Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method. — Mww

I think we're just disagreeing on language. I don't think it's very likely that the brain takes in sensory input and constructs experience out of it. That was the original idea behind indirect realism.

I think there's more likely a built-in framework that takes cues from sensory data. In other words, it's a kind of tango with world and conscious entity as the dancers. Is this direct realism? Not exactly, although it's something Aristotle might accept if we made the model something cosmic, which isn't outside the bounds of reason.

a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it. — Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more?

Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. — Mww

It depends what you mean by representation I think. You can have very minimal notions which do not do very much work or richer notions which are just unrealistic imo. I think representation is an idealized concept arising from meta-cognitive capacities (another idealization). But what is most fundamental is that the brain is in the business of 'what happens next?', most of this business being hidden from us because of the trillions of parameters in neurons that are hidden from us.

Because of this complexity, intelligible notions of representation are difficult to sustain imo simply because the brain's ability to track or enact 'what happens next?' is far more complicated than our metacognitive ability to track it (which is embedded within that, obviously). Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood. The representations we do make up and are intelligible to us are idealizations that cannot possibly precisely describe what the brain, or even our own experiences actually do. It is not some essential nature in experiences which lead to what happens next but the trillions of parameters in neurons, which are much more complicated and noisy than our metacognitive abilities.

Imo, our notions of representations are not things in themselves but inferential. No experience has an innate representative quality; instead, I infer that an experience has features that seem representation-like. Again, I don't think the notion of representation is impossible or something to be shut out, just it has to be quite weak.

Right, but the direct/indirect realism discussion is also commonly framed in terms of whether we directly perceive real objects or whether we instead directly perceive a representation or other perceptual intermediary (and only indirectly perceive real objects). I reject that we perceive a mental representation and say that we directly perceive real objects.

As stated earlier, I think the naive realist position is based on the misguided notion that when we perceive a real object we perceive the world in itself (or somehow identify the perception with the object). A perception that is identical with its object is not really a perception at all; it is the object.

The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object.

I reject the direct realist notion that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself (or that our perceptions are identical with the perceived object) and the indirect realist notion that we directly perceive only mental representations of real objects. Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations.

Thanks for the explanation. A question arises regarding the misguided notion of naive realism, that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself.

The qualifiers “in itself” or “as it is” confuse me to no end, and to be honest I have never seen a naive realist affix these phrases to statements about an object of perception, at least in common language. It makes me think that in order to see an object “as it is” I must see it from an infinite amount of perspectives at the same time, that in order to really see an object I must also see what I cannot possibly see, for instance the back of an object while looking at the front of it, or what it looks like if no one was looking at it, and so on.

So the question is: If we’re not perceiving the world in itself or as it is, what are we perceiving?

Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood — Apustimelogist

No disagreement from me here. Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. Besides, and quite obviously, we do not think in terms of neural activity, even if that is exactly how the brain works, which is perfect justification for a substitute descriptive methodology. To be a rationally adept human is to be discontented with no understanding at all, so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks, and whatever does is what we deem as understandable. Hence, speculative metaphysics; been that way since Day One.
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a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view…..cannot possibly be the method the brain…..actually uses.
— Mww

I'm not understanding this. Could you say more? — frank

Maybe what I said just above is sufficient? Enlightenment philosophy in general understood the brain’s overall necessary functionality without knowing hardly a single thing about the brain, so whatever we say about what’s going on between our ears is a fiction with respect to the physical operation of material substances. All Kant wanted to state as a warning to his peers, is to be careful in the construction of those fictions, one of which….his in particular it so happens….is what you already said regarding a built-in a priori framework.

Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. — Mww

so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks — Mww

Yup, definitely agree with your sentiments in this post! I think this applies to all our learning. All we have are "stories" that are constructed and enacted in experience and we argue about their merits.

Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain. — Mww

Yes, that seems right.

In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?

At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that. — Mww

It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality.

I don't think our mindsets are that far apart.