- :lol:

Great OP. :up:

Preaching faith means either not having it or betraying it. — Astorre

The preacher supposedly doesn't teach, but testifies. — Astorre

I think the idea that the preacher testifies is essentially correct. How does Moses preach in a fundamental way? By the light of his face, which reflects the light of God. He covers it to protect those who are dazed by it, but the covering still attests to Moses' stature.

God shines into the world. He shines in Moses' face, in prayer, in sacrament, in truth, in argumentation, in rhetoric... There is no box that can protect its contents from God's light. The idea that faith is simply incommunicable is a false form of apophaticism. "Faith is incommunicable, therefore God cannot communicate through faith," would be a false inference. Faith is incommunicable in a certain sense, but the one who thinks he understands faith so well that he can limits its bounds and its communication is engaged in a form of (apophatic) idolatry. The temptation is to try to encompass faith, both by excluding it from certain spheres and by attempting to comprehend its mechanism.

But love doesn't guarantee the right to interfere in someone else's destiny. — Astorre

Why not?

As soon as you try to convey faith, you rationalize it... — Astorre

So long as the recipient understands that the conveyance of faith is only a shadow and a sign, there is no danger.

It can point me to an interpretation that I hadn’t thought of, and I can then verify the credibility of that interpretation. — Joshs

This becomes rather subtle, but what I find is that people who tell themselves that they are merely using AI to generate candidate theories which they then assess the validity of in a posterior manner, are failing to understand their own interaction with AI. They are failing to appreciate the trust they place in AI to generate viable candidate theories, for example. But they also tend to ignore the fact that they are very often taking AI at its word.

The USSR collapsed not because it was too Marxist but because the vigour and paranoia of the liberal west out-competed it. The USSR functioned reasonably well and at least achieved the main aim of clambering aboard the rapidly industrialising world. But it was fundamentally inefficient rather than fundamentally a lie. — apokrisis

Okay, but part of the lie that kept the USSR afloat was the idea that it was flourishing inside its walls. The lie was that it was out-competing the liberal west. Then reality crept in, the lie was seen to be false, and the boat sank.

I would argue that one cannot believe something and not believe something at the same time. Or that it will at least lead to problems. — Leontiskos

That is why we have ambiguity. Logic demands that we don't. But then that is why Peirce had add vagueness to logic. That to which the PNC does not apply.

Between absolute belief and absolute disbelief. I would say in practice that is where we all should sit. Even if the counterfactual grammar of logic doesn't like it. — apokrisis

I don't grant that we have ambiguity because we need to lie to ourselves with fictions and both believe and not believe something at the same time. In the Thomist tradition vagueness is usually captured by the notion of analogical predication (which derives from Aristotle's "pros hen" ambiguity). So we do need to account for vagueness in a quasi-logical way, but I don't see how this changes what I've said about the lie that is uncovered. If I have to believe that my country is out-competing the liberal west even when I know it is not true, ambiguity isn't going to save my boat. The power of vagueness only extends so far.

Dominance~submission may be the natural dynamic. But it plays out with all the variety of its many different settings.

So the dynamic has the simplicity of a dichotomy. And then also the variety of the one principle that can emerge as the balancing act that suits every occasion. — apokrisis

Okay, thanks.

Liberal democracy clearly promotes discussion about the socially constructed nature of society. That is the liberating thought. Hey guys, we invented this system. And if it seems shit, we can therefore invent something better. — apokrisis

Okay, fair enough. Like I said, the arguments you present are reasonably strong. I need to pick my battles.

By neutral, I mean in the dynamical systems sense of being critically poised. Ready to go vigourously in opposing directions as the need demands. So we have to have some central state from which to depart in counterfactual directions.

Neutrality is not a state of passivity. It is the most extreme form of potency as you can swing either way with equal vigour. Which is what makes you choice of direction always something with significance and meaning.

A passively neutral person is a very dull fellow. An actively neutral person is centred and yet always ready to act strongly in either direction. Be your friend, be your enemy. Act as the occasion appears to demand and then switch positions just as fast if something changes.

So neutrality at the level of an egalatarian social democracy is about promoting equal opportunity for all, but then also allowing everyone to suffer or enjoy the consequences of their own actions. Make their own mistakes and learn from them.

Within then socially agreed limits. A social safety net below and a tax and justice system above. A liberal society would aim to mobilise its citizens as active participants of that society, yet still impose a constraining balance on the overall outcomes. Winning and losing is fine. Just so long as it is kept within pragmatically useful bounds. — apokrisis

Okay, thanks. More specifically, you said, "[Neutrality is about a balance that needs] the always larger view that can encompass the necessary contradictions." This "always larger view" is the transcendent fiction. So what are the contradictions and what is the fiction?

Equal opportunity combined with an allowance of consequences can seem like a contradiction, but I think we agree that this is only true when one is thinking about equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity. The "socially agreed limits" might signify the contradictions you have in mind, given that a safety net is in tension with an allowance of consequences. But perhaps there are other contradictions? And again, what precisely is the transcendent fiction of liberalism that relativizes these contradictions?

Well my argument is that "liberalism" is the promise of that kind of world. Or rather pragmatism. — apokrisis

Okay, and I can agree with much of this.

We are socially constructed. — apokrisis

...Although I would say that we are only partially socially constructed. There are important "constraints" on the theory that we are socially constructed.

Well you seem to be calling social constructions fictions. So I can go along with that. — apokrisis

If I recall, I originally said that liberalism requires the lie of value-neutrality, and you said that such a thing was the transcendent fiction that undergirds liberalism. I think that's where the language of "lies" and "fictions" comes from. One might use "fiction" without implying falsehood, but much of what we have discussing as "fiction" presupposes falsehood. When I use "fiction" I mean something like a "noble lie," i.e. a lie that is meant to have a beneficial effect.

You can have political parties divided by left and right. Liberal and conservative. Working class and managerial class. But then the system as a whole is free to pick and choose how it acts from this range of options. Identities aren't tied to particular solutions. Everyone can see that pragmatism is what is winning in the general long run. Life doesn't feel broken at the social level, and thus at the individual level. — apokrisis

So if liberalism (or else pragmatism) is a thing that exists in some places and not in other places, and if its central tenets are the points you outlined about equality of opportunity, consequences, etc., then is liberalism something that ought to be sought or not? In other words, you are implying all sorts of arguments for the normative superiority of liberalism while at the same time resisting the conclusion that liberalism is normatively superior. This goes back to the fatalism point, where one is apparently allowed to attribute all of the boons of liberalism to its high quality as a social narrative, and yet at the same time say that whatever works is what is best, and that therefore if a society falls away from liberal tenets there is nothing to worry about. (NB: Of course one need not say that liberalism is best in order to say that it is good or superior.)

Put differently, if we fall away from liberalism you will apparently just "switch" from liberalism to pragmatism. Analogously, someone who champions motorboats might move from motorboats to sailboats when the gasoline runs dry, but then protest that what they really championed was not motorboats but rather boats in general. Still, to argue in favor of a political philosophy is to favor its success and to be averse to its failure. So even if we switch from motorboats (liberalism) to sailboats (pragmatism), there still must be criteria for success and failure; for being right or wrong about one's thesis. If pragmatism is just whatever happens to currently be occurring, then it doesn't make sense to argue for or against it. It must be a falsifiable thesis, so to speak.

- And that's great for someone who already knows what the existentialist version of Nietzsche is, how to identify it, and how it generally contrasts with the postmodern version. It's the chicken and the egg of trust. If you already know the answer to the question you ask AI, then you can vet it. If AI is to be useful, then you musn't know the answer ahead of time. In human relations this problem is resolved by using test questions to assess general intellectual competence (along with intellectual virtue). Whether that could ever work with AI is an open question. It goes to the question of what makes a human expert an expert, or what makes humans truth-apt or reliable.

I find that a.i. is good at honing in on the expert opinions within these camps — Joshs

That's one of the key claims. I'm not sure its right. I doubt AI is able to differentiate expertise accurately, and I suspect that true experts could demonstrate this within their field. The intelligent person who uses AI is hoping that the cultural opinion is the expert opinion, even within the subculture of a "camp." At some point there is a tautological phenomenon where simply knowing the extremely obscure label for a sub-sub-sub-camp will be the key that unlocks the door to the opinions of that sub-sub-sub-camp. But at that point we're dealing with opinion, not knowledge or expertise, given the specificity of the viewpoint. We're asking a viewpoint question instead of a truth question, and that's part and parcel of the whole nature of AI.

Isn't the best policy simply to treat AI as if it were a stranger? — Clarendon

Perhaps that is the best policy, but does it already involve the falsehood?

If AI a stranger, then AI is a person. Except we know that AI isn't a person, and is therefore not a stranger. Similarly, we do not give strangers the benefit of the doubt when it comes to technical knowledge, and yet this is precisely what we do with AI. So at the end of the day the stranger analogy is not a bad one, but it has some problems.

At the end of the day I think it is very hard for us to understand what AI is and how to properly interact with it, and so we default to a familiar category such as 'stranger' or 'expert' or 'confidant'. The work is too theological for the atmosphere of TPF, but C.S. Lewis' That Hideous Strength is a remarkably prescient work in this regard. In the book cutting-edge scientists develop a faux face/mouth which, when stimulated in the proper ways, produces meaningful language which is both mysterious and nevertheless insightful. The obscure nature of the knowledge-source leads inevitably to the scientists taking its words on faith and coming to trust it.

We may be witnessing, in real time, the birth of a snowball of bullshit.

Are our conversations improving as a result? Or are they decaying? Let's wait and see. — unenlightened

Similar:

That is, whenever we trust ChatGPT we have taken our thumb off the line that tests whether the response is true or false, and ChatGPT was created to be trusted. What could happen, and what very likely will happen, is that the accuracy of human literature will be polluted at a very fundamental level. We may find ourselves "at sea," supported by layers and layers of artificially generated truth-claims, none of which can any longer be sufficiently disentangled and verified. Verification requires the ability to trace and backtrack, and my guess is that this ability will be lost due to three things: the speed and power of the technology, a tendency towards uncritical use of the technology, and the absence of a verification paper-trail within the technology itself. — Leontiskos

What are we supposed to do about it? — RogueAI

Why isn't anyone trying to do anything about it, despite the problems predicted?

so would you [...] cede the ai race to China? — RogueAI

Maybe. Maybe not. Why can't we ever consider whether there are some things that are more important than beating China?

---

In using a.i. for a field like philosophy, I think one is interacting with extremely intelligent fragments of the ideas of multiple knowledgeable persons, and one must consult one’s own understanding to incorporate, or disassemble and reassemble those fragments in useful ways. — Joshs

This would be true if you paid for a LLM and provided training data that is limited to "Multiple knowledgeable persons," but that generally doesn't happen. AI is providing you with a cultural opinion, not an expert opinion. AI is reliable wherever the cultural opinion tracks the expert opinion.

Your essay gets at the difference between humans and computers, which is something that the Analytic-leaning Anglo world struggles to understand. A beneficial side-effect of AI will be the way it will impel us to better understand what makes humans and the human mind distinctive, and this will center on the act of understanding.

Welcome to the forum. This is a thoughtful OP which will hopefully gain some traction.

It's not the first time I've heard people combine progressive historical sentiments with Christianity. — ProtagoranSocratist

I would highly recommend the historian Tom Holland on this topic. His thesis is not that Christianity produced progress per se, but rather that our contemporary world has been massively shaped by Christianity. This means, for example, that our criteria for progress are by and large Christian-birthed criteria.

One of my goals is to read Copleston's entire works on the history of philosophy — ProtagoranSocratist

Copleston is great. :up:

I think the crux is that whenever a new technology arises we just throw up our hands and give in. "It's inevitable - there's no point resisting!" This means that each small opportunity where resistance is possible is dismissed, and most every opportunity for resistance is small. But I have to give TPF its due. It has resisted by adding a rule against AI. It is not dismissing all of the small opportunities. Still, the temptation to give ourselves a pass when it comes to regulating these technologies is difficult to resist.

I made a similar point . I think the ethos of the forum could discourage AI in the same way it discourages other practices. Full prohibition would be impracticable.

(B) swallowing the insulting fantasy of interaction with an intelligent oracle. — bongo fury

The lie that one is interacting with an intelligent oracle is too good to resist. It's worth asking whether it is even possible to regularly use an LLM without falling into the false belief that one is interacting with an intelligent and extremely knowledgeable person.

Unlike handing it to a human editor, which is what authors have been doing for yonks? — SophistiCat

Nah. You are engaging in the same basic equivocation between a human and an AI. The whole point is that interacting with humans is different from interacting with AI, and the two should not be conflated. You've begged the question in a pretty basic manner, namely by implying that interacting with a human duo is the same as interacting with a human and AI duo.

The problem is that you don't think you are required to give a falsifiable reason for why the claim fails to demonstrate the presence of X. You are resorting to unfalsifiable dismissals. Even if you want to say, "Nothing in all of existence could demonstrate the presence of X," you would still have to explain why your claim is supposed to be true and how it could be falsified (i.e. how it is a meaningful claim).

I don't have to show X is absent. — Janus

And you of course say that you don't have to defend claims like this one. You've been begging the question for pages.

"Not tout court inferior" is not a subjective claim but a refutation of the masquerade. — Janus

So someone can't objectively identify when X is present because to do so is impossible, but you are able to objectively identify when X is absent? Again, this makes no sense. Is it the unfalsifiable sophistry coming up again.

I don't agree with enslaving any species. — Janus

And you have no reasoning whatsoever which would allow you to oppose such enslavement. If no proposition about whether a species is enslavable is true or false, then there is no rational reason to enslave, but there is equally no rational reason not to enslave.

Your whole approach is, "When you say racism is permissible you must be engaged in otiose subjectivizing, but when I say racism is impermissible I am not engaged in otiose subjectivizing." That's a neat magic trick, along with all of the odd rationalizations about why your "subjectivizing" counts more than theirs. It's "might makes right" with an extra layer of disguise.

Any support they come up with will necessarily be merely subjective, while it purports to be a universally valid claim. — Janus

If you are making a claim that says, "no, not tout court inferior," and the racist is making a claim that says, "yes, tout court inferior," and you say that "tout court inferior" is as subjective as the color claim, then both of you are making merely subjective claims, and neither one of you has any rational basis for enforcing your claim. That's the problem with your approach. The racist will just start enslaving people and you will object with a "merely subjective," "metaphysical," unfalsifiable claim. The bottom line is the fact that you have no rational argument against racism. You don't know why racism is wrong, because you don't have any substantive reason to believe that races are equal. You ironically reject all of the rational premises that caused us to reject racism in the first place.

Such a race would obviously not be human. — Janus

See my last paragraph, where I talk about the argument you give here.

On your reasoning if we found an alien species, how would we know how to treat it? Whether to grant it rights? Whether to eat it? Whether to treat it as a beast of burden? Understanding why we treat different animals differently will help one understand the rational grounds for or against racism. And yes, the vegan will be at an inherent disadvantage when trying to understand why racism is wrong - or why human slavery is worse than the domestication of animals.

Think of the claim that red is a superior colour to green. I reject that because it is unsupportable, If I say there are no sound criteria for considering red to be superior to green, is that claim falsifiable? — Janus

Why is it unsupportable? You simply ask the claimant what they mean by "superior" and go from there.

-

Regarding the original claim:

There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another. — Janus

Or the simpler claim:

"No race is, tout court, inferior to another." — Leontiskos

...I would say that we can make such claims in a falsifiable manner or an unfalsifiable manner. The fact that @Janus cannot give any way to falsify his claim even in principle is proof that he is giving the claim in an unfalsifiable manner.

But we could give the same claim in a falsifiable manner. We could say, "Well, 'tout court inferior' means something here, and part of what it means is that if one race is substantially intellectually inferior to other races then it is 'tout court inferior'."

At that point we would have to decide on at least one condition by which "substantially intellectually inferior" could be assessed, perhaps via some sort of IQ testing along with statistical thresholds that would count as "substantial." At the end we would be able to say, "Okay racist, so if you can demonstrate that some race is intellectually inferior according to the agreed criteria, then your position will be vindicated."

Or for another example, we might argue that it is not permissible to enslave any race. This could be claimed in an unfalsifiable manner or a falsifiable manner. If we wanted to make the claim in a falsifiable (and therefore rational) manner, we might agree that we are permitted to enslave beasts, such as oxen and horses and cattle. Thus if there is some race which is equivalent to a beast, such as an ox, then that race can be permissibly enslaved. We would be able to provide the racist with a falsifiable case, "Okay racist, so if you can demonstrate that this race has no greater dignity than an ox, then you will have proved that it is permissible to enslave them."

That's how you oppose racism in a substantive way, without unfalsifiable claims. You have to make "tout court inferior" mean something. The alternative to your approach is one where we are provided substantive reasons to oppose racism beyond mere taboo. We learn, for example, that the reason we are not permitted to enslave X race is because X race has a greater dignity than the things we are permitted to enslave. Metaphysical knowledge about the race in question provides the grounds by which certain actions are inappropriate, such as slavery. This is usually done with the syllogism, <It is impermissible to treat humans in such-and-such a way; X race is human; Therefore...>. But the falsifiability applies here as well, for the racist will often deny that X race is human and therefore we must have a substantive understanding of what makes something human in the way that confers dignity.

It's not that anti-racist claims are falsifiable. — Janus

Good, that's the closest you've come to admitting that your claim is not falsifiable.

The anti-racist claim is made on the basis of the unverifiability, and further, the complete unsupportability, of the racist claim. — Janus

So consider two charges:

"Your position is unverifiable."
"Your position is unsupportable."

We could simply ask whether such charges need to be falsifiable or not. Earlier you said that rational claims* must be falsifiable. If these charges are supposed to be rational, then apparently they must be falsifiable. Indeed, in general we would say that such charges do need to be falsifiable, and that the unfalsifiability of your anti-racist claim is in fact a problem.


* Or else publicly rational claims. I forget the exact wording.

The world does not work via baseball-bat falsification. — Leontiskos

It does. — AmadeusD

How so? Give an argument.

People do use violence as a 'valid retort' to various positions. — AmadeusD

People respond with violence, yes. What does this have to do with anything? What does this have to do with falsifiability?

What's being suggested is you are being sanguine to the point of irrelevancy. — AmadeusD

About what? Name it. Stop being intentionally ambiguous.

They think it's logical. — AmadeusD

"Someone thinks an illogical thing is logical," therefore...?

You're simply engaged in the fallacy of equivocation. "In the real world if you deny X then you will get hit with a baseball bat, therefore X is falsifiable." That's an invalid argument. We're talking about falsifiability, not the ability to coercively enforce a belief.

Ignorance of how the world actually works (i.e how people actually reason) isn't fixed by inserting a (totally reasonable, and valid) position on the logic of those impulses. — AmadeusD

I think your reading comprehension is struggling as well.

This is the claim in question:

There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another. — Janus

That is an anti-racist claim, and we are asking whether it is falsifiable. It seems that you and @baker have missed the whole point. I am asking whether @Janus' anti-racist claim is falsifiable, given that Janus has said that falsifiability is the key to rationality and claim-making.

Apparently because I have asked Janus whether his claim is falsifiable I am some sort of "sanguine" fool appealing to "irrelevant" canons of logic. Not sure how that's supposed to work.

And shame on you for suggesting I was a racist. — baker

Your recent posts provide a great deal of evidence for the thesis that your reading comprehension is very poor. But what's wrong with being a racist? On your view the only problem with being a racist is that you might be hit with a baseball bat. You don't seem to have anything more than that.

As it is often put, a valid deductive argument extracts the implications of its premises. That's its function. I assume that it is no vice in an argument that it does this, but the point of such arguments... — Clarendon

Great post. :up:

I admit that I am groping around in the dark where views about essential properties are concerned. — Clarendon

Okay, fair enough.

I suppose that if someone says humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, that's consistent with what's of intrinsic value about us being something that is essentially not physical. And so I think I can agree with someone who says that humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious. — Clarendon

I think that's right.

I am a human, but I do not think I am essentially a human.

...

Someone who says that we - the things that are of intrinsic moral value - are essentially physical and essentially conscious would be saying that consciousness is an essential feature of physical things. — Clarendon

Regarding these points, let's look at (1) (emphasis added):

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties. — Clarendon

Suppose object X is essentially conscious and essentially physical. If physical things are not essentially morally valuable, and yet conscious things are essentially morally valuable, then the question of whether object X is morally valuable turns on the matter of whether we employ "some" or "all" within (1). If we use "some" then X is morally valuable, whereas if we use "all" then X is not morally valuable.

(Of course, the substratum problem rears its head here as well, for one might object that, if the "all" interpretation is true and humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, then this proposition must be false: <physical things are not essentially morally valuable AND conscious things are essentially morally valuable>. Or in other words: the whole set of propositions is of course mutually interacting.)

Perhaps something can be intrinsically morally valuable due to answering to a concept and the moral value supervene on something essential to the concept rather than the thing itself. — Clarendon

Perhaps. I would want more detail on how the "definitional" approach and the "metaphysical" approach diverge or converge.

But even so, we can simply run the thought experiment where we ourselves are concerned and simply remove any and all of those features that our moral value is proposed to be supervening on and see if it remains.

For example, if my intrinsic moral value is claimed to be supervening on the fact I am a human, then I can simply imagine finding out that I am not one (as I did above) and see if this affects my intrinsic moral worth. — Clarendon

Yes, that seems right to me.

As it does not — Clarendon

I'm not so sure about this myself.

we still arrive at the conclusion that we are not physical things — Clarendon

I think it all goes back to "some" versus "all." Aristotle would say that the dignity proper to a human being does not derive from physicality per se, and yet that humans are nevertheless essentially physical beings.

Of course we must ask what is happening on a mind/body dualism view, such as your own. This seems to turn on the matter of how we adjudicate the question of whether we are essentially physical/bodily. If we use "all" in (1) then the question is answered. In that case we cannot be essentially physical if we have moral worth. If we use "some" in (1) then the mind/body dualist must search out some other argument for why we are not essentially physical.

5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects

...

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible. — Clarendon

For what it's worth, there are a lot of anti-religious and a lot of mind/body monists on the forum, and both groups will view your OP with some suspicion. There is also some anti-essentialism on the forum, but that's more of a fad. The anti-essentialists seem to have never investigated essentialism with any level of seriousness.

From the perspective of Aristotelian hylomorphism—a form of mind/body monism—an objection is that a human being is essentially physical and essentially conscious. In your terms we might say that the human being has the essential property of physicality and the essential property of bearing conscious states. This means that, for the Aristotelian, although consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects, nevertheless consciousness is an essential property of the object "human being," which also possesses the essential property of physicality. Or in other words, the Aristotelian would agree that not all physical things bear conscious states without agreeing with the idea that no physical thing has 'bearing conscious states' as an essential property. The intuitive value of this lies in the fact that whereas for your theory we must reject the intuitive belief that we are physical beings, for the Aristotelian this is not necessary.

The crux here seems to be specification or taxonomical methodology, where you are thinking of a substratum of "physical object" to which properties then attach, such as "extensive," whereas the Aristotelian is thinking of a substratum of "human object," to which properties then attach, such as "physical" or "conscious." It comes down to the question of the nature of the property/predicate-bearer. This is a pretty common conflict when different forms of essentialism rub up against one another. I have a few posts relating to this problem, including <this one>.

What sources are you drawing on for your understanding of essentialism?

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt: — Clarendon

Wonderful - thank you for this.

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging — Clarendon

Yes, that clarifies the point for me. It's a good argument! (A minor thing is that you have two 5's - you might fix that with an edit.)

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors. — Clarendon

Yes, very good.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to. — Clarendon

All of this turns on the meaning of the clause in (4), "[Minds] bear conscious states." The metaphysical interpretation seems perfectly plausible to me, but someone can pursue the objection you note if they like.

But we could also ask whether the objection you note is valid. Suppose we grant that minds are definitionally conscious. Have we lost our conclusion? Or do we just open ourselves to a definitional objection?

Huh! I have never encountered this argument before, but it looks to be quite solid. Nice work. I will have to think on it more.

-

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things. — Clarendon

Right, and this is the argument that I am familiar with.

Thanks for the pointer. Newman and Peirce were saying much the same thing. Peirce developed it more broadly as the mathematical logic – introducing his sign of illation – that then justified his pragmatic approach to truth. — apokrisis

Interesting. I knew Peirce did something similar but with more formality and precision, so this is a helpful lead.

Where is the evidence for this in history? Which religion or even political structure because it was discovered to be a fiction? The Catholic Church lives on. Marxism too. — apokrisis

I would say they live on because they do not believe their lodestar is a fiction. An example where the lie was found out and the social order collapsed as a result would be the USSR.

The reason is that truth can be transcendent even after the facts seem to have abandoned it. So God might not be real. But if society is better organised under His name, then I could live with that. — apokrisis

We will almost certainly end up disagreeing on this.

Anglicanism seems to have gone with that. The Brits also preserved the romance of having a monarchy. The nobility of running an imperial empire as a colonial trade network. In a lot of ways, the UK brand of liberalism thrived as it relied on this quite adaptive mix of transcendent authority. The US by contrast always felt officious and ill at ease with itself. Never actually a land of those feeling much freedom.

So God can be a fiction. The King can be a fiction. A Commonwealth can be a fiction. Everyone can see that and still find it a more useful truth if it binds everyone to a shared sense of social order.

The fiction isn’t the problem. The issue is whether the fiction can evolve in productive fashion. — apokrisis

I would argue that one cannot believe something and not believe something at the same time. Or that it will at least lead to problems. This is why a "noble lie" must always be told by an elite group of rulers and—if it is to succeed—be believed by a large portion of the society. If the lie comes to be known as a lie the system will fall. Not in a day, but inevitably. If a lie requires belief, and one cannot believe what they know to be false, then how could a lie function when it is known to be false?

But how close did we ever get to implementing that neutrality? — apokrisis

Does the question make sense if the neutrality is impossible? I wonder if you think the neutrality is impossible in fact but one can reach it in an asymptotic manner...? I am of the mind that it is impossible in a stronger sense than that. I would only say that certain events such as the invasion of Iraq contributed to the faltering of the fiction. Implementing the lie of neutrality and implementing neutrality are not the same thing.

I’ve sat with those in high office and their aims are far more pragmatic. Thatcher might have been more of the doctrinal stripe. Or she might just have had a middle class distaste of working class power and a matching love of the aristocratic elite.

But I’ve seen more interest in how to implement properly neutral public policy than doctrinal fervour. At least by choosing to live in a country as near the ideal as it could be in the world as it has become. — apokrisis

When I speak of those who are "doctrinally earnest" I am thinking of Locke, or of the Founders of liberal regimes in 1776 or 1789. I agree with you that the political leaders are less interested in liberal philosophies.

Yep. I have studied the details. I know the differences and also the similarities between bonobos and chimps. I wouldn’t leap to citing Peterson as my source. But RIchard Wrangham I recently mention in this light. — apokrisis

He is relying on the research of Frans de Waal. Here is an example, found at random: timestamp.

My point here is that if Peterson is correct then it seems that a simple dominance theory does not obtain. I don't know if you agree or disagree with de Waal.

The problem for liberalism is when it justifies itself under the old rubric of the good, the true, the beautiful, the almighty. The fiction is being rubbed in your face. One is being asked to worship at the base of a flag and recite an oath of obedience. Literal submission to a flapping bit of cloth.

I would gag at that. I prefer a country where no one really knows the national anthem and can’t even be sure whether the flag is their own or their neighbours, — apokrisis

Don't lies and fictions come to light eventually even if they are not rubbed in your face? If so, this is going to be a problem for liberalism's longevity.

If have to defend some transcendent principle, it would be pragmatism rather than liberalism - social or economic.

Liberalism has only won in the sense that it scales. It has outpaced the others in terms of growth in being stripped down to take risks and gamble on what burning a planet’s worth of resources can deliver.

So sure, other dynasties have their successes, especially to the degree they tended towards pragmatism and found ways to counter autocracy and corruption.

But liberalism was what lit a rocket under the world. And surely I am as big of critic of that as much as you. I never said might makes right. I’ve always said healthy balance is what we should seek. Unrestrained growth without a matching sense of direction doesn’t sound like a viable plan to me. — apokrisis

Okay. I think I am in agreement with you on much of this.

I suppose I should ask whether or to what extent you favor neutrality, and how you would societally justify neutrality in a pragmatist context. For example, is a fiction needed? Is a fiction pragmatic, especially in the long term?

Dominance-submission was an evolutionary problem for social organisation as it doesn’t scale. Homo sapiens took off just as the most successful foragers on the planet as they evolved the level of grammatical language to narratise the landscape they lived in. Turn the world into a place of ancestral history and custom. The land became organised over a vastly greater sense of space and time. It became possible to imagine life as an extended network of fighting and trading, raiding and sharing. Competing and cooperating.

The Neanderthals lived in small isolated bands. Sapiens rolled over the landscape in a sudden wave of social narrative. They wave swept across everywhere until it laid claim to the planet as its ancestral heritage. A place to be organised by war and trade. The seed of liberal order. An order that was good to the degree it could negotiate the internal contradictions that so powerfully drove it. — apokrisis

Okay, that sounds intelligible and plausible. But I want to ask why you see this as "the seed of a liberal order"? What is the signification of "liberal" in that sentence? Are you saying that social narrative is key to human success, and liberalism promotes social narrative? Or perhaps that liberalism promotes the proper kinds of social narrative?

But neutrality is about a balance. One that needs the always larger view that can encompass the necessary contradictions. And so to be “humanity”, we need to socially construct that transcendent point of view. That is what the collective narrative has always been about. — apokrisis

Okay, and what does the favored form of "neutrality" balance? What are we to be neutral with respect to?

Pragmatism just exposes the mechanics of how this is done in a post-foraging and post-agrarian world. We can appreciate the mechanism in its own rational terms. It the fictions are transparent, then at least they can be critiqued. — apokrisis

So now I am wondering if we agree that the fictions should be made transparent? Or are you just saying that now that the fictions are being laid bare we have an opportunity to recalibrate our direction?

1) Most of our beliefs are established as subjective inferences to best explanation. Consider the alternatives: few beliefs are established by deduction, and few are basic. What else is there? — Relativist

You could give a clear definition of deduction and then persuasively argue that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via deduction. But I would say that the same thing holds for inference. If we give a clear definition of inference then we will find that, given the large number of beliefs each person holds, very few of them are arrived at via inference. This includes inference to the best explanation. So as noted earlier, it seems that by "inference to the best explanation" you mean something exceedingly broad and also rather vague.

If we are talking about the practical way that most people arrive at beliefs, then I think the best work on the subject is John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, where he develops his "illative sense" among other things. If we are talking about this practical matter, then I don't think deduction or inference or basic beliefs are the right answer, especially in isolation.

- At every step of the way if you just starting doing some philosophy and presenting some arguments for your positions the ridicule would dissipate. The reason you are ridiculed is because it is ridiculous to avoid philosophical argument while pretending to be the brilliant magister of TPF.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false). — Clarendon

Okay great, thanks for this elaboration.

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical. — Clarendon

This paragraph presents the tension I am worried about. First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious. I am wondering how we get to the conclusion, "No physical thing is conscious," especially given that humans seem to be an example of something which is simultaneously physical and conscious.

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties. That is 'being morally valuable' is a 'resultant' property- something is morally valuable 'because' it has certain other features.

If something is intrinsically morally valuable, then - by definition - it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is. This is why intrinsic moral value must supervene on some or all of a thing's essential features.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things.

Maybe it will objected to this argument that the essential property that makes us morally valuable is our consciousness. However, consciousness is clearly not an essential attribute of a physical thing - at best it would be an accidental property of one. So as our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties, then it can't be that one if, that is, we are a physical thing. — Clarendon

I think this is an interesting argument that could be reworked to be valid and even sound. The idea is something like, "Our moral value does not derive from any physical attribute, therefore we are more than merely physical."

This is not to deny that consciousness may be an essential attribute of the kind of thing we are. Nor is it to deny that it may be the property in virtue of which we - the things that have it - are morally valuable. The point is that as consciousness is not an essential property of physical things, then we can conclude that the kinds of thing that are essentially conscious are not physical things.

Does this argument work? I think it does, but perhaps I am mistaken. — Clarendon

The counterargument would seem to be something which is essentially conscious and essentially physical. Or else, if your premise, "consciousness is not an essential property of physical things," means that no physical things are essentially conscious, then I would object to such a premise.

But what do you mean when you say, "X is an essential property of Y"?

Of course! I'll go further: discussing our reasoning with others can help us improve our judgements, by getting additional facts before us, and alternative theories. It forces us to think through our reasoning with more rigor, and to justify the various intermediate judgements that lead to the position we're defending. — Relativist

Okay, I agree.

Good, but do you also agree that if everything is an IBE then there is no intelligibility given that no differentiation is possible? — Leontiskos

Absolutely not. I can't imagine why you'd suggest no differentiation is possible. Do you worry about losing your keys in an interdimensional portal? Do you worry your spouse might be an extra-terrestrial? If you do not differentiate, how can you ever make ANY decision? — Relativist

If everything is an IBE, then what sense does it make to exhort someone to engage in IBE? Or to argue in favor of IBEs?

Okay, good. So would we say that, at least in some cases, there is the real explanation and nominal explanations are better or worse depending on how well they approximate the real explanation? If so, then an IBE is presupposing the ontological existence of an aitia/cause/explanation. — Leontiskos

Yes, to the 1st question (I think).

I don't understand the 2nd. What's the ontological status of descriptions of events in the public sphere? What does it matter? The appropriate objective is truth, and this is irrespective of one's preferred theory of truth, theory of mind, or the metaphysical foundation of reality. — Relativist

Let me put it this way: if some explanations are better and some are worse, then what are they better or worse in relation to?

For example, if I run a 100m dash in 16 seconds and you run it in 13 seconds, by what standard do we say that you did better than I? Isn't it by the standard, "The shorter the time, the better" (which is equivalent to, "The faster, the better")?

1. If there are better and worse explanations, then they must be better or worse relative to some standard
2. The standard is the true explanation
3. The true explanation is not an IBE
4. Therefore, not everything is an IBE

If Sherlock Holmes is working a case then he has any number of candidate theses floating around his head. Some are better than others. Also, something actually happened in reality that he is trying to understand. The best explanation will (arguably*) be the one which most closely approximates the thing that happened in reality. That is what his spectrum of worst/worse/better/best is aiming at.

Note too that there may be a witness who knows exactly what happened. They know the answer to the question that Holmes is asking. I don't think we would call their knowledge an IBE. They have the answer to the question, "What happened here?," and that answer is not an IBE.

My point is that if you try to make everything an IBE, then IBEs make no sense. An inference to the best explanation presupposes the possibility of the real explanation. Depending on our questions and their level of specificity, a single real explanation may not be possible, but in many cases it is possible, and especially so in a theoretical or conceptual sense.

This general problem in abduction is called being "the best of a bad lot". — Relativist

Okay, sure. I don't want to get into that tangent, as I think it might take us too far afield.


* "Arguably" in the sense that we don't have to get into the subtopic of better-relative-to-available-evidence vs. better-relative-to-the-reality-being-investigated.

- You've been failing to answer arguments and even posts for months now. No one is holding their breath for you to engage in philosophy. .

I just suggested watching Owens on Charlie Kirk for two reasons. The first is as a polished example of the new media. — apokrisis

Okay, I will have a look. I generally don't watch conspiratorial material because it causes the algorithm to give me more of the same, and this muddies up my feed (and I don't have a VPN to fully insulate myself). But I'll suck it up for once. :razz:

The other thing is then how there is so much information to keep the story going. Every event has so much cell phone footage from so many angles, or citizens sleuths running around interviewing each other, immediately finding all the strange coincidences that are going to be there to be found. With so many involved on the ground, there are swiftly any number of dots for a conspiracy theory to join. — apokrisis

Fascinating.

Even months ago, AI gave a lot of shit answers. Good only for a laugh. But now it is becoming very useful for self factchecking. — apokrisis

I tend to use it in areas where the programming and the training would tend to produce an accurate response, but I think it is deceptively difficult to gauge its reliability. The manner in which we vet and eventually come to trust an authority turns out to be a rather complex process.

Banno feels like he is here to run the cosy introductory philosophy tutorials of his fond memory. That would be why he treats us like confused first year students having to retread the well worn paths of ancient debates. We are allowed to speak, but as tutor, he gets to steer and gently reveal our neophyte errors of thought. We should be warmly appreciative of his condescension. And learn to stick closely to areas where he has already prepared the answers. — apokrisis

I can vouch for that a hundred times over. Awhile back there was a wild thread where Banno chastised his wayward students, insinuating that the deplorables were forcing him into private message conversations. The thread didn't go well for Banno and had to be closed by the mods, which I ahead of time. :lol:

If I were teaching a logic class I would ask you to provide an argument for your conclusion, "...Therefore, no conspiracy theory is an IBE."

If you reply that some conspiracy theories are IBEs, but this is rare, I would point out that the conspiracy theorist agrees with you. The conspiracy theorist would not be a conspiracy theorist if they thought that conspiracy theories were common or mundane explanations. It is precisely the rarity that they are attracted to.

Then appreciate how this relates to what I'm saying about IBEs. My explanation is "better". — Relativist

But isn't it just a truism to say that one should prefer the better to the worse? That's why a preference for the best is not a substantial position. Everyone agrees with it and everyone thinks their theory is better than other theories.

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. — Leontiskos

Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning... — Relativist

But how does any of this address the point at stake? I don't even know if you are agreeing or disagreeing with my statement.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. — Leontiskos

That assumes the other person is reasonable. — Relativist

The point is that you must do more than beg the question. The label "conspiracy theory" is too broad, bordering on things as broad as "bad" or "irrational." If one wants to engage in rational discourse, then they must offer reasons, and "bad", "irrational", and "conspiracy theory" don't really count as reasons. More generally, one must offer arguments and not assertions.

if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. — Leontiskos

Agreed. — Relativist

Good, but do you also agree that if everything is an IBE then there is no intelligibility given that no differentiation is possible? If so, then you must possess alternative approaches other than IBE if 'IBE' is to be a meaningful notion.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. — Leontiskos

In this context, an explanation is a conclusion someone is drawing from some set of evidence and background facts. — Relativist

Okay, good. So would we say that, at least in some cases, there is the real explanation and nominal explanations are better or worse depending on how well they approximate the real explanation? If so, then an IBE is presupposing the ontological existence of an aitia/cause/explanation.

For example: is there a "best" interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? IMO, no- because they are all consistent with the measurements- there's no objective basis to choose one, so I think we should reserve judgement. — Relativist

So would you say that when someone argues for one particular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, they are not offering an IBE?

We often don't have multiple, distinct "explanations" to choose from; we're just assessing whether or not there's sufficient justification to support an assertion. We examine this justification and decide whether to affirm it, deny it, or reserve judgement. It's the same process, whether or not we choose to label it abduction. — Relativist

But that doesn't seem very principled. If there is not more than one explanation, then how can you talk about an inference to the best explanation? It seems like you now want "inference to the best explanation" to include any judgment that there is sufficient justification to support an assertion. But that's not what the words mean. "This is the best explanation" is not the same as, "This assertion possesses sufficient justification." "Best" and "sufficient" are not the same concept. It seems that you are being too loose with words and concepts, and that is much the point.

Yep. Another resonating point. Especially as before Trump was on The Apprentice, he was part of WWE. — apokrisis

Interesting - I did not know that.

I used to like old school boxing but find modern MMA unwatchable. One claimed to showcase the skill, the other only the brutality. — apokrisis

That seems right to me.

I completely agree. That is why I focus on Candace Owens as a particular case in point. The medium is evolving fast. It is too easy to dismiss it for its history on the fringes and its WWE levels of believability. — apokrisis

Okay, but can you elaborate on this? I'm not too familiar with Candace Owens. I know she broke off from a media company, went her own way, and become more idiosyncratic and conspiratorial (much like Tucker Carlson). And is the "medium" you speak of conspiratorial thinking, or something else?

My suggestion is that the media may evolve but it always becomes what power must capture and control. And that exists in tension with the power of the people to resist. — apokrisis

Yes, I think that's quite right.

So the printing press at first liberated people power - taking back the written world from the social elite. Then it became the tool of class factions and eventually the liberal order, such as it was.

How is the internet likely to fare in that regard? How do things go as even social media crashes into the new AI paradigm. — apokrisis

Right. I tend to share Baden's worries that he expressed in a thread that has up and vanished.

That is why I now toy with AI as the instant fact checker on PF opinion. — apokrisis

I haven't used it for philosophy much, but I have tried the LLMs for other things. I agree that one must keep abreast of such things.

The great thing about is that @Banno holds the "opinions" of AI in high regard, and often utilizes them himself. I think that's part of the reason why he got so quiet after seeing his own theories debunked by his own authorities.

Almost nothing in life is provably true, but we can still weigh facts and evidence - and strive to do this as reasonably as possible- that is all abduction is. — Relativist

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. The labels "conspiracy theory" or "inference to the best explanation" are never substantive labels given that they always involve a begging of the question. The "conspiracy theorist" is always the other guy, just as the guy with the best explanation is always me.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. If your explanation is good or the best, then you should say why it is such. Labels like "conspiracy theory" or "inference to the best explanation" don't add anything substantial to a conversation, particularly when they lack context.

For example, if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. But when you continually say that IBEs are all there is and also claim that "IBE" means something intelligible, you aren't making much sense.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. And if you say that an explanation (or every particular explanation) is an inference to the best explanation, then you've fallen into the viciously circular quandary. If you give a traditional account of what an explanation is, then we already have an alternative to an IBE, at least from an ontological perspective, and therefore not every account is (or professes to be) an IBE.

There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations?

A good point and I agree. — apokrisis

Okay, great.

And yet what if all societies must construct some such transcendent fiction? - an argument I have made in this thread, and which plays large in Fukuyama’s account of human political history. — apokrisis

You are introducing a number of complex issues on which we may disagree at a relatively fundamental level. I don't agree with this first one, namely that all societies must construct some such transcendent fiction, but if it were true then the society would no longer function once the "cat is out of the bag" and the fiction is known to be a fiction, and I think that is becoming increasingly true with liberalism. In any case, let's look at the way you develop it:

What seems apparent is that social animals are organised by the emergence of dominance-submission hierarchies. It is something that is engineered in at a genetic level.

Humans have a capacity to narrate their worlds and so could create social order at this new “civilised” level. To make that happen, the old dominance-submission games had to be submerged under some form of collective transcendent identity. A narrative about ancestral landscapes, judging gods, or democratic justice. Even the mightiest in the group had to bow their heads before a power that outranked even them.

So this is what all societies have in common. The need for an uber-narrative which secures the identity of the individual. A neutralising force that breaks down the local gang boss and allows a society to scale - to grow large and complex despite the still natural tendency to play dominance-submission games. — apokrisis

So on this theory I gather that we could not return to an outdated uber-narrative which has now been debunked, given that it no longer possesses the necessary plausibility to function. Does the neutrality of the liberal state still possess the necessary plausibility to function?

Another difficulty I have with this idea is that it moves freely between the conscious lie and the unconscious lie. This isn't inherently problematic, but once a lie becomes excessively conscious it is much harder to maintain, and liberalism professes the lie of neutrality with a doctrinal earnestness. Given that the liberal lie is systematically presented rather than being an element of mythology or primordial tradition, I think it will be much harder to maintain.

Finally, you are presenting this as the problem of dominance-submission dynamics and the solution of a fictional uber-narrative. First, I would note that Jordan Peterson is constantly talking about group dynamics through the perspective of primatologists who debunked the idea that "gang boss" dominance (tyrannical social ordering) is common among primates. I don't recall the details, but his point is that that form of dominance is not an efficacious social ordering, which is why one instead sees forms of leadership and submission that are not based on brute strength or tyrannical behavior. If that's right and even primates can manage to avoid "local gang boss" hierarchies, then I don't see why ideational humans would need special help from fictional narratives.

The other point here is that most political philosophies, such as Aristotle's, try to tackle this issue head-on without the help of fictional narratives. That is, they attempt to provide rational grounds for avoiding tyrannical social orderings instead of resorting to a fictional narrative. Does that route seem unpromising to you for some reason? Because I don't see a great need to maintain the lie of liberal neutrality, at least beyond the manner in which every culture and time sees itself as normative, neutral, rational, etc.

So yes. Liberalism is a fiction. A meta narrative of a perfection that can never be achieved. But if it scales, then that already says it is a better meta-narrative than the other brands going around.

Whether human societies should freely scale is a new question that has come into view. But liberalism did win that competition. — apokrisis

This is another point where I tend to disagree. Around the timestamp I gave for that video Holland implies that liberalism didn't win that competition. There are other dynasties that far surpass liberalism, including Islam, China, Rome, and perhaps Christianity if it is separable from liberalism.

Presumably you are claiming that liberalism sits atop the mountain at this point in history, therefore it has won. On my view one must look at the natural lifecycle of a civilization in order to understand how successful it was vis-a-vis propagation or scaling. Here is the quote:

There's a default assumption that secular civilization can swallow anything up. There's a kind of arrogance there. "The secular civilization of the West is such a broad tent that everyone can be brought into it." But Islam is at least as sophisticated a civilization as the civilization of the Christian West. And a very ancient one. And for most of its existence has been much, much more powerful than the Christian world. Therefore the idea that it should accommodate itself to what liberal secularists think it should do isn't a given. — Tom Holland, ibid, 1:09:30

(The really interesting point with Islam is that it explicitly presented propagation/scaling as an argument for its own legitimacy, and the more territory it conquered, the more often it adverted to this argument. This form of "pragmatism" is common among many ancient civilizations.)

So I think you are making valid arguments, but I think the premises are questionable. Specifically, I think it would be easy to argue that it is not true that liberalism is theoretically or historically superior to other social orderings; and I don't know that a dominance-submission problem exists such that it needs to be answered with fictional narratives.

With that said, I think someone like yourself could modify liberalism fairly easily by discarding the neutrality principle and honoring values of individualism, productivity, free inquiry, etc. The argument from someone like yourself is apparently that liberalism is superior precisely because of its values, and at that point it could be argued that the fictional neutrality could be dropped given the wide recognition of the legitimacy of liberal values.

Sure. But what’s the best alternative to liberalism? — Tom Storm

Liberalism has all sorts of definitions. My claim is that if a society stops lying to itself in the way I outlined then it is no longer liberal (i.e. that that form of neutrality is a necessary condition of liberalism). The alternative is to stop lying to ourselves in that way, and this would result in substantive public debate over the particular form of good the nation-group wishes to privilege. So you might still say that rape should be illegal, but you could no longer say that legislating against rape is value-neutral. This in turn would require public debate about why and whether certain values should be enshrined in the laws. It would no longer do to say, "That is a value, therefore it has no place in law." It would become a question of which values have a place in law (or public life) and which do not.

But made a number of important points and I will have to respond to those before moving on in this line.

It would be nice if that were true. But I think instead that people get used to living in a reality show. The fact that the dramas are made up becomes neither here nor there. Instead the heightened life becomes what absorbs us into its reality. — apokrisis

So one example would be the shift from the popularity of WWF and WWE to the popularity of MMA. With the former there was a cognitive dissonance where one needed to pretend that a form of acting was not a form of acting, and the transition to the latter ironed out that cognitive dissonance. You get the same sort of event without the dissimulation.

So reality shows became a huge industry. And conspiracy theory is now moving out of the fringe and into the mainstream. It is becoming corporate and industrial. It is a flourishing economy with a real power grip on society.

Charlie Kirk is an event. And now it becomes this season’s freshest hit. The Epstein show still rolls. But Charlie Kirk could become even splashier if any of the conspiracy analysis is even a little bit true.

Reality shows spawned something real enough in Donald Trump. Conspiracy shows are becoming mainstream franchises now. An even more blurred line. What does that look like when it is the new dominant form of media owned by those with a will to power? — apokrisis

Those are good points, but at the same time I think you will find that the conspiracy theorists need to take care not to get too far over their skies. The popularity distribution will be a bell curve between non-conspiratorial material and excessively conspiratorial material. The sweet spot must still mind the further extreme, and truth or plausibility is one of the central variables governing that sweet spot.

The development of a taste for the conspiratorial is almost certainly bad for the flourishing of a society, and in this case it looks to be a reaction to an overly unified media landscape. But when you introduce magnifiers like YouTube or AI it's hard to know whether the pendulum will swing in the same manner it has in the past, or if a new dynamic will emerge.