Science is not intended to be persuasive to people. Science is intended to be the most rational way to evaluate the world. People at their core are not rational, they are rationalizing. Rationalizing is the act of forming some type of explanation that justifies your own personal emotions and beliefs. Being rational requires effort, training, and character. Further, being rational is inefficient in most of your day to day living, so even rational people aren't going to be rational all the time.

You can lead a person to science, but it doesn't mean they'll accept it. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean science is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.

So I do agree that science alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that science has to offer.

Science doesn't purse anything. Science is a tool or a method that we use to acquire facts about the world, or perhaps more accurately, is the attempt to falsify hypotheses we make about the world. Science is the tool of methodological naturalism, and can be used equally by theists and atheists alike, as long as while doing it they agree they are hypothesizing and searching for natural causes. The strength of science is that it is always open to falsification, refinement and improvement -- and thus is not appropriate for making absolute declarations of truth. Still, I would argue, it is the best method we have to acquiring facts -- and theories supported by facts -- about the natural world.

Truth, I would say, is a philosophical concept. As philosophers we pursue the truth, and science along with logic and reasoning is how we attempt to acquire it. The assumption is that if we can get our beliefs to correspond exactly with how reality is, then we have the truth. At least that is the correspondence theory of truth, which is probably the most prevalent and commonsense definition of what truth is. It doesn't take too much reflection to realize we can seldom if ever get our beliefs to correspond to exactly how reality actually is, or at least we have no way of verifying that. So, we have to be content striving for it, and always admitting the possibility of error.

Science is a methodology. It accepts methodological naturalism and scientists go on and study the universe and try to develop parsimonious and natural explanations for whatever it is that they are interested in. If they develop true theories, then those scientific predictions that come from their theories are replicable; if not, then they need to start over again.

For science to be atheistic, it would have to commit itself to ontological naturalism.

I think that since science has been so successful in explaining the world, without supernatural forces, it ends up appearing as inherently atheistic, but if the world contained supernatural entities with causal powers, then scientists would have accepted their existence.

The real question is if there are supernatural realities. If not, then, inevitably, science will be atheistic since atheism and ontological naturalism are closely linked.

Science is happily indifferent to theistic claims; were theology to disappear off the face of the earth tomorrow night, nothing about science would change. In that sense, science is indeed atheistic: theistic claims are beneath the dignity of scientific concern.

"Science" (which is pretty much amorphous these days) is not an epistemic standard. Science is a method (i.e., a way). Epistemic standards are presuppositions of science, but for that reason they are not to be confused with the theory and practice of scientists (which depend on those standards).

Science allows only naturalistic explanations which excludes traditional definition of God (as supernatural). I see a problem though: what about a naturalistic, non-supernatural God? Science seems to tar this with the same brush as a supernatural God.

The atheist cosmologists have created what might well be a gigantic fairy tale - Eternal Inflation and its multiple universes all with different configurations; just to get around the need for God. Seems to me they are jumping through hoops just to avoid God. Not very objective or scientific IMO.

science generates wisdom.

wisdom does concern the extraterrestial but never has been God directly.

science is definitely not atheistic but can be stupidly if the God question is already taken seriously. They don't stand by "not God" at all.

Science is a valid mode of knowing.
Philosophy is a valid mode of knowing.
Art is a valid mode of knowing.
Theology is a valid mode of knowing.

The problem is when science is epistemologically privileged over the others as a mode of knowing. Unfortunately we are in an era where the materialist reductionist perspective is dominant.

Science does nothing at all. Science is the acquisition, verification and organization of facts regarding properties of the material world. (And I doubt there is such an entity as 'the truth').

Science genius says the governments are slowly killing us with stress.

I know this link is long, but the pertinent information is in the first 15 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=896&v=eYG0ZuTv5rs&feature=emb_title

Facts.
The rich control the governments.
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746
Governments impose poverty and it’s stresses with their regressive and immoral tax control policies. Both income tax and regressive sales and V A Ts.
https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2011/01/04/why-vat-is-regressive/

Stress reduces our life expectancy and causes misery and hardship for the vast majority of us.

Most countries and our oligarch masters are the richest they have ever been and can easily afford to end poverty, should they choose to.

Should our governments and oligarch masters be urged to stop reducing our lifespans by using an immoral tax system when they could easily end poverty?

Thoughts?

Regards
DL

Science is agnostic with regard to hypotheses lacking conclusive evidence.

Science has yet to develop a coherent theory of consciousness and how observing a particular subatomic particle affects its behavior. Can it?

Science is used for discovery, when discovering more about something, we tend to become more wise. Wise, being, that quality which is benefient for themselves or can produce wise informaton, a print-out that's beneficent to others.

Handling life requires wisdom those wise of life handle it.

Science

1. Explains (causal): The Challenger space shuttle blew up. How (explanation)?

2. Predicts: Such and such will happen and this is why (proof).

The confusion between an explanation (how) & an argument (why) is a well-known issue, possibly because of the word "because" (ambiguous) used to introduce both the explanans & the premises.

Science is a method, an approach, of studying a subject.
Its not a subject or a tradition.
To claim any field or tradition is the sole possessor of the ability to establish facts, is cult-like thinking.

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths.

"Science pursues" testable, provisional knowledge (e.g. abduction). Only sentences are truthbearers.

Do you think that mathematics is less a particular science than an instrument in the service of other sciences? — Mathias

Not so much an instrument as foundational to science. All the branches of science depend on mathematical reasoning.

Do you think that mathematics is less a particular science than an instrument in the service of other sciences? — Mathias

I take the position that math is the language in which the laws of the universe are formulated. Granted that pure math, as distinguished from applied math, is a discipline all of its own, we still have to wonder at the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences. The phrase "unreasonable effectiveness" says it all: it seems unlikely that math's utility is a coincidence.

So, math, rather than an "instrument in the service of other sciences", is, for me, the true form of the laws of nature. Analogically, math in science is more of a decipherment of the language in which nature's laws are laid down than a tool used in that decipherment.

Quantification, and hence mathematics, is foundational to science. Mathematics is also considered to be a science in its own right, but it does not seem to fit the criteria to count as an empirical science, except under the most radical interpretation of the concept 'empirical'.

And do you think that math are a particular science itself or it is a tool and an instrument for others sciences sake? — Mathias

Mathias, this topic has been done to death on this site. Several threads have been dedicated to this.

But if you like, I'll get the ball rolling... seeing you are new, we ought to humour you. So please consider this declaration (and then I leave this thread, it's your baby from here on) :

Math is not a particular science in itself, it is rather a toool and and instrument employed by scientists and by non-scientists alike.

Do you think that mathematics is less a particular science than an instrument in the service of other sciences?

And do you think that math are a particular science itself or it is a tool and an instrument for others sciences sake?

A couple of years ago I had a discussion with a spanish philosopher who is a scathing critic of religion, about the foundations of scientific knowledge.

Eventually, the matter of the Münchhausen Trilemma arose. I asked him how he thought Science would fit in that Trilemma, and he answered:

For Science to fall into the Münchhausen Trilemma, it would have to be classified on one of the three options of said trilemma. Perhaps it could be understood that the only one into which it fits would be the horn of infinite regress, if we base this on asking ourselves, over and over again, how an event happens, then the one that causes it, then the one that causes the latter, etc. But any of the answers given in science does not depend, per se, on a previous premise. That objects attract each other, how and why they do it, for example, does not require premises to be proven as true. In Science, a proposition is not established nor taken as true by mere chance or coincidence. Every "proposition" can be checked and every experiment can be replicated to assess whether it is true, always. What's more, it's not that it can be, it's that it should be.

To that I replied:

You say that if we had to classify science into one of the horns of the trilemma, it would be that of infinitism, but then you argue that there are certain hypotheses / theories / beliefs in the field of science, such as "objects with mass attract each other" that do not require justification. But if that is the case, wouldn't science fit rather in the horn of foundationalism?: “An arbitrary cut in the chain of reasoning: A is justified by B, B is justified by C, and C is not justified. This last proposition can be presented as one of common sense or as a fundamental principle (postulate or axiom), but in any case it would represent an arbitrary suspension of the principle of sufficient reason). "

He replied:

What I said is that, in science, “(...) the claims that objects attract each other, how and why they do it, for example, do not require premises to be proven as true. In Science, a proposition is not established and taken as true by mere chance or coincidence. Every scientific "proposition" can be checked, and every experiment can be replicated to assess whether it is true, always. What's more, it's not that it can, it's that it should be “.

Foundationalism is an argument that is not based on tests/proofs: A is justified by B, B is justified by C, and C is not justified. That objects with mass attract each other is justified at the same time that such a fact can be verified: one drops an object and it falls to the ground. In this case, one, posing as the other party, might think that saying that this is verified when you drop an object and it is attracted to the Earth (an object with less mass than another, in this case a planet) would be to say something that has not yet been justified. Maybe there would be another cause, other than the mass, and he might say that I have not offered a justification yet (if the first example of the falling object is not accepted). For this reason, as I said, in Sciences one does not stop there: one checks the hypothesis (or "propositions") raised. In this case, what can and was done: measure the falling speed of said object (verified), it can be seen that there is an acceleration, ergo there is a "force" that attracts (verifiable and verified), see if every part of the planet has the same acceleration (verifiable and verified) and even see if it is due to mass and not due to another cause (verifiable and verified).

That force, which we can observe, measure, etc. exerted by two objects with mass we have simply called "Gravity". We have not said that A. there is gravity that B. causes objects to fall because C. objects with mass attract without justifying why we say it. In Science, the process is reversed: a fact is observed and then hypotheses are raised until one is found that explains it, subjecting it to all kinds of analysis and revisions, constantly. In Science everything is verifiable and is subject to evidence. If it could not be falsified, verified, experimented, formulated, etc. it would not be science. For that we already have religion, which is critical of any analysis and verification that is made of its claims.

But it seems to me that he forgets that scientific propositions, such as those concerning gravity, do depend upon a previous premise: The uniformity of nature (“The future will resemble the past”).

What are your thoughts?

This is a topic which I have been thinking about recently, because not just among the philosophy community but, in general, science is seen as being an important aspect of knowledge. This is in the emphasis on evidence based research. I am certainly not against science and try to keep up to date in its findings.

This thread is aimed to look at the nature of how science is often seen. One book, which looks at this is, 'The Myths We Live By', by Mary Midgley. She queries the neutrality of science, saying,
'It struck me as remarkable that people answer questions about science in two opposite ways today.
On the one hand, they often praise science for being value-free: objective, unbiased, neutral, a pure source of facts. Just as, as often, however, they speak of it as being itself a source of values, perhaps the only true source of them.'
This raises questions about the connection between science and values.

Also, I have been reading Rom Harre's, 'Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences'. He says, 'Logic and with it the principle of ambivalence migrate from the epistemology of science to the persuasive rhetorics of scientific communities.' He points to the ideas of Feyerband, including the claim about science, including '"Scientific rationality" may be no better, indeed it may be even worse as a general ideology for regulating the relations of people one to another and to the natural world than lay rationality.'

Harre also suggests that, '
the essences of human cognitive processes and structures are semantic networks, webs of meaning held together by ordered sequence of analogies. Metaphor and simile are the characteristic tropes of scientific thought, not formal validity of argument'.

This thread is not aimed to attack and criticize science, but just to look at its role and values from a critical point of view. Also, even though I use the words 'objective' and 'truth' in the title, I realise these words are open to question. My own meaning of objective is as something which lies beyond the individual and can be measured. I am not sure that there absolute 'truths', but that is not to say that everything is relative. The whole point in using such terms is that they are used by some writers and that even questioning such terms is important in critical examination of science. Any thoughts...?

are not the same. I would agree that science is not "the" pursuit of truth. — Arne

That's a good pickup. — Janus

I believe my intention was to say it wasn't "a pursuit of truth" as in, it wasn't merely a pursuit of truth. But, I take your point and can agree.

Agreed. The purpose of science is to tell us what it can about nature, not to define it. — Arne

Who/what is this in response to?

Science pursues truth. It does not pursue expediency, or the promotion of special interests, or the winning of the arms race, etc. (and yet many are deeply confused on this point today). — Leontiskos

I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own.

Scientific truth is one kind of truth, and therefore scientists pursue truth. Apparently you ran into someone who thinks that only scientists pursue truth, and you reacted by claiming that, "It's incorrect [...] to understand science as a 'pursuit of truth'." The person you ran into is wrong. So are you. You overcorrected. Science is not the only pursuit of truth, but it is a pursuit of truth. — Leontiskos

What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier.

I can agree that it's reasonable to say "science is a pursuit of truth". I concluded that:

science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science. — Judaka

Isn't your argument with me just semantics? By claiming that there's this "scientific truth", you're pretty much saying the same thing as me. My OP is a response to a concern that "truth" is being overly understood as the domain of science. If you want to say "Science pursues scientific truth", at least, that leaves me with nothing to be concerned about in that regard.

I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own. — Judaka

This is just another quibble. When someone says, "Science pursues X," they are not claiming that science exists apart from scientists.

Isn't your argument with me just semantics? — Judaka

The problem is that you are using false statements to support your claim that not all truth is scientific truth. You already admitted that the first sentence of the OP is false. Here is another:

science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science. — Judaka

That's like saying, "Science isn't Y, but Y under Z, and Z is what we call 'science'." The sentence isn't even coherent. Science cannot simultaneously be "Y under Z" and "Z". I think your faulty theory of language is leading you to try to separate science from truth. Science really is "Y under Z" and not just "Z", so to speak. Y cannot be separated from science.

.

What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier. — Judaka

Oh, is that right? So you don't think that some truths are scientific truths and some truths are not? You're all tied up in knots. :wink:

(Note: Atheism broadly means lack of belief in deities, according to Wikipedia/atheism.)

• Atheism does not merely concern rejecting deities, as you'll see on Wikipedia/atheism, or point 2 below.
  
• Modern Science is an atheistic endeavour. Since we didn't always have modern science, it is probably no surprise that Modern Science emerged from "archaic science/religion/protoscience" in the scientific revolution, as religion was literally dropped from science in the scientific revolution or age of enlightenment. See "Wikipedia/protoscience", or "Wikipedia/Scientific revolution". A quick example: See when "astrology/religion/archaic science" was dropped from "modern science/astronomy", on Wikipedia/astrology and astronomy. (Note that astrology concerns deities and religious endeavour.)
  
• This does not mean I am saying religious scientists can't exist. However, atheistic scientists are scientists that tend to objectively analyse the truth value of things including religion; they precisely align with the scientific endeavour of disregarding religious endeavour. This contrasts non-atheistic scientists on this matter, who disregard or "turn off" scientific endeavour while analyzing religion.

(Note that Wikipedia/astrology states that astrology may be seen as a “Greek system of planetary Gods”, see also Wikipedia/planets in astrology, which concerns deities. It becomes quite clear here that Modern science having dropped astrology (See Wikipedia/astrology and astronomy), disregards deities, where Modern Science need not make any positive claims about the in-existence of deities, although Modern Science clearly rejects belief in deities i.e. Modern Science is inherently atheistic.)

Traditional moral philosophy (ethics) can be understood to seek answers to two ought questions, “How should I live?’ and “What are my obligations”, and a question about what ‘is’ with ought implications, “What is good?”

Science of morality investigators seek answers to questions about what ‘is’, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” (Science of morality investigators sometimes go further with claims about what those goals ought to be, but these are philosophical, not scientific claims.)

Shared terminology between the two fields, such as “moral” and “universally moral”, refer to different things and even different categories of things. Communication between scientists and moral philosophers can be almost impossible if this is not understood.

Could scientific discussions about morality terminology such as “moral” and “universally moral” be usefully restricted to meanings within traditional moral philosophy’s framework? No, scientists are talking about a different subject. The traditional philosophical meanings of these terms are incoherent within the framework of understanding why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

Could traditional moral philosophy’s intellectual framework be expanded to include “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” and “How can answers to this question help us achieve our goals?” I don’t see why not; it is simple science.

In any event, new science of morality terminology might help. Below are my proposals for cooperation, exploitation, conditional ought, imperative ought, and universally moral.

In case it is not already understood, I want to first expand on the status of the science of morality framework these terms are intended to serve.

• The science of morality has answered the question, “Why do cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist?” by explaining them as parts of cooperation strategies. Evolutionary processes selected for and encoded these norms in our cultures and in the biology underlying our moral sense based on the benefits of cooperation they produced.
• Evidence supports this concept of morality (Morality as Cooperation Strategies) being as innate to our universe and cross-species universal as the mathematics that define the cooperation/exploitation dilemma and the cooperation strategies that solve it.
• However, being innate to our universe does not necessarily imply any innate, imperative bindingness - what we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.
• Rather, Morality as Cooperation Strategies’ bindingness will come from a combination of 1) Individuals and groups choosing to advocate it as a matter of preference and 2) hypothetical future philosophical arguments that might argue it is “What everyone morally ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”.

Consistent with the above framework for a scientific understanding of cultural moral norms and our spontaneous moral judgments, we can define:

• Cooperation is the process of working together to the same end. Motivation to cooperate comes from less effort commonly needed to achieve that end. For example, moral norms and moral judgments are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible, rules of thumb) for parts of cooperation strategies. The Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, which implies the (often unconscious) ends of “being treated as you would like to be treated”, not being lied to, stolen from, or killed. Violators of these norms are commonly judged to deserve punishment, though they may not be punished except by damage to their reputation.
• Exploitation (usually called “defection” in game theory) is selfish behavior that harms other cooperators in ways that discourages future cooperation. For example, free riders (those accepting the benefits of living in cooperative societies but selfishly choosing not to reciprocate) exploit others’ cooperation efforts. Also, Ingroups (sometimes called coalitions in game theory) can cooperate to exploit outgroups. The descriptively ‘moral’ norms “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is evil” are examples of ingroups cooperatively enforcing norms that exploit outgroups. This norm about women directly exploits them to increase the benefits of cooperation for the ingroup – men. The norm about homosexuals indirectly exploits them as imaginary threats and (in condemning the behavior) markers of membership in the ingroup, which can motivate increased cooperation within the ingroup. In summary, if there is a power imbalance, exploited outgroups may be unable to refuse to cooperate (unfair as that is when they are being exploited), and cooperation with exploitation can be sustainable in the long term.
• The cooperation/exploitation dilemma is how to sustainably obtain the benefits of cooperation without exploitation destroying motivation to continue to cooperate. This is a dilemma because exploitation is virtually always the winning strategy (virtually always achieves the most benefits for the exploiter) in the short term, and, in the case of power imbalances, exploitation can be a winning strategy in the long term.
• “Conditional oughts” are oughts of the form, “If you desire X, then you ought to do Y”. These are the only oughts that science, even the science of morality, innately provides. (One might also call them “hypothetical imperatives” in Phillipa Foot’s terminology.)
• “Imperative oughts” are oughts of the form “What you morally ought to do regardless of your needs and preferences”. (Perhaps one might also call them “categorical imperatives” in Kant’s terminology, but to me, Kant’s nomenclature is needlessly obscure. Also, the use of a term specific to science may reduce confusion.)
• “Universally moral” in the science of morality context is the subcomponent of descriptively moral behaviors that are necessary for all cooperation strategies. As necessary parts of all cooperation strategies, they will be cross-culturally and cross-species moral (universally moral). It appears to be the case that “universally moral” behaviors (in the scientific sense) are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. Of course, there is no necessary reason that what is universally moral in the scientific sense will be what we imperatively ought to do (a meaning of universally moral in the philosophical sense).

Terminology for describing results from the science of morality is not settled. Suggestions for more useful terminology and definitions are welcome. The best terminology will be equally useful for scientists working in the field and for moral philosophers.

Methodically, science is a way of thinking - demonstrated to establish reliable knowledge, leading to general understanding. The sum of scientific knowledge is a conception of reality, to compare to the conception of reality proposed by ideology. — karl stone

What is a "higher" epistemic standard? How can one compare standards? This is not a rhetorical question, by the way -- it goes to the core of the problem. (And asking it does not make the asker a relativist ;)).

I'll give you my answer: a higher epistemic standard (using "higher" in this normative sense that you are apparently defending) is one that calls our attention to the fundamental link between knowledge and (individual) experience. There is no knowledge without a knower, and a higher epistemic standard is one which tests a given proposition (offered as "knowledge") against the conditions of knowledge: personal experience, logic, rational articulation (among others).

Methodically, science is a way of thinking - demonstrated to establish reliable knowledge, leading to general understanding. The sum of scientific knowledge is a conception of reality, to compare to the conception of reality proposed by ideology. — karl stone

That is more utopian than actual. But even if we restrict the discussion to the natural sciences (the paragraph above becomes strained to the point of absurdity if we include many fields which are called "science" nowadays), it must not be forgotten that science works so well by excluding information from the field of inquiry. In order to develop a law of gravitation, we had to exclude all kinds of information from the actual experience and observation of falling bodies. (Indeed, Newton excluded better than Aristotle -- no slouch scientist, he -- which is why Newtonian gravitation is better science than Aristotelian gravitation). Science works by a severe shaving off of the (literally) infinite pool of "possible data", so as to focus on "relevant data" -- and the criteria of relevance is not a given in science. It comes from the input of the scientist as a rational observer. (In other words, we cannot do science by pure algorithm -- some criteria of relevance must be added beforehand to the mix).

I would argue, that to maintain ideological conceptions of reality, the scientific conception of reality has been suppressed, downplayed and ignored, to our enormous detriment. — karl stone

This downplays the immense difficulty of developing what you call the scientific conception of reality in the first place. It is not a given. It was achieved through hard work, expanded throughout generations. And it is not accessible to anyone without a proportionate effort. In other words, it is not easy to maintain a scientific outlook; it is not natural for human beings to do it. It is feasible, of course, but it is not intuitive.

It is not necessary to downplay anything if one wants to avoid a scientific outlook; all that is required for that is the direction of one's energies to other goals than that of achieving universalizable, replicable knowledge.

(I think your argument could use more explicit definitions of science and ideology, incidentally).

By the same principle, acting upon (not from) a scientific conception of reality will manifest a functionality in the real world - that follows from a truthful relation between the knowledge bases of action and reality. It is a lever - a key, a means of organisation with the potential for massive benefits - and in face of dire need. — karl stone

Well said.

Nonetheless, there are other things between heaven and earth than science x ideology.