Must be quite an A**hole to create humans that way just to make them suffer.
— Heiko

Actually I disagree. Suffering is caused by the same condition which allows for free will, the condition which produces the need to decide. I'd much rather have free will along with the associated suffering, than to live without feeling, like a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cannot see that - truly free will is not concerned with worldly affairs or affect. The formulation of a "need to decide" already makes clear that the world is forcing itself upon you. Truly free will creates it's only choice by it's decision and does not pick from given alternatives like a hunted animal that can either flee left or right.

The perfect Being, God, does not do anything by chance, and the appearance that He does is only our own ignorance influencing how we apprehend things. And the materialist perspective, which denies the reality of the prior immaterial cause, insisting that anything real must perceptible to the senses, only reinforces this ignorance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Must be quite an A**hole to create humans that way just to make them suffer. In that way Descartes seemed to have a valid concern: It leads to way less contradictions to assume a demon pleased by human suffering instead. It would make perfect sense to trick humans into believing he was a good entity just for the laugh and "devotion" to the endless suffering and cruelty executed day by day.
If the misery brought onto humans was only bad luck and ignorance there could be hope. If it's
metaphysical it has to be ignorant or malignant in first place and we are doomed.

We can observe that other creatures are conscious and presume that they too have minds, but the mind is never a direct object of perception. — Wayfarer

I tend to question what could be meant with that. We say a reflection on thought is one of our selves but do not overcome the distinction of the observing and the observed. The "observed" thought - the words in "mind" - is "there", in "space". Absolute Idealism hinted that this perception is already adequate. There is no arbitrary determination of things done "by the mind". The things themselves have already imposed their negativity, ie their restrictions on what they can be, on the subject which is a part of totality:
A try of reduction leads to the thought of two "me": It is the pure observance of "I am"-me that has the quality of "I think"-me. We tend to think the subject as the active - which it is (in common sense) only as long as it misunderstands itself as it's object. A camera being moved has the impression to move; the pure observance of "a tripod wanting to walk" bears the impression of a want to walk. How fitting!

This seems like a good opportunity to take my chips and leave the table.
Good luck to everone and congratulations to the winner in advance.

Wittgenstein says the meaning of something like 357x68 is the foundation of a language game, just as the statement ‘this is my hand’ is the foundation of a language game wherein it doesn’t occur to us to doubt the truth of the statement. One could then ask, how long does it take this thing to be my hand? The type of certainty that we accord the solution to the equation is what he calls a form of life. So the ‘time’ of the equation or ‘this being my hand’ is the time of its contextual use in a language game. It has no existence outside of the occasion of its use as a particular sense. — Joshs

Aren't you doing now what you accused logics of, namely sacrificing meaning and sense to form? Now we are doing "language games" - Chips are dealt, we'll throw a few forms around and see what being and time are. Yey!
But wait - a game is something with changes of states of affairs so maybe they are time after all. Damn...

I do not really see the point of this discussion. Positive statements have to follow some rules to not be just wrong. And being able to refer to an ideal object more than once surely is more of an "enabler" of discussions.
The whole argumentation that the things were really always different and so on overlooks the very topic of the discussion: It is still the same thing nonetheless. If things can be identified and referred - and this is in fact the usual habit - this seems to lie in the nature of being. In fact it seems to be the primary way of recognition. Given: there are moments when this is not the case but in my view it requires some thinking about what is there to even arrive at the point where things "logically have to" be constructed from raw sensual input.

Mathematics is a human activity. Humans do indeed exist “in” time (or, better, “as” time). — Xtrix

So the second sentence supposes an identity that is not there? That's the wonder of logics. They are not dialectical in nature.

It might seem that the statements
2*a = b
b = 4
follow each other but they "happen" at the same time. There is only one "b" - it denotes one and the same object. Of course this is an idealization. But note this not me starting at the period as the object itself is ideal in first place. When it comes to senses: There is a qualitative difference between seeing, hearing, tasting and so on. Are those senses identical to themselves?

Formal systems do indeed presume persistence -- the persistence of symbols, as mathematics presumes a persistence of number. — Xtrix

Mathematics do not know time. For example the law of the excluded middle states that any sentence must be either wrong or true. It doesn't matter if one or the other or none was shown. It does not know change. To conclude from this that is presupposes "persistence" is not directly correct as there simply is no difference that would allow to say such a thing.

Two persons blu a baloon, this is his, and this ballon is from another person, you pup the ballons, where air goes??? — Nothing

Closer to the nature of being it seems

If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration. — Joshs

To me this seems like a mere thought experiment. The totally of sensations always provides for a reference of duration. The body itself generates difference all the time - think of circulating blood or breath. It is not only external objects one would focus on that generates change. It is not even sensations that come clearly to mind as such if you think of the feelings of rest or unrest.for example.

Because formal logic depends on the notion of the self-identical object. — Joshs

So you are suggesting to ditch the positive identity and fall back to identity as difference? How could this look for "Dasein"?

And the stars? — Heiko

I am sorry. The point, again, is that the being of mere tools made for a purpose, is not what seems worth a lengthy discussion. A hammer is a tool to put nails into walls.

Not for Heidegger. He has a very particular understanding of ‘world’ that is neither planned nor just ‘revealed’ , and not a product of reflective reasoning. World for Heidegger is projected out from a pragmatic background — Joshs

And the stars?

Yes, he makes the distinction between the ready to hand and the present to hand ( objectively present ). But he derives the present to hand from the ready to hand as an extreme modification of it. His discussion of the statement and subject-predicate logic shows how a thing which just ‘is’ is derived from the hermeneutic structure of concernful dealings, rather than use and value being attributes just added onto an objectively present thing. — Joshs

For a hammer this might be true. There is not too much to doubt about the meaning, purpose or function of a hammer, because it is just a human-invented tool. The world, the sky and the stars, on the other hand, have a mode of being which is not grounded in a process of reflected reasoning. Their existence is, in a stronger sense, revealed rather than "planned".

In Being and Time he states

The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'Things': 1rpayp.a-ra-that is
to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings
But ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of the 1rpayJLa-ra is just what the Greeks left in obscurity ; they thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere Things'. We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern "equipment". In our dealings we come across
equipment fo r writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement.
The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited. The
clue for doing this lies in our first defining what makes an item of equip­ment - namely, its equipmentality.
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being
of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which
it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something
in-order-to . . . A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or referernce of something to something.

Emphasis mine - sorry for bad copy&paste.

In German, the formulation is somewhat stronger

Ein Zeug »ist« strenggenommen nie.

Equipment, taken strictly, never "is".

I take this passage to mean that Heidegger really does make such a distinction. A speculative reason is given above.

Here’s a phenomenological way of putting it:

“ “Equipment is “in order to.” This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something “with which to hammer.” Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon functionality relation.”(Basic Problems of phenomenology 1927) — Joshs

I take this to mean that the hammer was manufactured with a certain, known intention and therefor it's being is in-itself when we understand that intention. But note that this happened in an act of human work and is different to a mere revelation of being in that the hammer was invented by reflecting over use, need and purpose.

I'm good with that, but I'm not sure it provides a 'way in' for someone starting from a 'categorical' understanding. If you think categorically, then you can still say, a real apple is an apple and an imaginary apple isn't; a real apple can be sweet or tart, crisp or mushy, but an imaginary apple can't be. And then you're just puzzled, because imagination is puzzling, and now you're thinking about that instead of being. The whole approach of taking a 'complete' description of an object, as a collection of properties, and just adding or subtracting instantiation, checking the 'exists' box or not -- it's not that that doesn't lead anywhere, but it leads you in the wrong direction. — Srap Tasmaner

But wasn't the point of existentialism that the categorial understanding follows the apple's existence?
An apple is stating itself as an apple - all we can ever say about it would be a reflective category, that is, a negation. The apple asserts it's own existence which is why a language game can never create apples but can distinguish if a given thing is an apple or some other fruit.
We can refecively think about apples but not the apple itself.

That’s fine, but it’s not that we can’t atomize it— we can and do. It’s that we don’t wanted to mistake this for “lived” or “felt” time. — Xtrix

I'd rather say the point is that time is the measure of change, not the other way around.

I'd say the real apple is an apple that reveals itself as an apple whereas the imaginary apple is an apple that reveals itself as imagination.

Sure, we know more stuff now than they did back then, but we aren't smarter or wiser. Today we use science. Those guys invented it. — T Clark

The mass of detail may obstruct the view of the essential. Taking maths as an example it seems you can get through quite a few (even university-)courses by just manipulating formulae - which could be done by a computer. You get formal definitions of spaces, homomorphisms, have to prove x->y is such and go on. May be my fault, but putting such stuff together to be even able to ask some kind of "essential" question is something modern education does not seem to have the time for. Looking at some youtube video (e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVF4N1Ix5WI ) you can get a feeling of what masses of formalism you'd have to chew down to work on open, fundamental questions.
There is no chance to be that kind of genius that has something new and valuable to say over so many things. The undeveloped state of knowledge opened that opporunity.

Is the mind in what is understood, or in the way in which it understands? — Pantagruel

How could that be a difference?

And maybe abstraction is always like this — we’ll say ‘ignoring’ all except the features you’ve chosen, but maybe ‘ignoring’ means ‘pretending not to notice’. — Srap Tasmaner

A triangle can be little, large, flat or pointy. To me, it is not clear at all which same- or alike-ness would make up for the essential properties of an arbitrary determination.

My impression, though, is that Heidegger thinks logical relations are themselves in need of grounding, rather than grounding what we might have to say about the being of things. I suppose that passes over your point about identity, but here identity seems to be a sort of raw demonstrative ‘that’. — Srap Tasmaner

On the other hand, coming back to the use-character, Heidegger points out that such stuff really "isn't" in some sense. I guess this has to do with the intention the things were created with. Again, going back to Hegel it is totally unclear what was meant with "Dasein", which cannot be said of a hammer or some other "human" invention.

Does it make sense for me to be oriented toward something as something that ‘just is’? — Srap Tasmaner

I think it does. You do not need to know what is flying towards you to react. You do not need to know if it is a telephone-pole or a streetlight that you nearly walked into.
That said I agree that recognition of known things does not necessarily seem to require additional thought - one is usually too relaxed when in a known environemt to be continuously asking if the "thing there" might be dangerous.

PS: On the other hand all unexpected "movement" raises suspicion.

We can give no meaning to ‘that thing’ and have no use for it, so it’s unlikely to be our first choice if we can guess ‘tree’ instead and change it ‘telephone pole’ later if we have to. — Srap Tasmaner

But in this sense it is not about use, it is about what gains identity and so just "is" without spending any further thought. It is purely phenomenological. With further determinations we get into socially mediated concepts. I do not know many kinds of trees, so which "level of abstraction" would be low enough? And which woods are suitable for telephone poles? That would require some inquiry. And is that tree even a tree or is there some biological distinction, for example, is it a small tree or a giant mushroom? While thinking about those questions and considering what remains the same is "the thing there". In fact this seems to be the quickest, most immediate notion that one can possibly have. Maybe the "thing" is exaggerated and in fact it is just a "there"

But on what do I impose it? Is there not a primary phenomenon there of a fallen tree? ...
Will you say that I have imposed ‘tree’ on a selection of my visual field? — Srap Tasmaner

I'd indeed say the "interpretation" or recognition as a tree comes after the "that thing there". It happens all the time that one can not exactly identify what he is seeing. It's an undetermined "Dasein"(being-there) which becomes "Etwas"(a determined something) - lending from Hegel.
When it comes to the determination I'd indeed say, this is imposed, but also happens without reflection to some degree. After seeing a tree for the first time, it is likely following trees of the same kind will be recognized as similar to the first. More detailed classifications likely require reflection of the concept and a more thorough investigation.

Existence would be the way that the particulars ( a thing that is f) alters the sense of the subject that they are particulars of. Formal logic supposes that the subject and predicate sit still as self-identical contents , while we cobble them together in an external relation. — Joshs

The first sentence took me some time. I don't think that "alteration" is the right word there - "defines" would be more appropiate, I think. When using the existential quantor the "x" typically appears in the predicate as well. It does not seem to make sense to say "There is an x, so that 3=3" (atough the grammar indeed seems to allow this - but I would have to look that up).

Anyone for the idea, expressed to the OP I think, that existence is in the relation between subject and predicate rather than inhering in one or
the other? — Joshs

Does being happen?

Rather, in predicating to something one assumes that the something is there for discussion. — Banno

So being literally has no properties?

Roughly, to be is to be the subject of a predicate. — Banno

So, when talking about being, we would predicate being. Therefor being would have to be something that exists. But this seemingly cannot be the case as being alledgedly isn't ontic. Any thoughts on this?

No it isn’t. — Xtrix

Exactly. Which is why the statement "Harry Potter exists" is underdetermined and misleading. We would understand it as "Harry Potter is a real person" which he is not. "Harry Potter is a fictional character" on the other hand explicitely expresses the mode of his existence and makes perfect sense.

What do you mean by imagination? — john27

A mental picture of an apple, for example. Could be a painted image as well.

"Ronald McDonald does not eat spinach" is not like ""Ronald McDonald does not exist". — Banno

Wouldn't this mean Harry Potter exists? It is just that he is no real person but a fictive figure.

Do thoughts generate existence? — john27

If you imagine an apple then there surely is an imagination of an apple. I do not see inaccuracies of spoken language to be a problem. If you buy a painting of a dragon there must be an idea of what a dragon looks like.

It was Popper’s way of showing that he was stuck in a Kantian time warp. — Joshs

Exactly - the _negative_ account is the corrective.

Or just different ones. What was the point of "falsification" again?

not according to KUHN. — Joshs

I am really not concerned with Kuhn. I am more or less talking to you. But if you take his words to mean that assuming a flat earth is scientifically justified, you must have read him wrong or he is an idiot.

What about the relationship between me as a scientist and an empirical realm? — Joshs

Reality becomes visible when theories do _not_ hold. I doubt you can "construe" a vase out of thin air.

I can construe something as a vase but there are many, many different ways of doing this. — Joshs

There it is again. "You can construe". This is not the relation between you and a vase.

I’m nit sure I understand why a construct is ‘missing something’ or doesn’t ‘tell the truth’. Missing what? What truth? — Joshs

I just cite your argument:

To experience anything is to construe it. And he defines a construct as a referential differential. Specifically, a construct is a dimension along which to perceive an event along dimensions of likeness and difference with respect with a prior meaning in our construct system. Furthermore, every new moment in time must be construed, so our construct system is changing from
moment to moment. — Joshs

It is not me who doubts the vase is a vase until it isn't anymore.

What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie? — Joshs

In "being" itself. The point is that a vase is just a vase. It doesn't matter the slightest that it could turn into a pile of broken glass any moment - until it really becomes one. It is a "real vase". You could not convince yourself the vase was a pile of broken glass. It could even become a pile of sand if we started grinding it. Doesn't matter at all. It _is_ a vase. That is what "being" itself wants it to be.
To show the stupidity I'll borrow your own vocabulary: Say the vase is a construct. That is deemed of missing something therefor you should reflect on the construct "construct"? Doesn't that miss something? More than that: I could not convince myself the vase was a pile of glass. So, taking the vase as a vase means there was no contradiction. But now there is a construct "construct" because constructs were deemed to not tell "the truth"? Please....