@Wayfarer
but you need to grasp the argument before dismissing it. — bert1
I took this as an invitation to go back and read the OP once again (there was no mention of the time dimension) – and I thank you for that. And so, I will reply to some of the specific claims made in the OP (quotes from the OP are in bolded italics)
… the reality of first-person consciousness is ineliminable, and any account of the world must ultimately be grounded in the structures of experience as they appear to the subject.
Of course, consciousness is subjective. All neuroscientists understand this. But this statement makes an erroneous assumption – that any one neurological investigation tries to solve the problem of hard consciousness all at once. That’s not how science works. It’s one bit of information at a time. Specific functions of the brain can be investigated without access to the entirety of the subject’s consciousness.
As Earl Miller, the Picower Professor of Neuroscience in the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT says, “You can’t study the complexities of executive [brain] function and not get to consciousness.”
https://bcs.mit.edu/news/science-consciousness
If we know what consciousness is, it is because we ourselves are conscious beings
Science does not dispute this.
Pure experience is beyond the level of being and has no essence… It permeates the show without showing itself— Michel Bitbol
Well, it has essence as far as we would consider that the function of a structure has essence. But in all cases, and especially with consciousness, “existence precedes essence.”
Bitbol considers consciousness to be “self-evidentially absolute”: the one domain of existence that is given fully and indubitably whenever it is present. By contrast, natural objects are always incompletely present, appearing only as partial profiles or “adumbrations,” forever subject to correction by further experience.
Bitbol’s “consideration” is not a substantiated claim. I can just as easily say that – "no, consciousness is not absolute – it depends on the functions of the brain" – and my claim would be backed up by scientific investigation.
Bitbol’s central claim: the attempt to derive consciousness from material processes reverses the real order of priority. Whatever is presumed to exist in the physical world already presupposes consciousness as the field in which such ascriptions occur.
Is he saying the world can’t exist unless it is being detected?
the materialist project of locating consciousness in the brain or in neural processes is not just incomplete; it is conceptually incoherent. Like any empirical analysis, it rests on the presumption that what is real is what can be objectively measured and assessed.
No such claim is made by neuroscience investigating into the source of consciousness. Bitbol is conflating “locating consciousness” with “determining what is real” – two wholly different aims – and different branches of investigation.
Also - while science may measure certain structural features associated with consciousness (brain scanning, blood flow, etc) – this is often done in conjunction with self-reporting of the subjective experience. Scientists not only measure the system, but investigate the effects of the system.
However, the very notion of the objective world described by the empirical sciences is itself a product of selective abstraction — what Bitbol calls the end-product of the procedure of objectification. Why? Because science methodically brackets out the subjective pole of observation so as to arrive at an intersubjective consensus about the observer-independent attributes of the object. But when this methodology is applied to the question of the nature of consciousness, it turns around and tries to explain conscious experience in terms of that consensus.
Okay, trying to parse this – he’s saying that science can never explain the conscious experience because it focuses on the object rather than the subject? But scientists are subjects themselves?
Someone help me out here. What’s he saying?
(I am reminded of Einstein’s famous quote - “If you can't explain it to a six-year-old, you don't understand it yourself.”)
The result is not only circular but, he says, will always culminate in the notorious “hard problem”: consciousness treated as if it were something that emerges from structural relations in objectively–existing matter, when in reality it is the precondition for identifying those relations in the first place. In that sense, it is prior to the emergence of both objective and subjective, which themselves rely on distinctions that arise within consciousness.
So, he’s saying, consciousness can’t know consciousness because consciousness came before consciousness.
On the one hand, consciousness cannot be treated as an object — something manipulable, measurable, or existing independently of the subject. This is because objects are by definition other to us, and are given only through the sense-data profiles which, as we have seen, are open to correction by further experience.
Neuroscientists do not treat consciousness as an “object” – but rather as a function of the brain.
Bitbol seems entirely lacking in the “structure-function” concept.
And no, scientists do not treat consciousness as something existing independent of the subject.
Yes, consciousness may change depending on further experience.
… consciousness … is neither a useful fiction, nor a byproduct of neural processes, nor a ghostly residue awaiting physical explanation. Instead, says Bitbol, it is the self-evidential medium within which all knowledge about objects, laws, and physical reality arise … Any attempt to treat consciousness as derivative — as some thing that “comes from” matter — therefore reverses the real order of dependence. The world of objects may be doubted, corrected, or revised; but the presence of experience itself, here and now, cannot be disconfirmed. In this sense, consciousness is “absolute,” not as a metaphysical substance (which phenomenology rejects) but as the unavoidable ground of meaning, evidence, and world-hood.
He recognizes what consciousness is, but errs in thinking that neuroscience does not. He goes to pains to explain what, in his view, it is not, but his argument seems more like pronouncements – like wishes – than a rebuttal.
Who’s disconfirming the presence of experience? If that is the criterion for determining that consciousness is absolute, then he has made an error in his understanding of the present state of neuroscience, thus nullifying his conclusion.
Indeed, he makes no attempt to refute any of the large body of scientific evidence supporting the idea that consciousness is a function of brain electrochemistry.
Physics, biology, and neuroscience describe the structural, relational, and functional aspects of the world-as-object; they do not, and need not, account for the presence of the world-as-experienced. As such, consciousness is not something over and above the world, nor something inside it. It is the condition for there being a world at all.
Neuroscience does not substitute the “world-as-experienced” for the “world-as-object.”
That we can only experience the world through our consciousness is not an argument that opposes the idea that consciousness arises from the neurological functioning in our brains.