Wording is important here, I didnt say “equal”. — DingoJones

Equal means identical in logic and math ...?

I wouldn't have gone that far, but you did say that 2 in 1972 on a blackboard would not be equal to 2 in 2019 on a whiteboard, because they are numerically different in space and time. Same goes for X.

If that's the position nominalism ends up taking, then it does undermine identity. When I write X = X, well there are two Xs in different locations, written at slightly different times!

The third law of logic is the principle of identity. If identity is incoherent at the level of rigor logic requires, then we can't say that X=X is true, which likely has pretty bad ramifications.

All I'm saying is that if strict nominalism leads to abandoning a pillar of logic, then perhaps the nominalist restriction on identity should be loosened up a bit so as to not undermine logic?

In a certain sense I would say so ya. Obviously, when making references informally “identical” is perfectly coherent though. — DingoJones

Doesn't identity underpin logic? That's a pretty extreme position to take. Nominalism isn't worth jettisoning logic.

Im not sure what 2 identical to 2 would mean. In the strict, technical way we are talking about here nothing can truly identical to anything else. — DingoJones

So the concept identical is incoherent? This is a reductio ad absurdum.

It would be because you're not a nominalist, and you maybe buy real abstracts/abstract objects, you'd probably be a platonist re ontology of mathematics, and so on. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure. I can see your argument against composite objects, but what about physics itself? There are universal laws and properties in physics. How can equations apply to all instances?

The context of the current dispute is whether functionality can be identical across multiple things, which is something that's kind of taken for granted in computer science.

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So when we say that 2 is identical to 2, it doesn't matter if one two was written on a blackboard in 1972 and another on a whiteboard in 2019.

Is that because 2 is not an object? Substitute the word red or #FF0000 for 2 if you like, or F=MA.

There's no connection between nominalism and whether objects can be composites. Under nominalism, it's just that the parts and the object are particulars (that aren't identical through time on a nominalistic rejection of genidentity as well). — Terrapin Station

I kind of think there is. Because if we say a chair can be a composite object, then we're saying a lot of different kinds of material arrangements can be a chair. If every chair is particular, then what is the meaning of "chair"? Why are these different objects chairs?

t's not that "you're not allowed to conceive of it." Your abstraction isn't literally the case objectively, and your abstraction/conception itself isn't identical through time. — Terrapin Station

So is it philosophically the case that composite objects don't exist, or only exist for one instance in time?

Actually for that matter, is it the case that fundamental particles don't persist in time, since they're always numerically different?

Not at the same time is numerical distinction, so it's not identical in that sense. — Terrapin Station

Which means you're not allowed to conceive of an object over time, since it's always different.

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So a specific shade of red cannot be the same shade over time? What about the mass of an electron? Is that property different over time, even though its numerically measured to be the same?

I'm convinced that any sufficiently in depth discussion of realism or consciousness will turn into one on QM.

It does make me wonder what Platonists do with the wavefunction and the possibility that properties don't have set values until they're observed. @Wayfarer?

Not sure this helps the nominalist either.

That seems really incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Why does it have to be the exact same time to be the same photons? Do the photons turn into other photons over time?

But anyway, are you really so sure this couldn't be done with a double-slit kind of setup?

The photon wouldn't be numerically distinct (including numerically distinct temporal instances) but we'd somehow be able to point the the photon bouncing off of numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

There might be a way to emit and capture the same photons in a very controlled setting, while bouncing them off two surfaces made to reflect the same wavelength.

I'm asking you about the light. You used that as a determiner. — Terrapin Station

You're asking me whether the same photons bounce off different surfaces? Not under normal circumstances, but there might be a way to do this experimentally.

So the same light reflects off of two numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

The tomatoes are numerically distinct, the property is not.

Are they numerically distinct instances of redness? — Terrapin Station

Not if they reflect exactly the same wavelength of light.

Things can have identical properties, such as color, under nominalism, just not the same instances of that color? — DingoJones

I don't see how that works. How can nominalism have the same instances of color if everything is particular?

Properties and functions present the same problem for nominalism as does object identity. You can even dispense with objects in favor of mereological nihilism, and properties/functions would still pose a problem.

A nominalist isn't going to take any numerically distinct things as identical to each other, a fortiori because we believe that the idea of this is incoherent . — Terrapin Station

But that's begging the question. How do we know two numerically distinct things can't be identical in some manner that would contradict nominalism? Note here that I'm exluding numerical identity and spatiotemporal location.

We have tomatoe 1 and tomato 2. If they both have exactly the same color, then isn't that an identical property that nominalism says can't exist?

So, what would make one a nominalist, at least in the more common sense of the term, is that one doesn't believe that any numerically distinct things can be identical. — Terrapin Station

So all it would take to disprove nominalism is to find a numerically distinct thing that was identical for some property or function?

Wouldn't any two computers count then, or do they have to be of different chip design?

I think one should live authentically. Whether you are religious, spiritual, or philosophical. — Corra

What does that mean? That you're not a wannabe or that you don't conform to society when it conflicts with your personal views and feelings? Or that you're always honest with other people?

I've never gotten all this talk about the hard problem. Now that I've heard about the harder problem, I don't get it either. Nothing here seems particularly difficult to me. — T Clark

So Data wouldn't present a problem to you, because he could tell you he was conscious, and back that up with convincing behavior?

So the point of all this disagreement is the hard(er) problem. If we learn about our consciousness the same way we do other people, then it might not be a problem.

But I think our own case is special, because we experience our conscious states, and can only infer them about other people.

Consciousness, frustration, and anxiety are all mental experiences. — T Clark

I'm wondering why all your mental experiences aren't just being conscious? Feelings included. Are we using different terms? By consciousness, do you mean awareness of what you're experiencing, and that inner dialog is what makes us aware?

Really? When a baby cries for food, it's not because it is experiencing hunger? When a dog is injured, it doesn't experience pain and fear? Dogs and babies don't experience anything? That seems like a pretty radical claim to me. — T Clark

Which is not one I would make. Why wouldn't they be conscious?

Part of the problem here is that experience can mean behavior as well as consciousness, and I would rather restrict experience to consciousness, otherwise it's easy to slip between the two, resulting in arguing past one another in these debates.

If want to get down to it, a rock "experiences" the sun from a physical or informational point of view, but that's not what we mean at all when saying a baby experiences hunger.

don't remember ever having this kind of experience. I don't know how it fits in with our discussion — T Clark

You didn't think that dreams were experienced, only remembered. Well, I've had lucid dreams a few times. They are conscious experiences as much as perception is.

It is not necessary to consciously experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — T Clark

Color, sound and pain only exist as consciousness. Otherwise, they become labels for something biological or physical. The world is not colored in. It doesn't look like anything, except to conscious viewers. It also doesn't feel like anything.

A p-zombie universe has no color. It's only a label for the ability to discriminate wavelengths of visible light, since there is no experience of color in that universe.

But I don't fully endorse the p-zombie argument. I think there couldn't be any phenomenal concepts in a p-zombie universe. Color wouldn't exist as a word. Nor would pain.

It is necessary to consciously experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. It's obviously possible to experience these without being consciously aware. — T Clark

I would say we aren't experiencing anything when we're not conscious. We're p-zombies in that regard. Experience is consciousness.

What does Grandin say about awareness vs. consciousness. — T Clark

I don't know, I just recall reading that she claims to think in pictures and translate those to language when communicating, and she suspects animals also think in pictures. She compared her visualization capabilities to a Holodeck on Star Trek.

Also, what was interesting is that when she thinks of a roof, she thinks of the set of all roofs she's ever seen, and not some abstract roof concept. Therefore, particulars and not universals, with the ability to translate to universals for the purpose of communication.

Yes. Again, I said this in the earlier post. The full quote was: "'Adding 2' is not identical in both instances, obviously. And it's not identical in two instances of a calculator (or two calculators) adding two, either. " — Terrapin Station

I don't know that I can agree with that. How would they functionally be different for such a simple case? You're saying that there can never be an exact duplicate function across different physical subtrates.

I agree with this, but would like to clarify that inner dialog is one aspect of HUMAN consciousness. Non-human animals (and non-verbal humans) probably don't have an inner dialog, but they arguably experience qualia. — Relativist

Probably not, but they might have an inner visual sequence or smell or sonar, which aids their thinking like inner dialog does ours.

I argue that we should use a comprehensive definition of consciousness that admits a wide set of mental behavior. If we get too specific, we become overly human-chauvinistic. — Relativist

Yes, something philosophers are sometimes prone too. Over relying on vision for making epistemological and ontological arguments, for example.

That would work maybe if the functionalist is positing multiple instances of something identical, so that they'd have to be realists on universals/types. But we could have a nominalist sort of functionalism, where we're calling x and y "F," even though it's not literally two identical instances of F. — Terrapin Station

That might work, but would you extend that to different computers performing addition?

Are dreams and meditative states consciousness? I don't think I think they are. Or I think I don't think they are. In my experience, becoming consciously aware of dreams is something that happens in memory after I wake up — T Clark

You've never had a lucid dream?

Now, back to our internal experience of consciousness. For me, and, as I understand it, others, the essence of the experience is internal speech. Talking to ourselves. Another essential aspect is that it allows us to stand back and observe ourselves objectively, as if from the outside, just the way we observe others. We judge ourselves conscious just as we judge others - based on our behavior. — T Clark

Here is where we fundamentally disagree. Inner dialog is just one more form of conscious experience. And it's not necessary to experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc.

If inner dialog were all there was to conscious experience, it would still present a hard problem. Also, not everyone has inner dialog. See Temple Grandin and visual thinking.

I judge myself to be conscious because I am conscious, not because I behave as if I am. I judge other people on behavior AND biology, because I don't experience what they do, but I have no reason for supposing they would be lacking, since they're human beings like me.

ou cannot be serious ! :rage: — Amity

To quote the great Homer Simpson:

Life is one crushing disappointment after another, until you just wish Ned Flanders was dead.

I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming says: “I am dreaming,” even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream “it is raining,” while it was in fact raining. — On Certainty 676

Meh, I've realized I was dreaming before and recall even saying so "out loud" to a a dream person.

Secondly, even if we suppose in your scenario that you can "talk to people in both worlds in different languages" then you must be talking to someone else in a public language that you and the people you are conversing with share (albeit in your dreams). Otherwise, you are not really talking to anyone else at all. — Luke

That would be the position of the solipsist. So the question is whether solipsism can be defeated by saying the solipsist is not really talking to anyone. Which is true, but the solipsist can just say they have an experience of talking to people, just like in a dream, and that's all it is.

The point is that a private language is impossible. Therefore, as you say, "nobody in existence could call any language private". — Luke

Is it, though? A BIV has experiences of language with other people, but that language experience is fed to them by the vat. For the impossibility claim to work, you have to assume other people exist. It's not a defeater if you're willing to engage in radical skepticism.

Do you think there is a certain kind of humour which can only germinate or grow in misery ? — Amity

There's a certain kind of humor that goes with having lived long enough as a typical human being. Maybe the Elon Musks and Roger Federers of the world are not privy to such humor.

The ending seems a bit warped...
Is he saying they are missing out in not enjoying failure ? Because that is what feeds us...?
Guess I am not in tune with his wit...
Or does he mean that enjoying success so early - It's not such a great thing ? — Amity

I think he's saying that for most of us, we learn not to expect too much from life, but a 15 year old having amazing success might have different expectations. Which may not be how life turns out, because often there are disappointments, tragedies, and failures.

That being said, I would take the success at 15, if I could have been that good at something.

Interesting. Steam has it and it has some phenomenal reviews. Might give it a try. — Wallows

Me as well. Glad I saw this thread.

With all due respect to Alex and Coco, there’s sometimes something to be said for getting your disappointments in early. — John Crace

I love that statement! Maybe I'm just a lazy underachiever, but life's early disappointments certainly temper one's expectations a bit.