• Naming and Necessity, reading group?

    So, let me break it down.

    The meter stick is not the rigid designator, but the length of the meter stick is? How can this be?
  • The Shoutbox

    I'm starting to suspect that we will never finish Naming and Necessity without someone or something guiding us over or through it like a companion.

  • Ongoing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reading group.

    Interesting. But the metaphysical self is then transcendental?
  • Addicted to the philosophy forum
    Same. But it's a healthy addiction. I like when I get a post to respond to...
  • Naming and Necessity, reading group?

    Ok, that much I understand. But, the standard length of a meter isn't stipulated, is it?
  • Naming and Necessity, reading group?

    So, how do you address the issue of trans-world identification?
  • Ongoing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reading group.

    Ah, I see. But, then if the metaphysical self doesn't reside in the world, then where does it reside then?
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    But it isn't. The length of the stick might have been other than it was.

    Did you mean "The length of the meter is rigid in all possible worlds"? That works.

    My point seems to be that there is no difference between the two. If we are to assume a possible world where the nomological necessity of the length of the meter stick is defined by the conditions quoted text in the OP, which obtains due to being the same as our world, then stating otherwise is nonsense.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick

    Well, yes. Here's is what I'm referencing again:

    Today, a meter is defined as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second. A second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom. So in effect, we have substituted the caesium-133 atom for the standard meter bar. The same points could still be made, but we’ll stick with the meter bar for simplicity.John MacFarlane

    Had the speed of light been any different in another possible world, then the above would simply not be true or nonsensical wrt. to define the length of a meter in that world. I don't see how you can quibble over that.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    The metre stick is not rigid. It might be different lengths in other possible situations. But the metre is rigidly designated by "one metre"Banno

    Let's at least try and not be obtuse here. The length of the meter stick is rigid in all possible worlds where the accessibility relation of one world also guarantees nomological necessity in another. Those accessibility relations, or if you prefer, "properties" of said object are outlined in the OP's quoted text.


    One of the applications of 'possible worlds' semantics and the 'accessibility relation' is to physics. Instead of just talking generically about 'necessity (or logical necessity),' the relation in physics deals with 'nomological necessity.' The fundamental translational schema (TS) described earlier can be exemplified as follows for physics:

    (TSN) P is nomologically necessary means that P is true at all possible worlds that are nomologically accessible from the actual world. In other words, P is true at all possible worlds that obey the physical laws of the actual world.

    So, that is to say, that the stipulation that the meter stick is the same as a meter, is true in all possible worlds, and talking otherwise would invoke some nonsense or senseless declarative statement.
  • Naming and Necessity, reading group?
    Indeed, I had the liar sentence in mind as I was writing that. The similarities are strong. I also agree that it is fun to play around with such sentences. We only get ourselves into a muddle if we start to believe it tells us anything about how people really use language.andrewk

    As much as I would want to call 'philosophy' mental masturbation, I have learned a lot and have been stimulated by this thread. It has helped me understand that analytic philosophy can be fun to entertain.
  • Ongoing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reading group.
    Free will.

    The soul is not part of the natural world.

    These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... Are you inferring them from what has been said contrasted to what hasn't been said?

    Solipsism: The “I” alone (solus "alone" and ipse "self”) is a limit of the world, the limit of what I can say and think. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves.Fooloso4

    Yes, I think so. But, it's just redundant to state a limit where none can be drawn, no?

    The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. My world, the microcosm, is the world as I represent it.Fooloso4

    Not true, the facts of science are indisputable.

    The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.Fooloso4

    The subject may not represent itself; but, that is irrelevant. The form is the same.

    The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.Fooloso4

    I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world.

    My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.Fooloso4

    Yes, but, the world came first. I cannot doubt you don't have a beetle if you say it exists.

    The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. This limit marks a form of skepticism.Fooloso4

    Yes and no, because if we are to talk about the logical space of the first person, then yes, the limits of your world are one and the same as the limits of the actual world. But, you can always tell me you have a beetle if I can't see one.
  • Ongoing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reading group.

    No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve.
  • Naming and Necessity, reading group?
    The 'Nixon might not have been named Nixon' sentence is a classic example of how analytic philosophy often disappears up its own fundament, by agonising over the meaning of a sentence that nobody would ever use, and claiming that the analysis is somehow relevant to how people do use language.andrewk

    No, but it is an interesting thought experiment, and the sentence is perfectly well structured. Akin to the liar paradox.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    That's not circular.Banno

    Then it is instantiated or obtains through something that cannot be disputed, such as the laws of physics or nature.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    The metre stick is used to set a specific length, designated rigidly by the name "Metre".Banno

    I think you missed the entirety of the OP. It is the properties of the meter stick that maintain its rigidity in all possible worlds where the same accessibility relations (laws of nature) are the same.
  • What's grinding your gears?

    Lucky man. Ain't ever had to visit complaint clinics.
  • Ongoing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reading group.
    Meanwhile you have completely ignored my discussion of 5.Fooloso4

    Please distill your thoughts. I can't gather them all in one coherent fashion,
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    Everything is defined circularly, by the way. That's how definitions work. All the words in a dictionary are defined in the dictionary by other words being defined in the dictionary. If you don't have any intuitive semantic grasp of some of those words, it's just one big circular mess and you'd be stuck.Terrapin Station

    Is that so? What do you think, @Banno?
  • Tastes and preferences.
    Aren't tastes and personal preferences also truth-apt?sime

    I don't know, You tell me. It's interesting.
  • The Shoutbox
    Magikal beer time has arrived once again.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    We can logically conceive of him being called “Smith” in a possible world that he was adopted. However, “Nixon” is still a rigid designator because that is how we know we are talking about the same person. It’s a rigid designator, but that name given to him is a contingent truth.Noah Te Stroete

    See, this is like trying to have it both ways. We stipulate according to some criteria the rigidity of Nixon being a rigid designator according to some properties that are assumed. What are those properties?
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    Or let me try another way. What properties are we looking at or what criteria are we assuming in picking out designators in other possible worlds? To assume that they are rigid designators across possible worlds seems to imply that these entities assume properties congruent with their counterparts in another possible world.

    Or even another way. How is trans-world identification possible?
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    All this. It’s difficult for me to parse.Noah Te Stroete

    So, let me provide the rationale behind what I'm trying to say.

    ... although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called ‘Nixon’). [1, p. 49] — Kripke, Naming and Necessity

    Now, with the above in mind, isn't Kripke setting up the properties of what constitutes "Nixon" as a rigid designator, as a certain feature of accessibility relations that adhere to some form of essentialism?

    I feel as though Kripke is setting the cart in front of the horse when he talks about rigid designators, that are bona fide dependent on the actual world to be true. Again, hand waiving comes to my mind.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick

    What are you having difficulty understanding?
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    All what seems like hand-waiving?Noah Te Stroete

    Setting up a possible world to conform (altering the accessibility relations) to a certain set of circumstances instead of having it (rightly so) , the other way around of the world dictating or determining states of affairs.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    What do you mean by “accessibility”?Noah Te Stroete

    I typically think of "accessibility" as features of the world that endow or enable us to speak about counterfactuals.

    My point here is that if we have no sense of counterfactual definitiveness (or an accessibility relation that is true for all possible worlds, such as the laws of physics) defined in the axioms of a stipulated possible world, then all this seems to amount to is hand-waving.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    But accessibility relations are determined by the properties of the modal logic in use (basically which worlds can quantify over other worlds given certain properties like transitivity or Euclideanness), they aren't properties of the possible worlds themselves, right? I'm not sure if this is essentialism.MindForged

    Well, yeah. It's somewhat a trite truism to state that an accessibility relation holds if we can change the axioms of the possible world's properties at will or at leisure? What do you think?

    I mean if we are going to assume certain properties as equivalent to our own world, then we might as well restrict the domain of stipulating possible worlds to a certain set of circumstances. But, that just renders the whole issue as tantamount to nothing determinate.
  • Kripke's Meter-Stick
    Possible worlds are stipulated. We stipulate the counterfactuals. So, we would have to stipulate that the laws of nature are the same or different.Noah Te Stroete

    Yes, possible worlds are stipulated; yet, I'm highlighting the fact that their accessibility relations must be the same as those of the actual world to be able to rigidly refer to their status as rigid designators.
  • New old poster here.

    Welcome again!
  • Tastes and preferences.
    We can only invent a meaning, meaningful to ourselves as human beings and because of our individuality we can't invent an objective meaning, only individual ones. We might be able to conclude a meaning, value or purpose that might be true for as many people in as many different cultures and situations as possible, but we could never find anything truly universally objective.Christoffer

    Personally, I see a false dichotomy being drawn here. There's also a subsidiary no true Scotsman fallacy being drawn here. Let me explain:

    1. Meaning can only be true if it is objective.
    2. We don't know what is objective due to our subjectivity.
    3. Hence, life is meaningless until we create meaning for ourselves.

    Does that sound like your argument or is it just a clumsy strawman on my part?
  • Death, Harm, and Nonexistence

    Forgive me if I assume too much; but, I get the feeling in the sense that you're trying to express the inescapability of your condition, hence you feel despairing. Fighting with depression is like pulling on a Chinese finger trap. There's no point in fighting with it head-on/directly. There are better ways to deal with it indirectly. Instead of focusing on it too intently, shift your thoughts to things that give you comfort and happiness. Such, as feeling appreciative for the things you have. Don't compare yourself to others in that they are happier or without (seemingly) any problems that you have. Everyone has some problems they deal with and there's really nothing good that result from unfair comparisons, such as envy/jealousy/and such.

  • Tastes and preferences.
    Objective meaning can only exist if you can prove it to exist.Christoffer

    Nice post. Just sad that you had to start it with a statement equal in merit to one that begs the question. What do you think?
  • Tastes and preferences.

    Hear hear. Great post. I just wonder about whether anything can be said about ethics objectively if that is the case. What about the golden rule?
  • Tastes and preferences.

    But, what if you take the concept and apply it to existential questions regarding having meaning in one's life?
  • Naming and Necessity, reading group?
    For anyone who's interested as to why the view is wrong, it's because it predicts a de dicto reading of "Nixon might not have been named Nixon" that is contradictory.Snakes Alive

    I was under the impression that de dicto is all that can be said. De re there is nothing that can be said. Is that correct?

    One also has to deal with the thorny question of how to characterize name-bearing in a non-circular manner if one seriously adopts such an analysis – think about it seriously for five minutes, and it will dawn how utterly bizarre things become.Snakes Alive

    Through essentialism? Oh, wait I thought Kripke was against that...
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    USA has over 10 million illegal immigrants, which costs the country in the order of $100billion, though Trump may be right and the figure could be $250billion annually.Inis

    Please provide a source for this claim.
  • Tastes and preferences.
    Why would meaning or purpose be of divine status when it objectively doesn't exist?Christoffer

    Isn't that a paradox? Meaning that if one can objectively state that life has no meaning, then that objective statement in itself provides grounds to establish some meaning. This is the issue in a nutshell. To provide meaning to a life that objectively has no meaning. Hence, should we treat meaning as something of greater importance than tastes and preferences?
  • Tastes and preferences.
    Thanks, everyone for the responses. I have nothing to disagree with in particular with any of the posts except, one issue.

    Namely, as mentioned in the OP, if we reduce matters of what gives one meaning in life or purpose to a matter of taste or personal whim, then haven't we idiotized the issue of what gives one meaning in life to a simple matter of what I like best or dislike most?