1) "It's wrong to torture children." This is a moral claim, and it's also true. So there are true moral claims. — The Great Whatever

I deny the ultimate truth aptness of this claim. It's not that torturing children is actually okay or righteous, but that there is no actual real moral truth to the matter. Moral truths, in my opinion, are based on agreement and rationalizing within a system of relative coherence and not correspondence.

Dean Zimmerman has an interesting essay about what it would take and mean to survive after death.

http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/pitsod.pdf

It would be different if moral claims were in some obvious way different form non-moral ones, but they're not. — The Great Whatever

But moral realism isn't simply about the semantics of normative propositions, otherwise there wouldn't be any difference between error theory and non-cognitivism. There's legitimately something that makes them true or false; the presence or absence of moral properties in the world.

In my opinion, moral realism is not compatible with a naturalistic worldview. It's either too spooky or not "morally" sufficient.

Your life has to be a vale of tears or else your personal philosophy would be contradicted. — apokrisis

Why is this, and why do you assume my life is not a vale of tears? And why is the existence of lives that are vales of tears not important?

You stop belly aching about the life that has mechanically been forced upon you and take charge of creating a life as you want it. — apokrisis

Yes, indeed, one of the most deceptive aspects of positive psychology is the emphasis on the apparent compatibility between freedom and happiness (and, consequentially, one of the most emphasized aspects of cultural pessimistm is the incompatibility between the two). Especially since neither one is really attainable to any significant degree.

It's ridiculous to believe the universe was meant to make anyone happy, so the individual is expected to take up the reigns and bootstrap themselves into happiness - and this is expected of everyone, as anyone in dissent is seen as atypical. But the fact is that the Stoic advice contradicts its own metaphysics.

Neither do we have the freedom necessary to accomplish all our goals and aspirations. Fulfillment is not really about satisfying all your goals but of tailoring them to your environment, learning to swallow mediocrity. You have freedom to manipulate what is given to you in order to better suit your needs, but that's it.

And of course there's the oft-ignored issue of extreme situations. Natural disasters, catastrophes, horrible suffering and trauma - nobody wants these to happen, but they still do. Who is to blame? Are the victims simply supposed to accept that they're at fault?

Of course then if you think you can have a life of untroubled bliss, you don't understand the point of life at all. So there is no point making romantic transcendence your goal. The nature of nature is pragmatic. Suck it up. It ain't so bad once you do achieve that kind of harmonious flow. — apokrisis

And here we have, alongside your previous comment, the aggressive nature of affirmative ethics, specifically expansionary ethics like utilitarianism or pragmatic ethics. Instead of providing a reason satisfactory to the individual, you demand the dissent to suck it up and learn to deal with life. That's not answering the issue, that's just pushing it away as "unimportant" because it doesn't fit in whatever preconceived notion you're working under. It's strikingly similar to the bourgeoisie demanding the proletariat suck it up and keep working under such poor conditions. It's severely lacking in compassion and understanding.

I've said it before: civilization may thrive but only at the expense of its constituents.

For as much time as I spend reading and studying metaphysics, I have a comparatively low amount of metaphysical commitments. Those that I do have don't really affect my behavior that much, except for maybe my general belief that other people exist and that non-human animals can suffer.

If the religious folks are right, then the continuation of the species might have a reason going for it. But religious ethics is nevertheless almost unanimously affirmative despite having general negative approaches towards life and existence - for the Christian as much as the Utilitarian, the world is not good-enough (negative), but it can be redeemed (affirmative). The "candle in the dark". The paradoxical aspect of Christian ethics seems to be that problems have to be inserted in order for moral saints to "fix" them. Something-something problems are necessary for a good relationship with God or something esoteric like that. The idea that the candle shines brighter when there's more darkness or something.

But with the death of God, the only positive transcendent value a secular man has (to paraphrase Nietzsche) is the future. It's why "secular theodicies" inherently depend on positive predictions, even if these predictions are outlandish and far-in-the-future. So much of our value is dependent upon the future. Think of the children! Think of the possible accomplishments that we'll never actually get to enjoy! The deceptive nature of meaning seems to rest at least partly in the imaginative fulfillment of possible projects that never actually actualize. For the individual, this keeps them sane even though it is technically self-deception. For the society, though, this manifests as oppression and manipulation, as people are thrown away as expendable even if they agree to being thrown away.

But anyway, if you reject suicide in the way Schopenhauer rejects it as a manifestation of the Will, then you probably also should reject human or sentient extinction for the same reason. Things happen and persist for no reason and if we're going to change anything, it's going to have to be for more intra-worldly reasons than anything metaphysical.

I am trying to interpret this correctly. Do you mean to say Nietzsche believed that life-denying beliefs affirm life, because you have to live to deny life, and this is indirectly affirming it? — schopenhauer1

Essentially, yes. Nietzsche's Will-to-Power, a supposed-denial of the Will is nevertheless a form of willing (even Schopenhauer recognized this when he argued that aesthetic sublimation submerges one in the wider will of the world in general). In order to argue against arguments, you have to use an argument. In order to argue against the vital impulse of life, you have to use a vital impulse of life.

It is forced not directly, but indirectly in that not participating in these institutions is a non-starter. — schopenhauer1

er, one can argue that institutions are actually self-perpetuating and may not have the individual in mind so much as perpetuating the social contract. — schopenhauer1

One can also go the path of questioning whether institutions, hierarchies, governments, etc are justified to begin with. Is any harm or manipulation or coercion of the Other ever truly, infinitely justified (here we see the hypocritical and aggressive nature of affirmative normative ethics)? Such a negative perspective on political theory and life in general is almost always tossed out immediately as a "non-starter", as you said, because "life" is considered "immutable", "self-evidently valuable", "obviously worth continuing", etc. You can't exactly have a political theory of life if you reject the innocuous ethical view of life, or so it is assumed.

Affirmative societies take Being to be intrinsically valuable (despite it being simply a hiccup in between non-Being), and yet simultaneously obscure it; in other words, to affirm Being requires the concealment of Being by these same institutions you are referring to. But life, Being, is indefensible. One must point to beings within life to justify life, or take the Nietzschean route and point out the contradiction inherent in rejecting the vital essence by use of the vital essence, "life's vengeance" so to speak, the way life affirms itself by denying the validity of the opposition.

Just because it 'feels right' and it's not hurting anyone doesn't make the cut.
Someone could presume that it's sinful and that it 'feels wrong' and that it will hurt the person/society/God/children. — NukeyFox

Right, but to live in society requires one to make compromises. I could just as easily say that I am offended and scared by followers of x-religion, and point out how following x-religion is entirely optional and voluntary, and claim that it of utmost importance that those following x-religion cease and desist or gtfo of my homeland.

The fact of the matter is that individuality rests upon deviance, and that a society that promises individuality to its members must place limits on the expression of this deviant behavior. So long as someone is not a legitimate threat to the freedom of expression of yourself and everyone else in society, this person cannot seriously be prosecuted.

Is there a way we can justify homosexuals? — NukeyFox

At any rate, your argument doesn't seem to be consistent. You say it's against homosexuality as innate, but really you're trying to point out an apparent inconsistency between the social reaction to two deviant behaviors, homosexuality and pedophilia/psychopathy.

As far as I'm concerned, we shouldn't technically blame pedophiles or psychopaths for their harmful actions. But we live in society and as such these sorts of technicalities get thrown out as we end up focusing more on our rational self-preservation and the general well-being of the community. Like it or not, society will always be insufficiently moral, to whomever you talk to. It's just the way things are; people exist in close spaces and with limited resources and end up bumping and squishing and sliding and bouncing off each other as we all try our best to achieve our desires and fulfill our biological needs.

To ask such a question seems to presuppose not only that we have an adequate understanding of what personal identity is, but also that personal identity is concrete enough to be something that can be gained or lost.

Perhaps the answer is more psychological than philosophical. — TheMadFool

I suspect this may be the case.

Perhaps there's an absence of the implication of a personal defect in a general statement. — TheMadFool

Yes, interesting point. It is quite strange that we normally would be insulted by an attack on our personal dignity (say, if someone proclaims I am an insect (metaphorically)), but are not insulted when someone attacks the human race as a whole (we're all insects).

Say a super powerful race of aliens zooms into our atmosphere and proclaims that the human race is quite a sorry lot and that we should stop expanding our civilization. Although I normally would actually agree with that statement, I nevertheless would be quite insulted by such a statement. Like, who are you to tell me that my life is not worth living, that's my job!

But if the super powerful race of aliens comes with a message that all sentient life, not just human life but the alien life as well, is such-and-such and what have you, the sting goes away. It's as if, if someone admits that their own life is generally not worth living, it's no longer a serious transgression. It's more like a confession.

How an idea like this is presented seems to be important, too. If I present empirical, factual accounts of the human condition but leave out any substantial value-laden claims, I'm not really doing anything wrong. But this also is a bit too open-ended; the pessimistic conclusion from the data is not presented. But if the conclusion is presented too forcibly, it suddenly becomes way too aggressive. It's as if sometimes philosophical accounts like this have to be presented in a certain way. There's an art to finding the right balance between honesty and respect.

Perhaps a defining feature would be a passive evaluative claim. If I say "human existence is such-and-such", I am saying that I believe that human existence qualifies for whatever predicate I use. But there seems to be an element of passivity that prevents me from enforcing this evaluation. From my perspective I obviously believe I am correct in my evaluation, but I can't treat it as a factual claim, even if it is. For some reason there seems to be an ethical requirement that evaluative claims like this are held on a person-by-person basis, even if they objectively aren't subjective.

Although this is a big blow to heart and mind it also opens up the possibility of finding a personal fulfilling, enjoyable subjective meaning to life. As an added bonus we also, despite the suffering that is real and unavoidable, find moments of happiness, no matter how fleeting how small, that make us feel our lives worth living. — TheMadFool

I agree, a certain aesthetic surrounding the paradoxical nature of human existence can be cultivated to make a pessimistic life meaningful. Perhaps there is no logical connection between the value of life and the factual descriptions of it. Without trying to be cliche, it would seem to be that life is what life is, but the interpretation of this, the essence of life, is up to the individual to decide.

This also seems to be a decent argument for antinatalism - if I'm not morally allowed to tell people whether or not their lives are personally worth living, then surely nobody is allowed to force someone to live a life they may or may not feel is personally worth living. Of course, this is kind of a mask for the more fundamental issue, the disvalue of suffering, the same disvalue that I just said potentially isn't objectively shown to be of disvalue. Confusing.

Given the hard facts above wouldn't it be utter hubris and foolish to boot to claim one can understand god's mind?

Does this argument refute the problem of evil?

God moves in mysterious ways...Cowper — TheMadFool

No, because it begs the question.

You claim one cannot understand God's mind. Yet by saying so, you claim to understand an aspect of God's mind - it's apparent inability to be understood.

The religious leap of faith seems to be, then, that jump when someone recognizes the everyday, common-sense implausibility of what they believe, but also understands the technical internal coherence of the religion. That, despite the great chance of the opposite, it just might actually be correct. There's no way to rationally justify it. You just have to take the leap.

Much of theology and theodicy are not really proofs of God's existence or goodness or whatever, but rather defenses against criticism. Apologetics. To show that a belief in God is technically compatible with whatever criticism is brought up. It doesn't prove anything definitively, it just shows that it's not entirely incoherent.

Per utilitarianism good is what makes us happy. Its apparent simplicity and appeal to our subconscious instincts (''happy'') makes the idea sound reasonable. However I think the issue is far more complex than that. If good is only about happiness then a serial murderer on a killing spree is good since he's doing what makes him happy. This clearly shows there's more to being good than just happiness. — TheMadFool

Some of us might be willing to bite the bullet and accept that the serial murderer's apparent happiness is "good" - at least, it's intrinsically good for the murderer. It's bad for everyone else.

Good feelings are good feelings. Bad feelings are bad feelings.

Another problem is the ''maximize'' and ''overall'' terms. It assumes we can quantify happiness in a meaningful practical way. I don't think that's possible. Also it commits the fallacy of appeal to majorit e.g. in ancient times the Carhthaginians performed child sacrifices and I'm willing to bet that the majority of Carthaginian folks thought the practice was at least acceptable. Yet child-sacrifice is unimaginable to modern sensibilities. — TheMadFool

The use of thresholds and priorities are helpful when "calculating" utility. Scanlon, I believe, argues that welfare ought to be measured in terms of resources. I prefer to measure utility based on freedom. The happy man can take care of himself. Those who are worse off typically are those who are not able to fulfill needs.

Even though utility can be ambiguous, if you get a large enough gap it becomes quite clear when there is a difference in utility.

Also, re the Carthaginian child sacrifices: the Utility Monster is a direct consequence of classical, positive utilitarianism. Negative consequentialists avoid this, although they have other issues they have to deal with themselves.

After all a cursory glance at nature shows that it is ''amoral'' - unconcerned by human concerns such as morality. — TheMadFool

Yet saying nature is "unconcerned" nevertheless anthropomorphizes it, in the same way calling genes "selfish" or predators "merciless" ascribes some sort of agency to a non-agent (or is it a non-agent...?).

No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to fully describe nature in a way that isn't tainted by human values. And if teleology is a real aspect of reality, then it stands that we might actually be coherent in calling some things in nature legitimately malignant or harmful.

So evidence seems much stronger than argument. However, absence of evidence doesn't equate to absence. Something can be true but unobserved or unobservable. — Andrew4Handel

But evidence is only strong when it is pieced together through rational deliberation. Observation doesn't just magically lead to knowledge. What we perceive has to be disassembled, reassembled, and interpreted. The same observation can be interpreted in many different ways. The way we move forward in inquiry isn't simply by making more observations, but by returning to the premises and analyzing those as well. Paradigm shifts.

Reviewing the fact that utilitarianism seeks the ultimate option that maximizes the overall happiness in society, Is there any place for morality? — musimusis

Utilitarianism is a moral theory. That we ought to maximize happiness (and minimize suffering) is a normative prescription.

A warning here - don't get all 'mystical' about it - stick with reality. You can imagine things, but know that it is most likely sheer make-believe. You can spend time, money, and energy testing them, if you think they are worth further investigation. but don't go playing the IS GAME - where you claim your speculations are correct without tests and verifications (unless your purpose is deception and fleecing people out of their money, like a celebrity guru). — Numi Who

I don't know why you seem to be so resistant towards metaphysics. This also isn't even metaphysics, it's an attempt at phenomenology, the science of consciousness from the first person perspective.

METAPHYSICS AS PROVIDING EXCUSES — Numi Who

I don't get this, astrology isn't metaphysics, and metaphysics isn't astrology.

I call it the 'IS GAME' - when you claim that your speculations are correct, for whatever knavish reasons (and there are many). — Numi Who

Hence why epistemically productive metaphysics is far more conservative and based upon dialectic and not just the speculation of a single mind.

Interesting theory. In regards to how Christianity engenders atheism, I would qualify this and say that it engenders reactionary atheism. To get as far away from religion as possible by denying the existence of the most central doctrine of (most) religions. It's not based on perfectly rational inquiry, but more on skepticism motivated by social and political concerns. It's telling that modern atheists often try to appear suave and rebellious - they clearly aren't just responding to a philosophical view but are actively trying to separate themselves from what they see to be an oppressive and backwards aspect of society.

Of course a lot of philosophical debates are really just masked politics. For example, the problem of universals is irrelevant to those who aren't specifically interested in it, unless of course someone claims things have essential universal properties that influence moral reasoning. Then you get thoroughly-nominalistic positions that are really implausible and aren't motivated by plausibility but simply a rejection of what is seen as the inevitable consequence of the acceptance of the alternative.

Second-order morality takes its ground to be unquestionably justified, and as such suffers from inconsistencies, hypocrisy, aggressive-ness, and tendencies to compromise.

This is understandable as it's not really a "thing" in moral philosophy. A first-order moral agent can act in first-order moral ways. A second-order moral agent can only recognize first-order morality, but can only act in a second-order, or bastardized first-order, moral way.

Perhaps a similar conclusion, but for different reasons I believe.

I'm not saying we should just dismiss them as hacks, but that we should be skeptical that the metaphysical systems they employed are indeed accurate pictures of reality and not influenced by religion at all. It's why I said Scholastic philosophical systems, like Aquinas', are tailored for the Catholic Church.

Well Agustino, Darth did say they were just personal criticisms he had of Scholasticism. Emotional reasons are perfectly valid from that standpoint. He did not, at least on my reading of his text, adduce them as arguments that Scholasticism is mistaken. — andrewk

This is entirely correct. I suspect Scholasticism is indeed flawed even if has internal consistency, but this is just because it comes across as advocating the "final word" and not an ongoing exercise in inquiry. It seems dogmatic.

For most philosophies it is not possible to prove them correct or incorrect. If it were there would be far fewer philosophies around - maybe only one. Choosing between them is done mostly on an aesthetic basis - ie emotionally-based. — andrewk

I somewhat agree, although I would say that it's far more prevalent and easier to prove something incorrect than to prove something correct. Negative dialectic.

If the philosophy was not consistent it would be rejected and not taught. Any principles maintained would be consistent, and therefore viewed by us as being used to support the religion. So if you are interested in learning some of these ontological and metaphysical principles, without the Catholic influence, I suggest you read the work of Aristotle and Plato directly. Then, after a good understanding, if you proceed to study the Scholastics, you can judge for yourself how well the Church remains true to the masters, or if they distort the principles to support their religion. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was exactly the point I tried to make. Scholasticism, although impressive, has an issue of credibility. The reason it flourished was because the Church sponsored it. And of course it's going to be tailored to suit your sponsor.

Part of why I find scholastic philosophy so fascinating is precisely because it so rigorously tries to make a place for God, while at the same time trying to 'get things right' at the level of the world. This kind of double imperative, stretched between the two poles of God and world, lit a fire of intense philosophical creativity which resulted in all sorts of philosophical permutations that tried to strike the 'right balance', as it were, between the two. The entire spectrum of scholastic thinking can be mapped onto the various articulations between (the) transcendence (of God) and (the) immanence (of the world). — StreetlightX

Interesting interpretation.

One can be all the more secure in one's thinking if one can properly coordinate or triangulate just where one stands with respect to the many strands of scholastic thought that exist out there. — StreetlightX

Right, yeah, it's like the Scholastics thought of everything, or at least everything that was possible to conceive of in that day of philosophy.

And apart from all of that, all the theological puzzles are just so interesting! — StreetlightX

I'm not sure if I would call them interesting, in my opinion at least. They're kind of silly for someone who isn't totally into the whole God thing. And the silliness of them makes me doubt the legitimacy of theology in the first place. Hair-splitting and tangles all over the place.

Potentially an issue for non-theologically-inclined metaphysics could be the justification of metaphysics, or inquiry for that matter. For the Scholastics like Aquinas, metaphysics was basically some kind of sublime activity that brought one closer to God in virtue of studying creation and all that. Without God, the world exists, but there's no independent, transcendent reason to study it. It's not inherently valuable or intrinsically important, or perhaps more specifically, obviously valuable. And so metaphysics can potentially become sort of bland. But it also introduces a freedom that does not exist in theologically-inclined metaphysics. Without God, the world is not required to be perfectly rational or intelligible or even good.

Indeed, I agree with Agustino, thank you for the references!

My mind somehow isn't capable of accepting statements that philosophical pessimism offers. — rossii

If it helps, I struggle with this all the time. Our personalities are not of our own creation - they are socially influenced and thus the optimistic and affirmative morality of society literally bleeds into our psyche.

Wouldn't it be great if the pessimists were wrong? Wouldn't it be just fantastic if everything they said could be explained away by some flawless and satisfying reason? It seems like the existence of pessimism is itself an argument for pessimism...

The unfortunate thing is that pessimism is difficult to fully understand if you've been lucky enough to avoid some serious misfortune or have a flexible mind that allows you to ignore these memories. Another issue is how we seem prone to forgetting all the bad that has happened, downplaying negative possibilities. It's only when life starts to get rough again that you're confronted with the obnoxious and harmful nature of life and move from being sedated to being sober.

For me, at least, it's actually easier to stay in a melancholic mood than to go through radical mood changes. If I am correct, then the anxiety you feel when faced with things like suffering and death and suicide is the result of you bouncing back from an optimistic "high". It's exactly this sudden and overwhelming sense of dread that characterizes disillusionment.

But no, I don't think there is a rational reason to continue living. I think a lot of people on their death beds would not choose to re-live their lives, nor would I think unborn fetuses (if they were capable of doing so) would consent to beginning life if they saw what it entailed. But just because life is probably not worth living doesn't mean suicide is automatically the solution. If avoiding suffering is what you're after, then suicide is actually probably not the best course of action, since suicide has a tendency to fail and cause a hell of a lot of suffering. So you're stuck in a sort of penitentiary. Once life has started, it's hard to stop and you might as well just go along with the flow.

I'm also of the opinion that there's some legitimately interesting and ironic experiences to enjoy while surviving. If there's anything advantageous to being alive, it's that bitter irony and occasional sense of beauty and satisfaction that helps build an aesthetic of a life.

I am afraid I won't escape these feelings of anxiety, panic, depression abd suicidal ideation. — rossii

Like I said before, you're still in the affirmative mind-set. You need to let go of the idea that death and suffering are un-natural and contingent. As soon as you stop clenching on to life so hard, it gets a helluva lot easier and fun. Like Nietzsche said, the possibility of suicide helps comfort those in dark times. I think those who make a "pact" to themselves to never commit suicide are those who aren't emotionally mature enough to trust in their perceptions of their own well-being. If you always keep suicide in the back of your mind, and meditate on it daily, it becomes a sort of symbol of our predicament and can help ground your expectations and comprehension of the world.

For example, I find it funny when Tough Guys hyped up on testosterone try to pretend like they're King of the World and that they can do anything they want. They might be able to do a lot of comparatively-impressive things, but they probably can't kill themselves. Ha!

Since we're ALL on death row and if the law is sensible may I ask what grievious crime did we commit to deserve death? — TheMadFool

I made a similar argument for antinatalism elsewhere - basically, we did nothing to deserve the goods and bads of life, since we didn't exist before we were born so we couldn't have done any heinous or praiseworthy actions. It encompasses both the goods and the bads of life, but definitely is more poignant in regards to the bads.

From a different perspective is the death penalty a sensible form of punishment? — TheMadFool

Absolutely not. It's barbaric, and epistemically over-confident.

Probably I'll give a more thorough response later, but you might be interested in a book on this very subject: Is Nature Ever Evil?: Religion, Science, Value. It's all about not just whether or not "nature" can ever be seen as "evil", but also how humans relate to the world, including the myth of scientific objectivity. I got it for dirt cheap. There's some really interesting and thought-provoking essays in it.

As a human being, it seems like I got very lucky, when it's conceivable that I could have been a bat, cicada, giraffe, cow, rat, spider, salmon, kangaroo, etc. — jdh

False. You are required to be a human to be you. You aren't able to be anything else. That you exist as a human was 100% guaranteed, although your existence in general was not.

I think this is an example of a philosophical thought experiment that seems to be legitimately problematic, but in reality is actually not an issue at all.

First, it's unlikely, if not impossible, that there will ever be two identical stacks of grass.

Second, it's unlikely, if not impossible, that these two stacks of grass, even if they are identical duplicates, will be perceived as identical.

Third, it seems to me that if the ass really, really needed food, the preference for obtaining this goal would over-ride any hypothetical hesitation. Subconscious thoughts might come into play and start to make one of the stacks appear more preferable than the other, even if they are (objectively) identical.

In fact without any sub/unconscious motivation, it appears that basically nothing would be preferable at all. That we are given a choice in the first place depends on previous unknown manipulations.

Hotline Miami

Definitely Descartes >:O Infinitely worth skipping, by any student of philosophy. — Agustino

Ehh, I would disagree. Descartes is indispensable to any student of the history of philosophy. Studying philosophy isn't just getting what's important and what's not, it's also understanding the historical context in which these questions arose. Even if Descartes was fundamentally wrong about everything, he was fundamentally important to the Enlightenment and modern philosophy as a whole. For better or for worse, Cartesianism transformed philosophical thinking, and was part of the reason epistemology became so much more prominent in philosophy (again, for better or for worse).

I get kind of miffed when hardcore traditionalists try to argue that Descartes fucked everything up and that we just need to go back to the Scholastics or whatever and everything will make sense. Even if Descartes did fuck everything up, it can't just be all his fault. Political and social issues made Scholasticism decline, and the failure to keep it alive can be seen more as a fault of the Scholastics than of those who came after.

Typically these neo-Scholastic traditionalists end up advocating the metaphysical system of a single person or group, like Aquinas or Aristotle. Regardless of its truth, I find it nauseating and oppressive, and kind of cringy at times. There, I said it: I find most metaphysics to be nauseatingly totalitarian and psychologically limiting. People hold metaphysical views not simply out of rational consideration but out of a deeply-entrenched need for the universe to be some way. The value of a metaphysical belief is not simply its factual correctness but its causal role in the psychological unity. If you take my view on metaphysics, then, Descartes is just another instance of making the world seem one way.

Probably adequately rated actually. Nietzsche is a very deep and profound philosopher even though I think he's wrong in many regards. — Agustino

Generally, I agree. I've spent hours at night reading Nietzsche's Zarathustra and simply appreciating how I can fundamentally disagree with many of the things Nietzsche says but find real beauty and value in his work despite the fact. I like to think that both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer (and others) were tackling many of the same issues, but came to different conclusions. But mostly I just appreciate Nietzsche's obvious passion and mastery of language.

Well I mean I suppose you could say that Kant systematized everything.

But...but...my noumenon...

Wait but why, though? His aphorisms are great.

I think that what you call dispositions and powers - i.e., what I call tendencies and habits - are the laws of nature. Mathematical abstractions are what we use to represent them, perform calculations in accordance with them, etc. — aletheist

I think we generally agree. Habits and tendencies arise from dispositions and powers - they are the "macro" scale "laws" while dispositions and powers form a network at the "micro" level. As such the macro-scaled habits and tendencies can change, similar to the Piercean tychism. How a system behaves is dependent not only on its constituent parts but also on the organization of these parts, which creates a causal web/network in which general behavior arises.

Behaviorism was dominant back in the day, in large part because the mind was seen as unable to be studied scientifically. But clearly people don't just "behave" in mechanical processes and impulses. There's a mind behind it all.

Similarly, you wish to argue the nominalist position that natural laws are simply descriptions of behaviors. But where does causality come from? When two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom bond and become H(2)O, we can make a description of this phenomenon. But this description doesn't cover all the bases. Why does hydrogen bond with oxygen? And why does it bond in some instances, but not others? The element of contingency here leads me to believe that there is legitimately something relevant that "decides" what is going to happen.

So, if A causes B, why does A cause B?

For the record, I am skeptical of laws of nature. I prefer dispositions and powers. Laws of nature are mathematical abstractions based upon these things.