I see that he did that. Fair enough. But if its immoral it ought not to be done right? Or am I missing something?

lol I feel stupid. Yes he should be focusing on those other things.

You didn't answer my earlier question. What's your argument against human life being intrinsically valuable because that life can eventually feel pleasure and have preferences?
Most argue that a woman's autonomy outweighs the fetus's life. You claimed that women should "bear the consequences", which I can only assume means carry the child to term. That, whether or not its correct, remains to be an erosion of autonomy. You did use the word should after all.

He just admitted that he cares about all life.

Well I respect you then. Many are very inconsistent on that point.

I don't think Tzeentch is depreciating the value of fetuses, but rather the autonomy of women. He just doesn't want anything killed.

But its a vegetable. It cannot feel; it is not sentient or conscious. If you think its wrong to kill fetuses that are non-persons then you must have a problem with killing vegetables, or all life. You must also abstain from eating meat. I don't see any tragedy in eating a head of broccoli.

Is it wrong to rip a carrot out of the ground and eat it? You might have to swear off vegetables.

I don't think the unenlightened is arguing that abortion is okay because its fashionable or because its socially acceptable; I believe they're saying that women are treated terribly often times and that they face hard choices. But correct me if I'm wrong.

Would you argue that a justification for abortion arises out of the existence of an autonomous person's rights? Because ending a human's life might be argued to be an act that prevents an intrinsically valuable being capable of having preferences and feeling pleasure from entering the world. At the very least conservatives seem to put this kind of value on the fetus's life. How would you argue against this?

If god's commands are arbitrary, and not derived from moral facts, I see no reason to follow them and not one's own values. God has no commanding authority apart from his own unjustified commands under Divine Command Theory, and even commanding his commands to be obligatory would be arbitrary.

I find your viewpoint to be refreshing!

Quite frankly, Dingo, I don't understand half of what you say, and I have not been arguing in bad faith. I did indeed address you because you failed to understand the simple point that just because god commands something doesn't mean that it is not arbitrary. Maybe you can answer me a question: how is it that divine command theory is objective to believers? They might believe that they are following absolute moral laws but in reality they can't be unless absolute moral laws independent of god exist. Their belief is completely irrelevant. If I believe something hard enough does it make it the case?

“Does God command this particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right because God commands it?” It is in answering this question that the divine command theorist encounters a difficulty. A defender of Divine Command Theory might respond that an action is morally right because God commands it. However, the implication of this response is that if God commanded that we inflict suffering on others for fun, then doing so would be morally right. We would be obligated to do so, because God commanded it. This is because, on Divine Command Theory, the reason that inflicting such suffering is wrong is that God commands us not to do it. However, if God commanded us to inflict such suffering, doing so would become the morally right thing to do. The problem for this response to Socrates’ question, then, is that God’s commands and therefore the foundations of morality become arbitrary, which then allows for morally reprehensible actions to become morally obligatory.

The Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy.

It's peer reviewed and says gods commands under divine command theory would be arbitrary. I think this can end that argument. But perhaps you have more criticisms?

Furthermore what other than reason or observation would moral facts obtain from (If not of course from god)? I think that that one is just a given.

I'm trying to show why Dennis Prager's worldview is not as consistent or based on sound reasoning as one might think. I just don't see how you can think that something being good merely because god commands it is not subjective. How one might go about determining moral facts in god's absence is irrelevant mostly as this has little to do with their existence. But in order for the commands to be not arbitrary they must have been derived from something that exists independent of god. .

First off when I say "reasoned" I mean "not arbitrary". And yes, I would indeed assert that all moral facts must be derived from some sort of reasoning or observation in order for them to be absolute. Otherwise the moral facts are correct merely because of god's will. And if this is the case god is neither just nor evil, and cannot be a perfectly good creator of values; he is just a creator.

But it seems that if the correctness of god's commands depends entirely upon god's will and not upon reasoned and thus absolute moral facts it is indeed arbitrary. Under divine command there is only god's will.

Oh and skepticism about moral reality according to Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is a denial of moral facts. Should've defined that.

I'm always up for a debate!