I don't think it's right to say you 'feel' the sandpaper itself, anyway. You feel it's impression on your nervous system, shunted through your nerves, into your brain where it is constructed into an experience. — AmadeusD
yeah, if anything smell seems more acutely to be experienced in a way that's entirely distinct from reality-as-it-is even than sight. Smell is ENTIRELY an experience built up for us by our brains. — flannel jesus
MUI theory states that "perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world." Hoffman argues that conscious beings have not evolved to perceive the world as it actually is but have evolved to perceive the world in a way that maximizes "fitness payoffs". — flannel jesus
Your homunculus is showing... — Banno
I think using the term 'seeing' that way (that you describe) is misleading. If 'seeing' is defined as the entire process, then it's a useless term in this discussion because there's no difference between a 'direct' and 'indirect' version of 'seeing'. — AmadeusD
What happens if you reconsider these issues in terms of touch or smell?
It becomes harder to insert a "representation" in those cases. — Banno
If "see" is the act of one's eye falling on/turning to an object, then "perception" must be the further event (i.e experiencing a representation). Otherwise, nothing occurs in consciousness. — AmadeusD
Representation is constitutive of seeing/perception. It doesn’t also need to be the thing seen. — Luke
I would say that "seeing objects" and being "mediated by the indirection of representation" are one and the same thing. If you eliminate the mediation (that indirect realists complain about), then you eliminate the seeing. — Luke
It’s a bit odd, but maybe just shows that indirect realism on the forum is often not thought through (not all of them think this way)...Thus Luke is right on the mark in accusing some indirect realists of a failure to let go of the mythical view from nowhere. — Jamal
This isn't about the sunset itself, this is about the qualia experience of the sunset, which only happens when we experience and focus in on the representation. — flannel jesus
The representation built by our brains to present to our conscious self is not just "reality as it really is", and so that's why I can't agree with direct realism. — flannel jesus
Indirect realists disagree and say that the construction of a representation is not only the act of seeing, but is also the object that we see. — Luke
I said that indirect realists demand that you see your house as it is in itself. I was referring to the thing-in-itself in the Kantian sense. See here, for example. Or, as I said earlier, a God's-eye view. — Luke
Any change in the amount of force needed to define the on/off state (any change in M) requires that B-min(P) also change. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Suppose that we're only indirectly aware of reality. If so then how are we aware of our perceptions? Aren't we a step away from those too? — Moliere
But what if the statement about minds and perception are the same as whether or not our physical bodies really physically touch other physical bodies? — Moliere
A physical entity is part of the P-Region if and only if it is essential to M. This facet is what rules out multiple realizability. If a physical entity can be removed from the system and it doesn't affect M then by definition it in not included in the P-Region. We are now in a situation where P cannot vary unless M also varies (P is in fact defined in terms of M so that this is the case). — Count Timothy von Icarus
If you are defining superveniance with B-minimal properties or P Regions this is not the case. Any change in P, the (relevant) brush strokes (or their properties) would, by definition, be a change in the experience/aesthetic qualities of the painting. Multiple realizability is sacrificed by using these methods to define superveniance. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The mechanical act is not identical because the act of writing B takes longer than writing A — NOS4A2
What-if the subject to be shoved off the bridge wasn't the disposable fat man, for whom nobody has all that much sympathy anyway, but a gorgeous woman? — BC
In 2017, a group led by Michael Stevens performed the first realistic trolley-problem experiment, where subjects were placed alone in what they thought was a train-switching station, and shown footage that they thought was real (but was actually prerecorded) of a train going down a track, with five workers on the main track, and one on the secondary track; the participants had the option to pull the lever to divert the train toward the secondary track. Most of the participants did not pull the lever
Right. And it's the same whether the transporter kills the original before the duplicate is created, or after. — Patterner
And we're not really killing anybody, because the duplicate is still at the other location, right? — Patterner
We may use physical features to identify people in various situations. But my identity is my consciousness. We don't care what Bach or Beethoven looked like, or their fingerprints. Their identities are not about their physical characteristics. — Patterner
Still, the ways we identify our physical selves - things like looks/physical description, finger prints, and retinal scans - stay the same. Yes, we age, which is change. But there is continuity, which is not illusory. If we don't grant continuity in this, then what is continuity? Is the concept of continuity a sham? — Patterner
There's a self that has always been there. — Patterner
. It isn't the office -- it's the commute. — BC
Did I really kill him of is he still alive as Thomas Riker? It seems that if there is no body-soul dualism, the latter is true. But is, in that case, before I kill him, Will's consciousness both in Wil and in Thomas? — Walter
A mental state, representational in character, taking a proposition (either true or false) as its content and involved, together with motivational factors, in the direction and control of voluntary behaviour." — Lionino
What you refer to as cognitive seems to mean neurological, which can be explained mechanistically. — Lionino
it reminds me of "The game" or "You are now breating manually" of 2000s internet. — Lionino
belief is a conscious process — Lionino
I say the TE is invalid. If they were only receiving imput from their senses, from inside and outside their bodies, and only reacting to the stimuli as the laws of physics allow and require, they would not be thinking of consciousness, or saying they have it when asked. — Patterner