It seems like Wittgenstein's work is inherently resistant to interaction with the rest of philosophy. Thoughts? — Leontiskos
This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.
— Fooloso4
But, you're right given the historical evidence. — 013zen
Democratus' was more right — 013zen
(983a)All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better.
I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". — 013zen
Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. — 013zen
I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking. — 013zen
(5.641)Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.
(5.632)The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
Did you read the moral subjectivism section? — Bob Ross
[This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.]
No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined./quote]
It goes beyond being careful. This is the sentence that follows it:
— Bob Ross
Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.”
You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. — Bob Ross
Moral subjectivism is standardly ... — Bob Ross
All three terms [Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and “irrealism”] are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better.
unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.
... this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism). — Bob Ross
In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.
this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. — Bob Ross
... invariably about the attitudes of a certain individual or a group.
... the proposition invariably expressed by a given moral sentence does not have an absolute truth value, full stop or in and of itself. Rather, the key idea is that the proposition can be only true relative to a context of assessment.
I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (: — Bob Ross
I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position — Bob Ross
There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.). — Bob Ross
What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross
a proper analysis — Bob Ross
You cannot analyze X if you do not have an idea about what X is. — Bob Ross
Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely. — 013zen
Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best — Bob Ross
Everything starts with concepts: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross
... while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts. — 013zen
(4.0621)The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and
the same reality.
How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? — 013zen
The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen
I was obviously using the example of 2+2=4 because Bob Ross had already been using it, not because I think ethics is the same as mathematics. — Leontiskos
The rather obvious point of that post is that ethical claims are about ethical truths, not beliefs (or beliefs about ethical truths). — Leontiskos
1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism). — Bob Ross
Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief.
— Fooloso4
'Never said it was. — Leontiskos
When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. — Leontiskos
I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter ... — Leontiskos
I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because ... — Leontiskos
Leontiskos: The activity of ethical reasoning is X; the subjectivist is not doing X; therefore the subjectivist is not engaged in ethics. — Leontiskos
Prove to me, via ethical reasoning, that abortion is wrong. More generally, how is anything proved to be wrong? — Leontiskos
(2.06)The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)
(2.05)The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:
"The total reality is the world" (2.063). — 013zen
(2.04)The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
In logical space, however, I can picture the process of making a pizza, without it actually obtaining in reality. — 013zen
Like, you're seemingly outright conflating the world and reality, — 013zen
(4.05)Reality is compared with propositions.
If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment. — Leontiskos
Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos
The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). — Leontiskos
When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1) — Leontiskos
When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos
But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think — Moliere
(The Act of Creation)The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.
(CV, p. 47)The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.
As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos
To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos
Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos
... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos
Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos
they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes — ENOAH
That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space? — 013zen
(6.375)Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.
(5.4731)What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.
A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects are their relations are merely accidental. — 013zen
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)
Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determines the world. — 013zen
Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen
[CV, p. 47].The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight
Your challenge does not demonstrate a unique uncovering of real truth — ENOAH
It is just another conditioned path which surfaced because multiple "words" moving in your locus of history triggered the beliefs you are espousing. — ENOAH
Both do not kill and don't eat meat follow that process and are neither relative to subjective choice, nor grounded in Natural Law. — ENOAH
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross
2. Facts - not in logical space — 013zen
(1.13)The facts in logical space are the world.
2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.(2)
This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)
For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. (1.12)
The sum-total of reality is the world. (2.063)
It's not the gambit or the vanilla, it's the always. — tim wood
Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? — Fooloso4
Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do? — Fooloso4
The structure of the inquiry being, is-it, what-is-it, what-kind-of-a-thing-is-it, genus/species, quiddities; and the tools being the simple "why" and "what." — tim wood
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? — tim wood
...on the working assumption that there is something there to see. — tim wood
Thus if you always play the king's gambit, and I always chose vanilla, we can ask if in any way these are related, the "always" being the clue. And if related, presumably in some way by the "always," then there is a subject that might be pursued without any reification risked. — tim wood
I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us. — Paine
This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.
Democracy, nevertheless must not be disgraced. Democracy must not be despised. Democracy must be respected. Democracy must be honoured. Democracy must be cherished. Democracy must be an essential, an integral part of the Souvereignty, and have a controul over the whole Government, or moral Liberty cannot exist, or any other Liberty. I have been always grieved, by the gross abuses of this respectable Word. One Party speaks of it as the most amiable, venerable, indeed as the sole object of their Adoration: the other as the Sole object of their scorn, abhorrence and Execration. Neither Party, in my Opinion, know what they Say. Some of them care not what they say, provided they can accomplish their own Selfish Purposes. These ought not to be forgiven.
Surely you can think of a few cultural moral norms that seem unlikely to be parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S
If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome. — Mark S
...that hypothesis is robustly supported by inference to the best explanation... — Mark S
As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made?
... a few of the most wise and good.
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it.
Of Republics, there is an inexhaustable variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations.
of the people, by the people, for the people.
A lot of people think the court's on Trump's side and not being judicially impartial. And opinions about that correlate with people's opinions on Trump. — fishfry