I don't see why we should expect that a physicist in say 400 years' time will see universals as the same as we do now. It certainly hasn't worked out that way so far. — mcdoodle

There's a difference, though, between what universals exist, and whether or not universals even exist in the first place. For the metaphysician it doesn't really matter what the different universals are, what matters is whether or not we can identity a property as a universal. For metaphysical positions are largely empirically equivalent: whether or not universals exists, things at least appear to be similar.

How universals, if they exist, are instantiated in the world would be a job more suited for science: we can see how hierarchies evolve, how systems communicate, how the general structure of the world emerged from a heat bath in order to dissipate entropy. But I don't see how any of this would ever be able to change our views on the existences of universals. Nothing changes if I adopt a trope theoretic position or a nominalist position, because metaphysics is not an empirical science in the sense that physics is. Its goal is to explain what's "going on behind the scenes" so to speak, outside of the immediate reach of scientific instruments, the features of reality that everyone is exposed to in every second of their conscious awareness. These questions are "epistemically metaphysical".

I'm hesitant to say this but I doubt the vast majority of practicing physicists know or care of the various positions on similarity and constitution. It's the job of philosophy of science and metaphysics to elucidate these prior theoretical devices, because physicists have more important things to work on.

Other than Aristotle what are some good resources on four cause causation, in particular its relationship to science?

In general, the inference scheme 'everyone thinks x' to 'x' is invalid. People having an opinion doesn't make the opinion so. If everyone believes the world is flat, it's still round. — The Great Whatever

I think John is more concerned with the method of finding truth. Or, in this case, estimating truth. I don't think he's going to deny that group agreement is fallible. It's just that group consensus is the best thing we have going for us, as well as keeping the door open for any changes.

By mere fact that we are conceived, raised, and survive through social means- how it can it be otherwise that we do not take into account the other? — schopenhauer1

Levinas, I believe, identifies our first acknowledgement of the Other when we figure out it has a will of its own. In a more scientific sense we might identity this moment as the point in time in which the toddler recognizes that there are other people and that it is not omniscient nor omnipotent.

Happiness can occur during pain, but it is through a prism of pain, and thus it can be said that a painless form of happiness is preferred to a happiness but through the prism of pain. — schopenhauer1

I liken it to a tree with fruit.

If we're to call them metaphysical, then we ought to distinguish between the metaphysics Carnap was criticizing and his apparent "metaphysics" that bears so little resemblance to the aforementioned metaphysics that it might as well be called something else. More like linguistic analysis.

Here's a link to a book on externalism, or the extended mind, btw: http://www.imd.inder.cu/adjuntos/article/604/The%20Extended%20Mind.pdf

I got you fam. (Y)

As a follow up, your question also reminds me that for some time I've had the thought that Aristotle may prove useful in further clarifying and possibly widening Schopenhauer's metaphysics. I wrote some brief notes to myself on it a while ago and can share them with you if you want. — Thorongil

I'd be interested in reading what you have. I can't say that I ever thought that a connection could be made between Aristotle and Schopenhauer, considering Schopenhauer is indebted to Kant, and Kantian metaphysics is strikingly anti-realist in comparison to Aristotelian realism. If anything I would have thought Schopenhauer and Plato would have been similar...but Schopenhauer with his transcendental rejection of the immanent world paired with Aristotle's embrace of the teleological immanency? I don't know...

I can dismiss property dualism, or at least panpsychism because it seems that if panpsychism there would be no way to know where my consciousness starts and another begins, but what I experience is that I'm a being in a body. And there is still all the issues common to substance dualism (for example, how do tiny conscious things interact with physical brain?) — anonymous66

Externalism brah. The mind isn't an isolated specimen.

I made this a while ago, posted elsewhere, but here is a rough sketch of what I believe is the value of a life:



In other words, the value is equal to the personal pleasure minus the personal suffering (which is multiplied by a certain constant, since suffering is more pressing than pleasure), minus the net suffering caused by the individual on other persons (multiplied by the same constant), in which pleasure and suffering are measured by intensity, duration, and likelihood of happening. The amount of pleasure the individual causes other people is left out, since it can lead to instrumentalizing the individual.

I believe Peirce actually thought that matter was just condensed mind.

Logic works for us not by accident but because the Universe itself operates "logically". — apokrisis

Does Peirce think propositions are a real aspect of objective reality? Kind of like causal dispositions?

One can act out of self interest without acting in the interest of obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain, it seems to me. Then again, perhaps this is impossible. I'm not sure. — Thorongil

I'm not sure if harming oneself out of self-interest is even coherent. Surely, we can go through some tough times for the greater good, the overall goal, but that's still self-interest. Even a masochist who gives themselves pain is still doing something they want to be done (even if this is not the best thing for them, something a nihilist would reject since it's an impersonal value).

There's different kinds of nominalism, which can make it confusing. One kind of nominalism rejects abstract objects. The one you were referring to is actually a form of immanent universalism (re: Aristotle, contra Plato). Another form of nominalism rejects any universals entirely, whether they be transcendental or immanent, something that Ockham and Quine thought. There is no such thing as "red-ness" or "round-ness" or "mass" or anything like that - all that exists are particular individuals. The problem with this form is that it inevitably fails to explain why things are similar in the first place. Even trope theory fails because it doesn't explain why tropes are similar.

Whereas univeralism doesn't have to explain this, because all instantiations are of the same entity, either as an immanent universal (in which the universal is "stretched" across its various instantiations) or a transcendental universal in which the universal is abstract but instantiated in the real world as well.

I think a nihilist would be correct to reject "the existence of impersonal values" . It doesn't seem to make sense to say that values exist apart from being held. — John

Collective personal values may make an impersonal value. Impersonal values tend to describe states of affairs: if you have to pick between scenario A that has 10 people experiencing great pleasure and scenario B which has 20 people experiencing great pleasure, it is clear that scenario B is impersonally better than scenario A. There seems to be a value to collective personal values.

So the nihilist might say that there is no difference between the two states. The anti-realist would merely have to say there is no objective difference in value between the states. The nihilist, though, being an anti-realist, would have to not only presume that there is no objective difference but also argue that they feel no motivation to pick scenario B over scenario A.

The trouble with value nihilism is that the nihilist still has to make a decision. And unless they're going to make decisions at random and without any deliberation, their nihilism starts to fall apart.

Yes, nominalism gets it backwards. Things are not similar because of our language, they are similar because of their ontological makeup. The names we place on qualities are names of universals.

Is it not be the case that a nihilist rejects the existence of impersonal values? It would be impossible to live as a nihilist and believe that one's pleasure and one's pain are value-less and meaningless. Our choices depend on our evaluations of a situation.

From this it seems that nihilism inherently devolves into crude hedonism. It doesn't matter what the source is, since morality would not exist and aesthetic judgement would be unwarranted. It would be entirely in-the-moment, what are you experiencing right now.

I'm not interested in truth which seems overrated: an important-sounding value you put into a system if you want. I like clarification and insight. I doubt there is truth, I suppose: philosophy seems to me non-progressive, and I like it for that. — mcdoodle

I suppose this means you aren't very interested in, say, analytic philosophy? Analyticism does not use phenomenology very much, it's more intuitions and logic.

Well, TIL

If we're to take the Straussian interpretation seriously, it it that ancient Greek philosophy emerged from politics - those skilled and involved in politics found they had extra time on their hands to start wondering about apolitical stuff.

I'm with Augustine on this one. I don't particularly like Aristotle's, nor Aquinas', devotion to immanence. I prefer Augustine and Plato and their ideal Forms. Aristotle and Aquinas both deeply believed in a world filled with telos, and it was easy to feel at home in an environment teeming with purpose. The world is ripe for the taking, according to Aquinas and Aristotle.

It's clear to me that we have governments to maintain stability and control over the land: a government is an entity that has monopolized violence. It's a necessary evil, because anarchism is quite unrealistic.

How so?

One need not expect utopianism to realize that some things are entirely vestigial and ought to be removed from society.

Ethics is more general than morality. Morality is dependent upon an ethical structure. So any moral judgement (i.e. that we should live) depends on an ethical judgement (that living is even ethical).

I prefer to contribute to the mitigation of suffering, my own and other people's, as long as it doesn't put me out too much. — mcdoodle

Why not go all the way? Why is it permissible to not do your very best? Why is not-being-a-moral-saint permissible?

The construction would go a lot quicker if those darn conservatives would stop trying to enforce gender roles that no longer apply.

By being more harsh (i.e. calling bullshit), and not promoting global tolerance and P.C, they would inevitably constrain the possibilities of identity.

What the ontological status of gender is depends on who you ask. For some of the far-right, gender is practically synonymous to sex. You have a penis? Good, you'll be the muscles of the family, the one who goes to war, the one who votes, etc. You have a vagina? Good, you'll be the baby-maker of the family, the one who stays home taking care of the kids, the one who supports her husband, etc. For some of the far-left, gender is entirely different from sex. You wanna be a dude, or a chick, or neither, or both, or a tree, or a unicorn or a dolphin, you go right on ahead and be that!

The problem with the uber-conservatives is that they are trying to impose social expectations on sexes that are no longer needed, nor perhaps even moral. The female sex should be allowed to vote, the male sex should not be expected to volunteer for the military, etc. On the other hand, the problem with uber-liberals is that they are so focused on not offending anyone that they completely lose any legitimacy. If you think you're a unicorn, then we're going to need to start changing our definitions of unicorns to include those who look like a human but are unicorns in disguise. For these liberals, gender becomes something to experiment with, caused by an excessive amount of free time and comfort. I don't particularly have a "big" issue with calling yourself something silly like a unicorn, but as soon as you expect others to actually respect your new gender and give you all sorts of benefits for "being different", we're going to have a problem.

So gender is a set of personality traits and social expectations that traditionally depended on what sexual organs you possessed but now tends to be loosely associated with these organs.

What I would prefer, however, is if we just throw out the whole concept of gender. Does it really matter?! Some would argue it does - mostly because they're concerned about homosexual or bisexual relationships (girls need to act like girls, guys need to act like guys, it's all clean and pretty and a well-oiled machine...). They're concerned about keeping things the way they have been, despite there no longer being a need.

Instead, we should make it so that your personality and the way you act is motivated by who you wish to be associated with. Done deal.

Foals is much appreciated, thank you.

I tried Facebook, hated it. Too much drama.

Is there any way to contact those who never tried migrating over to this PF? It doesn't look like old PF is going to be up and running any time soon, maybe we should try to invite them over here so we can start discussion again.

Sure, but why is abstract thinking on the level that we have necessary for a human being's survival?

The capacity to hold knowledge is a complex biological system.

Usually a complex system in biology does not survive or even evolve unless there is a way this benefits the organism.

How is this not question-begging?

Modern human beings who shop at grocery stores have no such excuse, however. — Thorongil

And modern human beings who do not require children to help take care of them have no excuse for having children.

His hair had a "Will" of its own...a-hah!.... >:O

Schop. is religious, eternalistic, and salvific, the existentialists are atheistic, temporalistic, and revel in a lack of salvation. — The Great Whatever

I agree. Schopenhauer really shouldn't be associated with nihilism. Although he certainly was an atheist.