As it is often put, a valid deductive argument extracts the implications of its premises. That's its function. I assume that it is no vice in an argument that it does this, but the point of such arguments.

Where a vice may arise is if one of the premises asserts the conclusion (although this would not by itself render the argument invalid - 'T, therefore T' is valid - so much as uninformative). But it seems to me that none of the premises of my argument assert the conclusion. And so if the conclusion follows from the premises, then nothing has been gotten out that was not put in. The argument will simply have successfully shown us what was implicit in what our reason already tells us.

For example, the claim that -


1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.

- does not assert that no physical thing has consciousness as a property (and so does not beg the question of what kind of a thing our minds are).

Likewise -

2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects

does not assert it either. Both premises, taken by themselves, are entirely consistent with the thesis that we are physical things.

3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties

As this just follows deductively from 1 and 2, this is not question begging (for neither 1 nor 2 are question begging).

This -

4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states

is a neutral premise too. It does not assert that no physical thing can bear conscious states.

This -

5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.

is entailed by 3 and 4 and so cannot possibly be question begging unless a premise that preceded it is.

This -

5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects

is not question begging either. Indeed, I think most physicalists about the mind would accept it, for they do not typically argue that it is definitive of a physical object that it can bear conscious states, but make the much more modest claim that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states. This premise also seems independently verifiable by reason - it is prima facie implausible to think consciousness is a defining feature of a physical thing. (Even if there is disagreement over exactly what a physical things defining features are, consciousness seems clearly not to be among the plausible candidates).

And this -

6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

follows logically. And so 6 does not contain more than was in the premises and the premises whose implication it extracts are not question begging.

Maybe that's wrong and it does beg the question against the physicalist about the mind - but I don't think it does at this stage. I think the average physicalist about the mind would accept all the premises. Perhaps upon learning what their combined implication is they might set about trying to challenge one of the premises (although I personally think that would be question begging....), but that'd be a burden or cost or embarrassment given they each seem independently plausible.

I am not sure how plausible it is to claim that every existing thing has intrinsic value. Does a germ have intrinsic moral value?

Maybe everything does have some intrinsic value. Even so, my argument would not really be affected, I think. As clearly I have a different order of intrinsic moral value to a germ. And so whatever my intrinsic features of me my moral value is supervening on will be different to those on which a germ's intrinsic moral value (if have it it does) is supervening on. And I think that's all my argument needs. For if I just focus on me, then my intrinsic moral value does not seem to be supervening on any of the plausible candidate intrinsic properties of physical things. My moral value seems to be supervening on the fact I am a bearer of conscious states. Thus I can conclude that I am essentially a bearer of conscious states - something no physical thing seems to be.

I admit that I am groping around in the dark where views about essential properties are concerned.

I suppose that if someone says humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, that's consistent with what's of intrinsic value about us being something that is essentially not physical. And so I think I can agree with someone who says that humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious. I am a human, but I do not think I am essentially a human. If I were to discover I was a cow, my reason still represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable.

Someone who says that we - the things that are of intrinsic moral value - are essentially physical and essentially conscious would be saying that consciousness is an essential feature of physical things. And that, I think, does not appear to be true.

Perhaps something can be intrinsically morally valuable due to answering to a concept and the moral value supervene on something essential to the concept rather than the thing itself. For want of a better example, perhaps someone could be intrinsically morally valuable due to being a bachelor with the intrinsic value supervening on the fact they are unmarried. I think we would actually describe that as extrinsic value precisely because the one who is a bachelor is not essentially a bachelor. But even so, we can simply run the thought experiment where we ourselves are concerned and simply remove any and all of those features that our moral value is proposed to be supervening on and see if it remains.

For example, if my intrinsic moral value is claimed to be supervening on the fact I am a human, then I can simply imagine finding out that I am not one (as I did above) and see if this affects my intrinsic moral worth. As it does not, then my intrinsic moral worth is not grounded in that fact about me. And as that can continue until we arrive at something like "the fact I am a bearer of conscious states" - something that does not seem an essential feature of any physical thing - we still arrive at the conclusion that we are not physical things.

But a person, or a balloon, remains what it is despite change in shape, size or location. So these do not seem to be good candidates for essential properties. It seems to me that, for example, personality might be a good candidate for an essential property of a person, and that's not physical anyway. Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

However, though a physical thing's shape and size and location can change, it doesn't seem possible for it not to have a shape, size or location. The claim that these are essential features of a physical thing is not equivalent to the claim that they do not change, but only that without them it could not be that kind of thing at all.

Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

I don't think I have committed to a view about the composition of moral values. I think my argument is neutral on that. Thank you for your comments though.

I take 'intrinsic' moral value to be moral value that is supervening on something's essential properties. i take that to be true by definition. So, I take it to be uncontroversial that moral value - any and all - supervenes on something's other properties. The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic moral value resides in what it is supervening upon - if it is supervening on something's essential properties, then we can call it intrinsic moral value, whereas if it is supervening on something's non-essential properties, then we can say that it has extrinsic moral value (for then it does not have its value due to what it is, but rather due to some accidental feature of it).

I think all that's widely accepted - well, at least the idea that moral properties supervene on other properties (or, to put it another way, there can't be bare moral differences).

As such, if something is represented to be intrinsically morally valuable, then we can safely conclude that it has that moral value in virtue of some of its essential features. But when we consider all of those properties that are plausible candidates for being a physical thing's essential features - such as shape, size, location etc. - none of them seem to be that in virtue of which we have our intrinsic moral value. As such, the conclusion that is then forced is that we must be non-physical things.

The only plausible - and I'm not saying this 'is' the property in virtue of which we are intrinsically morally valuable, only that it is a good candidate (because 'if' something has this property, then it does seem to follow that it has intrinsic value) - candidate is that we have intrinsic moral value due to being the kind of thing that has conscious states. But as that doesn't seem to be an essential property of physical things - that is, it would be odd to suggest that part of what makes a physical thing a physical thing is that it can bear conscious states - then what we learn is that we're not physical things, but things that essentially bear conscious states.

I take the soundness of this case to be unaffected by what moral value itself is, as what it capitalizes upon is widely agreed-to seeming conceptual truths about moral value (ones that any plausible account of what moral value itself is would have to respect or be deemed implausible).

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things.

"First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious."

Yes, I think the premise is consistent with that. And I'd say it is important that it is, for otherwise it would beg the question. However, the argument as a whole seems to entail that physical things are essentially not conscious. That wouldn't be question begging, but would constitute an apparent refutation of the idea that physical things can have conscious states.

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt:

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible.

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to.

I don't think that's widely accepted. The notion of 'intrinsic moral value' doesn't seem to presuppose a divine command theory of ethics. As I understand it, the ontological commitments of moral value - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - are matters of debate. My argument, in helping itself to the notion of intrinsic value, does not commit me to any particular view about those ontological commitments, I think.

I take it to be a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on other properties. That is, there is always a 'because' where something's possession of a moral property is concerned (it is morally valuable 'because' it has this or that feature etc.). This is why if something is represented to be morally valuable, there is a further question of why or in virtue of what it has that moral value. It is, of course, upon this that my case hinges.

But if an object can have moral value in addition - rather than because - of its other features, then granted the argument would not work, for then we could not read more into what our reason represents to be the case.

Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case).

I am glad you think the argument has some merit.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false).

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical.

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude.

To use my valuing of something as an example, if I value something intrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something essential to it, whereas if I value something extrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something non-essential about it. Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing.

Applied to moral value, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it - the thing - to have moral value due to some its essential properties. I think that's correct anyway.

Thank you for your reply.

That something is morally valuable would be a property of that thing. But it would be a supervenient property, meaning that it is resultant from some of the thing's other properties. The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, whereas in the latter case it is not.

So all moral value - whether possessed intrinsically or extrinsically - supervenes on something's other features. But intrinsic value supervenes on something's essential features. I think that's right, anyway.