I am a bit puzzled with the way this topic is treated. I feel it is very much couched in the metaphysics of old, the nominalists and medieval realists, the rationalists and empiricists etc. I think Kant convincingly cleared up the matter when he deduced the categories of thought. The latter idealists refined these ideas considerably, but the gist is the same. Change, as well as space and time are categories. They are the fundamental structures that have to be presupposed if we are able to experience a 'world' at all. Relating them to each other, as if one is substantial and the other is a property seems to me mistaken. It is like asking: what is the quantity of time? Of course we think temporally and quantitatively and therefore we can devise a clock, but time as such has no quantity. there not multiple times or multiple spaces. Every hour is still time and every room is still space.

In the same way we think of substance and properties, and the relation between each other but do not for a moment think that these notions have any meaning outside of frame of reference. They are needed for us to think at all, operators, but I never saw a property as such, I only saw some definite properties. I also never saw substance as such, I only saw definite substances.

Change therefore is not a property, not of space, not of anything else. Change is a category of thought. I would even argue it is a-priori since change is not something learned by being experienced, but change is what experience is, aka it makes experience possible.

Call me daft if you want Arne, but you'll have to explain this to me. In my usage 2 stands for two distinct things with spatial separation between them, and 3 stands for three spatially separated things, etc.. Therefore, contrary to what you say, numerals seem especially useful when they refer to things with spatial existence. And I really don't see how they would be at all useful (except for the purpose of deception) to refer to things without spatial existence, i.e. fictitious things. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not seem very correct, or at least it seems only a way to imagine something. such as numbers. 2 and 2 is 4 independent of there being 2 things and 2 other things. In the same way that in the syllogism If p. then Q, p. Thererfore Q, does not have to be rephrased as: "If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore he is mortal". Quantity and space are not relatable to each other because they are both necessary categories. (I believe that for Kant space was a category of the intuition and quantity of thought, but that does not matter and I am not very certain about it and the picture I paint is more Hegelian than Kantian anyway). Maybe I missed something, or maybe the categories got jettisoned by the analytics in concert with the phenomenologists...

I think Zeus's concern, that with the technology of fire we would discover all technologies and then rival with the gods, forgetting the wisdom of the gods and thinking ourselves the ultimate power and destroying nature to satisfy ourselves, was a justified concern. We have confused technology with science and now have technological smarts but not wisdom. — Athena

What you describe is I think currently being developed. It has always been there in Western thought actually but it has not always been dominant. Schwarz and Thompson, two economists and sociologists define it as an 'egalitarian perspective', Sociologist Aaron Wildavsky defines it as a perspective of harmony. Traditional enlightnement values, values we still live with today proritize control of nature through technological means and progress through economic an cultural development.

The harmony perspective on the other hand is the one embraced by ecology. The sociologist and ecologist Anna Bramwell calls much of ecological reasoning and environmentalism 'manichean', presenting a battle between good nature and evil techno-science. Much of philosophy now is busy transllating philosophical ideas to the realm of the environment and to our relationship between man and nature. Martin Heidegger's essay on technology is an early example. Then came Hans Jonas 'The principle of responsibility'.

You might want to delve in ecological thought for answers to your question. I do think currently that we gradually see a shift in perspective, from individualist to egalitarian. However, do not have many illusions about this shift, like every revolution there will be a lot of struggle. Ecology is not necessary friendly to your enlightenment values and your love for democracy.

Hi @Reformed Nihilist, good to see you :) I would take an approach rooted in the history of philsoophy, which other posters also have done in this trhead. Philosophy started with the question what was really real, what, if all the fleeting and temporal was stripped of from this world, would remain. Parmenides argued for an unchanging abstract whole, Heraclitus argued that what was real was change itself.

This discussion, only fragmented delivered to us set the stage, because we have a paradox here. If what is really really real is an unchanging hole than why does everything exhibit one quality, namely that of change. If movement itself is realy real, how is movement possible withou something fixed relative to which there is movement? Philosophy has tried to come to grips with that paradox, Plato's dualism, Aristotle's attempt at reconciliation in the 'this here', the medieval philosophers who turned to God as the source of that which moves and Descarte's turn to the subject. Certainty is one of those concepts that emerged in trying to get to grips with this paradox because when we have something certain we could define every other thing, concept or experience relative to it. - Whether we were dealing with things, concepts or experiences, was itself dependent on the epoch in the history of philosophy one finds itself in. - Subject and object, essence and substance, phenomena and noumena, all those terms emerge from that endeavour.

As Joshs and Ciceronianus pointed out, philosophy moves and changes. I do not know about the analytics, but the continentals have by and large abandoned the quest for certainty. Joshs would say it was Nietzsche probably, I would say it was Hegel, who lay this quest to rest. There is no 'thing in itself', there is only 'the movement of the concept', the articulation of ever new and according to Hegel more sophisticated ways to try to resolve the ancient paradox. Partly building on this notion, partly out of a counter reaction to it, phenomenology emerged. We have learned something however from this history. Like you state for science, truth in philosophy depends on an "intricate webs of probabilistic relationships". Truth is 'preliminary', the best we have at the time, 'vorläufig' as they say in German, it stakes its claim in advance and has to retract when something better comes along.

That does not mean this preliminary truth can be put forward willy nilly, it has to be acceptable according to the rules of the game played at the time, the 'economy of truth'. Some articulations are taboo, some just fail in the conffrontation with our bodily experience, some get forgotten because we are busy dealing with something else. Truth making, meaning making, is a social affair and the second order rules of argumentation decide what is accepted as true and under what conditions.

I find pure materialist physics very unconvincing, worse than unconvincing - meaningless. But this is not the place to go into that. — T Clark

I was agreeing with them on this point:

On the other hand, some people understand our lack of free will to be dependent on a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. — T Clark

The lack of free will follows from a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. If one ascribes to a purely materistic ontology than accepting the lack of free will should follow from that premise. This type of metaphysics though relegates human experience to the realm of the 'unreal', only the third person perspective decides what is really really real. It is a metaphysical position. I am not saying I also ascribe to it. I do not think we are very far apart, if at all on this point.

Which of these do we take into account? The ones you and I are talking about are the medical and social forces I discussed. On the other hand, some people understand our lack of free will to be dependent on a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. — T Clark

I agree with them. Phenomenonologically, or maybe less controversially, experentially we do experience freedom of choice. We only do not experience it when under certain meical and social influences. The question is whether this first person experience of free will is illusory, or somehow contrary to the metaphyscial assumptions we accept. Criminal law takes the first person perspective, I experience free will, so assume you do too. Neurology for instance, takes a third person perspective, and accepting basic materialist metaphysics, tells us it does not exist. Criminal law though takes the circumstances that we also accept in our every day eistence into account. It will tell you it does not go into metaphysical assumptions about the nature of free will. I argue though it tacitly accepts the existence of free will as an absolute presupposition.

@SophistiCat I took a very straightforward interpretation of free will as my point of departure. There are others of course. The most sophisticated I have seen is the compatibiism of P.F. Strawson. I do feel they dodge the existential question though: do 'I' influence my life, or is all my choice in fact an illusion.

I think there are situations when people clearly are not in control of their actions, e.g. schizophrenia with delusions and hallucinations. — T Clark

Certainly and in those cases we cannot hold people account at all. This means we may take 'measures' against them, expedient actions out of social concerns such as forced care in a mental institution. We may not punish them in the proper sense, i.e. cause them harm because we resent the choices they made. (Dutch legal theory makesa difference between 'measures' and 'punishment', which is helpoful here. It does not mean measures are necessarily milder. Being locked up potentially indefinately in a mental health institution is of course onerous to the perpetrator, the rationale is different though.

I was thinking of this when I started this discussion - I've read about jurisdictions where mitigating factors; e.g. childhood abuse, poverty, hardship; can not be be brought up during the trail, but they can be considered during the penalty phase when punishment is determined. This would be especially applicable for cases where the death penalty is under consideration. — T Clark

Many jurisdictions take the circumstances of the perpetrator into account when meeting out punishment. Gradually in criminal law attention has shifted from purely reagrding the act to regarding the actor. Many people recognise that in some situations we are so pyschologically strained that we cannot think clearly. The problem is that it is not very consistent. It recognises that some circumstances influence your choice, but that that choice is then 'compromised' to some degree. It does not entertain the idea that people have no chocie at all to begin with, because they have no free will.

The law and any moral or ethical consideration at all. — T Clark

The law not necessarily. If it works to keep people from committing behaviour we consider unwanted it can still be there. also here only utilitarian concerns will count.

So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will? — T Clark

If a criminal can not avoid committing criminal acts (say, arson, rape, and bloody murder), would that not be a very good reason to lock him or her up? — Bitter Crank

The asnwer whether or not we have free will does have implications for criminal law. I would contend that in criminal law the absolute presupposition (in the sense of Collingwood) is made that we have free will. That it is such an assumption of criminal law is not uncontroversial, but I contend that it is, so will accept it for the purpose of this thread. If anyone would disagree we can discuss of course. Anyway, criminal law knows a number of justifications for punishment. One is prevention, but the second is retalliation. Prevention of course, as Bitter Crank noted, is still a perfectly justifiable reason for 'punishment'. However, the rationale for punishment shifts. It is not really 'punishment', but a policy measure. Out of policy concerns we would lock up criminals and apply the criminal law to them.

The second one though, retalliation, seems pointless without free will. Why would we reproach someone if he is not in control of his actions and free choice is illusory? It seems to be adding insult to injury because the perpetrator has not asked to have a crime prone character. Possibly that causes more harm than good and then we also reproach him for being who he is and doing what he does without a choice.

The question than becomes whether it matters whether you are locked up as a policy concern, or because society reproaches you for doing something wrong, which you should have avoided doing. I would reckon yes, for two reasons. The first one is practical: If punishing becomes a policy concern it means we should only look at effectivenes. Punishment should be tailored to the perpetrator solely an maybe to the obtaining the best results for society. Concerns of fairness, which are germane in criminal law, become less of an issue, because it is not out of fairness that we punish. We merely look at the perpetrator and what is a most effective means of stopping his criminal activity. Secondly we might also entertain social concerns. there might be outrage whe we do not punish a murderer because we know he does not kill again. So we should mediate social concerns with individual ones and find a tailor made pnushment in this specific case. Punishment becomes a utilitarian calculus.

The second reason is that punishment out of policy concerns relegates the perpetrator as an object of policy. The interesting thing about punishment is that it is also a kind of redemption. Yes, we rebuke what you have done but take you sseriously as a perpetrator. Contast that with peretrators that plead an insanity defense. They contend that at that point they were not being themselves, they did not have control of their actions. An insanity defense is nothing else than a request to be treated as policy concern and to be absolved from moral blameworthiness. When we judge that someone is culpable, then we also at the same time say 'we take you seriously' we accept that you are a person who is rational, who is capable of making right and wrong choices. I do think it is more humane to punish out of resentment. The perpetrator may lose his freedom but not his right to be viewed as a human being who is in control if his action. It is actually for this reason that mass murderer Aders Breivik from Norway resisted heavily to be declared insane and Ithink he is right. Calling him insane would amount to an extra punishment, above the life sentence he got.

So yes, I think it matters whether one rejects free will in criminal law. Maybe it this not totally answer your question, whether, given there is no free will, does it make sense to hold people accountable. The short answer based on the view above would be yes, it still makes sense, but only out of policy concerns. Criminal law in this case should be reformed to reflect only utilitarian concerns in dealing with perpetrators.

Out of curiosity, and I'm not asking for names, are there any forum members who you think would make A students. I realize that the format we work in is different from an academic paper. How does the writing and, more important, the quality of thought here compare to your classes? — T Clark

That is very difficult to say because this is a much more free format. I would also not know how to compare people, because everybody writes about different topics. I cannot judge many topics, for instance anything analytical. Many here also outgrew their student years. I myself joined ages ago when I just finished my university studies. Now we are more than 20 years further on. When I joined I found it to be a very entertaining and knowledgable community and was in awe of several posters. The core still is, but quality varies enormously from thread to thread. Some are really high level others are not. T

This is not an academic level forum, that is really a couple of notches higher, but that is also an unfair criterion because I am writing much more freely for instance here and do not double check everything. Submitting an academic article is a far more arduous procedure. No doubt that many here use the forum in the same way, a nice way to joust and to learn different viewpoints quickly, share thoughts etc. What I do know is that some of the posters here, past or present have the capabilities to be full professors (I am not by the way I hold a lower rank). Some even hold that position now. So, some here will make brilliant students yes, if they would be students :)

Does this lead to the requirement (definition) that "an undergraduate in writing a philosophy essay is not expected to develop new philosophical ideas but is expected to comment on existing philosophical ideas using reasoned and well-structured language, whilst including an original idea that makes the reader interested in thinking about the topic" ? — RussellA

It sounds about right I guess, yeah...

As someone searching for what makes an A, from what you say, in addition to being well written (something that can be learnt through careful study) the student should also put forward an original spark of an idea, a potential new insight into the topic under discussion — RussellA

When grading you are usually bound by criteria. I often get to write them myself now though and I regularly put in a criterion for creativity or 'argumentation' which gives me some leeway to reward originality.

Even if they don't have time to fully develop it within the confines of a particular essay, and even though the idea may ultimately prove to be wrong, its development may lead into new knowledge. — RussellA

That is never my criterion for me, because it is way too much to expect. 'New knowledge' is really rare. I do reward promise, I would feel bad rewarding a paper that is all good, but just collors between the lines over a paper that does everything well and has that bit of extra spark that makes you think. Usually such a student holds promise and should be stimulated a bit.

IE, perhaps a willingness by the student to push the boundary of what is conventionally accepted, providing they are willing to rationally argue their case - (pushing the boundary infers that they have to be knowledgeable in the first place as to where the boundary is). — RussellA

And doing things well. There might be a great idea, but if it does not answer the question it goes down anyway. Even if you are the young Wittgensteiin, the job of the student is to think within the boundaries expected. That is primary, show you can combine different pre given ideas. Do that well and I cannot find fault it may even give you an A (depends on the criteria). However, I would like it better if you combine the ideas and on the basis of those ideas make an extra observation, provide a different perspective etc.

I like this post by RusselA and would like to discuss it from back to front...

What this means in practice is that the others use convoluted language, don't answer the question, push their own philosophical ideas, use arguments where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, where their premises are opinions rather than being obviously true, where the essay isn't structured into a beginning, body and conclusion, where they don't make use of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, etc — RussellA

Yes, very true. This is often the case and one gets tired of it, because when you want to grade well, you do give feedback. So You have to point out al of this quickly because the time to grade is always too short.

So why does one student get an A and the others get B's if all that is needed is a good paper rather than an excellent one. Because the others trip themselves up, shoot themselves in the foot, make a balls of it, run around in circles and start up the creek without a paddle. — RussellA

Yes, but do not underestimate how hard it is to write a good paper. Writing is very difficult and an A is a very hard to obtain mark. Every writer 'makes a balls of it' at some point, prof or student and students have very little experience in writing. I hope I spot out students who genuinely gave blood sweat and tears to a paper and even if I mark it down, I hope to say something nice to them. So always look upon your students kindly, they are struggling individuals like all of us are.

The Professor is not looking for an excellent paper by a budding Wittgenstein, just a good paper that he knows from his lifetime of experience is on the right lines. — RussellA

Sure, in everyday grading that is true, but not totally, you always hope to spot the new Witty.

All the professor is looking for is a workmanlike, well crafted, well written, logically argued, well researched essay that is relevant to the topic. — RussellA

That is all he hopes for, and all that the criteria tend to desire, but not all he is looking for.

The Professor, knowing his subject inside out, having read every relevant paper, attended every germane conference, and after marking thousands of essays by bright-eyed and bushy-tailed students is not looking for new ideas when marking a paper, as the possibility of coming across a new idea is pretty remote. If the do come across an idea that it is new to them, then it is more than likely to be either wrong or nonsense. — RussellA

Yes, a new idea is pretty remote and a good prof tells his students that. Not to dash their hopes, but because philosophy (like law) is simply a difficult subject, of which you need knowledge to be able to say anything interesting. However, the divide between prof and student is not that wide as you make it out to be. It depends a bit on the prof of course, but many of them marking your papers are just struggling themselves. They als need to make sense of things, grapple, form their arguments etc. There are always students who surprise you and even if an idea has a hole in it and you spot it out, you can still admire it. From personal experience, when I see a paper and think "damn, I disagree with this, I have at least three counter arguments", I will look at it again and usually award it a high grade. A paper that makes me think about counter arguments does something, it 'works' even though I think it is wrong and yes that counts in the students favour.

Quite so. People are scared of new ideas, and the most scared of the newest ideas are the most mediocre philosophers. Please see my two essays, and the comments... but I'm preaching to the choir. — god must be atheist

Yes, but that is also generally what teaching amounts to. Usually one must learn to grasp old ideas before one can succesfully evaluate new ones. Therefore I would mark an essay with an A when it is philosophically interesting and on topic and well documented. Just a new idea while the essay if about evaluating a old one does not get an A automatically. It all depends on the question asked.

In my book it would get an A, provided there are no criteria the student has missed. If a paper gets me interested and I cannot find fault with it, I award an A. I might even award it if there is one small oversight, but it is compensated for by the interesting idea the paper brings to the table.

I doubt that paying the Chippendales for visiting the elderly centers is a good way to get rid of viruses in the rooms of faint-hearted ladies of 90 years old. — AgentTangarine

:rofl:

Sure Roger, all those public health and environmental institutes know nothing about risk assessment, but luckily you found the solution. The problem is you are working with a set number of people who can be infected. However, that is not how a virus behaves. It is not like you put 50 people in a room, but there is only enough virus going around to infect 20. Than you would be right of course. Put more people in the room and the risk for each person in the room decreases. The problem everyone in the room might potentially get infected and if I get infected, the chance does not become any less for you to get infected.

You are presupposing a zero sum game where the number of possible infections is fixed. However, it is not a zero sum game but a positive sum game. Me getting infected will actually increase the chances of you getting infected because I will also start spreading the virus. Each time an infected person exhales new virus is realeased. If one does get infected one will spread the virus, even when vaccinated, albeit to a far lesser extent. That means more people may become infected increasing the risk to all of us of contamination.

Tobias, you are misinterpreting the analogy. The "one bullet" represents a "viral infection", or if we wish to be more literal, the "one bullet" can represent "a group of 1000 viral particles" (note: it takes a minimum inhalation of 1000 viral particles to create an infection.) — Roger Gregoire

Yes but that does not matter one bit. Your premise is that a viral load will only infect one person, whereas a viral load might infect 1 or 20 or a 100 people... It is you who restricts the killer to just one shot, not me. If we are all overthinking your mosquito analogy, it might be because we are all stupid or because your mosquito analgy kind of sucks... think carefully about your answer...

Instead of a mosquito, imagine there is a mad killer with a gun loaded with one bullet, in this room with the woman. If the killer is intent on killing (shooting) someone, then the woman is in grave danger. ...agreed?

Now, if another person enters into the room, is the woman now safer (with a killer with one bullet), or less safe? How about if 100 people enter this room, is the woman more safe or less safe?

The math and logic (in determining risk) is very simple and straightforward. Take the number of bullets and divide it by the number of people in the room to ascertain the risk assessment to any individual in the room.

For example, if you double the number of people, you cut the individual risk in half. ...agreed? — Roger Gregoire

The analogy is again false. The virus is not a killer with one bullet. There is not 'one'virus flying about potentially only infecting one person. There is a virus load in the room, potentially infecting people. A more apt analogy is to imagine the virus as a potential bout of insanity which potentially makes an ordinary sane person draw his or her gun and start firing of bullets en masse and randomly. It is pretty clear than that the woman is safer on her own than in the vicinity of other people, even if those other people have had some antidote against this affliction which works 90% of the time but not a 100%.

Schopenhauer is very interesting. I read him a long time ago, and phenonemologcally I am on thin ice, so if I am not up to speed bear with me. I do think that the phenomenological notion of intentionality is much more modern than Schopenhauer's notion of will. Schopenhauer's will represents an answer to the problem Kant foisted on us, the problem of the Thing in itself. It leads to all kinds of dualisms, antinomies that needed to be solved by the generation of German idealists. Hegel's soution represents an answer and Schopenhauer's radically dfferent answer is an answer as well.

I think the phneomenologists dealt with the question in a rather different way. They did not try to answer the problem of the thing in Itself, or the antinomies that it created, Phenomenology shifted the method of analysis. Instead of asking why or how our knowlege of the worl conforms to the world, they analysed how certain objects appear and how consciousness then made leap of consstructing an object at all. They would not ask the question of what the object is, but only how it appears. Here intentionality has its function. The insight thatconsciousness is always consciousness of something. One can never question consciousness in abstracto, but it always has a concrete something in mind. That shifted attention away from the Kantian table of categories and Hegels' concepts to a philosophy of consciousness 'in the world'.

Schopenhauer does not do away with the question of the thing in itself in that modern veign. He keeps the Kantian insight that the world is idea in the sense of that which comes for consciousness, (Vorstellung in german, literally, 'that which puts itself in front') However that is only an aspect of the world. Our experience is not the thing in itself, that is 'vorstellung', however, everything that as such presents itself has a common characteristic, namely that it displays a certain 'will'. When we try to analyze the world as it is represented to cosnsciousness (rational, mental) we do not get there, but when we shift our focus we may see that every object, whatever it is, is the thing that it is because of will.

I read Schopenhauer more platonically / metaphysically. Will permeates everything and instantiates itself more or less strongly in each thing. In all our boily features will might be discerned, but even in our walls, in our houses, they all bare the hallmarks of a certain will. Even the lowliest rock keeps itself in its place. Will as this energy, or drive is what is the thing in itself in Schopenhauer.

Of course everyone is right to point out I think that he is a forerunner in the turn away from rationality and towards everyday being in the world. That might well be true. The turn to will in any case influenced Nietzsche and through him Heidegger and the latter postmodernists I guess.

The various roles humans play, for sure, important and as interesting now as ever.
They are not necessarily public.
The role of a good/bad teacher might be seen in public ( school ) but also in private ( symposium/home). — Amity

No, the way roles are treated shifts over time. Not too long ago one stayed with the same employer all her life and identified with a certain profession, aptly called a 'beruf' in German, something to which you were called. Now it is much more common to switch careers and staying at the same employer is hardly heard off. With a certain role comes a certain status, especially in soceties that are highly stratified.

They are not necessarily public.
The role of a good/bad teacher might be seen in public ( school ) but also in private ( symposium/home). — Amity

I am not saying roles are only executed publically, they are defined in public, teaching is a social practice. The marks of quality are determined in te public arena. Maybe moreso for the Greeks tho
ugh then nowadays, that is my point.

a private soldier, as opposed to a general
(adjectival use) private, homely
one who is awkward, clumsy
(in the plural) one's countrymen

Why would they not 'get to practise virtue' ?
'Practising virtue' as per Virtue Ethics involves the role of 'character' (having ideal traits) rather than playing a role or engaging in public politics. — Amity

Of course words take on all sorts of meanings and develop over time. However, if you see the similarities of the various connotations in these different meanings, than its history is revealed. A private person, homely, does not get out much, will become awkward and clumsy because he does not get to realise his potential, which for the ancient Greeks was only realised in the polis. Private soldier admittedly is off, but I am thinking that, especially if the private solider is opposed to the general, the 'idiot' just obeys commands, does what he is told without question. That fits in nicely with the idea of the idiot as the private man, the man who actually did not have the means and luxury to enter into political (as in polis, concerning the polis) affairs. Usually indeed a country man, one residing outside the walls. They are the ones who do not have a say in how affairs are ran, a commoner who just toils.

The virtues, the ideal traits, were cultivated in Greek thought. They needed work. You acquired them in practice. However, in order to gain that practice, you would have to engage in it. The highest virtue, the one closest to the essence of man, was virtue of good political deliberation. Man was 'zoon politikon', a political animal.

I do still think you confuse me with an ancient Greek though, or think I agree with the picture painted, that is not the case. I don't know where your animosity comes from. I just think, contra Hanover, NOS and you apparently, that engaging in the genealogy of concepts and words is worthwhile.

Banno's OP, as I read it, links the idea of a certain crrent mentality, the mentality that one should look out for one's own, to a certain conception of life, caught in the term 'idiot'. The wise man realises he is not on his own. The idiot does not.

Hmmm. 'One leaves the household and engages in political affairs'. 'One' would be a man, no ? — Amity

Oh yessiree, they were men alright, men all the way, you betcha!

So, those left behind ( wives/children) taking care of home affairs/studying wouldn't get to practise virtue ? — Amity

Yes indeed and women were not considered rational, though Aristotle much to his credit, considered them partly so. Children were considered not rational yet, but being potentially rational, if they were male at least. So yes, they were initiated in political life and hence learned virtuous behaviour. Women also had virtues, just not those connected to reason, therefore necessarily of lesser quality than men's.

This doesn't sound right - nor does the 'playing roles' bit.. and why 'necessarily public' ? — Amity

Well, it might not sound right to you, but I am not trying to please you, I am just giving a rough sketch of howthe Greeks viewed political life. Roles were important n Greek life as the still are in virtue ethics. A good lawyer plays a different role than a good judge for instance. Roles are necessarily public because they are defined publically. In society we play social roles, espeicalliy in stratified Greek society.

It would be helpful if citations were provided to support your understanding. — Amity

Oh really, because that is, like, so bloody common on this philosophyforum. Well here you go: M.Sandel, (2009), Justice, What is the right thing to do?, Penguin books, Chapter 8 on Aristotle. (for the parts on political ife justice and 'telos')
T. W. Adorno, (1965). Metaphysics, concept and Problems, 2000 ed. Polity Press, especially lectures 1 through 5, for metaphysical and teleological thought in Aristotle.

It might be me, but I reckon them better sources than wikipedia...

Now, I am not saying I subscribe to Greek thought in these matters, just telling you what these concepts meant, as far as I know of course, not being part of ancient Greek culture. It goes without saying I do not support ancient Greek views on gener relations, nor would I endorse Aristotle's defense of slavery for that matter. That does not mean ancient Greek ideas are not worth studying as we have copied a lot from ancient Greek thought, as delivered to us by the Romans and the Jewish/Islamic scholars of the middle ages

My point being that the etymology of words doesn't command meaning, but usage does. What words mean in one time period or context can be different than in others. — Hanover

Yes, but words also have historic connotations and these connotations and implicit hierarchies are reiterated when these words are used. The changing meaning of words is not a procedure that runs willy nilly but a historical process that actually shows similarities as @Cuthbert, described for similar terms, like plebeian. The comoner becomes a derogatory term. Just as the whole word 'common' has attracted pejorative connotation.

Militaristic uber-christian werewolves.... what is there not to love?
In my defense, it works when grading student papers.

When is an altruist out of a job? — Agent Smith

The man speaketh in riddles.... is there someone out there that can translate these sybline musings for me?

I can't explain it any further — Agent Smith

What do you mean? Maybe you agree with my point above, or maybe not. Maybe you think it is pointless to explain it to me. Or maybe you just want to bow out of the thread... I did not notice any explanation in your posts above,

What's all the hullabaloo about making your kids, if you have one, stand on their own two feet, make the independent i.e. not have to rely on others? — Agent Smith

Well if it really means not having to rely on others I wish them the best of luck. Modern society hangs together by relying on others, or are your kids not allowed to visit the supermarket, to call plumbers, travel the roads or take planes?

What they mean by standing on your own to feed is to think independently and critically. Kids are taught to put themselves 'out there', taking their place on the highway of life. It is exactly in interaction that they are independent and stand on their own two feet, being able to resist when necessary and argue their point. That exactly was the Greek ideal and we still honor it. How unfortunate it is then that we have a strand of thinking telling you you are all alone and all you should care for is yourself. It leads to contradictions, socially as well as psychologically. Firstly, the common good which enables people to thrive is seen as weak, causing us to bite the hand that feeds us. Secondly, success is portrayed as the product of your choice, but so is failure, transferring a huge burden of responsibilty for situations that are the product of luck and collective actuon far more than they are up to choice.

Here's wisdom: One who looks out for thier own interests at the expense of others is, quite literally, an idiot. — Banno

It makes sense in the context of ancient Greek life. The highest form of life for the Greeks was political life. One leaves the household and engages in political affairs, affairs concerning the polis. An idiot (a person not involved in public affairs) does not do this and therefore also does not get to practice virtue, which for the anicent Greeks was attached to playing roles and roles are necessarily public. So yes not engaging in public life makes one an idiot.

So egoism is idiocy. I prefer a system in which everyone is egoistic, the way it actually is I believe, and it all works out. I've seen people being called out for thinking for someone else. Doing that is considered a sign of arrogance. Every man for himself, people, every man for himself. — Agent Smith

Thinking for someone else is arrogance, deliberating and putting your ideas on the line in public life is not. In fact you do it yourself on this very forum Every man for himself is ludicrous. How does every man for himself get to to construct waterworks, sanitation, organise defense? In fact the genealogy of the word idiot as someone being on his own, nicely shows what the common mantra of every man for himself does. Greed is good is not just a business moddel. It leads literally to 'depolitisation', making it easier to control. An idiot is a far easier target to control than a mass or union. That is why the age of individualism became an age of idiocy, of evey opinion counting and the selfie becoming the highest form of enjoyment.

Reason's Greetings, my friend! :sparkle: — 180 Proof

Happy winter reasoning friend! :sparkle:

Anyone that advises (or mandates) that we socially isolate and clothe our healthy immune population is LOGICALLY IGNORANT -- doing so greatly INCREASES THE DEATHS to our vulnerable population, and PERPETUATES the further mutations of these killer mosquitos. — Roger Gregoire

No of course not. Your thought experiement is predicated on the mosquito (or the virus) stinging once. The problem with a virus is, when it stings it multiplies itself, increasing the risk, not fading away in anonymity. If vaccinated people can become infected and might spread the disease it makes sense to slow down social contact lest the virus copies itself, increasing instead of descreasing the risk.

(2) we are aspects of the universe who must make as much sense of it (via myths, metaphysics, arts, histories, natural sciences, etc) as we can in order to help ourselves survive and our descendents thrive despite the universe. — 180 Proof

Indeed!
We are sense making creatures. That is simply what we do, we try to make sense of things. that presupposes that there is something to make sense of and that in turn presupposes that, in the end, it makes sense somehow even if we do not fathom it. (if it was not, then there would not be something to make sense of) Even if you declare something totally absurd you have made sense of it in a way in the sense that you have brought it under a category of somprehension. You have said something about it, somthing purportedly true.

Whether it really really really makes sense or not, is a question of metaphysics of the impossible kind. We want to say something, but simply can't because we have no access to it. We can't speak (or think or reason) about it. We have simply determined the rational to be real. We can try to do otherwise but will neven succeed, or necessarily 'relapse' in our rationalistic presuppositions.

(Also, I was lying about reading it all. I read like 10 pages and went ehh I think i get the gist of it.) — john27

:rofl: :cool:

It was meant to provide a kick start to @John McManis! ;)

Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica. I like the way he organizes his thoughts. — john27

Really? That was what a prof. told me once... I think he tried to murder me or at least keep me fro contacting him ever again. Here is a link to every 9453 pages ... good luck! ;)

I liked The Penguin History of Philosopy by D.W. Hamlyn. The reviews though are not favourable. lol.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/166553.The_Penguin_History_of_Western_Philosophy

I still think the best way is through an introductory course, taught to you live. Even though it might be shallow, it gives you an overview, something to work with and you are motivated to work your way through the texts. Philosophy is still very dialogical I feel.

Well, to complicate the picture even further, the branches of governemnt are themselves not untitary. For instance the executove branch is usually comprised of different departments and these departments might start ars of all against all as well. So even if the executive 'wins' the war you describe, the question is which department has won control of the executive branch. You might be thinking of the president, but no president rules alone. So the queestion is still one of influence.

To curb this from happening, a number of institutional checks and balances are normally built in, like negotiations, often behind closed doors. Still, it is not an uncommon sight. In the European Union for instance, there is frequent infighting among the different departments headed by the various commissioners. In the legislative branch similar tugs of war are imaaginable, especially in multi party systems. In the EU further complicated by national allegiances.

So yes, Hobbesian wars of all against all are imaginable and these squabbles generally do not result in more efficiency unless a power grab takes place perhaps. If you are more intereste in this topic I suggest taking a look at the literaure on governance, there is a wealth of information out there.

We always try to gauge what we deserve and what others deserve, but how is any such thing measured objectively? Do we deal in just more or less than one another or can we find real world measurable things to compare in reference to deservingness? We certainly live different lives and experience different outcomes, but can we ever really determine we deserve our lot in life? — TiredThinker

Deserving is not objectively determined, but politically determined. I tend to look at Michael Sandel's 'Justice' when analyzing deserts, because A. he does not downplay the question of desert, and B. his account is historical and discursive instead of actuarial.
I think we cannot avoid questions of desert, even though we might disagree on the question of free will. We are creatures of value and we relate the actions of others to ourselves. We tend to value actions we consider virtuous and condemn those we consider vicious. what we consider virtuous is no constant matter but depends on the society in which we live and what it concerns virtuous. Those depend on political eliberation, custom, habit etc. That is not to reduce them to whim or to say they are 'merely' socially constructed. They are social constructions but they are necessary cnstructions nonetheless since valuation is I think part and parcel of our phenomenological 'embodied' experience of the world. As such some measures of desert seem to be more or less constant, even though they show a different face. We tend to value those that do not harm us and protect us over those who cause us pain.

Every society therefore has to engage in determining what virtues it tends to reward and what vices it tens to punish. A society that thrives on warlike traditions might reward military bravery and prowess while a society that thrives on trade and non violent conflict resolution might value persuason and argumentation. There is therefore no 'objective' in the sense of ahistorical way of determining deserts. What we can say though is that determining who deserves what is a necessarily political question and being cast out of the process, having no voice in other words, deprives you of some necessary feature of belonging to a society an therefore limiting of your 'being at home' in society.

I therefore disagree with @180 Proof when he states that deserving is just getting what you can take or what you cannot avoid. Even criminals might concur that there punishment was just even tough they tried hard to avoid it. Similarly, one feels the waiter deserves a tip, even though this is harmful to you and can easily be avoided. We tip even if we know we will never see the bar again. The reason is that we tend to value living virtuously, even though we not always do. Everyone does embrace values, even though that means limiting their own will. What we do want is our chance to reflec on them and to have a say in choosing them. We want the opportunity co command, instead of only following.

Well my immediate reaction is that you are depressed and therefore you see their optimism in a negative light. The question you ask should in principle be rephrased, "why are idealistic, optimistic people depressing to me? That has psychological causes. You feel you are stuck in life and they seem not to be. That causes resentment and further depression.

That said: a lot of 'optimism' we see nowadays, for instance in slogans like 'life is what you make of it', or 'you just have to be yourself', 'success is a choice', are not really optimistic or motivattional, though they are shrouded in motivational garb. They lay responsibility at your own feet and do not give you any clue what to do with it. In that way, for someone who is depressed they add insult to injury because if you are not successful (or feel you are not) than you apparently have not been paying attention or tried hard enough. That of course depresses. In the OP you seem to switch from discussing optimistic people to the agruments they give. These should be kept apart. I think perhaps you have nothing against optimistic people but the phrases they use nowadays. The depression those words cause is unfortunate, but not wholly unexpected. You becoming depressed over them has to do with them speaking to you on an emotional level, but you did not yet unmask them for what they are, hollow phrases that have in fact nothing to do with optimism.

From my point of view, I think, according to Ockham's razor that both Objective and Absolute Idealism are the same:

- One absolute being.
- the Objective things are present Objectively, but not Materially.
- The One absolute being is both the Perceiver and the Perceived. — Salah

Thanks @tim wood :)

Care to unpack these sentences because theymake no sense to me. Do you think that for absolute idealists things are not materially present?

@god must be atheist Well... I am not thinking the end of the world is nigh yet. And I am also sorry for switching my chosen song,, from the brilliant Zager and Evans to the euqally brilliant Cohen. It is chilling, yes, I agree. I also think constant monitoring is far more invasive than an obligation to be vaccinated. I do not know if it is a 'test' for a roll out in the West. I do think that governments are always prone to resort to mass surveillance. This surveillance system is 1984'ish.

Too much nuance, my friend, for somebody else's homework. :smirk: — 180 Proof

True 180, but I needed the jogging.... has been ages since I dealt with this stuff. And I am a procrastinator at heart... Now back to grading someboy else's homework...

In the year 2020....

2021 is simply a continuation of the epoch that has started after 2020. We are in the throes of scientific, social and religious change. We could call it, borrowing a term of Ulirich Beck, reflexivity, but it is a reflexivity on steroids. We have had a number of realizations that indicate the frailty of our instututions. Science cannot find a (social) cure for corona, democracy is under threat in the US and the EU and a chasm has opened up between the old with their faith in techo-fixes and the young with a sense of hedonistic romanticism.

Lenny said it all...

How come you know the truth?