Interesting topic! I asked the "old" ChatGPT 3.5 to compare McDowell and Searle on disjunctivism. I was hoping for a concise review of Searle's criticism of disjunctivism, but it seems that the chat bot has no clue. It seems to confuse disjunctivism with representationalism. :worry:

User
On philosophy of perception, how would you compare the stances of John Searle and John McDowell on disjunctivism?

ChatGPT
John Searle and John McDowell have distinct perspectives on disjunctivism within the philosophy of perception, although they both engage with the topic in significant ways.

John Searle: Searle is known for his direct realism and his critique of representational theories of perception. He argues that perception involves a direct, non-representational relation between the perceiver and the perceived object. Searle rejects the idea that perceptual experiences involve mental representations that mediate between the mind and the external world. Instead, he contends that perception is a direct awareness of external objects and their properties.

In the context of disjunctivism, Searle's views align with what is sometimes called "naive realism" or "anti-representationalism." He maintains that perceptual experiences are veridical and directly reflect the external world. Searle would likely reject the disjunctivist claim that perceptual experiences are fundamentally different in kind between veridical perceptions and hallucinations or illusions.

John McDowell: McDowell's approach to disjunctivism is more nuanced and complex. He acknowledges the disjunctive nature of perceptual experiences, recognizing that there is a difference between veridical perceptions and perceptual illusions or hallucinations. However, McDowell does not endorse the radical form of disjunctivism that posits a fundamental gap between veridical and non-veridical experiences.

McDowell's version of disjunctivism is more moderate and is often referred to as "epistemological disjunctivism." He argues that while there may be differences in the causal origins of veridical perceptions and hallucinations, they are nevertheless part of a seamless, unified perceptual experience. McDowell emphasizes the rationality and responsiveness of perceptual experiences to reasons and justificatory norms, even in cases of perceptual error.

In summary, while both Searle and McDowell engage with disjunctivism within the philosophy of perception, they approach the topic from different perspectives. Searle adopts a direct realist stance that rejects the need for mental representations in perception, while McDowell offers a more nuanced account that acknowledges the disjunctive nature of perceptual experiences while emphasizing their rational and epistemic significance.



User
In his book Seeing things as they are (2015) and in articles and interviews that are available online, Searle criticises disjunctivism. Can you summarise Searles criticism of disjunctivism?

ChatGPT
John Searle criticizes disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception primarily by challenging its central claim that there is a fundamental discontinuity between veridical perceptions and perceptual illusions or hallucinations. His criticisms of disjunctivism can be summarized as follows:

Rejecting the Discontinuity Thesis: Searle argues against the disjunctivist claim that there is a fundamental difference in kind between veridical perceptions and perceptual illusions or hallucinations. He contends that all perceptual experiences, whether veridical or non-veridical, involve the same basic perceptual mechanisms and are part of a continuous spectrum of conscious experiences.

Maintaining Direct Realism: Searle advocates for direct realism, which posits that perception involves a direct, unmediated awareness of external objects and their properties. He criticizes disjunctivism for undermining the directness of perceptual experience by positing a radical discontinuity between veridical and non-veridical perceptions.

Challenging the Role of Mental Representations: Searle rejects the idea that perceptual experiences are mediated by mental representations that stand between the mind and the external world. He argues that such representationalist accounts fail to capture the immediacy and directness of perceptual awareness, leading to an unnecessary ontological and epistemological gap between the mind and the world.

Emphasizing the Role of Background Knowledge: Searle emphasizes the role of background knowledge, context, and conceptual frameworks in shaping perceptual experiences. He contends that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, and prior experiences, which play a crucial role in determining how we perceive and interpret the world.

Overall, Searle's criticism of disjunctivism centers on its rejection of direct realism, its reliance on representationalist accounts of perception, and its failure to account for the continuity and richness of conscious experience across different perceptual states. He argues for a more unified and integrated account of perception that preserves the directness and immediacy of perceptual awareness while acknowledging the role of background knowledge and contextual factors in shaping our perceptual experiences.
— Chat GPT 3.5

Addition, I wanted to compare this with Claude, but found out that Claude is not currently available in my region (Sweden).

Yes, but that "what we in our scale see as cars" depends on us (and our sense organs) and is an essential component. — Michael

It's trivially true that seeing a car is dependent on sense organs, eyes. No-one expects to see a car without a possibility to see it. But does seeing a car depend on us? Again, it's trivially true that observations depend on observers, but many animals see cars as well as trees, rocks, water etc.

While seeing a car is dependent on sense organs and observers, almost any animal can see the car. Unlike our use of the word 'car' seeing the car is a biological phenomenon, so seeing the car is not necessarily dependent on us humans.

The notion that a car is reducible to atoms and the forces that bind them together is a false one, but is unavoidable if you try to remove humans from the equation. — Michael

Surely we can reduce a car to its constituent materials and atoms. The quality of its metal, welding, electricity etc. depend on material properties at the level of atoms. Reduction of the car, however, has little to do with the hierarchical structure of seeing the car. When we (and other animals) see the car, we also see its atoms as they manifest at our level, as materials whose surfaces reflect light in certain ways and set the conditions for how they appear for animals that have the ability to see things.

Collections of atoms exist independently of us, but that this collections of atoms is a car is not independent of us. — Michael

There's more than swarms atoms in fundamental physics, such as the forces that bind atoms together so that they necessarily form what we in our scale see as cars etc.. Seeing a car has this hierarchical structure that includes the atoms and the forces that bind them together, reflect their visual properties and so on.

Some relevant science:
...
..Kohler wear a pair of hand-engineered goggles. Inside those goggles, specially arranged mirrors flipped the light that would reach Kohler's eyes, top becoming bottom, and bottom top. — wonderer1

Why, though, when the original projection on the retina is already flipped upside down by the eye's lens, and then flipped back in conscious awareness.

To flip or otherwise distort the projection on the eye's retina does however show that it takes a few hours or days for conscious awareness to adjust itself to new conditions of observation.

I'd argue that it is this type of reasoning that has led to the politicalization and delegitimization of much of media where you go only to your own personal trusted news source for any information. — Hanover

It occurs to me that the reference to press ethics is an argument against an already ongoing politicalization in order to avoid further delegitimization of the press. You're right in the sense that it isn't effective, and that it can itself be used uncharitably as evidence of politicalization.

However, what leads to the politicalization in the first place?

Normally political interests buy advertisement in the press and participate in debates arranged by the press. But since a decade or so political interests also buy and control entire news stations and may decline to participate in debates. Political debates are becoming pointless.

Furthermore, the press doesn't seem to suffer too much from letting go of principles of objectivity and ethics, and here I wonder whether some might even approve of the loss. The influence that postmodern "thought" had on some journalists and other half-baked intellectuals from the 1990s and onwards, now they're chief editors etc. What can we expect from these radical relativists who were taught to abhor anything objective? Politicalized journalism and chatter about feelings, anything but facts.

This isn't to say there's such a thing as a view from nowhere and that objectively can be established, but balanced reporting, where competing viewpoints are presented would be the goal. — Hanover

For meaningful debate about different viewpoints the principle of charity is helpful, perhaps necessary, yet it is systematically violated by many politicians and journalists.

Authoritarianism has always been seen as the cure for the failure of the democratic institutions. — ssu

One example of a non-authoritarian possible cure to failed (representative) democratic institutions is direct democracy.

Populism, however, doesn't necessarily lead to authoritarianism. Basically, populism is a means for achieving something through the use of the cohesive force that can arise in crowds and populations.

Like fashion, political ideas compete and propagate in various ways. Sometimes it doesn't take much to succeed, the quality of an idea can be sufficient for it to become popular. But often it takes exposure, advertisement, or the help of influential individuals or institutions (e.g. media). Bad ideas or styles that wouldn't propagate on their own require more of the latter. Also bad ideas can succeed and reach a point of "critical mass' when they become self-sustaining. This has to do with the function of popular things in social contexts. It's harder to dismiss bad ideas when they are popular.

An orange building may appear blue in the early morning when the sky is blue before sunrise. So in a sense something that is in fact orange may appear blue. But that's different.

suppose the thing in the world is in fact orange, yet I always perceive it to be blue. It is true that I can never experience the thing in the world as it is, but this is irrelevant to my relationship with the world, as I always perceive the thing in the world to be as I perceive it to be, in this case, blue. — RussellA

How do you know that it is in fact orange if you never see the orange?

I'm trying to extend it from the usual notion of "institutions" to something a bit more anarchic, but still reasonable. (at least I hope) — Moliere

Seems reasonable. What is also a bit anarchic and extends beyond institutions is Goodman's suggestion that art and science and philosophy are similar inquiries.

The aesthetic attitude is restless, searching, testing - is less attitude than action: creation and re-creation.
What, though, distinguishes such aesthetic activity from other intelligent behavior such as perception, ordinary conduct, and scientific inquiry? One instant answer is that the aesthetic is directed to no practical end, is unconcerned with self-defense or conquest, with acquisition or necessities or luxuries, with prediction and control of nature. But if the aesthetic attitude disowns practical aims, still aimlessness is hardly enough. The aesthetic attitude is inquisitive, as contrasted with the acquisitive and self-preservative, but not all nonpractical inquiry is aesthetic. To think of science as motivated ultimately by practical goals, as judged or justified by bridges and bombs and the control of nature, is to confuse science with technology. Science seeks knowledge without regard to practical consequences, and is concerned with prediction not as a guide for behavior but as a test for truth. Disinterested inquiry embraces both scientific and aesthetic experience. — N. Goodman, Languages of Art (1976), p. 242

Yet Sweden is a perfect example of that huge transformations can happen without revolts and political turmoil and blood on the streets. — ssu

Right, historically there's been little blood on the streets here. Instead we have this "consensus culture" where open conflict and disagreement is avoided at all cost. It doesn't mean that conflicts and disagreements have disappeared, they just manifest in other ways. Imagine what that can be like at work places, schools, universities, sports clubs etc. If we are supposed to get along no matter what, then less people are likely to speak truth to power, and power can avoid being accountable. This might serve the interests of those in power, for a while, but now we have gang related shootings and bombings in public places, and politics characterized by populism and polarization. Not sure whether it will result in something historically significant. Well, 200 years of freedom of alliance seems to be at an end now that we're about to become members of Nato.

The poverty of peasants isn't at all a reason for there not to be peasant revolts, I'd say it's on the contrary! People that have nothing to lose can lose it. What would they lose if they have nothing to lose? Land ownership is something that makes people to take care of their property. Extreme poverty leads to a very shaky and violent society. — ssu

Being a land owner in rural Sweden in 1867 meant that regardless of how well you had taken care of your land you would starve to death unless you revolt or emigrate. 1,5 million chose the latter, and exchanged their land for a travel ticket. If emigration had not been an option, then revolt seems probable, at least if one considers the fact that these peasants had no political power, they were too poor to be allowed to vote, and thus easy to exploit by the feudal elite. I doubt that starvation in Sweden in 1867 was better than slavery in ancient Rome or in medieval Russia. Being a 'land owner' makes it sound better, and sure, ownership did have an effect on the landscape. By the way, nice photo of Värmland! I drove through there in January on my way from Sweden to Norway for a ski trip.

Ok, I'm thinking of 'institutional' as referring to recognized schools, museums, institutes, journalists, famous artists, gallerists, historians, theorists etc who through their status and activities turn art into an art scene, or an art world, where a relatively small clique is calling the shots, defining the meaning and value of their own investments.

I like your description of many momentary art worlds, but even with many momentary, small, local, private worlds an institutional definition of art is not concerned with art per se but its context, what surrounds it, who's who and so on That's why I think the definition turns art into PR.

So what makes it art? That it is a poem, or that it is merely labelled 'personal poem' and read at a poetry reading?

Objects become art through the artworld participating and dubbing them so. — Moliere

It serms to turn art into PR (networking, making headlines, influencing people) and the art becomes whatever serves those interests.

I prefer Nelson Goodman's suggestion that instead of defining what is art we look at when something is art.

you aren't just seeing raw reality as it is — flannel jesus

How would you know unless you sometimes see reality as it is? You know of illusions because you sometimes see things look weird, and then find out it's because of optics or intricate patterns that mess with the ability.

All experiences are created by the brain, but objects of perception exist outside the process.

I don't think we need the "really". — Banno

Ok :cool: I like the naive sound of it. Like 100% real.

What about the other illusion i mentioned? The one that doesn't involve a physical change of light, and must only happen in the brain. — flannel jesus

Right, so the illusion doesn't involve refraction or the like, just some light that projects a grid on the retina. The grid, however, is not an ordinary object of perception but a pattern that can evoke the illusion of dots that emerge and disappear within the pattern.

As soon as you look closer, the illusion disappears, and when you relax, the illusion emerges. Not unlike a dream. In ordinary vision, however it's the other way around, when you look closer you see things more clearly. A real dot wouldn't evade observation.

The illusion is not evidence of a defective or misleading visual system but an active and working system responding to manipulation.

From manipulation of the visual system it doesn't follow that we never see things as they are. Hence the futility of arguments from illusion or hallucination against direct or naive realism.

In Sweden there aristocracy was never dominant, they had to take into account the strong position of the peasants, who were independent. You can notice this from the fact that the Swedish peasantry have never revolted. — ssu

3/4 of the population owned very small lots, so one might have reason to suspect that these peasants were simply too poor to revolt against the ruling nobility, church, and monarchy.

In the late 1800s 1,5 million swedish peasants emigrated to the US to avoid starvation and the arrogance of the feudal aristocracy. Maybe the latter were not as dominant as white land owners in South Africa, but to claim that these peasants were independent seems a stretch. Voting rights were based on income, the church controlled education, and so on.

Ok well the scientific understanding of perception is very aware of the illusions I mentioned, so does that mean science is inherently self refuting? — flannel jesus

Not the science, but the assumption that you never see the world, only illusions and delusions while referring to science as if it would support the assumption. It doesn't.

For example, you see a bent straw in a glass of water because you see it as it really is under conditions as they really are: a straight straw bent by refraction. If you never see the straw, then neither you nor the science would have a clue of what is seen, nor what is going on under those conditions.

I'd say that the science of perception supports the converse assumption that we do see the world as it really is, including optical illusions under various conditions.

Maybe Philosophy of Art is an inquiry into why and how what is shown or is done by artists effects us as it does. — Ciceronianus

Historically there's been a lot of speculation on the psychology of the aesthetic experience. For example the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin used ideas about empathy as a theoretical ground for describing aesthetic experiences. One of those ideas was the philosopher Theodor Lipps' theory of empathy, Einfuhlung.

Empathy is the ability to use knowledge of one's own experiences in order to understand the experiences of others, and Lipps' theory was that you project your own experiences onto any object of perception, including shapes and colours. Hence a bulging shape is heavy in some sense, a concave shape slender, a yellow colour inviting, a red colour intense and so on. Wölfflin describes Venus in Botticelli's famous painting as if rays of energy literally flow through her fingers.

From his evocative descriptions and psychological speculations followed an aesthetic individualism. There were also counter-movements that emphasized universality, such as De Stijl in art, and the international style in architecture. But the psychological speculations about the meanings of shapes and colours are still used in contemporary art, design, and architecture.

From time to time, I've wondered what art is, what an artist is, what the Philosophy of Art or Aesthetics is, for that matter. — Ciceronianus

Some works of art inspire or provoke discussion on what is art. Since the early 1900s, artists have been exhibiting ready-made, or abstract, or ugly, or revolting objects in fine art galleries.

Being exposed to such works can evoke experiences that vacillate between the ugly and the beautiful or sublime. They can also show differences between the value of an object that you appreciate for its own sake and its significance in a social context, e.g. its market price.

For example, in 2008 a bottle of urine with a crucifix was sold for 277.000 USD. Who appreciates it for its own sake?

Other works of art are less preoccupied with the question of what is art or social construction. Instead the works show signs of skill, craftsmanship, intelligence, beauty, or unusual properties that catch our interest. A more traditional notion of art, I suppose.

What are others views on such topic from experience!? — Born2Insights

Many work places are unethical. I don't think they can be fixed. Just avoid them if you can. Start a better work place.

Ethan Iverson's trio

a definition — Arbü1237

In some contexts it's sufficient to be original or unusual in some way, for example skilled, insightful, inventive. A creative person is not necessarily productive, nor successful.

But there's been a professionalization of the word 'creative', and there's a "creative class" of people working in advertisement, design, entertainment etc. The creativity of these guys is defined by how much stuff or content they produce, exhibit, publish or by how much influence they have or how much money they earn.

Intentionality is typically defined as a certain type of conscious mental state, so intentionality requires consciousness either way. — Lionino

It's a relational property shared by different types of conscious mental states.

SEP

Without intentionality, thoughts would be empty, vision blind, desires aimless and so on.

I don't know of a conscious mental state that doesn't have intentionality (disregarding hallucinations, phantom pain and the like).


* Edited for clarity

Study the history of roller skating, and find out what kind of roller skating is for you.

Is there in fact any substantive difference between PDR and Indirect Realism? — RussellA

Yes, the adverbialist avoids the use of sense-datum theories.

For example, when you see white...

something like whiteness is instantiated, but in the experience itself, not a presented thing.

-From the same SEP article

I don't think you're making a very compelling case that indirect realists need to have any special skepticism in regards to what they see. — flannel jesus

It follows from their assumption that perception is indirect: they never see the world, only their own sense-data or worse.

Direct Realists are immune to eye problems? — flannel jesus

That doesn't follow from what I write, though.

I suppose the direct realist will be quick to notice a defect in the visual system (it's not an object of vision) unlike the indirect realist for whom all vision is somehow defective relative objects in themselves.

The direct realist doesn't have BETTER reasons to think the red dot in their visual experience is caused by mars — flannel jesus

Right, what causes our experiences is something that we find out empirically. Let's clarify some reasons and their consequences.

Since the indirect realist thinks that s/he sees a 1 mm red dot in the visual field, s/he might first want to consult an eye surgeon instead of using a telescope to find out whether the cause is in the eye, or some hallucination, or mysterious sense-data with a causal relation to the planet.

For the direct realist there is little reason for such exaggerated skepticism about vision. S/he doesn't see a dot (unless the cause is a dot). When the cause is the planet, then s/he sees the planet. The planet's appearance is relative the distance, angle of view, available sunlight and so on.

Disagree. Indirect and Direct Realism are part of epistemology. — RussellA

Doesn't seem right. Lots of epistemology is based on idealism or the nature of language with no interest in realist accounts of perception.

I think everyone should be sceptical, whether the Indirect or Direct Realist. Who wants to unquestionably believe everything they are told. — RussellA

Sure, but it is one thing to be skeptical about beliefs of what you see, and another to be skeptical about the seeing as well. In the latter case the skepticism becomes insurmountable.

I would think the representation is some collection of neurons in our brains firing with some relationship to a brainwave phase. However, I don't think it makes sense to say that "I see such a representation." At best I only vaguely imagine such a representation. — wonderer1

I suppose some objects of conscious awareness are representations. For example, memories and beliefs may represent what's remembered and believed. Representation is asymmetric, so a memory of a rainy day might or might not represent that day but the rainy day doesn't represent the memory.

Other objects of conscious awareness are presentations, which is a unary relation. For example, the look and sound of rain are properties that present themselves in our conscious awareness when we see or hear the rain.

When the rain stops, we normally don't continue seeing or hearing it. That's unlike representations. We can continue believing that it rains regardless of the fact that it has stopped raining.

Direct or indirect realism isn't epistemology, recall, they're philosophies of perception.

So, regarding the nature of the object of perception, it is the indirect realist who assumes that the object of perception when you see Mars is a 1 mm dot. The indirect realist never sees Mars, only dots, words, or other representations.

While the direct realist may not always know what it is that he sees, it can usually be found out and explained. The indirect realist, however, assumes that he never sees things directly, only representations, e.g. 1 mm dots, and that has, in fact, epistemological consequences. As long as the assumption is that you never see things directly, then skepticism follows. Not so for the direct realist.

When looking up at the night sky, if the Direct Realist doesn't literally see dots in their visual field, what do they see? — RussellA

Stars, planets, moons etc.

Indirect realists sees dots that represent stars, planets. The direct realist sees the stars and planets that may appear as dots, discs, or spheres etc depending on distance, available light etc.

Similarly, the word "is" can be used in different ways in language... — RussellA

Like "look over there is Mars", or "What I see is Mars".

The problem with Direct Realism is that it assumes an identity between what is seen and the cause of what is seen. It assumes an identity between the bright dot and the planet Mars, such that the bright dot "is" Mars, otherwise the Direct Realist could not see the external world as it really is.

And if this is the case, in that the bright dot "is" the planet Mars, how can a bright dot in the visual field have a mass of 6.4∗1023kg? — RussellA

The direct realist doesn't see a dot in the visual field.

I really still don't 100% understand what direct realists mean when they say that they directly experience mars. — Ashriel

That mars is not experienced via something else, such as sense-data or a mental picture. Hence directly.

Does that place representationalism among direct-realist ideas or indirect? — flannel jesus

Searle defends direct realism.

- - -


Here's an addition to my short reply. I suppose representationalism is indirect realism under the assumption that you never perceive things directly, only your own sense-data, concepts, ideas, mental pictures etc. that more or less accurately or usefully represent the things.

Direct realism, however, is the idea that you do perceive things directly, not via something else. Things can be perceived in as many ways as possible given the physics, chemistry and other conditions that enables us to perceive them.

The world may appear tilted when you tilt your head, but that's not a good counter-argument against direct realism. Arguments from illusion or hallucination are basically that bad.

I think it's really interesting that Representationalism is claimed by both direct and indirect realists in various contexts. — flannel jesus

Searle, for instance, distinguishes representation from presentation. For example, believing x is a representation, seeing x is a presentation..

If I believe that it is raining I can separate my belief from the fact that it is raining, but when I see the tree I cannot separate the visual experience from an awareness of the presence of the tree. This is true even if it is a hallucination and even if I know that it is a hallucination.

Link to source.

If nothing is experienced then what is the distinction between having an hallucinatory experience and not having an hallucinatory experience? — Michael

I can evoke the experience of seeing a sudden flash by poking my eye (not recommended), and I suppose that the experience could be subjectively identical to seeing a real flash. But when I poke my eye it is just the experience without its object, the flash.

In the hallucinatory case nothing is experienced, because imaginary objects don't interact with sense organs. Hallucinations are not experiences in the same sense as veridical experiences. Hence the names hallucinatory and veridical.

Under any normal use of language, things are experienced when we hallucinate (and when we dream); it's just that the experience isn't a consequence of external stimulation of the relevant kind. — Michael

Right, seeing something when there is nothing to see is normally called 'hallucination'. Such an experience is not about something, but the psychological ability running amok.

Dreams are interesting. Unlike veridical experiences of a recalcitrant continuous reality dreams are gappy or collage-like, and cease to exist as soon as one wakes up. Granted that a dream of waking up could be subjectively identical to waking up. But not for long, because of the differences between dreams and veridical experiences.

hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

What makes them distinct is that in the hallucinatory experience nothing is experienced.

In the premise that one can't see whether an experience is veridical or hallucinatory it is assumed that the veridical is indirect. Hence the doubt on whether it is what it seems to be, veridical or hallucinatory. From this we're supposed to "conclude" indirect realism. But the conclusion is hidden in what is assumed in the premise.

Direct experiences, however, don't represent anything, and therefore they are not subject to doubt on whether they are what they seem to be.