Choice definitely plays a role. But I don't think I could choose to believe that the Earth is flat. Even if I read nothing but flat earth advocacy for five years, I don't think my mindset is conspiratorial enough to ever allow me to believe that every scientist and astronaut is lying to us.

You may choose to have a certain belief, in the same way you may choose to dress yourself in a certain way. — Shamshir

I'm not conscious of my ability to choose what I believe. I understand on some level that my beliefs are influenced by my personal biases and my upbringing. But I still feel like my beliefs are the most reasonable beliefs I could hold. I can't just choose to believe something I perceive to be less rational.

And why are we using the ease with which you personally can imagine something as a measure of what is, or may be, the case. What possible mechanism of reality could there be which ensures its inner workings are conceivable to a particular 21st century Homo sapiens? — Isaac

The idea that the universe can be understood is a fundamental presupposition that underlies nearly all human thought, especially scientific thought. If we can't use logic and mathematics to draw conclusions, then science is futile. Planning out your afternoon might even be futile.

You'll have to explain this, as I'm not getting it from your assertion alone. How would such a universe violate the laws of statistics? — Isaac

In statistics, we collect data about a sample in order to make inferences about the whole to which the sample belongs. For instance, we might survey a sample of coin flips in order to find whether heads or tails is more likely. And unless we are biased in the way we choose our samples, we assume that the more individual samples we take, the more confidently we can make estimations about the whole. If we consistently find that half of coin flips land on heads, we infer that the 50/50 principle applies to all coin flips. It can't just be that the coin flips we came across happened to result in heads half the time for no reason. There must be something about coin flips, as a particular kind of phenomena, that causes them to behave this way. And the same applies to objects of mass attracting objects of mass. If all the objects we observe attract each other in accordance with the law of gravitation, then we conclude that gravitational attraction applies to all objects. It can't just be an arbitrary pattern in the sample we took.

In order to see that as statistically unlikely you'd have to make two presumptions 1) the default position of particles in the absence of guidance is to act randomly, and 2) out of all the other universes with fundamental particles none of them (or very few of them) are like ours. — Isaac

Randomness is the default state of something which isn't governed by laws. Isn't that self evident? If something isn't ordered, we should expect it to be disorderly. Coin flips are random because there isn't any regular principle which determines how we flip them. Conversely, if something does exhibit consistent regularities in its behavior, that indicates that it is governed by a principle. Regarding the second assumption, all we need to accept is that a universe where fundamental particles behaved differently wouldn't contradict anything about logic or statistics.

The universe exhibits form rather than obeying it or creating it as the horns of the dilemma suggest. — Andrew M

Something seems very wrong to me about saying that everything in universe exhibits the same forms for no reason. And if there is a reason, I don't think the reason could be framed as simply a property of the objects which exhibit form. For instance, it seems to be a property of mass that it causes space-time to warp around it. But I don't think you can just take this fact at face value. Why does the universe exhibit these patterns? It's not logically necessary. Maybe it's physically necessary, but necessity, it seems to me, implies the existence of laws. Something can't just happen to be necessary. There must be something else that makes it necessary.

D.M. Armstrong developed a physicalist metaphysics that is consistent with these abstract principles. In a nutshell: — Relativist

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Armstrong's theory is that physical properties are universals which particulars instantiate. So even if physical laws are just functions of properties, the properties have universal natures which exists over and above their particular instances. Are these universal natures real things? They're not physical objects. How do you resolve this problem without admitting non-physical objects into your ontology?

The problem with arguments like this is because they assume some type of dualism - where two or more kinds of substances exist and are so different that they are incompatible, or unable to interact. — Harry Hindu

I'm not assuming dualism. There are a number of alternatives to physicalism and dualism. I personally prefer a sort of Kantian idealism. I believe in an external world of one kind or another, but I don't think we can know what it is. We can only know how it affects us.

If there are truly no laws at all, then one of the things that can be the case is that all particles simply behave the way they do for no reason at all. — Isaac

That would be true if there were no laws of logic and statistics. But a universe without logic and statistics would be utterly absurd and inconceivable. A universe without gravity, on the other hand, is easy to imagine. The existence of a universe where mass did not affect the curvature of space-time would not violate any principles of logic or statistics. A universe where all objects always obeyed an intricate set of laws for no reason would absolutely violate statistics, and perhaps even logic. A random process can occasionally yield non-random results just by random chance. But if a random process exclusively yields non-random results, the chances of that draw closer to zero with each passing second.

So it appears you are asserting a Euthyphro-style dilemma. Either the universe obeys a law external to it or else there can be no law (in which case we should expect a disorderly universe). Would that be a fair description? — Andrew M

I will tentatively accept your summary as a fair description, although I'm slightly worried that you have an argument in store that will make me regret doing so.

↪Dusty of Sky I'm asking for an explanation of just how the physical property of liquidity arise from a liquids purported constituent particles. I can't see that you have given anything like that so far. — Janus

Particles in a liquid move in a different way than particles in other states of matter. They'll don't resist being rearranged the way particles in a solid do, but they can't be compressed the way particles in a gas can.

Aren't you relying on science to tell you all that? I can't tell whether you are accepting or rejecting physical explanations of the experience of wetness. — Janus

I partially accept physical explanations. We know from experimentation that experiences correlate with brain states. But I'm not a Cartesian dualist. I think experiences like wetness or surprise or the color blue have real substantial existence. I think it's self evident that they do, because we experience them. I think that physical objects only exist in the sense that they can explain the world we experience. And physical explanations are compelling enough that I think it's pretty safe to say that there really is something (let's call it OR for objective reality) corresponding to our concept of the physical world. But we don't what OR is. We only know how it affects our experiences. I'm drawing the same distinction that the Orthodox Christians use when they talk about God. They can know the energies of God, but they can't know his essence. So when I talk about the physical brain, I'm just referring to the causal source of experiences. I'm not specifying what the nature of the source is. And I'm also drawing the Aristotelian distinction between different types of causes. The physical brain might be the efficient cause of our experiences, but I don't think it's the material or formal cause. The material causes of experiences are not neurons, but the components of experience itself such as colors and sounds and feelings. And the formal cause of experience, I think is best described by what Kant referred to as the schemata: the functions by which our manifold of sensations are arranged according to space, time and the Categories. I'm happy to defend and elaborate upon my own ideas, but I'll just remind you that the original purpose of this post was to challenge the idea that everything that exists is physical.

You are offering definitions or descriptions, but these don't seem to amount to explanations. — Janus

Why not? I'm sure there's more to be said. But can you find me any scientifically observed properties of liquids which can't be explained in terms of basic physical concepts like shape, volume, motion, temperate and pressure?

To be sure there are neural processes within the body that, along with physical contact with the liquid give rise to the feeling of wetness. What is it that feels wet, though, apart from our bodies or parts of our bodies? Our brains don't feel wet, in fact we don't feel our brains at all. If I dive into water my whole body feels wet. If I dip just the tip of a finger into a liquid it is only my fingertip that feels wet. — Janus

Our minds coordinate visual and bodily sensations to form a distinct impression of body parts like fingertips. And when one of our body parts is wet, our minds associate the sensations of wetness with the body parts from which they originate. But the feelings themselves are in the mind. If you jump in pool without a brain, the feeling of wetness will not occur. In the context of our current argument, I'm using mind and brain interchangeably.

I don't know enough about physics to say for sure. But from what I remember, the four states of matter are clearly defined. They don't have any mysterious emergent properties. Solids have fixed shape and volume, liquids have fixed volume but unfixed shape, gasses have unfixed shape and volume, and plasmas are ionized gasses. Am I missing something?

Nothing that we experience is the direct representation of an interaction between our bodies and the world. First, it gets processed through our brain (and perhaps a non-physical mind as well). So the phenomenological feeling of wetness can only be a mediated result of the body's interaction with a liquid.

Perhaps I should brush up on my physics, but I think that the liquid state of matter is fairly simple to define. It corresponds to certain pressures and temperates. And if something is liquid, that means that it will assume the shape of its container. It has a fixed volume. And it will behave according to the laws of fluid dynamics. I think physics gives us a fairly comprehensive definition of liquidity. Phenomenologically, wetness is the feeling that something is wet. It doesn't exist in the object which we perceive as wet, but in our own consciousness.

If you mean wetness phenomenologically, then it's definitely not a physical entity. If you mean liquidity, then wetness is reducible to the composite state of physical entities.

Regarding neurons, I agree that we should try to find the most plausible explanation for experience. Neuroscience seems to be a better candidate than vaguely defined notions of spirits and souls. But I still think we can do better. The P-Zombie and Mary's Room thought experiments demonstrate what to me seem like serious problems with the idea that all experiences are caused by neural processes. However, I'm open to the idea that all experiences are correlated with neural processes.

Regarding physicalism, I'll try to give adequate definitions of the terms you asked for. By 'reducible', I mean that nothing in addition is required to explain. So I mean both explicable and nothing but. By physical entity, I mean fundamental particles and the composite objects that are made of fundamental particles. Maybe space-time should also be included as a physical entity.

If I understand your use of the term 'emergent' correctly, you mean that the whole which emerges is somehow greater than the sum of the parts from which it emerges. So you could not come to an understanding of the smell of roses just by analyzing each individual neuron involved in producing the olfactory experience. But is it even theoretically possible to understand experience using neurology? A painting is greater than the sum of its paint droplets. But that's because, along with the individual droplets, there are also geometrical relations between those droplets. And we understand how geometric principles transform individual points into complex shapes. But what sort of principles could we use to correlate simple neurological activities with the complex experiences they supposedly produce? Maybe I'm just not imaginative enough, but I don't see how that's possible. And if the emergence of experiences from neurons doesn't occur in accordance with clear principles, then it seems like the word emergence is just a more mundane sounding substitute for 'infusion by the holy spirit' or 'transcendent awakening.'

Regarding physicalism, I am not arguing against any particular eliminative physicalists. Maybe physicalism, like humanism or conservatism, is one of those philosophies which continues to evolve and branch out. In that case, there doesn't seem to be any point in critiquing it, since its defenders can simply claim 'not all physicalists think that' or 'physicalists haven't believed that since 1917.' But the definition of physicalism I was using was the simple one that you get in encyclopedias, namely that everything is ultimately reducible to physical entities.

I agree with all of that. But don't physicalists believe that everything is reducible to physical entities and nothing else exists?

I agree. For instance, if you smell roses, does that mean your neurons smell like roses? Obviously not. So how can you neurologically define the smell of roses? You can't. All you can do is point to the spots on your brain that light up when you smell roses.

If I understand your cat analogy correctly, you are saying that just as you can represent a complex organism (your cat) with a simple name (Rico), you can represent an enormous amount of physical phenomena (for instance, all the gravitational activity in the history of our universe) with a simple equation (F=G(m1m2)/r^2). So the law of universal gravitation is not something abstract which exists outside of the material world. It's just the name we use to designate the sum of a particular variety of phenomena that occurs within the material world. Please correct me if I misunderstood you.

But I think there's a serious problem with your argument. When people refer to laws of physics like gravity, they are not referring to the sum of a particular sort of phenomena. They are referring to a principle which they understand to govern the material world. If we use your definition of physical laws, then the laws will lose their character of necessity. If the law of universal gravitation just refers to a type of movement, then there's no reason why objects of mass should necessarily attract other objects of mass. Laws of physics would cease to be laws and become mere description of the past. And if gravity is just a simplified description, then I have two questions. 1) why have all objects observed in all controlled experiments always obeyed the law of gravity (as well as every other well established law of physics)? and 2) why should objects continue to obey the law of gravitation in the future? If it's just a description of past phenomena, then perhaps I'll suddenly float up into space. There's no good reason to think I won't unless we understand the gravity equation to refer not to a concrete object, but to an abstract principle which governs the physical universe.

I'm using the words physical and material interchangeably. So if elementary particles aren't concrete objects in the physical world, then how are they physical? They can't be abstract objects in the physical world. So they're not in the physical world. But if they're not in the physical world, which I understand to include all physical things, then they are not physical things. And isn't the core tenet of physicalism that only physical things exists?

I think my reply to TogetherTurtle basically covers your argument. If the laws of physics are just descriptions of the way things happen to be organized, then they are not laws. And if the laws of physics aren't actually laws, then why does the universe obey them. It can't be random. What are the odds that every physical object, in the absence of laws, would always act as if it were governed by laws? Statistically infinitesimal, I would say.

The questions you raise are so complex and multi-faceted that I'll have to be a bit overly simplistic.

What brought us to this state is the triumph of the American Empire (let's call it AE). AE became the dominant global power in the aftermath of WW2. And following the collapse of the USSR, AE's global supremacy was basically unquestioned. However, America doesn't like to think of itself as an empire. AE doesn't conquer nations or set up colonies. Rather, it rules by trade. AE dominates other countries by giving them no other option than to business with it. And when you do business with AE, you do business on AE's terms.

In a lot of ways, America does a much better job at ruling than its imperial predecessors. It goes to war less frequently than the Romans did, and it doesn't violently impose its culture upon other peoples the way the British did. But because Ae rules through economic might, it's caused wealth and power to become nearly synonymous. And that, I think, is why we are so obsessed with filling our coffers and raising our GDPs no matter the human cost. Under the current global order, money makes the world go round. You can't do anything without money. All the noble objectives you want to accomplish require an enormous amount of money. And in order to get that money, you need to act like a greedy soulless capitalist.

So that, I think, answers the question of why we're in this state. But the question of how to make a change is far more difficult.

I strongly believe that socialist revolution is not the answer. For one, it hasn't worked in the past. And I don't see how it ever could. If you give the government enough power to radically redistribute the wealth in society and centrally manage all large scale economic activity going forward, they will almost certainly abuse that power. And if you think that power can remain with 'the people,' you should read Animal Farm. I could write a lot more about why socialism (even if it's democratic) isn't the answer. But for now, I'll focus on what I think might be a better answer. Because America is the source of the problem, it also has to be the source of the solution. Of course, we could just try to destroy America, but that would probably end in massive wars and global chaos. So let's cross that off our list.

I think you're right that we need better leaders. But how do we make them better? I don't think we can just educate a generation of exceptional people who will naturally take charge and fix our problems. What we need to focus on is changing the aspects of our system of government which cause our leaders to make bad decisions. And when we think of possible changes we could implement, we should make them as realistically achievable as possible. So we can't just design a new system of government.

I'm sure there are many flaws in our system that we should try to change, but I'll focus on one for now.

Our politicians are too dependent on special interests. But we can't just get money out of politics. Corruption will always find a way to creep back in. We need to adjust the rules of democracy so our politicians aren't so desperate for donations. Right now in America, Democrats and Republicans are fighting with everything they've got to maintain their power. And in order to win, they need money. They need to act like corrupt, morally bankrupt traitors who care more about undermining their political opponents than serving their country. This dynamic is tearing America apart. It needs to end. And the only way to end it is for one side to win and the other to lose. It's too late for us to come together. We don't need a total victory where Democrats absolutely wipe out Republicans or vise versa. We just need one side to dominate the other enough so that the two can reach an understanding about who has the power. Following WW2, the Democrats had all the power. From the early 50s till the mid 90s, they never once lost their majority in Congress. During that period, the Republicans understood that the only way they could have any influence is if they cooperated and sometimes even went along with the Democrats.

But given the current demographics of America, neither side can dominate the other. So both sides have to bend to corporate interests in order to raise enough money to win elections. Both sides have to refuse to compromise in order to satisfy the people who vote for them and give them money. What we need to do is change the rules so that one side has a clear advantage. We shouldn't change the rules too much, because that might cause political instability and make the situation even worse. And we should change the rules in a way that makes sense, seems justified, and isn't just clearly ad hoc. If we do that, we'll at least be capable of having effective leaders. And maybe these new leaders will be able to address some of the problems you're talking about. And whether the changes to democracy should result in Democratic or Republican leadership... I've already written too much, so I'll save that part for later.