The comment seems irrelevant to this thread.3+1 "is" 4 but 3+1 "is not" 2+2 — Fooloso4
I disapprove of statements that use "is" to purportedly make a statement about objective reality that hides the fact that the statement better qualifies as someone's experience of objective reality.So, which of all of the above meanings of "is" are you against? — Alkis Piskas
There is some truth to your statement. (Notice how "is" makes that sentence about objective reality. I should have said "I partially agree with your statement.) So, if I say "This ice cream tastes good" most people know I mean "This ice cream tastes good to me." But someone might mistake "The floor is hard" as a statement about objective reality. See my next comment.Not to any competent language user. — SophistiCat
"The floor is hard" is a statement about objective reality. Compared to a diamond, the floor is soft. Compared to neutron stars the floor isn't much more than a wisp of smoke.“If I say "the floor is hard, . . ." — Joshs
Agree. But being aware of how "is" tends to remove the speaker from the statement so the statement appears to be objective reality seems reasonable.Getting rid of it altogether is surely an overreaction. — Banno
Perhaps some preacher somewhere said that, but I doubt it is the position of any conservative church. For them, I think homosexuality is a sin, not a mental disease. — T Clark
Then why the roundabout way of stating ~A = A is false? Is it hat we don't want to introduce the "not equal" connective?A = A is simply the most basic form of saying that ~A = A is false. It is the axiom that tells us that contradictions are always false. — ArmChairPhilosopher
And mathematically there are no actual triangular objects in the physical world, merely approximations.For example, there are no triangles outside actual triangular objects in trope theory. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Good pointSaying they are two different balls because they are in two different locations is not that helpful either. Relative location is a derived trait, one that changes with context. If such derived traits are part of identity then you would be a different person when you're north of your house than you are when you're south of it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
unless change is part of the thing's identity, as a whirlpool for instance, or the human body's continuous process of food intake and subsequent evacuation.The next thing is that the law of identity allows that a thing might be continuously changing, yet maintain its status as the same thing. This is very difficult to conceive of . . — Metaphysician Undercover
You might find E-Prime relevant to the above.He wants to move past propositions such as, "the apple is red," that take the apple and its redness as existing outside of the perceiving mind. Identity has to be different because identity changes and grows more complete over time as our knowledge grows (as the dialectical progresses). And he doesn't want to look just at the apple as being a part of an individual subject's mind, since he is not a solipsist or subjective idealist, but how it is for all minds. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think it also qualifies as representative realism because I'm leaving the existence of external, independently-existing object an open question.That's phenomenalism as I understand it. — Tate
Because for millennia human beings have worked to understand what they experience through their senses and the standard model is one result.Why do you have confidence the standard model if you learned about it through your senses? — Tate
I'd classify them as variations of the sense of touch.There are a lot more senses, which are recognized today as such, beyond the classic 5 ones: balance, weight, motion/movement/kinaesthesia, velocity/speed, spatial/orientation, body position, pressure, vibration, temperature, pain, and more ... — Alkis Piskas
I'd say we have more than the image. We have the idea of a tree which tells us more than an image: tree begin as seeds, they grow slowly, etc. Whenever we learn something new about trees, we revise our idea of them.Well, a tree is not an abstract idea so that we have an idea of it. It is an object, something concrete. So I would say that, independently of its name, i.e. the word "three", it exists in our mind as an image connected to various data (knowledge) we have about it. — Alkis Piskas
We have indirect access to physical objects.Ok, but this does prove there is anything we don't have access to — Richard B
My eyes only see light. If free-standing 3D holograms existed indistinguishable from real trees, my eyes would see exactly the same thing.Ok, your eyes don't see sense data of trees, they see trees. — Richard B
In means no intermediary. I take it I have direct access to what my eyes see, my mind thinks, etc.Please explain what direct access means. — Richard B
Yes.We do, in fact, not experience reality past our senses — Christoffer
And yes, again.We don't have to accept the illogical conclusion of reality only existing because of our perception of reality in order to accept the importance of differentiating perception versus actual reality. — Christoffer
It's reasonable to believe the table has no color independent of us.Is it reasonable to then conclude, “see, this proves that we can never know the actual/the real color of the table, the thing-in-itself.” — Richard B
Can I take this question in terms of Kant's thing-in-itself? Kant said we cannot know the thing-in-itself, only phenomena. I'm making a more modest claim: that what we know of the physical world is based on sensory input and ideas our mind creates in response. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it.The question arises: how did we determine that our knowledge stops with experience? — Tate
OK, what ideas do you have in mind?Hume was a phenomenalist. Why would exploring his ideas go in a different thread? — Tate
I'd be interested but I think it should be in another thread.I don't think that's what Hume was thinking. Would you want to explore his ideas more? By going through the logic of bundle theory? — Tate
I think this captures part of our disagreement. We have five physical senses and I'd say we experience the sense data from these sense directly. Question: do you believe we experience anything directly and, if so, what?I do not directly experience electrons/protons; but with my senses and some scientific theory, I can infer their existence indirectly. Similarly, I do not directly experience sense data — Richard B
If you, and everyone else, experiences sense data directly, why do you explain what you mean by examples of illusions and other representations of reality? — Richard B
It says that an object basically is its properties. There's no extra "object" out there that has redness, or softness, or whatever.
"Light" and "mind" wouldn't be exceptions to that. See what I mean? — Tate
Lets say we both are standing in front of a tree. I look at you and see you directly looking at and experiencing a tree. I don’t see you directly experiencing sense data. Is this not being objective? Whatever is occurring “inside” is not in my purview. Whatever is occurring “outside” is shared by both of us and thus we gain an understanding of what we are talking about. — Richard B
Searle disagrees. Can you tell me why in your own words?From John Searle’s “Seeing Things as They Are” — Richard B
The OP doesn't mention "subjective experiences".but directly perceive only our subjective experiences. — Richard B
We experience the tree via our senses, but it would be silly to conclude that therefore we do not experience the tree. — Banno
How are maths and logic accomodated by this theory? — Wayfarer
I have some ideas about objective moral values but that would be the topic of another thread.When it comes to God, God is plausibly required for there to be certain sorts of prescriptive law, the most obvious being moral laws. Moral laws prescribe, they do not describe. Thus there needs to be a prescriber. And plausibly that prescriber will turn out to be God. — Bartricks
Characterizing an argument to dismiss it is not the same as addressing it, especially since there are 2000-year-old, traditional explanations still being accepted and discussed today.This is the old, traditional explanation atheists have used to explain the purpose of god. God as white lie. So? — Tom Storm
Processes are not a problem. Swimming, runnning, etc. are universals.There might be an error even here. Perhaps at least some of what you call "abstract objects" are things we do, not things we find. — Banno
True, the language we develop has indications of what exists but if our interest is ontology, language is subordinate to reality. In the middle ages, language included much talk of "witches" but that didn't mean witches really exist.Those with a background in philosophy may recognise what I am suggesting as deriving from philosophy of language. Instead of looking for the meaning of the terms we use, stand back and look at how they are used. — Banno
I see problems with defining abstract objects in terms of sets because it seems you need a definition of the universal before you can decide what is or is not in the set. For instance, "American" is used to refer to people in the U.S. and also to anyone living in Canada, Chile, Cuba, etc. (i.e., North and South America taken as continents, not a particular country.) We need to understand the meaning of "American" before we can define the set.'things we do', which is a set, and therefore an abstract object — Tate
You originally asked: " Can you give me an example, one will do, of a pure abstract object and by that I mean an (abstract) object that has no links whatsoever with the physical world?"The aether is a medium for waves, both these concepts have links to the physical (water waves/ripples). — Agent Smith
True and most working mathematicians say discovered; i.e., they accept Mathematical Platonism, which says mathematical objects exists "out there." True, our minds apprehend them but "triangles exist only in our mind" seems wrong. A geometry teacher is not trying to teach about what exists in his/her mind but the triangle "out there." Question: suppose I say triangles exist in my mind and they have four sides. How could anyone dispute what I say? Sure, triangles in another person's mind might have three sides but so what? Triangles in someone else's mind might have five sides. Clearly a definition of triangle is needed. Would you agree that definitions exist in the external world not only in our minds?there's a controversy with regard to whether math is invented or discovered. — Agent Smith
If all objects are viewed as individuals, it seems that some types of knowledge would be difficult or even impossible. Yes, I could gain knowledge about this particular object but I couldn't apply that knowledge if I encounter a similar object later because I wouldn't recognize the two objects as being instances of the same universal.they view all objects as individuals — Richard B
I'm not sure I understand what you're saying. How do we create a language of universals without acknowledging the existence of universals?Why would I need to hypothesize that inhabitants who use universals can perceive some Platonic realm, when I simply can appeal to our make up that favors detecting commonalities and creating language of universals vs detecting differences and name individuals? — Richard B
Sure, just as we can have the idea of a unicorn without ever having seen one.Can you have an idea of "tree" without having first perceived more than one tree? — Harry Hindu
A particular tree is a concrete object which we recognize as an instantiation of the idea of a tree. The idea of a particular tree is the idea, say, of the oak tree in my yard.What is the difference between the idea of the universal tree vs the particular tree? — Harry Hindu
What does the idea of two look like? It has various properties: synonym for pair; the first natural number after one; the only even prime number, etc.What does the idea of two look like in the mind independent of the scribble, "2" or "two" and independent of the observation of two particulars? — Harry Hindu
Is the idea of "two" independent of observation of two particulars? Yes. I grant that empirical experience often leads the mind to ideas but I regard the ideas as pre-existing. Just as when I take a walk, I see a rock that was there before I saw it. Similarly, the idea "two" existed before anyone thought of it.How do you know that you are holding the idea of 2 in your mind independent of these forms — Harry Hindu
My view is that ideas already exist in the mindscape, just as trees exist in the landscape. Seeing a pair of apples may awaken our mind to the idea of two, but the idea already exists. Any being which lacks the mental capacity will never perceive the idea "two." Imagine an earthworm, for instance, crawls over two pebbles. I doubt the idea of two ever enters what mind it has.From where did we get the idea of two if not by first observing more than one thing? — Harry Hindu
See previous answer. All ideas exist in the mindscape. Some minds (like ours) access ideas to make sense of sensory input. We find an idea in the mindscape that fits what we observe.Newton found F=ma. Einstein found different ideas which better describe what we observe.How did you come to experience the universal by observing just one pattern (a particular) of rough brown patches and smooth green patches? — Harry Hindu
Yes, thank you.Brief defense of universals, bolds added. — Wayfarer
OK, if we require “exist” to apply to only things in space/time, then universals don’t exist but they subsist.But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist — Russell, World of Universals
How about the following? "Luminiferous aether or ether ("luminiferous", meaning "light-bearing") was the postulated medium for the propagation of light. It was invoked to explain the ability of the apparently wave-based light to propagate through empty space (a vacuum), something that waves should not be able to do."Can you give me an example, one will do, of a pure abstract object and by that I mean an (abstract) object that has no links whatsoever with the physical world? It should exist only in the mind is what I'm saying. — Agent Smith
What could this mean “we don’t directly experience concrete objects” I see a tree, I go over to touch the leaves, smell the bark, hear the creaking of the branches, or taste the fruit it produces. How more direct can we get? — Richard B
I have no further comment on abstract objects, but I do have something to say about all these purported "illusions" the mind creates. . . . Secondly, the generalization from such "illusions" is dubious - — Agent Smith
This way however, we may at least indirectly experience an abstract tree - through experience of concrete objects and their concrete causal associations in the brain. — litewave
