I don't think someone who knows they live in a machine/simulation can truly be happy.

I take your question to be whether God would bless one with knowledge of the good even if that person lived in a world that was merely simulated. I think the answer may be yes, although I do not say this with certainty but with a speculative mind.

It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..."

And I think I can now better appreciate what you are saying about the principle of plenitude, but...

I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection.

First of all thanks for engaging in this discussion with me.

Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says.

Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved.

Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory.

Lastly, the argument I am suggesting is grounded in the law of noncontradiction. We both agree that contingent things exist now. I maintain that, to avoid contradiction, the contingent things existing now must exist now (but can not-exist at another time). But if something must exist now, then there cannot be nothing now. But if everything is contingent then there could be nothing now. However, there cannot be nothing now based on the law of noncontradiction. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent i.e. there must be a necessary being

It is unclear to me why there would be more leaf worlds, could you spell that out for me?

I think I have heard it said that if a future people decided to make a simulation, they would make A LOT of such simulations. And these simulations would be nested -- simulations within simulations. If there are a huge number of simulations within simulations, that means only a small number of these simulations will be simulations that do not have a simulation that they are themselves running. But if we are living in a simulation, we must be living in one of the simulations that is not itself running a simulation. In that case, the odds that we are living in a simulation would be astronomically small.

On the other hand, I do not think we would be conscious if we were "in" what you are calling an actual simulation. But we are conscious. Therefore, we must not live in a simulation.

In any case, I know I am not living in a simulation.

I see what you are saying about contingents requiring an efficient cause. In fact, I think you are correct. However, I am not sure that that is Aquinas' argument in the 3rd Way. The argument for an efficient cause of an accidental series is covered in the 2nd Way I think.

because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now — Metaphysician Undercover

-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now.

To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings."

And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not.

What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being.

I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not.

That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being."



Do you think there are any "necessary non-beings" ? A square circle perhaps.

"How long I might live is not up to me, but how I live is within my control." -- Seneca. I like this quote. I think the Stoics emphasize concerning ourselves with what is within our control, rather than the things that we do not have control over such as the circumstances that we find ourselves in.

Marcus Aurelius says in so many words that death is (A) natural, and (B) not evil (also not good, it's neither). He seems to say that when viewed "objectively," what is happening is dispersion of atoms; he recommends us not to be afraid of death.

Stoicism's views on death seem off to me. Stoicism seems like kind of a hopeless philosophy in my opinion. The concern I have is that stoics seem to condone suicide. Cato the Younger is an example; not to mention Zeno (founder of Stoicism) and his follower Cleanthes both killed themselves. I think suicide is always wrong.

I also think the "objective" attitude of stoics like Marcus Aurelius may be a form of dissociation, particularly concerning one's emotions.. seems unhealthy to me. I think it is better to address trauma rather than "objectifying" it.

I would not be as concerned with A and B, that is, whether I am right or wrong in thinking I am free. The more pressing matter appears to be C and D, whether I deny my obligations or fulfill them. If someone does indeed deny their obligations on the basis of determinism, then that is surely a negative outcome. Perhaps some empirical research may be helpful in finding out if determinists make decisions consistent with their deterministic convictions.

Leontiskos and Wayfarer, thanks for the links.

I read the link to Feser and found what he had to say helpful and interesting; it appears very similar to the background information Wayfarer articulated earlier.

Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."

To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:

1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.

To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.

Thoughts?

But something to consider is that, if the Universe had existed eternally, and everything in it has a finite lifespan, then again, nothing would exist now, as everything that could have existed, would have already perished, as the amount of time involved is infinite, and no addition of finite durations can add up to an infinite sequence of time. (This is not stated explicitly in the argument, but it is part of the background to the family of arguments). — Wayfarer

I see, yeah, the argument does make more sense with that background in mind. Still, the argument would be easier to follow had he said, "by necessity, everything must not exist at some time if everything were contingent" or something like that.

No need to apologize Wayfarer. Thanks for your comment. The argument you just stated is a good one, convincing to me. My concern is that Aquinas does not say "there must have been a time when nothing existed." He says "there Could have been a time when nothing existed." That, in a nutshell is the issue I take with the argument as well as the reason I suggest it needs interpretation. At the same time, I think Aquinas is a really smart dude, so I'm like "what am I missing about his argument?"

Because 1. I've been giving it a lot of thought the past few days 2. I wanted to have a philosophical discussion 3. I wanted to hear what others thought about it 4. I want to learn and develop my views and understanding. I don't have all the answers believe it or not Wayfarer. And I don't think the argument is pointless but, like I said, I do think it requires some sort of interpretation. But thanks for calling me out on my posts because it gave me the opportunity to reflect on them.

1. Because I might be wrong. 2. I want to hear others' interpretations.

My point here is that, at face value without interpretation, Aquinas' argument doesn't actually say anything. Sure there could have been nothing now, but if there could have been something now, even if everything was contingent, then what work is Aquinas' argument doing?

Thanks for the question. The point is notsomuch that necessity must be derivative, but that where it cannot be self-imputed (as in this case a possible being by definition cannot of itself be necessary), then necessity must be imputed by another, a necessary being. If one possesses tallness and is the only person in the room, then I would say the necessity of their being tallest is something they can "self-impute." The individual has the necessity by virtue of what they are in that case.

Yeah, I am somewhat confused about the distinction between necessary and possible. From my perspective, everything in the past and present are necessary. But at some point in the past they would have been merely possible as they did not yet exist, and projecting into the future may at some point cease to exist. Does that make everything a fusion of necessity and possibility? It's difficult to make sense of.

Thanks for the reference to David Hart re: the contingency argument. I will look it up.

Am I understanding you to say that a contingency argument proves causation, but that it may only prove, at most, an infinity of contingent causes? If so, what would you say to one who objects to infinite contingents on the grounds that none of the members of that infinite would possess the existence necessary to pass along existence causally? Unless I have misunderstood you..

NotAristotle is not Aristotle — Fooloso4

Never... in my time here at the Forum have I ever heard such a bold-faced, unconcealed, blatant accusation! How dare you! I maintain, and have ever maintained, that I might, or might not be, Aristotle. It has not, not even for a minute, been my disposition that I either am, or am not Aristotle, with 100% certainty! And I'm not sure where you get the notion! Instead, I have always sought the middle ground, and I am most emphatically insulted and otherwise taken aback to hear such misanthropy!

:wink:

Aristotle: And tell me, Plato, is the form you speak of the same or different than the form that is in the particulars I investigate?
Plato: It is different.
Aristotle: Yes, I thought you might say so, for if it were the same, then by investigating the form in the particulars I would be seeing outside of the cave, don't you think?
Plato: That sounds right to me.
Aristotle:Tell me though Plato, how is the Form different than the form in particulars?
Plato: How do you mean?
Aristotle: Well, a great action is great by partaking in greatness; isn't that so?
Plato: It is.
Aristotle: Well, if a great action partakes in the Form of greatness, and the greatness of the Form is different than the greatness of the action, then either one is not great, or the other is not great, for by being different, they differ in the form of which they either participate or are participated in.
Plato: Quite so.
Aristotle: Well then greatness is not great.
Plato: Hmm, I see. Yes, that appears to be a problem.
Aristotle: It is Plato, it is quite problematic. So you see, I think you were wrong to say that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Plato: Yes, I must have been mistaken. So now I say that the Form is the same as what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Aristotle: I was afraid you would say that.
Plato: Why is that?
Aristotle: Because, if the Form of greatness is itself great in the same way that a great action is great, then it will be necessary for there to be a form that includes both the great act and the greatness that is present in the Form of greatness. And then there will need to be a form of that, and a form of that, and so on and so on.
Plato: Oh dear Aristotle, that seems quite problematic too.
Aristotle: Quite so.
___: Excuse me, excuse me, if I may interject...
Plato: Why, is that you Socrates, old friend?
Socrates: Yes, it is I, Socrates.
Aristotle: What did you wish to say?
Socrates: Just this, I think Plato was right in what he said at first, namely, that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to the quality that is partaken of.
Aristotle: And why is that?
Socrates: Well for just the reason you stated, if the Form is the same, then it will need a Form above it, and in that case it is not really the Form of what is partaken of it.
Aristotle: Well how will you overcome the objection that Plato and I just discussed: that greatness is not great if the form is different than that that partakes in it?
Socrates: By saying that greatness is great, Aristotle, but that the Form of greatness is great in a different way than the greatness of a great action.
Aristotle: How is that?
Socrates: A great action is great, but in a qualified way. Meanwhile, the Form of greatness is supremely great, there is nothing not great about it; it includes not only a great action, but every other greatness. By being so great, it is, as it were, a different kind of greatness than the great things and actions and qualities that partake of it.
Aristotle: Hmm, well said Socrates.
Plato: Well said indeed.

I would add that there are important ways in which consciousness is not an illusion. Emotional, experiential, rational, doxastic content, means something, points toward something true, is important.

Maybe that is an unfair question because consciousness may be undefinable. I guess what I want to know is: why defend consciousness as not an illusion; what's at stake? Why is consciousness not being an illusion important to you? What does consciousness mean to you?

A lie is an illusion is it not? Well, what misleads more, the lie or the liar?

Would you define the "consciousness" you say is not an illusion?

It may seem strange, but I would say negative thinking is more illusory than positive thinking in that one who thinks negatively (about themselves or about others) is, in my opinion, further from the truth; they do not see themselves or others as-they-are-in-reality; that is, with understanding/patience/and in a word, love. Maybe it's somewhat tautological, but I think illusion is separation from truth.

Agree, if there is not any kind of relationship then it is difficult to see how there can be responsibility, reconciliation, accountability, forgiveness, contrition, reward, gift, mercy.

Yeah, I'm not sure we can give a coherent account of responsibility without free will.

I see your point, yeah I guess I think people's actions can be "a problem."

Sorry Mentos but I don't think people are "problems to be dealt with." People "have problems," maybe, but no person is "a problem" or "the problem."

I think we may think of responsibility in relational terms. We are responsible to another for our actions. Responsibility doesn't entail punishment, rather it entails the possibility for reconciliation (a relational "event" that is mediated between persons); at least, that is how I see it.

Without free will we would still be responsible to each other? Walk me through that.

a thread about challenging our intuitions of consciousness. — Skalidris

Hi all,

I added you all to this reply because I think my comments here relate to the discussions that have been had thus far.

I have been rethinking my own intuitions on consciousness. In particular, I have been considering Christoffer's claim that consciousness is an illusion. I ask myself, in what sense could it be thought to be an illusion?

There are at least two ways of thinking about it (that I can presently think of). One way is to say free will is an illusion. I disagree with that assertion. On the other hand, when one says "consciousness is an illusion" they could mean something like -- you are not your thoughts. In that case "I think, therefore, I am" would be kind of a non-sequitur. You think. Yes. You are. Yes. But you are not because you think. After all, I would say we may not have that much control over our thoughts as far as I can tell, so I see no reason to think that our identity should be linked to our thoughts.

Negative thinking, patterns of thought, insofar as we identify these things with consciousness, it is easier to see how consciousness is an illusion; it is an illusion just as negative thinking and patterns of thought are an illusion, they are part of a script so to speak. In addition, a person is not identical to or the same as a mental illness they may have - mental illness does not define anyone.

For the sake of clarity, I do think we have free will and that we are responsible for what we do and what we say, even though I don't think we have control over our emotions and maybe not our thoughts either.

Nevermind, I guess "scientific miracle" is not a thing and I'm just making up words.

Thus the experimental discovery of the atom (or more accurately, the proton in the atom) by Ernest Rutherford (edited) : unpredicted, but explainable in natural terms.

I don't recall where I heard about it before. I was thinking it was like a miracle insofar as it does not adhere to known natural laws or regularities, but that it is an occurrence that can ultimately be explained by natural laws. And so it is an occurrence that would be contrasted with a veritable supernatural miracle.

Concerning 1., the further assumption you need is that physical laws, were we to understand them completely, would explain the purported miracle. — J

I think Philosophim intended this as an implication of the view, although I think you are right that it is an assumption that is necessary for the argument to work.

you need to show why particular miracle X requires a physical explanation. — J

Not sure I agree -- so-called "scientific miracles" (like the discovery of the atom), in my opinion, do not need to be shown to be physical, we can assume that they just are physical. But perhaps you are defining "miracle" to exclude "scientific miracles." If so, how would you define miracle in a way that does not include "miracles" that are "scientific."

Although, I suppose one could hold the view that everything physical is miraculous, including the regularities of physical laws, or at least that every scientific miracle is a supernatural miracle.

I'm not really committed to any kind of illusionism, but if consciousness is not a reality (and I think it is), then I guess we could think of it as a kind of illusion, sure.

It is as if we were saying our emotions analyzed our emotions, no?

I guess I'm unclear on how the mechanics of a self-referential system would work.

You're asking the wrong person because I have the same question; I don't think consciousness is an illusion.

instead we experience some emergent phenomena of "being" — Christoffer

The illusion is our experience of ourselves to be more advanced than what we really are. We don't see the strings that pulls our behavior, wants, needs, thoughts and actions, we only experience the sum of those strings and it makes us feel like we are in control and have agency — Christoffer

The strings are our emotions - the predictive system; you're saying that's what controls our actions.

But then I'm confused when you say:

And so our new layer of predictions analyzed our own emotional behavior and started to mitigate them when needed. — Christoffer

The predictive system can study itself?

in this sense I think you mean to be free from the emotional driving forces and be able to always act without biases to any needs. — Christoffer

That is not necessarily what I mean when I speak of "seeing reality as it is." As I am presently using it, I mean seeing reality in contradistinction to the way reality is seen through the lens of an apparent illusion of consciousness.

Still, it seems to me that any sort of illusion of reality would be weeded out by evolution in favor of a more honest interface, seems to me like that would have an evolutionary advantage.



I'm not sure I understand the question; I guess I take it as given that an illusion is necessarily differentiable from non-illusion .