Well, they're your kids.

What I should have asked, more analogously to the Bannon situation, is do you think it would be prudent to hire the child porn enabler who never expressed disapproval to, say, run a day care center?

Lots of folks are all too happy to make all sorts of ridiculous conflations, yes. — Terrapin Station

The distinction between a racist and a paid, professional who knowingly enabled racism and gave no evidence of disapproval is a distinction without a difference in some people's pragmatic political judgment. To armchair logic choppers, it makes a big difference.

Would you hire a paid professional who knowingly ran a site that regularly featured child porn (and gave no evidence of disapproval) for a babysitter?

I'm not sure what "political" adds there, really. What's the difference between a political difference re whether someone is a racist and just a simple difference re whether someone is a racist? — Terrapin Station

Yeah, you responded before I edited to convey what I was actually trying to say.

The political fact of the matter is that the public cares little about the difference between whether a high official was a racist or just a paid, professional who knowingly enabled racism. Politically, the technical logical difference is irrelevant pedantic nonsense.

Pragmatically and politically, the difference between being a racist and being a paid, professional enabler of racism is close enough.

Laws are typically pragmatic formalized applications of societal mores. And such mores typically are those considered to have the greatest moral significance in the society.

Which is both saying that he's racist--the comment speculating what his opinion of Jews would be is pretty explicit about that, and it's positing guilt by association, because you're taking the comments of associates of his to count as evidence of his own views.

I would easily allow the content that's on Breitbart if I were running Breitbart, too. For one, I'm a free speech absolutist, I have a problem with people being offended by speech rather than a problem with offensive speech, and the sort of content in question is part of what has made Breitbart as successful as it has been.

You might figure that I'm racist, sexist, etc. because of that. You'd be wrong. — Terrapin Station

What exactly is the relevant difference between managing and promoting an organization noted as a platform for racist, (as well as sexist, and xenophobic) material--and "being" a racist?

Yes, in the model of doing factor analysis. But the fact that it works suggest something more. You can't use the mental construct, as I mentioned above, to explain why the model works on real data.

IOW, this isn't just a mathematical concept. It's use to get at unobserved factors in real data. That's the reason statisticians came up with it. The theory being that there really are such things explaining the data. — Marchesk

Seems to me that if you can't demonstrate, either logically or empirically, that the unobserved factors are real things rather than ideas of things, then they are just as consistent with an anti-realist as with a realist stance.

Exactly.


Latent variables are inferred, a mental construct, part of a mental model. Thus, consistent with an anti-realist metaphysics.

From Plato's Republic, the good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. So if we lose "the good", we lose intelligibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just as the sleep-inducing properties of opium stem from its "virtus dormitiva".

Well, just how united we ever were, from the earliest settlements on, is debateable.

Yeah, the idea of people arming themselves to oppose a tyrannical government is quite ridiculous at present. That would only possibly work if we were talking about some tiny banana republic. — Terrapin Station

It is a well-known fact that tiny banana Republicans are the ones who compensate by buying the biggest guns.

Actually, I think science, philosophy, language, concepts, life, and, of course, forum discussions ... are quite messy.

I think it's important to realize that there isn't universal agreement on the vast majority of claims about objective, factual matters.

"Objective" doesn't imply agreement, and "subjective" doesn't imply disagreement, even though that's a common misconception — Terrapin Station

Well, I think there is not literally unanimous agreement, but surely is virtually universal agreement about the vast majority of claims about factual natters-that's how something gets widely established as a "fact."

Anyway, I think the central issue in the difference between claims about religious experience vs. claims about temperatures, weights, cats on mats, etc. is a difference in whether or not the phenomena are publically observable such that independent observers are more or less agreed on the criteria, and can judge the truth of falsity of the claim for themselves. It's patently obvious that a claim such as "Water boils at 100 degrees C" and "The door is open" are readily confirmable by independent observers, whereas "The Blessed Mother appeared to me last night and told me to make a shrine here" and "My sister's cancer was healed because we prayed to Saint Jude" are not.

Sometimes they vote twice and collect Social Security checks. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Ha! There ya go.

And get elected. — Michael

Q.E.D.

Can the dead have citizenships? If not then you can't be both dead and Australian. — Michael

OF course the dead have citizensjip.

They even vote in some places.

Why "Banno was Australian" and not "Banno is Australian"? You seem to be implying that he isn't an Australian (any more). And if he isn't an Australian then he isn't a dead Australian. Therefore that he talks is not proof that dead Australians can talk. — Michael

P1: Banno be dead.

P2: Banno be Australian.

P3: The evidence here shows that he refuses to stop talking.

C: Dead Australians can talk

P1: Banno is dead.

P2: Banno was Australian.

P3: The evidence here shows that he refuses to stop talking.

C: Dead Australians can talk

Q.E.D.

So objectivity is defined by agreement? — Metaphysician Undercover

If the truth or falsity of a claim can be determined objectively, I think this means that it'ds available for indpendent inspection and judgement.

The claims of established science are either presented as logically rigorous arguments (including the data and math) and/or as empirically observable. The criteria for someone's judgment of the truth or falsdity of such claims are explicitly defined and universally agreed upon.

This is not the case in judgments about the truth or falsity of moral claims.

What if we construe "cause" as an event(s) or set of contingencies, without which, a subsequent event we call the "effect" would not have occured, and with which, the effect reliably occurs?

I would think the first step would be to survey the reasons we have for believing one thing or another. Logical coherency certainly isn't all there is to reasons for believing things. — Terrapin Station

What would these reasons possibly be, other than speculative hypotheses unencumbered by empirical evidence?

If logically coherent hypotheses for both is presented, how, in principle, can dispute about whether experience is caused by interaction with an alleged external reality, or is entirely subjective possibly be resolved?

Your argument doesn't make sense. Scientific judgements are "internal", and value judgements just as much as ethical judgements are. The difference is in the value system used. Scientific judgements use numerical values, reducing qualities to quantities. Ethical judgement judges quality directly without converting the quality to quantity. This extra step, of conversion, whereby quality is converted to quantity, is an extra internal judgement process. Therefore scientific judgement is likely less objective than ethical judgement because it requires a twofold internal judgement system. The more internal judgements required to decide something should make that decision more subjective.

All these scientific terms you refer to, volt, newton, etc., are true by definition. There are many acts such as murder and theft, which are wrong by definition. To argue against the fact that these acts are wrong is to go against the convention, just like arguing that an object which everyone says weighs 50 kilos, does not weigh 50 kilos. — Metaphysician Undercover

The difference is that scientific "judgments" are based on clearly defined, universally agreed upon criteria, and are publicly observable. This includes the various units of measurement, and whether or not the instrument readings are consistent with the claim at issue, as well as more straightforward, uncontroversial observation, such as after introduction of the new compound, the microbes in the dish rapidly died off, or after following the exercise protocol, subjects were able to run the distance faster than the control group, or when you refrigerate the food, it lasts longer than unrefrigerated food. etc.

Whereas, in the case of moral/ethical judgments, there may or may not be agreement about the criteria for judging the begavior as moral or immoral, there may or may not be agreement that the behavior at issue is an instance of the behavior covered by the criteria, and there is no way to publically demonstrate that the behavior really is moral or immoral. The behavior itself may be public, but the judgment that it is moral or immoral is not based on publically observable and agreed upon criteria.

In science, dispute about whether or not the item at issue weighs 50 kilos, or that the test subjects run faster than the controls, or that the microbes died is resolved "objectively" by observation. But there is no "objective" way to resolve dispute about whether or not a given behavior is moral. Note that dispute about whether or not the behavior is considered moral or immoral according to the conventions of a given society can be objectively resolved, but not dispute about whether or not it really is moral or immoral in some sense that transcends a particular sdociety's conventions and applies to all societies. Determination that a given behavior is considered moral or immoral in a given society is an observable sociological fact, not an observable moral fact.

At a certain point you have to nail your colours to the mast, you have to declare what you believe is moral or immoral. As you've said you're meta-ethical nihilist, presumably this doesn't come up for you. — Wayfarer

But a moral realist is not just declaring that you believe a given behavior to be moral or immoral. A moral relativist does this too. (As for that matter, does a moral irrealist, in the sense of expressing approval or disapproval of the behavior and/or supporting condemnation, punishment or reward.)

A moral realist holds that there is a moral fact about the matter that's indepemdent of his, or anyone else's, belief one way or the other. Presumably, his belief is informed by this fact. But the problem, as I've noted, is that he cannot produce this fact, cannot even intelligibly explain what kind of thing this independently existing moral fact thingy is, and cannot even use it to resolve dispute that challenges the alleged factuality that a given behavior is moral or immoral.

By and large, religious beliefs presuppose moral realism, but moral realism does not entail religious belief. So, It is certainly possible to be a moral realist, but not religious.

The moral realist, though, seems at a loss about how to resolve dispute about whether a given behavior really is moral or immoral. At a loss about how to resolve dispute about whether or not a given claim is a moral fact or not. If there allegedly are moral facts of some kind somewhere, but we cannot actually access them to resolve such dispute, then the notion of moral fact is useless, if not vacuous. And then, of course, there's always Mackie's "queerness" argument about the alleged reality of moral facts.

In that absence of an agreed moral framework, like that provided by the Judeo-Christian tradition, then that is about the best we can do. — Wayfarer

Even when there's an agreed moral framework, there is still much disagreement about whether given behaviors are moral or immoral, as well-knowm divides between certain fundamentalist groups and more liberal groups reveals. We can readily see this in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

In science, there most typically are universally agreed upon, clearly defined criteria that the judgments are based on. Everybody understands how much counts as a cm, or a volt, or a newton, etc. And any dispute about whether or not a given object, say, weighs 50 kilos, is objectively resolvable. But there is no way even in principle to resolve dispute about whether or not a given behavior really is ethical, because there is no universal agreement about the criteria, or about mitigating factors, or exceptions, or degrees, and the like

I don't think that this is at all what people mean by "objective". I think Sapientia, and now you, are trying to create a new definition of "objective", one that suits the purpose of the claim that science is more objective than ethics. "Objective" generally means of the object, the external, as opposed to of the subjective, the internal. Ethics deals with how we ought to behave in relation to others, within the community, so it is clearly something external to the individual subject, and therefore objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that objective refers to the external vs. internal, and this is consistent with what I said about the scientific argument and data being put on the table so that any independent observer can judge for themselves.

People's behavior is indeed external, but any claim that behavior is or is not ethical is a value judgment. And value judgments are decidedly internal. We can express our value judgments in language and share them with others, but we cannot show them any entity that they can observe for themselves. They can only observe the behavior and make their own internal value judgement about whether that behavior is ethical or not.

ob·jec·tive

adjective
1.
(of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
"historians try to be objective and impartial"
synonyms: impartial, unbiased, unprejudiced, nonpartisan, disinterested, neutral, uninvolved, even-handed, equitable, fair, fair-minded, just, open-minded, dispassionate, detached, neutral

I know. My point is that's incoherent. Any cause is, by definition, a part of nature, a state of the world which results in another. The "supernatural cause" is only ever a state of the world which does something. With respect to curing a disease, for example, a drug is no less "magic" or "miraculous" than the command of God to be healed. Both are states of the world which result in the disease being cured. If it's true, the "supernatural" is just the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I disagree that any cause is, by definition, a part of nature, a state of the world which results in another.

So-called supernatural causes are outside of nature by definition. Operationally, they are equivalemnt to magic. They can impact the natrual world, but they are not subject to the ordinary rules and constraints of the naturlal world, and are not "states" of the natural world.

Now, if you want to deny that there are such things as supernatural causes, and explain all so-called supernatural causes as actually natural causes we just haven't identified, then sure--by your own definition, all causes are natural.

Ok, let me try again. You said that something which is demonstrated scientifically has a better chance of being objective, than ethics. You say that "because" it is demonstrated scientifically, it has a better chance of being objective than ethics, which is not demonstrated scientifically. You imply that it is the scientific demonstration which causes objectivity.

So I ask, can you justify this? Can you demonstrate to me why a scientific demonstration would cause something to be more objective than ethical principles are? — Metaphysician Undercover

For a proposition, hypothesis, etc. to be demonstrated scientifically typically means something along the lines of presenting logically rigorous argument (possibly incuding the math) and methodologically robust empirical data from which any independent observer can judge for themselves whether or not the propositions, hypotheses, etc. are sound. It is this, more or less, that people mean by "objective."

On the other hand, the proposition, hypothesis, etc. that some prescription for behavior is an ethical principle cannot be demonstrated in such a way.

It's not logically fallacious, you're just saying that as far as you're concerned, it's unbelievable. You have a 'will not to believe'. Incidentally, the point about theistic belief systems is that the saints are not dead, and are spiritually efficacious. — Wayfarer

I have very distinctly said that the reasoning is logically fallacious and explained this in detail. And I explained that my belief or unbelief in the truth of the premises or conclusion is entirrely irrelevant to whethr or not the reasoning is logically valid.

What is logically fallaious--as I explained in detail--is the conclusion that since there's no known naturalistic explanation, therefore, the cause must be x. In your particular case, x is Goddidit in the somewhat convoluted way via prayer to the dead guy, but the particulars of what's on the card you pulled out of your vest pocket are irrelevant to what renders the logic invalid. I explained why the logic is invalid.

↪Brainglitch

It's worse. "God did it" is a "natural" explanation. If (unobserved or not) God changed the world, then God is causal. Causality cannot function outside itself. "Supernatural explanations" are incoherent by definition. If present theories do not describe how an event occurred, then how it happened has another description. Something else happened in reality. If "God did it," then that's what the world does.

Miracles and magic are entirely possible, but they are always only "nature": the world acting how it does. What logically follows is that if a "naturalistic"explanation is not accurate (e.g. it's a hallucination), then a different "naturalistic" explanation will be (e.g. an experience which is an ad hoc reduction of the world to a concept of "God," an entity of God speaking to someone, etc., etc.). — TheWillowOfDarkness

The defining distinction that differentiates naturalistic from supernatural explanations is that supernatural explanations posit a supernatural agent as the cause, and naturaliistic explanations don't.

The point of the book that I provided a link to, is that it documents the procedures involved in declaring supernatural intervention. Part of these procedures are to rigourously contest any such claims. To this end, an ecclesiastical panel is convened, which issues evidence such as medical and pathological reports to expert witnesses who are not associated with the case. A recent NYTimes column was where I read about this particular author. The 'devil's advocacy' role is required to be sceptical and critical of the evidence. Indeed the (atheist) author of the book in question, was surprised by the degree of apparent cynicism and willingness to discount favourable evidence:

I never expected such reverse skepticism and emphasis on science within the church.

But, according to your pre-existing belief, divine intervention simply could not happen, regardless of what evidence there might be.

I am not suggesting that you ought to believe anything. This is a philosophy forum, so the philosophical approach is not to say whether or what you believe about it. The philosophical argument is that if such claims were to be validated, then it would answer the question that was asked, specifically "by what criteria are 'natural' and 'supernatural' causes differentiated?" — Wayfarer

What seems to have entirely escaped your understanding is that we can analyse the logic of an argument independently of what we may believe about the truth of either the argument's premises or conclusion. Thus, our pre-existing belief or disbelief in supernatural agents and their habits is irrelevant to whether or not the reasoning is logically valid.

And it is logically fallacious to conclude that if we don't know the cause of something, then the cause therefore must be whatever card somebody pulls out of their vest pocket--or their ecclesiastical robes. (Talk about bias toward pre-existing belief!!!) Such a conclusion is logically invalid irrespective of whether it posits a naturalistic or a supernatiral cause.

As I responded to dukkha a couple of posts back, if the content of whatever card somebody pulls out of their vest pocket constitutes a valid conclusion, then you'd jave to allow that any number of other conclusions are just as logically valid as yours--including, that the cause of the healing is invisible, undetectable rays from the Andromeda Galaxy, and the like.

Furthermore, if you say it's logically valid to conclude that God must be the cause of something for which we have no naturalistic explanation, then it's just as logically valid to conclude that God is the cause of cancer, sudden infant death, and every unexplained accident and sickness, pain, and suffering in the world.

BTW, besides being a logically fallacious argument from ignorance, note that positing God as the cause for things we have no naturalistic explanation for, is just another example of invoking the infamous God of the Gaps.

If a conclusion is logically valid, then it is not posssible that the premises be true and the conclusion false. But, since it is entirely possible that natural processes caused the healing, but we have not been able to identify them, it is entirely possible that the conclusion that Goddidit is mistaken, that is, false. Thus the reasoning that concluded that Goddidit is logically fallacious.

The Devil's Advocates at best may do a rigorous job of eliminating known naturalistic causes for the healing at issue, but that's the end of their rigor. Their conclusion that therefore the dead guy must've gotten God ti do it, and therefore this proves the dead guy is in heaven, and therefore passes their test for canonization is logically fallacious, for the reasons I've given, and rather than logically and empirically rigorous as you claim, is the height of illogic and fanciful imagination.

That is a statement of belief, or should we say 'un-belief'; because, according to you there is no God, so there must be a 'natural explanation' which simply hasn't been found in these cases.

That nicely illustrates that it is impossible for anyone to answer your question as to how to differentiate between natural and other kinds of explanation. Your view is: there are no other kinds of explanation; the only possible kinds of explanation must be natural. If science hasn't found them yet, then it will one day. More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'. — Wayfarer

My view is that I may well be mistaken about virtually anything I say.

And I am eager to hear reasoned analyses of, and counter-arguments to, the substantive content of claims I've presented a case for. Note that reasoned analyses and counter-arguments are different form ascriptions of motive and bias, as well as your opinion of my meta-ethical stance.

Anyway, the reasoning you presented about the epistemically rigorous Devil's Advocate process seems to be this:

• A person is sick.
• People pray to some dead guy to intercede with God to heal the patient
• The patient is healed.
• There's no known naturalistic explanation for the cause of the healing.
• Therefore, God must've healed the patient when the dead guy interceded,
• Therefore, this proves that the dead guy is in heaven with God
• and therefore after three such spisodes like this, the dead guy qualifies to be canonized as a saint.

Can't imagine why anybody would object to such compelling, rigorous logic and empirical methodology.

But gotta wonder: What's the explanation when subsequently, people pray to that dead guy for other patients but they die anyway? Does the sainted guy get demoted back to being just a regular dead guy?

And, since God is omniscient, and thus already knoes about the sick patients, why does it take some dead guy interceding to effect the cure? What's God's game here? I don't understand the logic of it.

Isn't a miracle just something which doesn't have a naturalistic explanation? Claiming its a fallacy to invoke god to explain something which doesn't have a naturalistic explanation seems wrong. What principle of logic/reasoning is being violated here? — dukkha

I am saying that the conclusion is not logically entailed by the premise. That is, just because we don't have a naturalistic explanation for something does not logically entail that Goddidit.

Further, if you say it's logical to conclude that Goddidit, then it's just as logical to say that the deity of any religion did it, or to say that witches did it, or the shaman's spell did it, or undertectable beams from the Andromeda galaxy did it, good vibes and positive thinking did it, etc. Thus, a conclusion that Goddidit has no more epistemic warrant than any of these others. One invisible cause would be logically as valid as another.

Note, also, that if it's logical to say that if we don't know the cause of something, then Goddidit, then it's logical to say that since we don't know the cause of cancer, then Goddidit, and if we don't know the cause of sudden infant death, then Goddidit, if we don't know the cause of x, then Goddidit. How many uncounted times throughout history was the notion that Goddidit eventually replaced with a naturalistic explanation, particularly as tigorous epistemic methods were developed and implemented?

If a conclusion is logically valid, then it is not posssible that the premises be true and the conclusion false. But, since it is entirely possible that natural processes caused the healing, but we have not been able to identify them, it is possible that the conclusdion that Goddidit is false. Thus the reasoning is logically fallacious.

It's an empirical argument, because it is based on data and observations of recorded cases, over several hundred years. In each of those cases, the very same question was asked which you are asking me: is there a natural explanation for this observed apparent religious phenomenon?

So it doesn't violate any rules of logic. What it challenges is your meta-ethical nihilist sense of what is possible, because, according to you, no such thing ought to be possible. In fact you're prepared to say that without even considering the evidence — Wayfarer

Each time the devil's advocate concluded that since there is no known naturalistic explanation for the healing, then the healing was a confirmed miracle, he committed the logical fallacy, becasue it does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore Goddidit

Ah, OK - so it can't be an epistemic standard, because it's Catholic, and you're a nihilist, therefore it doesn't make sense!

I can follow your reasoning, but please do not condescend by saying that a perfectly sound argument is a non sequitur simply because it offends your anti-religious sensibilites. — Wayfarer

It us a fallacious argument because it violates the rules of logic.

It does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore Goddidit.

If they're authentically religious, then they're not amenable to a naturalistic explanation, right? And the example I provided was the case of the Vatican examinations of purported miracles, which proceed by attempting to discredit the miracle by providing a naturalistic explanation for it, and, only when that fails, declares that 'supernatural intervention' has occured. Now you may think Catholicism a crock, but that is not the point; these are clear cases of 'judging spiritual experiences according to both naturalistic and supernatural explanations'. — Wayfarer

Blatant non seq.

The fact that a naturalistic explanation is not known does not entail that therefore Goddidit. And the claim that Goddidit is a blatant logical fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam--as the Catholic scholars would say.

This is a ridiculous epistemic standard.