The veracity of your claim of fault inhering within that line of phrase is contingent upon the way in which one derives any sense of the meaningful, therefrom, and what forms of parameter constrain one's chosen interpretation of its object. Which is to say, without cause for equivocation, that its meaning as intended, is likely to have endured a depth of change itself, and consequently deviates in the case of its present expression, from that of which it was conceived, firstly. Given time, in its fullest passage, such as has occurred with respect to the given manner of phrase, loss of clarity becomes doubtless, as what is held in question as the object of one's inquiry assumes a newfound significance for the general thought of each passing era, which, having grown in breadth as a whole, finds ever lesser precision in its usage; or at least, a conditioned variance between those sentiments that it seems to convey is found, when one considers it in a context that differs to any great degree from that in which it came proceed, before all else, at the time of its outset.

There is reason for one to suspect that the subject to which his past statement pertains, is the universality of the application of change to all affairs of life in its broadest sense. Any individual having sway, and been considered in the instance of which he had spoken, in particular, serves only as a means to illustrate, and grant further reflection upon some principle of an exceptionally diverse, and expansive foundedness. Seeing as a clear and established difficulty lies in the act of rendering such maxims intelligible, without sacrificing due substance through the inadvertent, within the course of their respective exposition, it is necessary at times to dispense with conceptions that lie wholly entrenched in the abstract, and without any firm grounding within the world of the intuitive, such as he had sought to achieve. One may thus provide a certain extraneous structure, applicable to any domain of thought, within the confines of which the preceding force of expression collapses unto itself beneath the heft of our instruments of analysis, as devoted thereto, whilst ensuring that such scrutiny never alters, nor detracts from, the truth of its principle.

A precondition fundamental to what is defined in the present context as 'B-Theory', that being a sense of timelessness, is directly conflictive with what has been supposed as true, within your prior argument. The latter condition being the claim that change in tense, within a system of thought for which such a characteristic is wholly indistinct, or otherwise ill-defined, is itself permitted to become emergent. One cannot reconcile between that which lies in contradiction, unless the associated precepts of the argument from which it was first set forth, are altered in such a way as to resolve the given inconsistency.

The general notion upon which you have come to expound seems to me a correlative with the doctrine of Eternalism. Which, as can be expected, precludes the ability of change to become emergent, inasmuch as its object of application be that of timelessness, such that the distinctions between all tenses are obscured from view. Were the case otherwise, one would confront a broad and ever-reaching contradiction in terms, which must be reconciled with, as a matter of judgement, if what is expressed in thought, thusly, is to be regarded as having any merit. That which exemplifies even in modest degree, the Eternal, is bound by an unassailable continuity within its operation; the course at which it proceeds further, by way of action. For conflict to arise therein, with respect to which, and those conditions which inhere within the 'Model' in question; in the case of what it presupposes as axiomatic, and necessary for its procession, there must lie a great fault in how one conceives of it both as a particular form, and a lesser division of the whole to which it pertains. That is to say, if any conception derived from a principle that itself can be made applicable to the generality of its associated domain, and might thereby establish itself as an element of universal importance within the confines of such a field, remains contrary to what is anticipated in outcome by a rule of procedure of breadth, and significance, less than its own, there is reason to cast doubt upon whether the latter principle ought to be considered. This relation of which I have spoken being further illustrated through the following;

Within the sphere of traditional forms of interpretation of the manner in which time stands' to progress, as we hold it to be, there is a ceaseless shifting within its state, and a relative distinctness within each state that it may occupy. Whilst some have sought to demonstrate the fallibility of this conception, on the grounds that it appeals blindly to the precepts of mere intuition, those so concerning bear the ability to set forth an argument, in advocacy of the need for such simplicities of the understanding, to accord with all that is entrenched within the intuitive, and that by virtue of its content, may be apprehended readily, by any other. As it must conform to the basis of the experiential, and rendered intelligible with a faultless clarity by the faculties of mind, much value is evident in the case of its usage, if provided as an instrument in the exercise of cognition, for the understanding. A utility. Yet, one need recognize also, that these notions are in their nature, extraneous to the world, and thus without a sense of the objective in their appearance, and predication thereupon, in all instances.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-spacetime/

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-theory_of_time

Your difficulty in understanding arose from the substance of such notions as those described being fraught with many inconsistencies. When one is subject to the conflictive, and misconceived, for any great period, clearness in sight, and recognition of truth, is certain to faulter. I wish to implore you, for the sake of your own benefit, to ensure a greater depth of weariness of these things; lest your development of mind be stifled as well, in its entirety. For the insubstantial seldom proves conducive to growth, in any aspect of life.

Firstly, I wish to offer expression of remorse for the vastness in delay by which my present response had hitherto been preceded. I have felt drawn by the prospect of devotion toward matters which remain in isolation, and are thus separate, from that of the course in which I strive to deliberate.

The “array of certain conceptions” which “serve to constrain” the understanding within its logical bounds, are the categories, which are transcendental in their derivation, but not in their employment. The categories themselves are discrete but not boundless, there are but twelve after all, even if the objects which may be assigned to them, are. Metaphysicians from Aristotle onward grant the theoretical necessity and logical veracity of the categories, as sufficient means for the possibility of human empirical knowledge. — Mww

It has grown evidentiary in my own eye's that one needn't grant admittance, nor means for entailment of further consideration, inasmuch as that of which we have spoken, lies entrenched in the truth of that to which each shall pertain. One can make inference that such sentiment, if it be held in sight, and accord with one's passage of judgement, in a manner such that it bear semblance to the former in that with which each manifests, cannot in any truthful sense be regarded as of fault, nor less subject to disputation in the veracity of all therewith. One ought to persist in silence; to abide by an act of heartfelt acknowledgment of all forms thereof, as necessities of the constitution of the world in its totality.

My disposition for argument, lies contingent upon whether there remain means through which the former can be vindicated, and if there be reason to act upon either((I regard the prior, as that through which there be exemplified mere consensus amongst ourselves and as consequence, am bound only by the disinclination to contest its truth.

Yes, because experience is never complete and therefore induction, both given by the faculties of the mind, is itself entirely insufficient for determinations of “the world as it is, truly”.

The alternative is to theorize that our representations actually do conform to the world as it truly is, re: direct realism, and such and sundry external world explanatory speculations. — Mww

Once more that for the sake of which we ourselves had sought to offer conveyance, stands in form, reflective amongst each, as the resultant of our own expenditures, on behalf of one another; seldom have I come to garner sight of any manner of dissimilarity arising therefrom. Nor have I found reason to ensure furtherance in the depth with which we have made discernment of the fault which inheres within such doctrines by virtue of the nature of that upon which all are predicated((in disregard of the truth of the condition of that for which we and all else resides, in appearance; the world as it seems through the lens of the subject, not as it is, truly; how the latter serves as an unassailable boundary to understanding inasmuch as all therein can be attained in potentiality)).

Perhaps, if it were not for the availability of knowledge, the denial or contradiction of which leads to absurdities. All there needs be is an instance or series of instances of apodictic certainty, within the confines of the human cognitive system, for which the basis of constructive criticism of reason itself can stand on good ground. Permitting reason to subsist in its natural state invites imagination to overpower experience and while there is little to prevent any rational subject from relying on one or the other, he absolutely cannot do both simultaneously with respect to the same cognition. Besides, imagination carried too far inexorably becomes the irrational. — Mww

One need only exercise forethought throughout the whole of one's abidance toward that within which the modality of reason pervades, to confer fulfillment unto that of the requisite for constancy in form of thought, its every aspect, and that through which each be expressed. Reason must persist in its natural state, untarnished, wherein no enactment of synthetic restrictions as cast unto itself be granted for truth to be apprehended in its grandest breadth; the latter of which were it to have countenance, wouldn't entail preclusion by virtue of mere necessity of that which one hoped to preserve, as bore in thought((constancy)). None can assure that there be inception of discrepancies in the forms with which each manifests in its appearance, were the case otherwise((if one sought to permit the state for which reason has much proclivity, to remain, and endure such in course unabated, the advent of contradiction in prospect, is no matter of assurance. To constrain the forces of judgement as confined to that of the instance within which it is to appear, rather than the whole of reason, would allow for achievement of the same, as consequence.))

For detraction from the extent of either inconstancy in the sense of that which is prospective, if it be yielded, one must restrict the boundaries of reason in broadness, only insofar as each correspond to a certain instance of appropriation therewith, in which its usage be warranted, and acted upon through the subject((if it be accounted for, that which has come to precede, since, would obviate the aforementioned requisite for preservation of that attribute((constancy)) in such form((thought)).

Not sure what to do with this. Mathematical thought is reason exemplified, that is to say, mathematical thought does not exist without reason. Indeed no thought whatsoever exists without reason. Reason and thought are the same thing. It follows that reason said to be neither more nor less tangible in form and procedure than mathematical thought, is analytically true, but nonetheless entirely redundant. If by modality is meant method of expression, or mode of presence, re: existence, then I suppose it could be said the conveyance of reason has no more or less tangibility than mathematical thought, for each is every bit as intangible in its strictest sense as the other. One glaring difficulty herein would be the fact that mathematical thought, while predicated on a priori conceptions, depends necessarily on experience for its proof, whereas pure reason, even by definitions alone regardless of its implicit content, cannot abide any empirical proof at all. — Mww

The latter of which bore reflection upon that which I had sought to convey, which would thus hinder in the same sense development of such redundancy in form. One could as is the basis for my own suspicion assert that reason stands as the catalyst for one's understanding; remaining predicated in judgement, and inherent within the same, yet which can subsist despite, as neither stands wholly indistinct from the other, whether in constitution, if not as a matter of appearance in the eye's of the subject.

Oh. Almost forgot: reason is not the consequence of understanding; it is understanding that is the consequence of reason. Obviously.....we always reason toward our understanding, which is nothing but the exercise of that faculty, with possible judgement always its immediate consequence, and cognition its termination.

Point/counterpoint; dialectics. Not proof of nor hinting toward logical error or lackadaisical rationality. Grain of salt. Etc, etc, etc.

Philosophical musings. — Mww

Seldom have I felt inclined to deviate from that course.

((I have grown ever more indifferent toward the prospect in which we ourselves strive to maintain the correspondence upon which we have hitherto come to act; though by consequence of my transition toward a state of mind in which no other sentiment, is diffuse throughout, as made manifest by means of cyclothymic disorder. I wish to ensure that it be recognised, that neither hardship is attributive to that of which commitment had been made on your part, throughout our exchange. None can hold its sight in anticipation with certitude, nor ought one to ascribe fault unto oneself for the advent of either.))

I have begun to offer devotion toward the study of certain notions, throughout many works which serve to illustrate the pertinence of each, and the myriad aspects which reside therein. My principal hope is that my state of apathy, the ever greater lessening in eagerness with which I deliberate, and speak with those whom endeavor toward the same, abate in time and entail thusly, further engagement amongst ourselves for its own sake.


We shall see what is to come of it, I suppose.

I intend to take heed of that which you have come to endorse, for its own sake, and mine.

Despite the sense of confliction which had grown ever more pervasive amongst ourselves, I remain in appreciation of the depth of your responses and see now that the nature of your intention wasn't of malice, which was how it seemed to be in my eye's, before.

My hope is to remedy that deficit in understanding of mine; as I stand wholly intolerant of failure to garner true apprehension, in all its forms.

If it weren't this time((3:36 AM)), I would earnestly strive to address what you sought espress, prior, in full. Though I have yet to rest, and am quite fatigued on account of that.

I would wish to speak with you in the coming future, in different circumstances, however. As what preceded our exchange, its catalyst, I regard as much less than ideal.

Rest well, man.

As have I adoration for the distinctiveness of your own form of expression, and am appreciative of the time which you came to devote, for my own sake throughout the course of our exchange. Moreover, my intent hadn't been to cast a tone of disparagement unto you for having sought to intercede; as I have held as preference therewith, little besides. I have seldom felt impelled to speak with others, and find those of the forms with which such engagements manifest, more often than not, to be abhorrent. I imagine few whom have taken solace, here, to have much aptitude in that respect either((the 'stammer'; 'talking like an idiot in certain situations')). I confess that I stand afflicted particularly by the former ailment, which abates only insofar as I transition toward a contorted state of mind wherein disinhibition pervades((brief periods of hypomania facilitated by means of cyclothymic disorder)). Could one suppose rightfully that my dispositions while of that nature, serve to account for as to why I remain inclined to deliberate on any matter, to such depth((my 'philosophical musings', so to speak))?

We reflect upon one another, I infer, in a great many respects to a degree which is incomparable beyond itself((in disregard of all disturbances of the psyche, I suspect)).

You think I am being disingenuous — I like sushi

That much stands evident in my eye's.

Admitting you cannot communicate clearly is not equivalent to being able to communicate clearly. I suggest editing after writing - meaning REDUCE the number of words. Use Orwell’s ‘Politics and the English Language’ as a guide (it’s quite superb!) — I like sushi

While I acknowledge that to be truthful, it is the case necessarily that one must grant admittance of a particular deficit, if its resolve is to be attained, in time((if at all)). I have read that work more than once((twice)) thus far, and in full. Owing to which I see no reason which would vindicate further devotion toward its study; as I believe that course insofar as it be acted upon, to confer no betterment((I have already apprehended much of its substance, and content)).

(We each regard that sentiment as a matter of consensus; I have no eagerness, nor the inclination, to contest it. The work is itself quite superb, truly.)

It is of my understanding that there is no such distinction amongst the notion of noumena. The contrast rests upon that of the noumenal world, and its comparison as drawn between that of the whole of all phenomena. Whereof the former is antithetical((negative)) to that of the latter((positive)); rather than that for which the contrast resides within each, individually. Though, I wish to offer acknowledgement of the prospect of my own fault; as akin to all others I remain vulnerable to its commitment, whether that be in thought, if not otherwise.

Seventeen years of age, at present.

It seems to me that you have made commitment solely of failure to offer recognition of the truth to which each has hitherto come to pertain; that of which one speaks, and holds in sight, as a matter in which the former be held by the subject as exemplified((truth)), stands independent of what is the case. The intensity with which one abides by a certain manner of sentiment, and expresses belief therewith, has no bearing on whether it is in alignment with the truth of either.

I hadn't sought to exercise pretension((not deliberately)), by means of any conveyance as granted on my own behalf, nor at all, prior. Yet I concede to have grown ever more wary of that of the prospect in which your course of intrusion, however unjust, subsists nonetheless. In the hope of attainment of resolve, in such respect, take heed of the following.

If that were clear*
And*
To understand*
(If it were the case as you have professed, that I am without even the faintest sense of understanding in that regard, I wouldn't have shown an aptitude for determination of fault amongst the same; as I have done, since.)

It is clear that you harbor the inclination to undermine me, yet remain blind to your own plight.

I request with finality a SINGLE coherent sentence. — I like sushi

I implore you with the utmost sincerity in tone, to fuck off.

"Note: My previous post took little to no effort." Nor had my own as the delay in its inception can be accounted for by means of a corresponding devotion of mine in effort, toward separate tasks all of which were conducted in concurrence with the previous.

The vacuous verbiage of thine begotten foe wanders wistfully with warped whispers of the sanctity of sinful speech as conferred by virtue of the consequence of cowardly conners conceding in concomitance to the callousness of false consideration speaking in spiral tongue in a tone which lies in exceptional exhaustion of fleeting moments of intellectual prowess purporting to import endowment of ease in pursuance therewith all the while tearing at its seams.

Once more you misconstrue much of that which I have sought to convey, and the purity of my intention, by which it had been preceded, and brought to fruition.

The condition which ails me is no less true, nor evident in form, than the eagerness with which you strive to impose.

Would your preference then, rest upon the course through which I appropriate that of which we ourselves had spoken prior, in prospect, and ensure that it no longer reside in mere potentiality? That I strive to abide by lessening of that toward which I have hitherto been drawn, in its intensity, for the sake of all others, if not my own?

I lie bound by the disposition for argument, inasmuch as the veracity of that unto which I ascribe truth, be contested. As has been made evident, and for which only attestation on our behalves can be granted.

I objected to the accusation of fraudulence on my part on the basis that it remained destitute of merit, and bore no semblance to that which is the case, in truth. What came to follow therefrom, merely served to affirm further that sentiment as having firmness in its grounding, and thus a sense of merit((my own argument for its failure)). Though the latter I felt to be of little consequence in my standing, as my intention was that it illustrate how such accusations are independent of whether either has truth, and that all courses of action confound that in which all are implicated, yet to claim that one has acted in a particular manner is no requisite, and has no bearing upon whether one came to act, in the end, thusly.

I wish to make it clear, that none of those of the past I believe, with perhaps the exception of few whom subsist in obscurity, are reflective of the central form of my own choice of prose. If held in account, either claim would as consequence, in which I stand at fault, be obviated; were it truthful.

It is not necessary to differentiate one's choice of prose from those of the past, in full, to thwart the development of claims of fraudulence((either may transpire irrespective of which)), in the same respect. Nor need it be the case, that such accusations wherever they may arise, are well-founded, if at all. For instance, take heed of the following;

One could say, 'you serve as a hollowed imitation of such and such author', which if taken at its face and stated as fact would be fallacious; it would be more appropriate to say, rather,'as I see it your choice of prose bears similarities with such and such author whilst integrating certain aspects from ever more different sources; it is quite eclectic.'

Therein lies a pertinent distinction, which makes its passage unaccounted for in judgement, and forgotten, more often than not.

(This presentation of mine would disregard the prospect in which one had sought to emulate a particular author to such an extent; though that course seldom arises, and is thus without even the faintest sense of generality.)

"What one speaks of as an instance of mere inauthenticity, in which another is implicated, may reflect only upon one's own belief of the matter of fraudulence, and hollow imitation, rather than that which is the case in truth((the claim itself would then, be unfounded)). The belief held may have no rational grounding, and be prejudicial. To be regarded as dissimilar in a particular respect to any arbitrary degree, in the eye's of many others, is not necessary to preclude claims of fraudulence, in which one stands implicated. One can maintain semblance in choice of prose to those of the past, without descending toward either vice, as consequence."

"It is not often that people are good at distinguishing their own prejudice, and blind conviction, from the truth of any particular matter, or instance."

The discernment of mere inauthenticity, as granted expression by means of that toward which I feel drawn, lies predicated upon fallacy, and is thus of tenuous standing. To ensure that one seem dissimilar((to what end?)) from those whom have hitherto preceded the advent of one's own life, is itself no requisite for that which is contrary to the baseless supposition of fraudulence, in which one be implicated.

Seldom have many shown aptitude for differentiating truth, from the manifestations of prejudice, and blind conviction.

The flower has already begun to blossom, and yield its fruit.

I stand now before you, humbled by your audacity, and that for the sake of which you had made conveyance of such manner of sentiment((and some other fucking shit, none of which I would care to explicate at this time)).

ah man, but that's... — csalisbury

All the best shit, and nothing besides, man.

I have yet to determine as to how, with regard to that form, that of which I have conceived, since, can be expressed without incurring loss of either; the clarity of its expression, and the extent to which it exemplifies most acutely, such prose. My hope is that each attribute, insofar as the whole thereof manifest, be commensurate with one another, and coalesce, thereby assuming for itself a form far grander in its appearance than either would be, alone, were it otherwise.

The sum of my aspirations are many in number, and variegated in substance; as I have a keen fondness for much of the fields which constitute that of Linguistics, in full, as well as philosophical thought. To instill greater specificity than would be granted were I to abstain; Morphology, Discourse Analysis, The Study Of Syntactical Structures((Syntax)), Logical Positivism, German Idealism etcetera.

As you have hitherto seen, and to which we ourselves can attest readily; I ascribe neither greater nor lesser a degree of precedence unto each, than I have for those of the rest. Nor are there discrepancies amongst any in the value of all those residing therewith, as I speak of it; in the sense of the aesthetical in particular.

Odd though, to talk of reason as if it were an actual thing, rather than merely a specific kind of procedure adopted by the human animal, intended solely to accomplish a specific task. — Mww

The modalities with which reason be conveyed, are neither more nor less tangible in form, and procedure, than the domain of mathematical thought((though I acknowledge the former to bear a much greater disposition for elusion within its state, and is thus seldom found untarnished)); as in truth one could assert without incurring loss in veracity of that which one wishes to express, that all such forms are antecedent to the faculty of reason in its fullest constitution. I had sought merely to speak of it in the sense of a conceptual relation of the abstract, which stands destitute in its representation for that which is singular, and determinate, as consequence of the broadness arising therewith, such that it reflect upon those of the rest. All manner of inquiry, remains bound by that through which it finds' appearance, from which discernment can be drawn, whereof it serves as that upon which the former is predicated, and conceived thusly prior to its own inception((a priori)).

(There is requisite for presupposition of the same faculty, which need be granted fulfillment in its course, if that which is to entail therefrom is to be regarded as deserving of consideration in passage of judgement as yielded by the subject'.)

understand reason already inquires as to itself, attempts to discern its own nature. But in doing so, reason may exercise its intrinsic capacity to exceed its own ability to tell us the truth about what we really want to know, overstep its boundaries as it were. If we are not interested in knowledge for its own sake, we permit reason to wander wherever it wishes to take us. Or, more accurately, we have critiqued that which reason presents to us((and shall persist in that course)). Hence the prohibition imposed, for the sake of knowledge((is of tenuous ground as it imposes synthetic restrictions on reason, rather than permitting it to remain in its natural state, and inquiry, as to that same form by means of itself)). — Mww

That which lies in potentiality, needn't exert itself unto the same as constraint, nor ought one to offer abidance by either as to accord with that there can be made only contrived restriction in the breadth of forms with which reason is permitted to manifest. Yet vastness alone wouldn't preclude sufficient acuity in its manifestation; on account of which, none shall have bore the inclination to tarnish its state by means of either and need be impelled to preserve the same, to ensure that it remain as such whilst bearing in mind in concurrence with which, the prospect whereby credence had been ascribed unto fallacy, and strive to avert each resultant thereof.

(Preservation of constancy in understanding, and reason by consequence, can be attained, without conceding to that of the intention upon which you have hitherto come to act; establishment of series of restrictions which are mere externalities and thus not intrinsic to any form therewith, though which are regarded as vital((falsely, in my belief)) nonetheless if the course toward which it must venture, and conform through the subject, is to never once deviate from that which rests amongst the centrality of its own domain, as the latter be assigned.)

Do you mean "I could've said it more concisely"? — Pattern-chaser

Yes. Though on account of its implication, each form of expression would be indistinct from one another. Despite which, I have since come to offer recognition of the truth wherein, were I to persist in such a course, and further abide by that as a matter of preference, I may be subject to derision, if not dismissal in prospect. Neither of which, I imagine would manifest to a comparable extent, were it otherwise(if I were to cease in action, indulgence in verbosity for the sake of itself; I sought to make it clear however, prior, that to accord with its cessation would stand contrary to that for which I harbor much preference.)

Yet, that had been what I meant at the time.

(I reside in classification, amongst the same continuum to which you pertain through your own condition, as well it seems, as has been made evident; Asperger's-Autism Spectrum Disorder (High-Functioning; in accordance with the criteria set forth in the DSM-V).

A notion is a conceptualized idea, re: quantity, possibility, existence, etc., and for which no representation is given. Any judgement grounded on an idea, and from which a possible cognition follows, is entirely a priori, therefore not of necessary experiential derivation. If any mathematical judgement, as is any simple arithmetic expression from which applied mathematics arises, should manifest as cognition, a purely a priori conception must be antecedent to it, for it is quite impossible to express combinations of numbers in whatever form without the explicit incorporation of the pure conception of “quantity”. Simply put: if we don’t understand the idea of “one” and cognize it as a singular and therefore the simplest possible notion of quantity, we will never judge a multiplicity of “ones” in unity with themselves as having any meaning whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, by “manifest” is meant verified with objective validity, then experiential predication would be required. Nonetheless, the manifestation of judgement is primarily cognition, the possible proof of which lies in experience. — Mww

With regard to the former, we seem to be in alignment and thus are reflective of one another in that for which we had made conveyance at the time. The manner of sentiment in which there be ascribed truth unto that whereof certain conceptions((truth, falsity, quantity, existence, possibility and so forth)) pervade throughout thought and are those upon which the latter itself stands contingent, in all forms, with which it may manifest in potentiality independent of its appearance in the eye's of the subject((a priori)), we hold as destitute of all confliction in its every aspect amongst ourselves((a matter of consensus in that which it illustrates, as we ourselves regard it)). In the same course I sought to offer recognition merely of each, though had succumbed to failure in ensuring that it be of an extent of clarity, sufficient to facilitate greater apprehension of those with whom I spoke, than that for which either would be, were it otherwise.

The latter, insofar as it come to bear in consideration, I felt to be evident in such sense, on account of which I remained bound by no disinclination toward the prospect wherein it be expressed, as principle.

I suppose forms of conception can subsist, meaning continue or prevail, without being in attention to conscious thought. Depends on what one considers a form of conception to be. If by form is meant a kind of pattern, the question becomes whether there subsists a pattern to which conceptions adhere, or some criteria to which conceptions conform, which in turn begs the question: how do we know the form of conceptions without first having conceptions for them? I don’t know, but am inclined to let conceptions be merely the spontaneity of the understanding. — Mww

I had spoken of the matter in the sense of that which came to precede, since, and granted entailment for its own expression by means of the same. The criteria to which all must adhere serve merely to exemplify that which is the case, independent of the form with which it manifests and by virtue of the prior, its appearance as held in sight by the subject. I imagine the designation which it bore, as conferred through that toward which we had striven to act, to have semblance beyond that basis((with respect to that which I described in the past as 'conception'; beyond how it came to be termed on our own behalves as that alone would seem to be the catalyst for all dissimilarity having arisen therewith)). Attainment of resolve for which, can be granted without much further consideration.

The ego? If it be granted the human cognitive system is representational, and if ego as that which is presupposed by the act of thinking, such that all such thinking has that to which it necessarily belongs, it follows ego must have its representation. Reducing the systemic predicate far enough, we will end up with the ego determining its own representation, which defeats the lawfulness of the entire logical system. While I grant there must be a subject that exists thinking, in order to circumvent the inconsistencies intrinsic to “cogito, ergo sum”, which is at its final rest quite backward, it is sufficient to merely grant the subject without having to prove its fundamental constituency.

There exists the argument that the ego is represented by the “I”, which necessarily precedes all thought in general such that “I think” is given objective validity. It follows then, that a subject through whom thought can manifest, could be the “I”, without too serious a complication. Still, much closer examination will lead to self-contradictions, or at least the possibility of having no logical explanation, because we can always ask why such should be the case. — Mww

The sum of our every faculty constituted thereof can yield only series' of representations which are to be vindicated through the acuity with which the appearance of each stands to reflect upon that to which it would pertain. Yet, herein rests an intrinsic fault if one is to have hope to speak of the world as it is, truly, which is itself to lie in vain, inasmuch as one be bound by the requisite for such faculties of mind to discern either. Therefrom would follow the sentiment in which none can garner apprehension of what bears truth as separate from that which is beheld as an object of inquiry, and perceived thusly. One can draw inference, then, if such is predicated by the experiential, as seen through the same lens, that none can offer with even the faintest sense of veracity, and rightful belief, attestation of the world as it proceeds forth despite, in indifference of the subject should the latter be accounted for in either manner of judgement.

I suppose there may arise therewith an instance of necessity if each be truthful; that one must predicate all forms of consideration, and every aspect residing therein, as conferred solely by means of the subject, as exempt itself from furtherance of such a course in inquiry; an axiomatic condition((the subject)).

For further discussion on the matter of the final, see the following; if you haven't done the same, before, of which I remain doubtful((as it is evident to me that you are far more perceptive than most of those whom I have hitherto encountered)). https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument

This particular theoretical speculation is logically consistent, hence there is no contradiction. That is not to say another theory, grounded in other hypotheticals or conditionals would not falsify it. But as it stands, and given the premises that support it, in which it is given that there is a proverbial bottom line to such speculation from which no further truth be forthcoming, self-contradiction is averted. In other words, the truth is in and of the speculation itself, and no attempt is made by it to subsidize truth as a stand-alone entity.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions which suggest it? — Mww

If resolve is to be attained for that sake, in its contradiction, one need only concede to that of the principle, the condition, which permits all forms of reason to be exercised such that it have entrenchment in inquiry of itself as a matter of thought; to discern its own nature rather, than espouse, and abide by prohibition of each as you had done, it seemed to me. Though, if it be the case, that what I have sought to profess, as it lies in pertainment to that of your own, had in truth been misconstrued on my part, I shall offer concession in argument, instead.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions((see the prior segment of my exposition))which suggest it? — Mww

My position at present is one for consideration of the boundaries which serve to constrain yet inhere within the breadth of all understanding((to inclusion of the world not merely in its appearance)), and as to how either can be differentiated((if there be such distinctions in any truthful sense)) from those which are synthetic in nature. As attributive to thought yielded by the subject, rather than of the fundamental conceptions((quantity, possibility, change, time, space, truth, falsity, etcetera)) which subsist, despite absence of the aforementioned((subject)) and which are transcendental with regard to the myriad object's whereof each may arise((all that constitutes the world)).

For the sake of brevity; all manner of understanding is bound((as I speak of it)), in contrast with that of an array of certain conceptions((the same as before)) on which it is predicated in full, which needn't themselves be grounded in the experiential as each must be held distinctly, a priori, independent of whether either be conceived, beforehand((and are thus in a discrete sense, boundless;transcendent(al?).

I believe that which came to precede, as offering illustration of such principle, and its necessity, with the utmost clearness((what you felt it prudent to demonstrate earlier on, and an intent upon which you had acted in the end, with respect to the notion of 'quantity')).

There is a lot of rubbish here about 'the law of the excluded middle'. Since this is inapplicable to all parts of quantum physics, and much else, it is clear that classical logic is merely one form of limited rationality we apply to what we call 'ontology and epistemology'. — fresco

I had neither spoken of it in such a tone that its usage be implicated wherein it ought not to be, nor sought to assimilate it in the greater whole of my prior deliberation, as it came to serve merely as an instrument, through which certain series of propositions could be expressed with much clarity, whilst ensuring that neither be misappropriated through the same course.

"Either it is raining, or it is not raining." By means of appeal to that principle, inference of the prior's truth as a whole can be drawn; as was my intention.

Whilst it rests upon a particular domain which is itself quite discrete((predicate; propositional-logic)), and is applicable to each, I nonetheless had felt it to suffice in its illustration((to demonstrate that which is tautological in nature)) of that which I hoped to convey at the time. If the case were otherwise, I couldn't vindicate its usage, and thus wouldn't have acted upon it. One needn't offer consolidation of all forms of rationality in judgement to illustrate a singular aspect thereof.

None have hitherto conceived of a form of thought which accounts in full for every modality through which the aforementioned can manifest, whilst preserving coherence and dispelling all manner of prospects' in which contradiction can arise. To endeavor toward the former would as I imagine, be no less than inviable to an extent such that it lie beyond comparison.

even more word salad ! — fresco

I had made commitment of fault in only a few instances, though all have since been granted resolve. I find it nothing short of burdensome a task, to address each firstly, nor have I come to harbor fondness for what must precede therein if it is to be regarded as effectual in any sense(proof-reading). Owing to which I seldom strive to fulfill that need, despite the depth of clarity which would entail therefrom were it to be given. The modestness of my device in its proportionality lends no aid in that respect, either(Nokia Lumia Model-521).

For further discussion, see the following; https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle

Judgement. The faculty whereby a conception is cognized as belonging to its object. The limit of understanding is, therefore, where judgement does not cognize a conception as belonging to its object. For instance, if we see a bicycle with square tires, we understand immediately the bicycle will not move, for the concept of square does not belong to the concept of tire. Because experience promises bicycles with round tires always move, we will never understand how it is possible a bicycle with square tires will also move. Of course, we could force a bicycle with square tires to move, but then we’d have to judge some force as conjoined to the conception of moving bicycle which does not naturally belong to it. We would thus understand how it is possible to move a bicycle with square tires, but then we’d have trouble understanding how one would employ the bicycle in its primary function, whereby understanding devolves from a faculty of rational thought, to a merely non-intuitive speculation. — Mww

It need be the case that all manner of judgement insofar as it make passage, and thus manifest, lies in predication of the experiential, yet all forms of conception bear the privilege to subsist, though not be apprehended, in spite of absence of the former and that by means of which it can be yielded; the subject. The consequence which would find entailment therefrom, stands' in its implication to express that of the truth which must exemplify the same, and as to how all aspects residing therein constitute the whole, while are transcendent(al?) amongst that of the object(s) through which each is to be spoken of, as contingent upon experience. It seems evident in my eye's if hope for facilitation in passage of judgment isn't itself to lie in vain, there must be conferred fulfillment as cast unto a certain requisite for conveyance of mere thought. There need be held in sight prior to its inception, a subject through whom thought in its every form can manifest. The latter prospect is to be of greater substance than that as to which either would appear, were it otherwise. That which is drawn in association as arising among that of a series of object's amongst the same((thought)), remains bound by the prior, and determined in form solely through repudiation of dissimilarity therewith, as granted by the subject.

If association amongst a particular object, and that of which the latter is constituted is to be made, there need be granted before, a subject through whom its recognition is certain, and of clarity. On account of the condition in which each are in absence, there would be precluded such a supposition owing to which. Truth as it be ascribed, and in the tone with which I have hitherto spoken of the same in my every conveyance, whereof the matter had arisen, is of a transcendental form and by no means contingent upon nor subject in its determination through either inasmuch as it preserve establishment of mere necessity in its predicate, therewith((truth)) by virtue of that unto which it is reflective in content.

"For any bachelor there is one who is unmarried."
The central modality of the former presupposes in its appearance, and thus assumes for itself, the latter, by means of implication and as consequence is a matter of truth, necessarily.

"Either it is raining, or it is not raining."
An instance in which the notion of 'Law Of Excluded Middle' is clear as it had been termed thusly;
For the sake of offering that of a sense of greater generality;
"Either A is A, or A isn't A."

The principle of non-contradiction, predicated on experience or empirical possibility in general. On the other hand, we can think anything we want, but to arrive at valid cognitions when doing so we must still abide the principle. Any principle deemed intrinsic to human rationality presupposes a very unique capacity, which must escape definitive investigation, for in such case reason must be used to investigate itself. — Mww

All of the aforementioned each to their own bear semblance to truth, a priori, independent of whether either be conceived by the subject. If it be the case that each as it appears, had grown absent, its truth if not otherwise ((falsity)), insofar as either be rightfully bore by the object, neither is given tarnishment in subsequence as each must persist as it were, despite. All manner of expression which has come to precede, since, remain object's of thought, and are those unto which we strive to affix our sight throughout the course in which we inquire as to the integrity in expression of all thereof. The nature of its catalyst, the means whereby credence can be imparted, and attainment of understanding made, ought not to be exempt from such inquiry. The act through which one speaks of the latter, as a maxim for which abidance need be yielded, reflects only upon that for which there is sought, aversion.

To describe the variegated forms of limitation wherein the depth toward which one can venture through the faculty of reason, is bound, is to commit in course, reflection upon the same. If one were to speak of the latter, whilst in concurrence subsisting in that which preceded, is to ensure, implicitly, through that same means, entailment of contradiction, arising therefrom. If one were to speak of the unassailable boundary of understanding, and reason, as you have done, whilst regarding a certain sentiment as truthful, in which it be expressed that all manner of faculty therewith, cannot be exercised to inquire as to the truths to which its own modalities would pertain, and by which each be determined, is to make commitment of that which one had hoped to prevent; contradiction.

((None can appeal to the veracity of the principle of non-contradiction, and speak(investigate) of the boundaries which restrict the breadth of reason whilst regarding it as truthful, concurrently, that all reason need be exempt from such inquiry. As to accord with that, there can entail no grander contradiction.))

How is discernment to be made of wherein that boundary truly lies amongst the breadth of all understanding, hitherto known? Must there be particular criteria which vindicate that course, only insofar as each be that unto which there is cast fulfillment? What must have bearing in one's consideration of sight of the former ((the boundary itself as it is regarded))and that which may entail therefrom, if either is to be apprehended?

What is that through which one can deem its nature as unassailable in the truthful sense; need a certain condition if not series thereof be evident, if such a boundary as drawn is to be granted credence? If that be the case, then, by means of what manner of criteria, particularly? Furthermore, how ought one to differentiate that which lessens the vastness of all forms of understanding which can each be attained, from that inherent in its expression?
(That which stands reflective upon a natural limit((if it be so)) in thought as inhering within itself, and any aspect which resides therein as distinguished from mere synthetic restrictions to which the former would pertain.)

I don’t think your thesis is contrived, however much I find it, at some fundamental level, in opposition to my understanding. Given the difficulty I have with your half of the dialogue, I accept responsibility for failure to properly interpret your arguments. — Mww

That may bear semblance unto and thus serve as denotation for my own commitment of fault, in contrast with that for which you have spoken of yourself, as the subject unto which that sentiment ((deficiency)) be ascribed((I imagine that to reflect upon me, and embody a deficit of some form held on my behalf, rather than the same, for yourself)). The degree of clearness with which one can derive understanding, is contingent upon the clarity with which its matter, and content, are expressed. I wish to offer recognition of its veracity as principle, exemplified by the state in which I have since taken occupancy((my role, here)), in the course from which we ourselves have yet to deviate.

The burdens' conferred by our desire in having striven to ensure that attribute((sufficient clarity)), pervade every instance through which we partake in an act of expression, for its own sake on our behalves, are commensurate with one another((wholly equivalent with respect to the same)).

We ourselves each traverse the path halfway, if alone, and as such are reliant upon one another to permit its completion, for which only the sum of our every effort is of consequence.

I understand this as an attempt to report that the conditions for an analytic proposition, tautological expressions in general, the contradictions of which are impossible, are antecedent to the conceptions contained in the subject and predicate of such propositions. While it may be given that the conditions pre-exist the conceptions, no synthesis of the condition with the conception, such that the notion of truth should arise from it, is at all possible absent a rational entity in possession of a natural ability to so synthesize. — Mww

While it need be the case that all manner of truth, beyond that contained within its own predicate; are bound by reliance upon a subject through whom each can be apprehended and given credence, there stands no such requisite for those of the 'analytic' in form. The notion of truth shall arise insofar as there be present a certain supposition which serves to permit sight and thus privilege in usage of reason; that which has entrenchment in the rational and is catalyst for all inferences, arising therefrom. Yet in regard to mere tautology, on the basis for its own determination, as an instance bearing truth and contingent upon its predicate to yield the former attribute ((truth)), each is to subsist in independence and lie thusly transcendent(al?) amongst that of the object upon which it would reflect and to which it must pertain.

If particular criteria be fulfilled, by means of the predicate of any conception hitherto remaining latent, and if it be a matter of principle that if the former were granted fulfillment, the latter must be true, there can be vindicated no disputation of its veracity irrespective of whether it had been conceived beforehand, if at all, as having arisen in thought.

Wherein lays a differentiation between our arguments: truth as humans understand it, does not have its own intrinsic form, but rather, rationality constructs a form a priori within which the possible notion of truth resides necessarily, re: a logical syllogism, or merely a subject/predicate statement. — Mww

The basis for distinction, and variance amongst ourselves, known since, rests upon how we regard the prospect of truth as preserved through an object of thought in the absence of its own inception therewith; if either attribute be intrinsic and thus transcendent(al?) amongst that in which it would otherwise originate, it need come to bear, despite.

OK, but this suggests a kind of truth different than the kind of truth understood as such by humans, which are to be considered herein the “object(s) of which it stands reflective”. At any rate, “implicit unto itself” would seem more transcendent than transcendental. Not to say such is impossible, but I submit such at least makes little sense, hence is of precious little use, and at most is utterly beyond the scope of human knowledge. — Mww

I have grown to suspect to an ever greater extent in clarity, that your claim in which there be present, an unassailable boundary in the depth of understanding which can be attained, and as to the reason for which either would preclude its truth, as you have sought to convey thus far, all the while acting to delineate each aspect of its modality, and in what respect the latter's truth as conferred ought to be held as transcendent(al?) in form. If all manner of thought in which a sentiment of that nature no longer is to be evident it remains the case nonetheless, that its truth while separate from that which can be apprehended, hadn't come to endure a change therein as consequence.

For any collective A whose every member B has a certain property P, all members of A must have that same property P as assigned, and remain true T even if it be absent amongst the whole of thought by virtue of the content with which it manifests as in encapsulation of its own predicate.

That of which I have made expression, stands destitute of merit if there be conducted even the faintest transition, in that unto which we affix our sight, as object's of inquiry. Merely that with entrenchment and firmness in grounding within the experiential, cannot serve as either, therefrom much else to the inclusion of certain notions of which we ourselves have hitherto spoken, are exempt from its truth.
(The domain of noumena, wherein it may lie, if it be; all manner of tautology; that which is the case, independent of its appearance in thought; the abstract, and so forth are all that bears applicability as constituents of its relation in contrast to the world as it appears solely amongst experience.)

All of the aforementioned I imagine would seem, as I can say with certitude, rather contrived on the outset as seen through the eye's of another. I had taken intrigue in it, and thus its course toward which I came to abide had garnered ever more precedence in my mind at the time, and thereafter, toward the present. I remain in doubt as to if either imparted betterment in any sense therewith.

You have either succumbed to the advent of naivety, and remain blind to your own plight, or persist in destitution of an awareness of that which is the case, at this time. Though one ought not with much immediacy to disregard the prospect in which all the aforementioned, bear truth, as it may well be so.

None of that which you have come to profess, here, is true in even the faintest sense.

"You’re either a troll or unfit for this forum atm."
It is evident in my eye's then, that you have shown no aptitude in proper judgement of character.

"No point pretending." I never once had before, as I am nothing if not earnest.

The discrepancy in apprehension lies contingent upon the deficits of the rest, as drawn between my own depth of understanding and the former.

"He has just revealed his condition."
Yes.
Asperger's; Autism-Spectrum Disorder (High-Functioning)

"Clearly lacks reading and writing comprehension." If that be the case, their absence ((lack)) must be an ailment by which we are both ourselves burdened.

"Flagged this member multiple times now." As have I on account of your incessant yet unjust scrutiny and derision, as ascribed unto me.

How righteous of you to act upon that, and how eloquent your expression had been.

"I cannot see any substantive point being made."
I ask that you address what has since come to follow, therefrom, onward.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/299642
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/299509
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/299798
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/299654

"From a species perspective, shared physiology and language gives much agreement which we tend to misleadingly call 'objective', and that sort of blinkered thinking can fuel a futile 'reality debate'."

Each of which we regard amongst ourselves as a matter of consensus in form. I see no reason which would vindicate any wish to contest its veracity.

"There seems to be a lot of 'word salad' above surrounding the notion that what we call 'the world' is 'observer dependent'."

My intention as had been made evident, is to ensure that there be a lesser degree of abidance by the prior 'verbosity' on my own behalf in the hope that it abate the burden of understanding of those with whom I have hitherto sought to speak, and for the sake of whom I have acted upon it. The former constitutes a clear preference of mine, and thus must present as to how either would serve to account for that by which it has grown pervasive, in time.

(I harbor a particular condition which detracts from the depth in eagerness with which I strive to partake in an act of speech, as bearing such forms((that which is barren, and plain)); Asperger's; Autism Spectrum Disorder, High-Functioning.)

"Although the social criteria for Asperger’s Disorder (also known as Asperger’s Syndrome, or AS) and autism are identical, the former condition usually involves fewer symptoms and has a generally different presentation than does the latter. Individuals with Asperger’s Disorder are often socially isolated but are not unaware of the presence of others, even though their approaches may be inappropriate and peculiar. For example, they may engage another person — usually an adult — in principally one-sided conversation characterized by long-winded, pedantic speech, about a favorite and often unusual and narrow topic."

It stands as an innate disposition conferred upon birth in potentiality, which has seldom been granted repress on my part.

For further discussion, see the following;
https://psychcentral.com/lib/in-depth-look-at-aspergers-disorders-symptoms/

It need be the case, then, with regard to all forms of tautology for which the truth of each, as conferred implicitly unto itself by means of its own content as intrinsic in nature, determine that the former must be transcendental amongst the object of which it stands reflective in appearance.

For all manner of supposition which bears truth, as by virtue of an aspect which resides therein, remains of neither greater nor lesser truth than before, independent of whether it be conceived in thought and thus no longer serve as mere prospect, a priori.

My intent had been to demonstrate the descent toward contradiction which would entail, were it otherwise. The state with which it came to manifest, firstly, is distinct from that for which it was led in subsequence. Therein stands a requisite if apprehension is to be granted entailment in any form as the world must be conditioned by the subject, and remain as such. I wish to concede in that respect; as I ought to have spoken in a tone such that it be evidentiary 'no conception can be yielded if there be absent, the subject', in contrast with 'none can conceive' as the latter of which I acknowledge would presuppose and thus be contingent upon some manner of subject which would remain contrary to that for which I had hoped to make expression at the time.

The notion of truth can arise irrespective of whether the subject and all faculties contained therewith are in absence insofar as that of the object to which the former were to pertain confer implicitly fulfillment onto certain criteria which serve to render itself, if fulfilled, as had been the case before, as a matter of truth within its own intrinsic form. To dispel for a period however brief, with that founded solely in the abstract; its constitution bore semblance to those of the 'analytic'; truths which are nothing else, by virtue of the terms of each, and their content as separate from the subject(for which its truth subsists therein untarnished, and destitute of all externalities as cast unto itself; non-conditional).

For instance; the following suppositions bear truth, despite there being no catalyst, through which either are to be given credence as yielded by the subject, as if each must be experiential in some regard had it been otherwise.
"All bachelor's are unmarried."
" For every three notions there are three notions."
"For every element n+1 of the real numbers R there is at least one member in R of indenticality, whose sum equates to n+1 for any n of R."

"An unintelligible assertion, unless it carries the implication of a mode of cognition without self-contained forms of intuition or understanding (and whose extent of truth is bound by neither)."

I hadn't sought to exercise forethought, of depth sufficient to facilitate my own sight, through which there be determined either, yet felt all the same that the course toward which we have striven, since, may impart unto us what is to be designated and spoken of, merely as a 'God's Eye View' thereby allowing for circumvention of that constraint. By what means, in your belief, could there be amended the prior, in full, and permit it to be reconciled with, in the account, without as consequence deferring to the former to ensure preservation of constancy in form and deter the encroachment of fault in that upon which it need be reflective?

For the sake of brevity, and your own, I shall offer mere summation of that for which I had sought conveyance, by means of the following.

The World as appearance is conditioned by the subject through its sight. All of that which can be conceived remains latent prior to its inception in thought. If all manner of subject were to transition toward absence in state, there is no longer a basis through which conceptions can be yielded as thought which is itself catalyst for the former, is contingent upon the subject, and thus must be absent if its origin, the subject, were to be the same, in reflection of one another. That which is to entail therefrom, can be regarded as a manifestation of the domain of noumena; all the while remaining without fault, imperceptible, as the subject lies absent therein.

I see no reason which would vindicate, nor serve to warrant divergence from our course as it remains at present.

"One can conceive of an instance in which oneself be absent, yet none can for that in which all are in absence."

As there is no subject through whom the world can be apprehended, need that be true; the world as it appears is conditioned by the former in its representation therewith, yet if either be absent, neither can subsist in the state which must, were it otherwise. The prospect for which the world rests in view, is contingent and thus bound by the determinant of the subject in appearance through its sight.

In the hope of conferring unto you greater depth in the clarity with which you apprehend that for which I have made conveyance since;

Conditions;
1. To conceive of the world in appearance and all aspects contained therein, there must be a subject through whom it be sighted, and as such known in understanding, however much partial the latter may be in form.
2. A mind and by virtue of the same, a subject which bears sufficient depth in all faculties which only in full constitute the former.
3. The presence of a subject is to be regarded and spoken of as requisitory with respect to understanding of the world; its every aspect and all manner of prospect hitherto manifested to which each is in pertainment.

x; a particular aspect or event confined to the world in appearance
X; the subject, if not series thereof
y; that which holds true independent of its apprehension
Y; the world as it is in truth amongst itself, in absence of the subject
Z; the world as it stands' bound and conditioned by the subject, and nothing besides

For any particular event x, there is at minimum a single member of the collection X as contained in that of Z upon which it be contingent and to which it would belong. The collective of X is a subset(proper?) of Z, and by consequence held within it, never to leave its boundary. In contrast therewith, any sentiment y which bears truth independent of its vindication is analytical in form, as each contains the predicate for its own truth in content (no longer conditioned by the subject; is non-conditional). Only the latter can be designated as mere tautology (an instance in which truth stands amongst itself in potentiality; for all possible worlds', to inclusion of the noumenal Y). One can draw inference, that inasmuch as all manner of subject be destitute, and thus in absence of state; all of that upon which there is predicated such a world Z, and dependency wrought upon the subject in its representation, are to persist no longer if either be the case.

(The World as appearance is conditioned by the subject which must grow absent, to reflect upon the state in which the subject lies; yet the world as it is truly, independent of understanding, and representation shall persist despite. It retains semblance in form to the noumenal, without the subject and thus imparts fulfillment unto the central criterion by which determination of its nature is yielded; as imperceptible in the eye's of the subject.)

Danke fur alle du die haben bestimmt.

Nein hat das worden beispiel nahe einsen laune, recht?
(That instance hadn't been near nor of humor, right?)

Are you trying to be funny, here? — I like sushi

Ja.

Insofar as I abide in conviction by that which had been espoused on my behalf, prior, for which you had come to serve as the recipient therewith, each reflects unto one another to an extent such that each conform to the same in substance, differentiated only in the manner with which either be granted expression.

"In a domain which can never once be apprehended, and thus bearing no entrenchment in the experiential as noumena."

In Hell I offer no contention nor in High Water; I imagine it to be fortunate then, that neither were the case in truth.

If we are to regard the latter notion as bearing only semblance to the truth to which each would pertain; a form of object of the grandest ideality, without fault and all manner of imperfection; it would suffice to designate that of which I had spoken at the time as merely noumenal, whilst in concurrence with the prior, every aspect therewith, lying contingent upon a certain principle which to the inclusion of all else in its account entails formation of a conceptual scheme in which the aforementioned as a whole must reside.

1. The subject strives to attain apprehension of that which is the case in the world, though cannot garner sight of its complete image; it stands as partial, thusly.
2. All states of affairs, and every conception hitherto known, as occurrence, constitute the world as it appears in the eye's of the subject, in full.
3. The world as it finds' appearance must exemplify all of that which is the case yet shall subsist in destitution of what can arise, in prospect, insofar as the latter remain, true to form; merely prospective.
4. That which has since grown absent, and has made no expression amongst the whole of the world as it appears, bears the privilege and means to ensure that the former become otherwise, and by virtue of which, manifest itself.
5. The preceding conditions if held in account from which none are to be exempt, denote the advent of a world independent of the subject in appearance, in which there has taken occupancy all of that conferred through potentiality; a domain which can never once be apprehended, though must have arisen all the same as consequence.

(All of that which is the case amongst itself independent of representation by means of the subject, in both occurrence and prospect as accounted for through the domain of noumena.)

I suppose I could attenuate its form in a manner such that what had been spoken of, and expressed on my part, be of greater frugality in that respect.

The World in its every aspect as we ourselves regard it, is mere appearance in full and nothing more. Our faculties of mind grant us the privilege in opportunity to apprehend the reasons for which it stands as it has, and permits our own discernment however much bound by partiality in depth, as to the course toward which it offers guidance, and as to how in time, its cessation shall arise.

Though it has grown evident, that we seek to condition the world such that it accord with and thus reflect upon, the modalities with which its representation manifests; dismissing the nature of either in the hope that it further affirm, and allow us to dispense with constancy in sight as ascribed unto the prejudice which serves to distort all clearness in our passage of judgement, and regarding that which ought to be spoken of as matters of perception as having come to harbor much semblance to the truth to which each alone would pertain, independent of all thought yielded by means of the subject; ourselves.

My intent rests on abidance toward the same form of sentiment, in the hope that it confer betterment in apprehension, greater than that which would bear truth were we to act otherwise.

I can merely offer ever more an extent of affirmation than before for that of which you have yielded much advocacy since, as we regard each, as a matter of consensus; absent of all disputation amongst ourselves in its every aspect.

(Thanks man, you as well.)

"Now we see your colours."
Never once before had I sought to conceal them, nor lessen the clarity with which its image finds' appearance.