be brought up, after all I am bringing it up here. What I want to convey is that if one believes in such things literally, then I think the arguments given for such views should be quite strong, considerably beyond say, demonstrating the existence of a tree or a river.

Again. I am responding to you saying that in philosophical contexts believers shouldn't bring it up. You seem to be taking this as me telling you what you should believe and do. — Bylaw

It's the same sentiment as above. By all means, anyone wanting to defend or articulate such views is welcome, but what I would want to see is what do they make about such experiences, so far as ontology is concerned.

Well, this is moving away from the points we were discussing, but, ok: how many adults believe in Santa Claus and believe they have see him?

And note: you don't need to tell me I haven't demonstrated that ghosts exist.
But I don't think those two things are the same. — Bylaw

Yeah, it's already complex. In one crucial respect, the vast majority of adults do not literally believe in Santa Claus.

In another respect, they do (or pretend to) and they have seen him numerous times, at malls or shopping centers of Christmas festivals and whatnot.

We can then clarify, they have not actually seen him, but they have seen people dress up to imitate how he looks like in our common mythology.

Not all phenomena have been as fixed and solid as trees. But again. I don't see why this shouldn't be brought up in a philosophical context.

Many people think the way you do about ghosts about free will. Would it make sense for them to say that free will shouldn't be brought up in philosophical contexts? There have been phenomena that were dismissed as the conclusions of people being irrational that later turned out to be true. On what grounds do we decide what should be talked about or not in a philosophical context? — Bylaw

With free will, we do have a very long and distinguished tradition going back to Classical Greece and even before that time. And it's very much pertinent today.

With ghosts or spirits, it's a bit more complex. I don't know how the Ancients thought about the gods, if they had a literal belief or a flexible belief system. As far as I know, I think the belief in literal ghosts started rapidly declining with the rise of modern science and modern philosophy.

To reiterate all beliefs should be looked at in philosophy and evaluated. The issue is the literalness of the belief and what this entails.

I mean I see the intuitive appeal but, are we then going to say: ghosts are real and so are trees and rocks?

Well, they could accept naturalism, but think that ghosts are a natural phenomenon. Something not yet confirmed via science, or perhaps they think there is enough evidence in parapsychology to take the possibility seriously and this fits with their experiences. IOW the discussion could be framed as, hey let's not close the door on this. Or one could be arguing against specific reasons people assert one can rule them out. — Bylaw

You can take that stance. The issue here is that, despite the numerous reports on such things, when they are investigated seriously, the evidence in favor of these accounts tend to be very thin or non-existent.

We should keep doors open, but it's tricky to do so, given what investigation into these things tend to show. Also, if we do this with ghosts, should we also keep the door open to fairies and gnomes? What about Santa Claus?

I don't intend to sound righteous or dismissive, but how do we differentiate between ghosts and Santa Claus?

If they seem to be suffering immensely and their belief in ghosts - or free will, or determinism, or Hell, or no afterlife, or The Ship of Thebes argument against the persistent self or whatever, iow regardless of the content of the belief, then we might tread lightly. But otherwise why not simply engage in the discussion like one might any discussion focused on a belief one disagrees with? Or is curious about, etc. — Bylaw

Sure, the point is to attempt to explore these topics, but irl situations are legitimate issues to bring up here, I think. In the case of schizophrenia, we do acknowledge the reality of the perception, as we must. But to assert the existence of what is experienced, the way we assert the existence of a tree we can all see and touch, is quite problematic.