Is a method that accomplishes the goal successful or not? Of course, there's room for nuance in evaluating the outcome. The best method isn't one that succeeds at great costs or with great risk. But shouldn't a perspective be evaluated by what it produces, not by whether it's logical or accurate? What does it even mean to be logical and accurate without a goal? What do you think? — Judaka

I think that to say that perspectives only have value insofar as they produce the desired outcomes doesn’t deal with the selection of which outcomes should be pursued (not saying you are saying logic and reason don’t matter). In chess, as you point out, the goal is pre-defined as winning. So yes, I agree that we agree on the fact that in circumstances in which the goal is clear and immutable, the only thing that matters is producing “moves that win”, as opposed to trying to only develop moves that are rational or logical for the sake of being rational and logical. Consequences > reason for its own sake.

But in cases where the goal must be established, either by subjective evaluation of one’s own motivations and desires or by knowledge of objective facets of reality, reason seems to be at least partially responsible for the establishment of those goals, as we can always ask ourselves: is this goal, whether it be informed by facts or a way of thinking or something else, actually worth pursuing? If it is, why? Is usefulness not itself relative to the goal, whose relevance is in turn relative to the reasoning used to formulate that goal?

Thus, I think logic and reasoning are inherently valuable because robustness of opinion is the greatest measure of whether or not some perspective is valuable for accomplishing a goal insofar as it represents the realization of a plausible world that we would want to live in - which I think is the greatest goal for any perspective.

Do you think the rules of chess, by which moves are a function of, are based on a logic that makes it a desirable, deeply satisfying game to play? I do. I see the realization of personal goals as being no different; goals must possess some logic to be of value in a world that largely acts sensibly on a human scale. People want there to be rules, they just differ on which rules are correct, and rightly act in accordance with said rules when possible - much of the time.

Something kind of interesting but somewhat off-topic: I think reason plays the long game; if you have a game in which the rules change, the goal becomes to both further the game (so long as it is useful to do so) and to develop new heuristics via experience and reasoning. What you outline, while conceptually efficient, doesn't favor this augmentation of perspectives, but rather provides a schematic for understanding the processes by which people should form perspectives. So, it seems of limited usefulness outside of evaluating the worth of an individual's opinions.

I would like to discuss Aristotle with you but, honestly, I'm reading about this and none of it is making sense. Wikipedia is not ideal for learning things...at all, really.

The proximity to the powers that be seems to be important to me: the corporation, while faceless, takes the position of the provider to a certain degree, yet has no issue with dictating the terms of one's toils without any pretense of having one's best interests, or the best interests of anybody, in mind, as profits are all that matter.

Furthermore, there is a sense of purpose and identity that goes with living under an authoritarian strong-man who speaks to all of the xenophobic or otherwise dark tendencies some people desire to see realized. At least Trump had the interests of the reactionary right and alt-right in mind. I doubt a single cart-gatherer for a super-market truly believes that the supermarket they work for cares that they harbor racist thoughts - or would validate them. Probably because they don't and wouldn't, as a corporation is not a political tribe.

edit: not supporting Trump here, he was perhaps the most criminal president we have ever had

Unreasonable arguments that bring a person happiness, therefore, produce happiness. Well-reasoned, intelligent arguments that bring a person despair, therefore, produce despair. Happiness is preferable to despair, and so the illogical and fallacious perspective is correct. — Judaka

I am not arguing against the use of reason. I am proposing that one should use reason to find the most useful perspective for themselves, and carefully consider the pros and cons of their perspective before deciding upon it. — Judaka

Truth or logic, they're both irrelevant, just choices, we reach our conclusions by the process of deciding what factors to include and emphasise, and how we interpret these factors. — Judaka

It seems arbitrary to designate the illogical and fallacious perspective to be correct merely because it produces happiness. But I understand you are playing fast and loose with some of these conclusions merely for the sake of conciseness; some people have already done that legwork.

The connection between the assertion that selecting factors to reach conclusions and the idea that all that matters are the outcomes of such conclusions doesn't really follow, I think.

Truth and logic are relevant because they are integral to any process by which factors are considered and disregarded; you seem to be operating under the assumption that we do not apply different types of reasoning when forming conclusions, and the choice of reasoning is certainly paramount to reaching a conclusion that can be deemed useful, just as the selection of factors is.

And reason, even if applied to reach a certain end, inherently arcs towards truth given some correct first premises or postulations. Conclusions that do not have any basic logical prerequisites are by their nature not useful much of the time because they do not have to reflect reality. So, if we want usefulness that extends beyond "this is good because it makes me happy" or "this is good because it will help me become more competent", the application of logic and reasoning isn't really a choice.

I would say that reasoning is imperative as a means of extending one's useful conclusions
— ToothyMaw

What does "extending" mean? — Judaka

I mean using logic and reasoning to form beliefs based on other beliefs. People do that all the time, and it doesn't necessitate the consideration of an arbitrary number of relevant/irrelevant factors.

I am not arguing against using reason. Chess is not an example where reason determines what perspectives or ways of thinking are good, only what produces good moves in chess does that. — Judaka

Okay, but - and you seem to agree with this - the formulation of good moves is still informed by reason in chess, even if it isn't the same kind of reasoning that determines if a perspective is good or bad. It does determine usefulness, however, which you claim to be the most important measure of the validity of a belief, so there is a parallel.

Thus, my point in bringing up chess was to demonstrate that, even given a context in which outcome is all that matters, imposing parameters often does not diminish the value of reasoning (whatever kind of reasoning that might be); I'm not saying that the goal is to form logical, reasonable opinions about chess, but rather that parameters, even if they must exist to do something as basic as thinking, do not inhibit the importance of using reason to "win". Reason is not a choice, but rather a necessity, for forming opinions with useful outcomes.

Only so far as they help to produce the desired outcome. However, I'm not endorsing any methodology for what outcomes are desired. — Judaka

The stakes here are whether logic, reason and accuracy are mandatory qualities for a belief to be considered good. Not whether they're ever important. Do you think that an unreasonable opinion that produces happiness is better than a reasonable opinion that produces misery? Or is the quality of your opinion dependent upon being accurate, truthful, logical and valid? — Judaka

I would say that reasoning is imperative as a means of extending one's useful conclusions, and also of measuring the usefulness of extending or broadening a conclusion: if the forming of opinions existed in a vacuum with no logical extensions or prerequisites for forming them, then any belief could potentially be justified via weighing of subjectively valued pros and cons. If this were the case, then no belief would have any more value than another unless its value was consensually agreed upon by all, and there would be no way of resolving many significant disagreements.

I know you aren't arguing that logic doesn't exist, but you do argue that it is a choice to use it when forming valid opinions. If the methodology by which an opinion is formed is the only measure of its validity, disregarding the logic that might help you form beliefs based on other beliefs, then there would be a collapse into what I just described; we would be stuck with a bunch of contradictory opinions whose conflicts could not possibly be resolved except to introduce some sort of reasoning and/or logic.

I don't know how this translates into logic being necessary for an opinion to be good, but logic is an absolute necessity for us to have any means of sorting reality in cases less trivial than leaving for work late because one is a dunce.

Someone is finally understanding that I'm this forum's villain. — Judaka

You took that dig well.

Upon reading a few more times: did you actually write this, Judaka? It's like you told ChatGPT to write like a cross between the Joker and someone trying to recruit young men for a domestic terrorist group.

Maybe there's a little Jocko in there too.

edit: hints of lobster?

I hope my post wasn't too critical, by the way. I think it is a thought-provoking OP.

I rely on a whole army of people because my little brain could not even slaughter the cow or start a fire, or a hack random piece of flesh off a carcass to hold over the fire on a green stick till it had charred a bit. And that is how I deal with unworkable complexity - I get someone else to do it, who can do it better. — unenlightened

I get the feeling Judaka is concerned with an individual's interactions with complex constructs or issues. Even between the different people in the beef-to-mouth chain you talk about Judaka would probably say those people engage in the pruning of relevant factors when fulfilling their tasks or communicating with each other. That's how I understand the OP, at least.

But I could be wrong, for sure.

To express one's self, in thinking or communication, there needs to be a concise message. Of all the points of possible relevance that could be brought up and used to reach some type of conclusion, it is not feasible to use more than a handful. — Judaka

The limitation of logic lies in our limited capacity to deal with more than this handful of factors, and that each factor must be limited further still by meaning. — Judaka

You make it sound like the process of reaching conclusions goes backwards; when someone addresses an issue of some complexity, I would expect them to both discover and intentionally select points of relevance to integrate into their expression, and this might facilitate something not so concise.

While it may be true that people set out to prove things via some established premises or postulates, perhaps even in the hopes of reaching a certain conclusion, most people are not mathematicians and logicians; most people don't use the logic necessary to forming sound conclusions, so they aren't really bound by it. Nor are most people textbook writers, so I don't see why people must necessarily form conclusions based on points of relevance only.

You seem to be arguing in favor of some sort of ideal thinker, even though you appear to simultaneously assert that logic and reason are irrelevant and that the only thing that matters is that one disregards certain factors when expressing oneself.

What is the process used to sequester these factors if not some form of reasoning?

To give each point the meaning necessary to justify its relevance? The very process of thinking precludes the possibility that one hasn't created a circumstance with parameters resulting from the prerequisites of simplifying for limitations of expression. — Judaka

True, but parameters might genuinely not matter, or be immensely useful, insofar as useful conclusions can be drawn despite what seems to be a selection process centered merely on producing something concise enough to be understood that also works. For instance, when determining how to move your bishop in a game of chess, its possible moves not only exist so long as the rules of chess are agreed upon, but also remain so when you are considering how to move other pieces. You could think about how your adversary's knight might intersect with how you might move your rook. But you wouldn't say that one's strategizing does not matter when considering things other than the movement of your bishop, would you?

I know this example is imperfect, as anyone any good at chess just holds all of the ways the most currently important pieces can be moved in their heads at all times, with no need to partition their thinking. But they do engage in strategies that do not require near omniscience that win them games, so those strategies must pay off, and I find it difficult to believe that reasoning ceases to matter, or becomes less important, the moment you exclude some factor from consideration.

Unreasonable arguments that bring a person happiness, therefore, produce happiness. Well-reasoned, intelligent arguments that bring a person despair, therefore, produce despair. Happiness is preferable to despair, and so the illogical and fallacious perspective is correct. — Judaka

So basically, everyone should believe anything they want so long as it makes them happy because we use arbitrary processes of sequestration to express ourselves. That seems to be what I'm reading here.

The methodology for measuring the various pros and cons is what matters, rather than evaluating the logic or truthfulness of the ideas. — Judaka

 
Are the logic and truthfulness of a belief not important pros or cons, or perhaps even the most important depending upon what we are talking about? And what about morality?

How could humanity possibly function if that was what all of us did? Just weigh the pros and cons without any care for right or wrong, true or false? Maybe that kind of logic applies to aesthetics, or warfare, but in a civilized society we need to have laws that are a result of, or are enabled in some way by, some sort of logic. Science also requires the imposition of parameters yet exists beyond pros and cons.

I see no way around that.

Okay, I think we almost entirely agree. That doesn't happen a whole lot on this site.

Would you say we ought to reduce suffering regardless of the status of the individuals in consideration? The suffering of one individual does not take precedence over the suffering of another?

If so, that is a sensible, but not flawless, morality that fits my conditions and then can inform our laws.

The morality of an action is deemed by the effect of harm be that physical, financial or even emotional on an individual. — invicta

You are talking about the specific case, which would be some sort of negative utilitarianism, whereas I am talking about the general case - the conditions necessary for a morality to inform our laws in a meaningful way.

Right. Thanks for the wisdom, Josh. I'll look into some more contemporary accounts of philosophy of science.

I find that every time I talk about something I don't really understand on this forum I get corrected. Maybe I should stop talking about things I don't understand.

Right. I agree, I'm probably just not in touch with how science is related to culture. Probably because I'm no scientist or philosopher of science. But I get what you are saying. Thanks for the correction.

It’s not a question of paying attention but of comprehending what one is paying attention to. We have philosophers , scientists and mathematicians today who represent widely differing levels of cultural understanding. The more traditional among them are living in the midst of ‘aliens’ they cannot comprehend. — Joshs

I don't see how culture would get in the way of good science. Scientists, if they are good scientists, largely shouldn't pay attention to culture. That's not to say we shouldn't have ethicists directing how we use our science, but culture doesn't matter that much, I think. The same goes for mathematics.

As for philosophy, yes, philosophers have a tendency to make more mistakes because the only corrective methods are when it intersects with science, or someone formulates an indisputable counterargument. There is no hard and fast means of showing a philosopher to be wrong if they cloak their arguments in layers of ambiguity.

You mean like the robot hand in Terminator 2?
I think our most talented philosophers, mathematicians and scientists will become Quines when presented with the ideas of an advanced civilization, just as the ideas of Freud, Darwin and Einstein would have been gibberish to the scientists of ancient Babylonia or Azteca. Science doesnt emerge in a vacuum, it is a product of larger cultural worldviews. — Joshs

That's part of why the surprise box would read our inputs to determine where we are technologically/philosophically/scientifically (and maybe even culturally) and then guide us instead of just giving us a bunch of information outside of some absolutely necessary proofs and explicit philosophical arguments.

You are right to think that the aliens' information would be doubted, but if the surprise box works the way I say it would, then your trepidations wouldn't apply so much.

I also suppose we have something of a paradox: the more surprising the alien information, the more and more efficiently the information would be communicated, but also the less likely that we would accept it.

Thus, the surprise box.

We already live amongst intelllectually advanced aliens, interacting with them in myriad ways. — Joshs

What? Where are these aliens? Do you mean smart people?

this direct and unrestricted access does not make possible the transfer of one mode of thinking from one individual or group to another. Why not? Because we can only assimilate complex ideas that are consistent with our own worldview. — Joshs

I think people often change their worldviews in light of discovering new, complex ideas, although people often don't, too. I change my views quite often, even if I have a semi-consistent worldview.

As a result, we share a world in which ancient, traditional, modern and postmodern ways of thinking co-exist. If the immediacy of social media cannot bridge these gaps in outlook, our exposure to other-worldly cultures will fare no better. — Joshs

That's pretty pessimistic. I think that philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians, at least, would pay attention to what we might be able to learn from such advanced aliens. Maybe many people wouldn't adopt, say, moral facts given to us by aliens, but much of the important stuff would get through.

Not to mention, the advances we might make would be largely self-discovered if the surprise box exists. I think people would probably be more likely to invest themselves in such discoveries because of that.

However, we would have no idea of where the surprise box is guiding us, which could be creepy. So, there's that.

yes, seems good to me, but i would say it is not clear what some of these terms mean..."nature' being a big one... — jancanc

I just used the term because it was expedient. I could have said "the totality of all of the things that make depression, depression", but that is cumbersome.

I'm not sure what Kant would think of my usage of the word, honestly. Haven't seen him use the word at all, or any online resources when they discuss his work.

I thought about it some more: philosophy of physics definitely matters, but most of our science is done through the same old methods outside of that highly specialized field. Or so it seems.

Not necessarily. What if their civilization imploded because of rampant moral relativism?

Thanks for the extended version of the argument and link to the article. Makes a lot of sense, and I certainly have no immediate objections.

In my experience, you can't cure a sadist or a psychopath, but you can get them to play by the rules.

edit: for whatever that's worth

Can one overcome a born predisposition to harm others? — jgill

Yes, one can overcome such a predisposition. I have a predisposition for doing self-destructive things, but with time that has diminished. Sometimes you also have to shift the goalposts to something more reasonable than some ideal you have in your head. But largely, yes.

In the end we are largely responsible for our actions. — jgill

I agree.

So, we are caused to will, but we are still willing one thing over another. Seems like a safe thing to say. How does that relate to the (probably misrepresented) argument in the OP? The argument seems to dispute that we can will one thing over another in any meaningful sense.

I think Strawson would argue that the way we are is caused itself. That seems implicit in (3).

edit: thus, our will would be caused because we will what we will because of the way we are

You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon

Okay, this doesn't make sense. You also behave the way you do based on external constraints. You might will one thing over another because of some event or conclusion reached through deduction, for instance. You might choose a vanilla ice cream cone semi-arbitrarily even if you prefer chocolate because chocolate isn't available.

Or you might act in such a way as is contrary to the way you are, insofar as you could want to stop smoking crack even if you are addicted to smoking crack because someone persuaded you to quit. You are acting in a way that is antithetical to the way you are; you are a reluctant crack smoker.

Furthermore, if you have libertarian free-will you are not necessarily choosing based on the way you are, but rather your choices originate with some magical mechanism that allows you to choose unimpeded. So, (1) presupposes that we don't have free-will. Unless you can demonstrate how choice is only determined by the way one is?

It seems to me Strawson must have had some other premises in there.

Indeed. We can leave that task to Sam Harris. :razz: — Tom Storm

I have mixed feelings about that man.

edit: he is right about free-will and on religion, that is true, so I think he has been a force for good. But I know he has made some mistakes here and there on philosophy.

Definitely.

As for identifying them, I don't know. Maybe science will eventually give us some answers on that one, as philosophy doesn't seem up to the task.

edit: what I am saying here is that I don't think we can come to an understanding of moral facts merely through thinking about them, and that rather science, which often seems to be the first mover of our understanding of truth, might stand a chance of revealing some sort of fact about morality. Not claiming we can get an "ought" from an "is".

I'm not a philosopher but this seems reasonable. — Tom Storm

lmao, neither am I

Really? Perhaps it's no different to having a view on the merits of a novel. There is no 'correct' assessment of any book, but some assessments are better argued, are more illuminating and make more sense. — Tom Storm

Given a basic text to interpret, yes. But the only objective common ground we seem to have is some putative universalized claims and human nature to work with.

If we take a goal we can all or mostly agree upon - say the flourishing of conscious creatures - we can make assessments about morality - what we ought or ought not to do. I would argue this is superior to consulting gods, say. — Tom Storm

Agreed. That would be a good goal to converge on, but, again, there is so much seemingly intractable disagreement. Look at my discussion with 180.

I'm interested to understand (in theory) how would a moral fact ever be identified? Would it need to have a transcendent source? — Tom Storm

Maybe. Moral realists are split on this. Moore's Open Question argument seemed to indicate moral facts would be transcendent, but some advances have shown that it might not have to be that way.

edit: going to resolve this elsewhere than the actual thread

Maybe a promise creates an obligation, but that also doesn't propel it into facthood.

No, I'm saying that saying that if you promise to do something, and then say that there ought be a phenomenal manifestation of that promise being followed through on, isn't so much a moral fact in itself but rather a claim about whether or not there should be a manifestation of what a promise entails if a promise is made. You are only making a descriptive claim about the consequences of a promise followed through on; furthermore, it doesn't report a moral fact in the sense of a normative statement or more abstract moral claim like "torture is wrong" - the latter of which doesn't offend Hume's Guillotine. What other form could moral facts take?

And you jerk yourself off every time you write a post, you sad little man.

Insofar as we humans are a eusocial species, it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another constitute our eusociality in practice and that these implicit promises entail that we ought to behave in ways which fulfill them — 180 Proof

You are claiming that the implicit promises somehow entail that we ought behave in ways that fulfill them. In what way do these implicit promises entail within themselves that we ought follow them, exactly? Because it is natural, given we are eusocial? That is both circular and fallacious - to assume that we ought, in a moral sense, follow through on these promises merely because our eusociality is predicated on such implicit promises is to claim that what is natural is right. That is a mistake.

thus, they are moral facts because, unlike institutional facts (e.g. money, citizenship, marriage) which are explicit constructs (e.g. contracts), these promises are implicit to – habits for – adaptively cohabitating with others in a shared/conflicted commons. — 180 Proof

These implicit promises might result in a reasonably structured society, but it doesn't follow that these are moral facts merely because they are not explicit like institutional facts. There is nothing that says that moral facts need be implicit. You also conflate moral facts with useful norms of behavior here.

Contrary to the typical conception of "moral realism" which ToothyMaw is incorrigibly fixated on, isn't it more reasonable to conceive of moral facts as performances, or practices, (i.e. norms / grammars) instead of the objects of propositions (i.e. "claims")? — 180 Proof

If you make the claim that no moral propositions exist, you are committed to the claim that no moral claims can be true. This, for the third time, leads to no grounds for resolving moral disagreements. If that is okay with you, then more power to you, 180.

But don't think you have any moral grounds for objecting to being slapped with a fish.

By the way, I think promises are incredibly important and provide traction for a reasonable morality.

Okay, I understand what you are saying now. And I don't like it. Give me a moment.

it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another constitute our eusociality in practice — 180 Proof

This seems severely reductive. We also have billionaires exploiting their wealth and that contributes to the structure and arrangement of our society, but I wouldn't say that even implicit promises and wealth distribution account for everything.

No. :roll: — 180 Proof

Then what are the promises implicit in if not our moral statements? As stated, they are quite explicit.

Contrary to the typical conception of "moral realism" — 180 Proof

It is an actual thing. You don't need to put it in quotes.

edit: Thanks, btw, for posting something substantive that lays out your position

Insofar as we humans are a eusocial species, it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another — 180 Proof

Are you saying that promises are implicit in the claims that we ought not harm one another and those other things? Because those things you listed are not themselves implicit promises.

What about the person who is forced to change, to become stronger and braver or end up dead in a ditch, or so heavily traumatized they are hollowed out from within? That seems to cut against this self-exploratory, somewhat saccharine, and speciously value-laden discussion.

Millions of people are forced to change, and it has nothing to do with ethical questions. Get tough, or perhaps even monstrous, or die. For many people it is that simple. No child forced to flee a genocide and live as a refugee in a slum asks: "should I try to become more ruthless and cleverer to survive?"

So you might be able to decipher that I am a poster on a philosophy forum, and yet not know what I had for breakfast this morning.

Smart dude, Kant, I can find no fault with his position. — unenlightened

I honestly don't know what to think of Kant. I think he would say that both your status as a poster on the forums and what you had to eat for breakfast are directly knowable as phenomena to the senses, so you aren't addressing the novelty of things-in-themselves or the noumenon.

If one were instead employing logic to deduce from some premise derived from observation that you must have had eggs for breakfast, then one would be using some sort of transcendental means of deciphering something that is distinct from direct experience and observation - the noumenon.

Yes.

(i.) If some object/thing A manifests as some object/thing B, then B is the nature of A, — KantDane21

It seems deductively valid, but unsound because of (i.). e.g. i can say the “if depression manifests as body-trembling, then a body-trembling is the nature of depression”. But this seems to be false since body-trembling is not the "nature" of depression, but maybe just one symptom... — KantDane21

Good point.

But even if we knew in totality what the nature of depression was through our senses - even if it is arrived at through some piece-meal process - our understanding of depression would converge on what it is in itself independent of its phenomenal attributes. It seems to me that if you take into account the fact that noumenon is necessary as a limiting factor, at least according to Kant, we can't say that something's nature can be identified with the way it manifests to our senses - or we could know everything about depression, or anything, really. So, your conclusion that (i) is unsound seems right.