A world where only good actions are possible is impossible in principle because if it were so, we would no longer be capable of making a mistake, we would no longer be human. Instead of free agency, we would be fully determined to act in a certain manner. — Cavacava

And what's wrong with that? Isn't that what it's like for God? A perfectly good God has no free will to do evil.

I don't see the inherent value in being able to choose evil actions.

But let's revise the argument a bit. Say that for God, the good is pleasure, and evil is suffering. God is a hedonist. So then we can ask whether an omni-hedonist God is compatible with a world full of suffering.

If the response is that suffering is necessary for pleasure, then Benatar's critique of existence surely applies. Why create a world where you have to suffer in order to feel good?

There's no cop out, it's just that most human beings really don't understand "evil". Do you understand evil? — Metaphysician Undercover

Evil is behaving selfishly, harming others, manipulating them, exploiting them, discriminating against them, causing them to suffer, etc.

Are you really suggesting that human beings can't tell good from bad, in general? Do we not grow up being told the difference, and enforcing the difference amongst ourselves, and teaching our kids likewise?

The term 'good' losses its meaning without the concept/experience of 'evil', they co-implicate each other. Imagine that you were in a world where only good could possibly happen, if so then what's good would be the way things are, it would have no differential — Cavacava

Not being able to name the good seems like a small price to pay for not having to suffer.

And if God doesn't see them as evil, why should he prevent them? — Metaphysician Undercover

All that's fine and dandy, but then why would the theist call God, "good", since being good is based on our conception of good and not God's.

You can't have your cake and eat it too. Either God is perfectly good in a meaningful sense to us, or we shouldn't use "good" as a description of God. So the price of using this line of argument for the FWD is God's goodness, so far as we understand the word.

This is deserving of it's own thread.

We may think there is even change outside of our possible experience, but by definition any such change would be completely unknowable to us; and it is arguable that the idea of something completely unknowable to us is not even coherent. — John

Wouldn't' there be all sorts of things going on beyond our light cone that are completely unknowable to us? But astronomers are confident the universe is quite a bit larger than what we can see.

We don't even need to go that far. There are things going on in planets in the Andromeda galaxy that we will never know about.

But entire traditions are built around not recognizing this obvious fact. As someone who was in the thrall of the position before, seeing how stupid it is now, I can't really articulate why it was convincing to me. My only explanation is that people sort of hear platitudes and are convinced by them. — The Great Whatever

Maybe part of the problem was that Kant promoted fixed, fundamental categories of thought in response to Hume's radical empiricism instead of a more fluid model. Because it's quite clear that human categories of thought change quite a bit over time. Including our concepts of time and space.

That looks about correct to me... — lambda

What that implies is that the world is equivalent to our conceptual schemes, which would seem to mean that science can't work.

The truth is somewhere in the middle can also mean truth in that situation is not a binary proposition.

The whole belief in the existence of God is based in the assumption that the universe behaves in "mysterious ways". Nor should it appear as a cop out, because until human beings are omniscient, there will always be "mysterious" things out there. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem isn't assuming that God would do things we don't understand. The problem is when you combine an omni-good god with the existence of an imperfect creation, specifically evil.

It's a cop out to say that such a God must have a reason for allowing evil, but we can't state what it is. The reasonable conclusion is that such a being doesn't exist, and if there is a God, humans have incorrectly ascribed ridiculous attributes to such a being.

We don't need to know what the good reasons are for "there are good reasons" to follow from the premises. — Michael

But if the argument can't show what the good reasons are, then why isn't the argument flawed? The argument is assuming there is one.

Just as we don't need to know what's in the box to infer from the evidence that something is in the box (e.g. it weighs more than it would if empty). — Michael

That's because we know the difference in weight between an empty box and one that has something in it. That analogy doesn't apply here.

here are good reasons for creating things that choose to do evil. — Michael

And what are those good reasons? You just stated that God must have a good reason, but it can't be known by us, which seems like a huge cop out.

That he has a good reason for doing so would follow from the premises, even if we don't know what that good reason is. — Michael

Or the concept is simply flawed, resulting in defenders of it claiming that we mere mortals can't know. It's really suspicious that the argument ends up with God's mysterious ways.

And if you don't define evil as being unjustified then you need to defend the claim "nothing can justify evil, no amount of good.". — Michael

When it comes to God, the question is why evil would ever need to be justifiable. The FWD is that the existence of free will does this, but God's omniscience should allow him to only create those who will choose not to do evil.

Otherwise, God's omniscience is in doubt. The theist will need to argue that God didn't know Lucifer would rebel, and somehow this lack of knowledge is not a limitation on knowing everything, because presumably free will prevents such knowledge.

So then the argument becomes about God being able to know everything to prevent evil.

If evil is defined (in part) as being unjustified. If it isn't defined in this way then genocide could still be evil even if justified by the greater good. — Michael

I don't think evil is defined as justifiable. We might agree that sometimes war is necessary and therefore justifiable, but it's still evil. It's just less evil than the alternative (or at least so we think, although not everyone will agree).

We're forced into those moral dilemmas at times because we're not God, and have serious constraints on what we can do or know.

he free will theodicist and utilitarian could simply argue that because certain harmful acts are justified for the greater good it then follows that these harmful acts aren't evil, and so the problem of evil is dismissed on the grounds that evil doesn't actually exist. — Michael

Couldn't this line of reasoning be used to justify any action? It's the ends justify the means sort of morality. Genocide isn't evil if it leads to something better.

And indeed, you do find it in the OT, where God is commanding Joshua to go slaughter a bunch of people.

All of this seems like rationalization to me.

Humans are more interested in stories than either philosophy or debating. — Baden

That's certainly true.

Another thought occurred to me. What makes us think a computer simulation is the best that advanced civilizations could do? Maybe they would consider digital simulations to be crude when they can just rearrange matter at the pico scale to do anything they want.

It seems the reasoning for assigning probability for being inside a simulation is based on the actual universe outside the simulation. But if we're inside a simulation, on what basis do we assign such a probability?

Afterall, maybe in our simulation we're alone in the universe.

Also, maybe the real world is very different from the simulated one. A simulation need not be an accurate one.

Finally, it seems to rest on the assumption that the laws of physics are computable.

But I think people just aren't suited to philosophizing. As a species, I mean – just a little too dumb for it. — The Great Whatever

Is it that we're too dumb, or that we're motivated by something other than being good philosophers? I can't recall which radio program it was, maybe Science Friday on NPR, but there was a show claiming that maybe reason isn't about finding the truth, but rather winning arguments.

If so, then humans are more interested in sophistry.

I generally think now that philosophy doesn't have the tools to help people in life. My main philosophical interest now is sort of meta-philosophical, why people are so bad at reasoning, why they are generally intellectually dishonest, incapable of distinguishing fine-grained positions, convinced by bad arguments, drawn to implausible platitudes, etc. and why intelligence seems to be no help in guarding against any of these. — The Great Whatever

Have you started a thread on this before? Because I think you're probably right. I've seen in myself and plenty of others, not just in online forums, but in general across the board.

I read an argument about G's supposed foreknowledge a while back. It went along the lines that God sees all of time: past, presence and future, but it is all past to him, and since he is perfect he can't change what he remembers, therefore we are free to act any way we want. — Cavacava

That is an interesting and a bit unusual argument.

I recall a Christian explaining to me in college how the Garden of Eden was a setup. God wanted Adam and Evil to fall, because that was the only way to work out the potential of evil in creation, and deal with it.

I thought that explanation was better than most Christian explanations regarding free will and evil, but it would probably be considered heretical by many denominations.

so therefore interprets 'omniscience' to mean 'anything I think is possible'. — Wayfarer

Omniscience means to know everything. What exactly is meant by knowing all things is debateable, but non-believers did not' invent the term.

The break you're looking for is to actually be God. — Wayfarer

Wouldn't this apply to believers as well?

In doing so we're forgetting a salient point - that the understanding is corrupted, we don't see the nature of the situation we're in, but instead hypothesise about something we could never know. — Wayfarer

And this all came about because believers claimed that God was so and so. Atheists didn't invent omniscience or the perfectly good. The FWD exists because some believers wish to defend God's omnibenevolence.

The point is that if God is real, then "perfectly good" is whatever He is. If that turns out to be different than what we humans define as "perfectly good," then we are the ones who have it wrong, not God. — aletheist

In that case, we wouldn't call God perfectly good, would we? God could be perfectly evil from our point of view, but perfectly good from God's. Maybe we have it all backwards?

If God is real, then who has the authority to define "perfectly good" as anything other than whatever God is? — aletheist

I don't know. Did God say he was perfect, or did human beings come up with that?

If God is real, then whatever He is, is perfectly good. Who are we to judge otherwise? — aletheist

Why suppose he is perfectly good, though?

Imagine an argument justifying war is that although lots of evil comes about, some people show incredible bravery and sacrifice.

The courage and love of these individuals outweighs the evil of war.

Now, I don't think that works as a moral argument. I think the evil of war is what matters, not whether some individuals managed to be super good. So, a thousand people were incredibly brave, but 10 thousand died, including civilians, children, etc. What sort of moral calculus is that?

Again, that explains why you are having so much difficulty with the free will defense. — aletheist

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure.

Basically, you have to argue that a perfectly good being is willing to put up with evil to achieve higher goods, such as love. I'm not sure that works. The higher good is worth any evil that comes about as a result. Sounds like the ends justifies the means for God.

Second, there is always the possible world that J.L. Mackie describes: beings who, through their own free will, always choose to do good. If Mackie's world is possible and God can create this possible world, then the free will defense fails. — Chany

Which goes to the question of why God created Lucifer in the first place.

now the response is to say God cannot actually create this world and that it is up to the agents within the world to make it happen, but I do not see how, without claiming that God cannot have foreknowledge of the actions of free creatures, one can avoid God's ability to foresee which possible world contains no moral evil and create that world. — Chany

Is free will supposed to be something that God cannot know about in advance? That would seem to place a limit on omniscience, and God knowing or existing through all points in time. That God is subject to time like created beings are.

here is an interesting discussion, one that I have never personally seen discussed, about God's responsibilities and morality if God cannot know the actions of free agents ahead of time, as God effectively would be creating the world blind. — Chany

That is an interesting question. So God plays dice with free will?

My point here is not to argue for intelligent design, just to highlight a philosophical curiosity. — aletheist

Agreed. There should be a way to tell whether a life form or biosphere was intelligently designed or the result of natural processes.

What's the counter argument? That intelligent design is meaningless or impossible? What if we found a world terraformed by aliens in which they continuously modified the organisms instead of letting them evolve on their own? Can we not distinguish between the two?

Precisely by choosing to act well toward that person, despite your negative feelings about him/her, rather than simply acting in accordance with the latter. — aletheist

I don't consider that to be love, but it's a semantic disagreement. I don't think something can be love if it's absent the feeling. I understand that people don't always feel love toward each other, but can still act in a loving way. I would consider that faking it to keep the relationship going, because the bond exists from a feeling of love enough of the time.

Humans are imperfect lovers. We don't always love the people we're friends, family, lovers with.

I think Jesus had to command that because humans don't always love. Otherwise, it would just happen.

Choosing to act humanely toward them is choosing to love them - especially if we do so not because we want them to do the same to us, but simply because they are our fellow human beings. — aletheist

So I act well toward person A because I really like them and enjoy their company and value them as a person. But I act well toward person B (okay maybe just passably well) because they are human, and I wish them to do the same for me, but I can't stand them.

How is it that I love person B?

"Dams, nests, webs, cities, and genetic engineering are not evolution" - as though this sentence was even sensical to begin with - well, I'm sorry, but it's clear that you don't have the terms of evolutionary science down well enough for this discussion to be productive. — StreetlightX

Also, I'm like 99.9% certain that cities and genetic engineering are not topics of biological evolution.

Also, I'm like 99.98% certain that nests and webs are not evolution, since evolution is a process that life forms undergo, not things like dams or nests.

It seems like you want to import your own philosophical views on how natural and artifical should be used (or not used) into science, when you know well that genetic engineering and cities are not a topic of study for evolutionary biologists.

think the claim that we can choose who to love is as mistaken as the claim that we can choose who to be attracted to. — Michael

It would be nice if we could will ourselves to love the people we don't love. But it seems the best we can do is choose to act humanely toward them, despite not loving them, because we want them to do the same to us.

Maybe the Buddhists have gone a bit farther here with cultivating empathy?

Right, so what about spider interference? Is that natural selection, or artificial selection (or spiderficial selection)? — Michael

So humans are naturally selected to manufacture medicine to prevent natural selection from selecting against some of us, just like spiders are naturally selected to produce webs that give them a survival advantage?

I think there's an important distinction somewhere along the line. At least when you get to the point of directly manipulating DNA in a manner that nature never would.

So with that in mind, does making medicine to aid survival prevent natural selection? Or is the ability to make medicine a naturally selected trait? — Michael

It doesn't prevent natural selection, but it does change the outcome from what natural selection would have selected. Human interference isn't natural selection, it's artificial selection. We wish to artificially select for as many people surviving as opposed to lots dying to improve genetic resistance.

But sure, natural selection still acts on the result of our interference. In order to completely be rid of evolution, we would have to engineer life forms whose genetic copying was bullet proof. I don't know whether that's doable.

What other abilities would you grant and deny the creatures living in your world? I am looking for a comprehensive response. If that seems unreasonable, maybe creating a better world than the one we have is harder than you think. — aletheist

No doubt it's beyond my limited ability. But giving birth to more empathetic humans is only part of it. Another part of it is having an environment that prevents the most serious crimes, like murder. We humans can't manage that, but God could.

I think that if humans could manage it, we would, or most of us would (excepting those who wish to commit murder).

I'll simply request, by way of being constructive, that you take a read of the paper I cited on page 3. — StreetlightX

It's fine to want me to read a paper, but this is a philosophy forum, and you should be able to spell out the argument. I can link to papers and videos, too, and hope that posters read/watch them, even though odds are they won't.