So, if governments make it illegal to help people die, they will be helped illegally - as before - or stored away somewhere until they die, in whatever conditions, whatever agony - as before. — Vera Mont

My post was actually more directed at Andrew than you, because I feel we are mostly in agreement... I would not advocate criminalizing euthanasia. However, I do advocate regulating it very meticulously as it is an important topic worthy of social debate.

Laws are necessarily made in the abstract. But they're also made within a political and economic framework of what is possible. In a culture strongly influenced by religious factions, certain ideas cannot be considered for legislation - as had been the case with birth control and gay rights. In a debt/profit economy, the source of funding for any proposed legislation determines its viability. — Vera Mont

Well it is certainly true that law is made within a cultural and political setting. Law is a child of its times. I do not think that money is the only source that talks though. There are interesting puzzles in this regard. the lobby power of corporations is much larger than that of the environmental movement and still environmental legislation is strengthened. Not enough for many, but still. Law making is also a popularity contest, it is balancing interests, ideology, there is no one size firs all. I live in a country with liberal euthanasia laws by the way. Here, the subject is regulated by law.

Even the best health care systems are already under severe strain. One more round of the current pandemic will collapse even the most robust. — Vera Mont

Yes and sometimes hard choices need to be made. However, I do side with Andrew when he argues that euthanasia laws may also be a symptom of a careless society. The notion that we do not sacrifice people for the greater good, but we do our utmost to keep them on board is meaningful. I think it is a great good to have a society in which people feel that if they find themselves in great peril, others will come to their aid, including the government. It gives a sence of security and with that allows people to flourish and feel at home. I value that sort of thing.

I am not withholding medicine from anyone I am opposing the legalizing of physician and government assisted suicide because of a wide range of concerns that I have outlined already. I am not advocating prosecuting anyone for assisting a suicide either except on a case by case basis which already occurs in countries with assisted suicide when the suicide is suspect. — Andrew4Handel

Medicine was used metaphorically. I know you are opposing it and I know your concerns and some of them are good. I just question the coherence of your position as both an anti-natalist and arguing against assisted suicide.

I am not advocating prosecuting anyone for assisting a suicide either except on a case by case basis which already occurs in countries with assisted suicide when the suicide is suspect. — Andrew4Handel

Prosecuting on a ' case by case basis' is suspect from a criminal law point of view as there is a danger that prosecution becomes arbitrary. This is against basic principles of criminal law and fair trial. So we need guidelines.

I personally think that once you have created a life you have created a responsibility to make that life flourish. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, but I am thrown into the world, without having been asked. The onus is maybe on my parents, but I might want to end it and there is no argument against that, especially since on your terms the world is such a bad place we should not put people in it.

Most antinatalist are strong supporters of assisted suicide so I am in a minority. I think the only way to avoid suffering is not to create more people, once you have created them suffering is inevitable and assisted suicide often happens because of suffering. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, but why should I suffer? If I want to go, than I go and you should at least understand that since the world is a rotten place on your account. Now, of course it would be great if I could do it myself, but some people can't and need assistance. You seem to hold the view that assisting them is wrong in and of itself, but that position does not seem to be very coherent. You wish to end suffering. Terminating the life of one that suffers may end it.

I an not an antinatalist nor am I uncritical on the issue of assisted suicide. I share some of your concerns. The most strong argument against it, is that ending life becomes an option just like all other options and that it becomes socially accepted to end the life of the sufferer instead of trying to improve it, when costs for doing so are considered excessive. In a day and age where we are fond of measuring, caluclation and efficiency, decriminalizing assisted suicide runs the risk of becoming standard practice because we simply do not want to pay the price for keeping someone alive. I am also critical of the individual autonomy argument. Choices are never made in a vacuum, people exist in networks with others and take those others into account. We should be very wary that people feel they are a burden to others and therefore want to end their lives, especially since the law treats it as ' just another option in the great marketplace'. Those are all concerns that deserve the utmost attention. However, that does not make it wrong in itself to do so, it just means it has to be regulated with utmost care. As Vera said, it has been done for ages, only in secret. Sometimes doctors will be in a conflict of duties, on the one hand to obey the criminal law and on the other to end the suffering of their patient. Such conflicts should not rest on the shoulders of individual doctors.

As for the cases you cite, I think they make your argument weaker so I will not go into them. You do not know the facts of the case, you make unwarranted assumptions that people with a mental illness cannot suffer intolerably etc. In short you have no idea what you are talking about, neither do the others here, neither do I. Even if a mistake is made in an individual case, it says nothing about the underlying principle. Therefor it is best to argue in the abstract.

I do not really understand your argument Andrew. You are an antinatalist, so you must feel the chances of spending life suffering is bigger than the chance of becoming happy. Why then, would you withhold the medicine to end the suffering for someone so unlucky as to have been born, just because others are needed to administer it? Your position simply seems cruel by your own lights.

I agree that we have to look at assisted suicide or euthanasia laws very closely and that it is an ethical issue worthy of the deep societal debate they have caused. I also agree with some of your arguments, but I question the coherence of your position as a whole.

I like the thought experiment, it is good. Sure you are the God of love and sex, but you would not be seen, unnoticed. You are forever behind the scenes and eventually forgotten. In the second choice you are all that exists, forever in the minds of other and loved, but no one else is seen or loved. You have become, in a philosophical term, actually. Vera is right, both choices are equally crappy, but why?

In choice one you have become nothingness, the simple backdrop for all there is. In 2, you have become pure being, encompassing all and everything. In both instances you have lost who you are, a limited being, a one among many, a certain something. You In scenario 1 you cannot be loved, for all purposes you do not exist and you are alone. You have lost all autonomy vis a vis others, because they cannot know who you are. Your efforts will be only valuable to you. In scenario 2 you equally lost autonomy, because you can never be other than you are. You can never be 'un-loved' no matter how hard you try. That shows something. We are who we are by the grace of being a concrete, bounded other. Robbing one of autonomy means robbing one of concrete existence. You become a mere object, a non-existing object, or an all encpompassing object, but never a subject. So we are subject by the grace of becoming. By becoming other than we are, loved sometimes, unloved at others, we realize our subjectivity.

It is extreme to go against the current wide spread acceptance of private property. — Andrew4Handel

Why? Once it was extreme going against the widely held belief in God or witches... Once it was considered extreme to think that homosexuality should not be outlawed....

By extreme I did not mean incorrect but making claims that would challenge norms or suggest we need to change our views or action radically. — Andrew4Handel

By that light indeed, many philosophical positions are extreme or lead to extreme consequences. Peter Singer's utilitarianism comes to mind or Nozick's proviso in his libertarianism.

\

I think nihilism makes the meaning of philosophy fail. We accept certain meanings to communicate. — Andrew4Handel

Is there anyone that really held such a view? I think certain philosophical positions are incoherent. I do not think they are 'extreme', just incoherent.

Philosophy attempting to make things intelligible or does it have no boundaries on what position is reached or defended? — Andrew4Handel

Of course it has no boundaries. Where would they come from, philosophy, no? Also I find thee list odd. why is private property any less extreme then the idea of not having private property?

No doubt there's entanglement, but I'm unaware of any replacement. To me we should distinguish carefully between calling out hypocrisy and attacking rationality and science itself (presumably in the name of something tribal or esoteric?). — Pie

Well, here you make the assumption that law is a science. To the German mind it is, to the British it is not... the rule "water cooks at 100 degrees celsius" is ddifferent from "rivers ought to hold to the right side of the road".

In my view, there's no need to cling to the sacredness of private property, for instance, if we want to maintain individual freedom. No particular, frozen understanding of freedom is sacred. I understand our current notions of freedom ( and of rationality) to allow for an internal critique that allows for their modification. We inherit the norms that govern their modification, and we pass those modified norms on. Repeat. Note that this means Enlightenment rationality is not static, and I refer to it as a handy starting point, though one could also go back to Socrates and Democritus. — Pie

I am not necessarily disagreeing, but currently this whole philosophical tradition is under attack. If I do take a marxist tack, the division of property rights is crucial to the way we think. So for a materialist this idealist tradition is an accomplice to a tradition of oppression. I am not saying they are necessarily right, but they are more en vogue than Hegelian idealism.

As Brandom might put, how are autonomous humans, who now live beyond God, supposed to have binding norms which we ourselves reserve the right to change ? To what degree does this require or imply a story or stories of progress? — Pie

This is a very good question, central to the philosophy of law. I do think that indeed we must have something of a shared story a like mindedness when it comes to justice. However, I wonder if Hegel's is not too much of a good thing, too thick. Well, perhaps not, but subscribing to it means having to bite the bullet: contra sophisticated thinkers about human rights such as Makau Mutua you would have to hold that the western inddividualistic tradition in which freedom means individual freedom, is in fact universal and more collectivistic accounts inherently despotic. I am not wishing to bite that bullet yet.

I think of us as having a second order tradition of stories, some of them about physics and biology and others about rights and rationality. Then there are philosophical stories that are largely about stories themselves and the dominant role they play for creatures like us. This tradition is second order to the degree that no story is sacred or final, excepting perhaps the meta-story or attitude toward stories that we might call Enlightenment rationality. — Pie

I agree with you but indeed you would have to place your bets on 'enlightenment rationality' which brings you into conflict with post colonial and feminist scholars who argue that enlightenment rationality is steeped in colonial history and its accomplice.

Notice that Karl Marx went on to practise this form of dialectic, by negating Hegel's fundamental principle. Marx negated Hegel's proposal of "the Idea" as the basis of human existence in the social setting, and replaced it with "matter" as the kernel, or foundation of human existence in the social setting. From this perspective, the purpose of the state is to provide for the material needs of the individuals, rather than the Hegelian perspective, which places the purpose of the state as to provide for the Idea to know itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed and that, comically enough, Marx shares with neo-liberal exconomists. Through Marx on the one hand and Adam Smith on the other, matter and material became the dominant idea and replaced it. Leading to our current anti-metaphysical times....
We are all material girls now... (It is a very clever song by the way, a very good description of the 1980's containing some biting irony)

I am hesitant to endorse Hegels writing on history. It is purely speculative in the sense that with Hegel's dialectic in hand I could write a completely different 'history', for instance the awakening of spirit as only currently upon us by the realization of minorities and marginalized communities how they have been subjugated and demanding their place in history... That such is possible though shows something about the nature of dialectic, something that is more idealistic than realistic.

Dialectic is a kind of logic, though not a logic in the traditional sense, but a logic nonetheless. It is a 'logic' because it is a formalization of the way we think about the world and therefore the only way the world can 'be'. That is why Hegel is according to me an idealist. We cannot escape to think of the world dialectically.

Dialectic is a dynamic way of thinking and therefore prone to become historicized. The articulation of the dialectic also emerges historically in the history of philosophy. History was always dialectical, but in history its abstract articulation emerged. I though Hegel over emphasized this historicity and cut out or did not know earlier examples of dialectical thinking, such as the Tao te Ching. It would laos have upset his neatly organized dialectical world history, but I digress.

Dialectic is a way in which we conceive of the world, the way in which we make sense of it. Hegel did not use the thesis anti thesis and synthesis scheme. He describes it as thesis, negation and negation of the negation. It is important because synthesis alludes to some kind of unity, but Hegel is reluctant to speak of unities. Rather fault lines remain within the new position that can accommodate both the original position as its negation. The synthesis is itself not at rest, it is a continuous thread of negations, because the new position is not as such a new position, but something that engenders its own negation yet again albeit on a higher level. It is a kind of spiral of negations.

Now because it is a logic, an inescapable way of thinking about the world, we see the dialectic at work in every theory we conceive. Take for instance the theory of evolution. A species emerges, but finds itself in hostile conditions, (negation) it adapts to those conditions, negating the negation, but in so doing encounters other problems, negations and adapts again and so on. It develops and diversifies, increasing its complexity through this constant flow of negations. It develops into species, but also eco systems in which both hunter and prey need to coexist even though they feed on each other.

Also look inside yourself and tell the story of your own life. You came into this world, accepted what your parents told you, but learned thinks were different through opposition by other and you adopted a different opinion and different behavior, but that itself became subject to challenges when you grew up, you fell in love, learned about the other, broke up, it enriched your understanding of who you are without reaching any definite end point, or said differently, the end point is yourself as you are now, the product of all these encounters. Everything can be analyzed dialectically. It is fruitless to try to find empirical evidence for the dialectic, as fruitless as it is to ask for empirical proof of the law of identity.

4. 1. is false. (RAA) — unenlightened

It is indeed as simple as that.

As I understand it, it is the state of being of the virtuous person that is actualized. This is the case whether one acts on that knowledge or not. But yes, it would be wrong to consider virtue in the absence of action. — Fooloso4

Yes, but the virtue would be entirely without consequence if you would not act on it and that seems wasteful. Being wasteful hardly seems virtuous. A soldier who knows what to do and acts on it, seems to me more worthy than a soldier who knows what to do but stays passive.

I might do something considered virtuous but that does not make me virtuous. My reason for doing it might have nothing to do with virtue. — Fooloso4

Yes, Kant made a similar point centuries later and it is a point well taken. However, I think we should be watchful to make virtue entirely subjective, in the sense of a quality of the subject. It threatens to overburden the subjective side and we will only be able to judge actors and not acts. To me the attraction of virtue ethics rests in the reciprocal or perhaps dialectical relation. The virtuous person is virtuous because he displays virtue, he acts.In the action the virtue is highlighted. Without knowledge of course the act is random, but without action knowledge is pointless.

One must be in the proper state, be a beautiful soul, in order to perceive the beauty of things as they are. More specifically, to know that these choices and actions are beautiful and those ugly. — Fooloso4

Yes, but from that follows that knowledge as perceiving is not enough for virtue because this knowledge is only actualized in action, no? Actually what I get from the article is that virtue only arises in action. A further assumption must be made to make the claim that knowledge by itself is (a) virtue sound, that is that a knowledgable person will also act upon that knowledge. That to me seems a shaky assumption though, though might well be one made by Ari.

Yes, but is this doing applied to the act of knowing only, or, and that was Hello Human's point I guess, is knowing, even as an act of knowing, not enough, and is virtue displayed in practical situations that do not only involve knowing? A courageous soldier knows the right man, but also acts upon this knowledge. That knowledge itself is also an action, does not answer this question.

I imagine from there we can generalize and conclude that there is more to virtuous action than knowledge. So it seems virtue is not equal to knowledge.

And now we have also distinguished between wisdom and knowledge. So it seems the conclusion for now is: wisdom is equivalent to virtue but not equivalent to knowledge. — Hello Human

I think this all is correct...

The right thing to do is indeed to get rid of the phobia, but is knowing that you must get rid of it sufficient to get rid of it, or are there other factors other than knowledge at play ? — Hello Human

Something Aristotle called practical wisdom. Knowing is not enough because unless one acts one does not get rid of the phobia. So it is a composition of action and knowledge, or in Aristotelian terms actualized knowledge

It is my understanding that life in general was impossible in the universe for the strong majority of time and will be impossible again. Maybe 0.00001% or less of time is when life can exist, and sentient life is even fewer and farther between.

Is this more an argument that sentient life is special and valuable or insignificant and an anomaly? Or neither? The universe never fails to humble us, but rarely seems to lift us up. Lol. — TiredThinker

It means absolutely nothing at all. Given infinite time, sapience will happen countless of times, That seems to make us rather insiginificant. That does not make us any less significant to ourselves though. Our knowledge of our insiginificance of a universal scale is matched by our knowledge of our significance on a particular scale.

What I'm trying to say is, sometimes, knowing is not enough to start doing. I can very well know that ghosts don't exist, yet continue being scared of them at night. — Hello Human

You can, but would that be virtuous? It hibk that in this ethical scheme the right thing to do is to try to get rid of this phobia

I should have written 'the map = territory fallacy" by which I mean idealists tendency for confusing – conflating – epistemology (i.e. what I/we know) & ontology (i.e. what there is), that is, there is not anything more than what I/we can 'experience'.

it is just that there are maps all the way down. There is no territory.
Always the Hegelian. That's the fallacy / incoherence of idealism I mean. — 180 Proof

I feel there is a kind of conundrum here. You are right, my expression leads to problems. If there are maps all the way down there is no way to tell whether one map is more accurate than another. ontology collapses into aesthetics. It is impossible to intelligibly uphold that view.

On the other hand assuming there is a territory requires a leap of faith and the assumption of an archimedic point which ultimately leads to some sort of foundationalism. Every foundation leads to problems because there is no way it reveals itself. Claims lead to counter claims. Ontology collapses into metaphysics. Maybe I should read Levinas...

Re: 'The map is the territory fallacy' (of idealism). — 180 Proof

I cannot see how from here you derive at the fallacy of idealism. What you argue is that the idea came on the scene, in a human mode...

If matter was all the hot stuff why do insects not consider the question? The map / territory distinction is not a fallacy, it is just that there are maps all the way down. There is no territory. Matter as the territory is just a figment of the imagination, aka, of thought. The question becomes, what is the most meaningful map? I am convinced it is love. In the craw feet, in the grey at her temples, in the curly hair and the girlish smile, there resides the ultimate question of metaphysics. That is not meaningless romantic twaddle, but it means metaphysics resides in 'you' rather than 'I' like Descartes, or even 'we' like Hegel, or 'he' like both religion and science hold.

I would take the opposite route from Fooloso4. Wisdom is indeed the greatest virtue because it means one can rightly assess the right mean of things. Courage is great but it means knowing the mean between cowardice and recklessness. We call someone courageous who knows this and who shows this knowledge is action. However, is it not always preferable to know the right measure of all such virtues? We call wise someone who assesses rightly in differing situation. Wisdom means assessing the right mean between extremes in general whereas courage would mean assessing the right mean in situations of conflict. The first one is more general and therefore a higher virtue.

The English translation of the poetic German is rather pathetic...

You're referring here to what he said about Christians. That tells me all I need to know about you. — Tate

Funny how taking an impersonal position on a subject, a position that was for instance also taken by John Stuart Mill to name one, immediately leads to judgments about my personal character...

I am not against the banning per se. I trust Baden's judgment, he explained it and is an excellent mod. I am also not here to make enemies. The banning of a prolific and long term poster is a cause for discussion. Not a subject to be scared of in a philosophy forum I would think.

No, we don't babysit posters. They follow the rules or they get banned. It's that simple. — Baden

With this I wholeheartedly concur.

I might well be uninformed. I do not know what you guys needed to delete. I do think that, if one causes the need for the moderators to clean up the mess every day, that itself deserves a ban.

is acceptable. If you do, please do us all a favour and leave now. — Baden

No, I do not think it is acceptable. I would support those who would speak up against it. It is also such an overt generalization, simplistic, silly, it simply refutes itself. I do think, but that is my attitude in general, that such things are better settled in debate. I do see a trend of people being overly thin skinned. I remember days gone by when Baron Max, Black Crow, Gassendi1, 180 Proof and yours truly were at each other's throat viciously. We would all be tossed out by today's standards. I am a dinosaur and I sound like one, but times really did change. I am European, used to much more rigorous prohibitions against insult and hate crimes than there are in the States, but we became much, much more sensitive today then we were some time ago. Probably a sign of a much more polarized and volatile society...

Ok see this is a good example. If you really felt that way you wouldn't have had to come up with a way to not-so-slyly call anyone who thinks the world, let alone intelligent debate, is better off without filth (not calling anyone filth just speaking about conduct and mindset) chickenshit — Outlander

Huh? I know Unenlightened, I value his contributions, I like his posts. I did not know he felt that way. I was genuinely sorry he felt intimidated, I had not guessed and it made me think... Perhaps you jump to conclusions just a tad too quickly? And honestly, your contribution does not display 'intelligent debate' in my book.

One cannot know how many contributors have been put off posting by the many gratuitous insults he made. But I know of another intelligent poster who has expressed such a sentiment as I quoted above. — unenlightened

I appreciate that... I am of the rather thick skinned school when it comes to debating. I think there is a tad too much concern for the feelings of anxiety at receiving a harsh remark, but that is me. Of course there are limits to everything and they lay differently with different people. I am sorry you felt intimidated.

hmmm, banning streetlight.... that is a controversial one to say the least. Sure he could be rough at times, but isn't the disruption he might have caused with his hard debating style offset by his very knowledgeable contributions? I would think there should be a balance struck, except maybe when in case of extreme violations. He could he rough, inflammatory, sure, but he did not cross lines of decency and criminality I would think...

"She loves me, Miss Argentina
Though she hides behind her smile
She runs free, Miss Argentina
Dripping blood
With lots of style"

The description Iggy gives of his (ex?)lover is an amazing piece of writing.

If nothing does so much for you guys, it gotta mean something right? Paradox away all you like and equate God with nothing, or nothing with being and God with being and being with nothing again, but what does such a spiral indicate? Maybe we can get all ratio-phenomenological and conclude that we have concepts that denote more than we can experience. That would then be an indication that our conceptual apparatus is somehow apart from, or over and above our experience. The concept of nothing, proves then, as does the concept of the most perfect being, the 'plenum', that there are ideas beyond the scope of our earthly existence. That God is somehow added in the mix of being an nothing, would, then, not be any coincidence.

However, as there is also the equation of God with nothing, it cannot be the JCI God, but has to be something, or nothing, utterly transcendental. Perhaps that is what those words do ey? they tell us that you are trying to speak of something one cannot speak, and as such, not describing but gesturing towards the mysical. Das Mystische zeigt sich, according to Wittgenstein. The function of purely metaphysical categories, metaphysical because they are solely abstract, 'non-physical', is to articulate our sense of wonder at the world.

The concept of ‘nothing’ ends in paradox as nothing is the absence of something and you need something to refer to the concept of ‘nothing.’ — universeness

No shit Sherlock :rofl:

If something exists, so does nothing exist. — Jackson

A 'something' in Hegel, an 'Etwas', is already a more concrete form. Pure Being and pure nothing are sublated into becoming. I am not saying this to quibble but to indicate that being and nothing does not lead to an 'existent', they lead to 'flux', however a flux requires there is something concrete that is in flux. Nothing as well as being are thought determinations. As pure abstract generalities, they do not exist. Nothing therefore does not exist at least not in its 'pure' form.

The passage you quoted does not entail that 'nothing' exists, at least not as pure nothing, perhaps best translated as 'nothingness'. What exists concretely, when opposed to 'Etwas' is 'determined nothing', bestimmtes Nichts. And bestimmtes Nichts is lack of something, at least I find that the most convincing reading of the first remark: "It is customary to oppose nothing to something. Something is however already a determinate existent that distinguishes itself from another something; consequently, the nothing which is being opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing. Here, however, the nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate simplicity" P. 60. So I think here Hegel already backpedals on his opposition of pure nothing to something on p 59. It is often done but incorrect. Determinate being 'etwas' is opposed to determinate nothing, aka, a not something, lack of something, or void. That idea is much less forceful than pure nothingness. Nothingness is pure abstract generality, emptiness and as such the same as pure being, while also its opposite.

I did not know that debate between Heidegger and Carnap, thanks for that! I do think Heideggers 'Nichts' and Hegel's 'Nichts' are very different. In Hegel it is not really a 'something', in Heidegger it has much more of a function in and of itself. Das 'Nichts nichtet' and also serves as the backdrop I believe against which Dasein realizes itself, there Nichts is a bit akin to the fear of death. That though is memory from a long time ago....

I think the scientific method does employ 'inference,' 'rigorous conceptual analysis,' 'distinctions,' 'explicit disputation,' 'argument rebuttle,' etc. This will be based on many many, rigorously controlled
experiments, but scientists will still interpret the results gained in different ways and project implications. — universeness

Well yes, but conceptual analysis is not what natural scientists generally do. At least they do not bring it to the foreground. That generally does not hurt natural science, the scientific method was a big leap forward for the sciences. It does lead to mishap sometimes when scientists start writing about metaphysics and think it can mean anything and everything and that how it is used colloquially is of equal value as to how the concept is used in the philosophical community, like the concept of metaphysics. To illuminate that concept, the scholastic method is of more use than the scientific method.

Not 10,000 laypeople no, but perhaps you will garnish the opinion of a few of your experienced colleagues to build confidence in your own direction of thought. This is akin to the scientist trying the same experiment or different scientists trying the same experiment more than once to attempt to confirm results or find anomalies in interpretations of results already gained. — universeness

Well, I might consult them informally, indeed to garner their opinions and see if they can spot flaws in my reasoning. Asking a few learned colleagues is not a very scientific way to go about the question actually, from the point of view of the scientific method. I would not know if the answers can be extrapolated to what society generally feels if I just ask a couple of people in the same circumstances as myself. A social scientist will shoot that approach full of holes. She will tell me that to answer the question what commonly accepted conduct is in this case, you would have to leave the books and see for oneself. She would advice me to set up a survey use this case as a 'vingette' and garner the responses of a statistically valid representative sample.

A lawyer would tell me that my learned colleagues are not sources of law, although it depends a bit on how learned they are. She would advice me to take a trip to the sources of law first, legislation, case law, treaties, jurisprudence, and custom and maybe then 'the doctrine', the communis opinio of learned scholars as found in the hand books. What counts as a source of law though differs in different jurisdictions and is, on the edges still a matter of some controversy. Legislation and case law though are considered most important.

Do you think all 'philosophers,' would agree with you here? — universeness

Yes, although I do not know what you mean with 'philosophers'. Ontological questions may be metaphysical questions of course. There was once, centuries ago, a debate in metaphysics whether non material creatures, creatures of pure form could exist. I do not know anyone who does metaphysics nowadays that wonders about this question anymore. What is wondered about, is for instance the ontological proof of God, but it is a squarely logical proof, it has nothing to do with whether God is indeed a man with a long beard or something.

Which is part of our disagreement. To me, you are suggesting that insisting all knowledge and all future knowledge belongs to the label 'natural science,' is problematic and insufficient. I disagree and insist that the label 'natural' is sufficient for all knowledge that passes scientific scrutiny and any proposal or idea that does not pass such scientific scrutiny should be refused the label 'knowledge.' — universeness

That is fine but do note that you are then using your concept of natural science in a very stretched way, which leads to misunderstandings. If I say that I am a natural scientist because I am a lawyer, people look at me in a puzzled way. They would be right, law is not generally considered, nor considers itself, a natural science. Yet, me knowing that you will have to pay indemnification when you leave open a tap and it harms the goods of others, is knowledge. Legal knowledge.

Then they might make better choices in their day-to-day lives.
If we keep providing them with very bad examples of 'applied knowledge,' such as swearing to tell the truth by placing their hand on a book of fables.' Then they might feel they can waste as much water as their mood dictates, regardless of the cost to another. — universeness

I do not think so, swearing an oath does not need to be done on the bible. I once did it, just by saying 'I promise' before somebody competent to take the oath from me. I think it is also not knowledge. It is in fact a legal device, for instance you are subjected to penalty when you break a properly administered oath. It is not knowledge at all, just like saying 'I do' at your wedding ceremony is not knowledge.

They can always claim god commanded them to 'let its glorious waters flow freely into the thirsty Earth!!' Who are you to judge the will of the supernatural? Metaphysically speaking of course. — universeness

It is not a metaphysical question :) It is a legal question. If I am the judge of the case, I am competent to judge the will of the supernatural. The metaphysical question would be what grants the judge this competence. That is a question of legal metaphysics and a question of the philosophy of law.

Sounds like a valid version of the scientific method as applied in the legal profession, to me. — universeness

Ohh, no, it is everything but the scientific method. It is a version of scholasticism. I will briefly explain. To this case I would apply the standard of 'commonly expected reasonable conduct' from article 6:162 of the Dutch civil code. In a number of judgments which does not render a very clear line, but at least a reasonably one, we can deduce that one has a standard of care for other people's goods which states that if it is foreseeable, in your control and easy to fix, you are liable for damages if you did not prevent the accident from happening. Leaving a tap running foreseeably causes damages, is in your house and easy to fix without giving you any trouble. It is actually very clear cut. (it used to be different on the 1890's from which this case stems ;) )

However what I will not do to substantiate the common expected reasonable conduct norm, is to ask 10.000 people what they think in this case reasonable conduct would be, plot it in SPSS and find some sort of statistically significant number to say with confidence "this is what is commonly expected". The funny thing is we are actually only minimally interested in what is commonly expected at all. We, the legal community, the learned scholars fill in this norm.

But this is the kind of definition/application of the term 'metaphysics' that I support, although it's probably more 'metajudicial, or metajurisprudence.' I notice you didn't mention god once or any other supernatural source, that you might consult, to help you with your decision-making. — universeness

No of course. But metaphysics as a term for 'the search for the supernatural' has really nothing to do with philosophy. Whatever metaphysics is, it is not that :D What I use the example for is to show you made a metaphysical move, namely reduce all our knowledge to physical knowledge and all 'science' to the positivistic natural sciences, whereas in law we deal with a normative science (or art, the judgment is still out) which is not (and arguably cannot be) conducted with the same natural scientific concepts.

I don't see how that follows from what you describe above?
You are considering 'guidelines,' in what sense are guidelines or suggestions based on the similar experiences of other legislators not 'physical.' These other examples really happened, they are not merely based on the fabled decisions of Solomon in the old testament! or the fabled judgments of god via Moses when he came down from mount Sinai! I would be a lot more concerned for your position if they were. — universeness

Certainly they happened. But law tries to establish what the normative import of such a fact is. A left the tap open and B's goods stacked in a wherehouse below got damaged. It is a fact and I can describe exactly how the damage came about in physical terms. Nothing supernatural needed, nothing normative too. However, what I can not establish is whether we should reproach A for the fact that this state of affairs came about. The judgment that we o ultimately displays the metaphysical assumptions inherent in law, that people have a choice to open or close the tap, that if they possess a modicum of rationality, they should figure out the concsequences, that the world is not a deterministic place because otherwise it would not make sense to hold people morally culpable on normative grounds, but only on utilitarian grounds etc.

(I am indeed an asst prof of 'metajurisprudence', 'metajuridica' as we say :) )

Yet your struggle with the issue continues and you will make a decision.
This will show your brain is up to the task. Mainly because it sounds like that's what your current job is and what you are paid for. Many justice systems have appeal systems in case the judged feel utterly wronged by your decision. I am sure you can consult with the legal records of similar cases. If you are the final arbiter for your 'water tab,' case then have faith in your training. Consult and make the call!
As long as you are not relying on the supernatural to send you a decision, you will be fine. — universeness

Yes, but that one decision does not come about williy nilly. It is not solely my decision. There are procedures I follow. I check the legislation, I check jurisprudence and I read up on the opinion of the authors in cases alike. If I am feeling very meticulous I might even look up the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions. I read up on the state of the art concerning standards of care and try to gauge the meaning of the legislators behind the article at stake. I present my opinion not as my gut feeling but as informed legal judgment, the steps of which everyone can follow.

There are however metaphysical assumptions made in law. For instance that I should follow the supreme court's judgments. (Not mandatory in NL though, but still often done) That I should care about what learned scholars had to say about such a matter. That the goal of the legislator can be deduced from the parliamentary documents. Moreover law also assumes people have a choice in doing what they do and so are liable for tort when they make a choice that harms others. Those are a lot of assumptions revealing the rationalistic metaphysics behind law.

Yet... reformulating the problem in physical terms brings me nowhere. That shows that metaphysics cannot be reduced to physics. There is more to 'being' than mere particles moving about. The humanities may not be capturable in your physicalist metaphysics. That is: what a thing is, is perhaps not ultimately decided upon by the matter it is made of.

Not individually no but as a collective, yes. The full detailed neuroactivity that happens in your brain when you make a decision/ruling based on earlier information/evidence is not fully understood but it certainly does involve neurons firing and accessing information previously stored in your brain and 'processing' it using your previously developed reasoning techniques.
Computers are mimicries of the human brain and computers contain operating system software as well as application software. In computing science, we call the equivalent software contained in the human brain, 'wetware.' — universeness

It is all well and good but it still does not solve my case on the water tab, collectively or individually. Those reasoning techniques are also not individually developed but collectively. Such knowledge of the brain may have an impact on law, but they do not prescribe what the impact should be. That is again a matter for a normative science to deal with. The physicalist reduction simply does not help me.

To be fair, it is part of the common meaning of "metaphysics." It goes back to what you said about the word being overburdened. — Clarky

I do not know by whom it is used for the supernatural... in popular tv shows maybe... Sure metaphysics studies the nature of reality and therefore also the existence or non existence of God. It has studied angels... but that is something else than witchcraft or ghostbusting.

Legal knowledge is a product of human endeavours. It what way is legal knowledge not part of the physical world? All human thoughts are products of physical brains! — universeness

Well yes, but knowing that brain activity is neurons firing and all kinds of cellular activity simply does not tell me whether I should rule that Mrs S needs to compensate Mr P for the damages she has caused by leaving a tab running.

If you have a counter-source, I'm interested. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Hmmm, I always learned it that way and accepted it as a given it seems. I must have gotten it from somewhere because I was quite certain, but well pssible you are right. I thought they were the two branches of metaphysics. Maybe it is Collingwood actually. It does not make much of a difference to me though. Let's treat them as separate then...

Epistemology is usually classified as a sub branch of metaphysics. Metaphysics includes the nature of reality, ontology and the nature of knowledge, epistemology.

The scientific method is epistemology. Epistemology is often included within metaphysics. I believe that's appropriate. — Clarky

Well, I side here with the people that make a distinction. Methodology, is the way one gets results i.e. the way one goes about investigating. Epistemology concerns the question what we may know and what the appropriate standards for knowledge are. It is quibbling, but I think there is a point to it. The scientific method is predicated on an epistemology, namely that by empirical demonstration one may come to knowledge. This is contrary to for instance the scholastic method that tells us that one comes to knowledge by referring to credible sources of knowledge, the revered scholars or religious leaders.

I think different methodologies may rest on the same epistemology, for instance qualitative and quantitative methodologies might both rest on an empiricist epistemology. I also wonder if 'the scientific method' as is often mentioned on this forum actually exists as such. It seems to me to be a cluster of research methodologies, based on empiricist empistemology and perhaps heeding Popper's methodological constraints.