What makes happiness an automatic justification for procreation of another person? Is it really the ultimate "trump" card for why it is justified to put new people into existence and have to experience life? — schopenhauer1

I have a very macabre interpretation of life. I wasn't born during that time but if human vanity isn't a myth I'm sure there was much fanfare and celebration when the language of life DNA was discovered. Watson and Crick won the Nobel if memory serves.

I know this sounds like a conspiracy theory but allow me to say every schoolboy knows that the only part of us that really has some form of eternal existence is our DNA. Despite the notion of personhood being so highly regarded no "person", no matter how great or low in our esteem, survives death. What is perhaps relevant to your argument is that happiness has a purpose if you can call it that.

"What is this purpose?" you might ask. It is to keep us alive long enough to, well, have sex and pass on our DNA. Think of it. Without happiness as a motivation all of us without doubt would reach for the nearest gun and blow our brains out. So there. I said it. Happiness is merely a very useful tool for DNA for it to replicate onto another human being which will also serve the same purpose and so on and so forth in an endless chain until another world-destroying asteroid happens to swing into the collision zone.

I was just reading about existentialism. Where does "existence precedes essence" fit into this whole idea of antinatalism? It does appear, at least by my inability to justify why existence has intrinsic value, that plain living - no perks no frills - is just not enough for us. We desire to be happy too. Happiness if an attainable to the desired degree within an acceptable timeframe is definitely a point in favor life and against antinatalist philosophy. However, many fail in the pursuit of happiness but notice that we simply can't use the word "all". Given this impossibility of universalizing antinatalist arguments to say that life is not worth living appears uncomfortably like tyranny of the majority. It's like a group of sad divorcees insisting that a happily married person should also leave his/her partner.

If you don't mind I'd like to request a clarification.

What exactly does one mean by subjective experience.

I read Nagel's paper and he doesn't define subjective experience (SE) anywhere in paper. If I understood correcty Nagel's "single point of view"/SE is critical to his argument but what exactly does SE mean?

It can't be self-awareness because that's something every consciousness has so, according to Nagel's rules, can be objectively evaluated.

Is SE dependent on the milieu of our minds - mental objects like concepts and its derivatives and our physical surroundings insofar as they affect SE? If yes then we can be objective about them. We can, after all, be objective about concepts and whatever follows from them. Also the physical world too is amenable to objectivity.


If all what I said is correct then SE is an instance of our consciousness interacting with its environment, both of which it's possible to be objective about. Ergo, we can be objective about subjective experience.

Well, understanding seems to be inversely proportional to complexity. After all, per my definition of simplicity and complexity, there are fewer interactions/relationships in something that is simpler compared to the, possibly unmanageable, interactions/relationships in something more complex. This makes the simple easier to understand than the complex.

I guess I'm using intelligibility/comprehensibility as a good yardstick for discerning the simple from the complex. Do you think that's wrong? If yes, why?

Well, it's because certain properties of experience are perceiver-dependent and not in the objects themselves. The air feels cold, but that doesn't mean it is cold in an objective sense (the feeling of cold varies between individuals and time). It just feels cold to you now. — Marchesk

So subjective experiences are simply beyond objective understanding. Something like non-overlapping magesteria that Stephen Jay Gould proposed to keep religion and science from each other's territories.

I guess we could proceed along those lines and say consciousness is literally incomprehensible because just like we can't separate the subjective from consciousness we can't take away objectivity from understanding/comprehension. After all comprehension has to be unbiased which is another name for objectivity.

Do you agree then that as per Nagel's argument, consciousness is, by its nature, incomprehensible? Or is there the better option of a type of comprehension that is non-objective which can access knowledge that objectivity can't handle?

I believe Nagel was saying that science uses an objective view from nowhere (perspective-less or lacking subjectivity) to create explanations. But the subjective doesn't fit into these explanations. And yet subjectivity is part of the world.

If the universe went bang, and stars formed fusing heavier elements leading to life evolving, then somehow subjectivity emerged. — Marchesk

Aah! Thanks for the explanation.

I wonder if that's entirely true. Scientific objectivity doesn't mean you ignore essential and defining aspects, here subjective experiences, of the object of study. Rather scientific objectivity is specifically designed to eliminate observer bias and in no way does it/should it overlook, in this case, subjective experiences.

I may be completely wrong here but the claim here seems to be, if you take the argument to its logical conclusion, nothing that is ever subjective can be scientifically studied due to objectivity being necessary in science. While this may somehow shield consciousness from attack it also makes consciousness a woo-woo pseudoscience. I don't know which is more preferable here - following Nagel into pseudoscience or give up one of my favorite beliefs that there is something about consciousness that defies the physical.

The problem according to the esteemed Nagel is that subjective experiences (what it is to be a conscious being) are unique - "single point of view" in his words. Thus, since objectivity, a necessity for any physicalist theory, would be forced to ignore subjective experiences this will, in effect, make such theories incapable of explaining consciousness - the phenomenon they were built to explain.

What I don't understand is how and why "single points of view" (subjective experiences) precludes objectivity?

Is Nagel relying on the definitions of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" when he says any objective theory would be forced to exclude subjective experiences? This seems wrong since we may objectively study subjectivity or subjectively study objectivity without running into problems.

Is Nagel saying something more powerful in terms of relevance to his argument that it's impossible to view subjectivity under an objective lens? How did he come to have this belief?

Frankly I'm puzzled.

For example, deduction might be considered to be special case of induction in which there is believed to exist perfect certainty for a conclusion with respect to a given premise. — sime

This makes sense only if you ignore the difference between probability and certainty. Any conclusion with a probability less than a 100% is from an inductive argument and anything else (100% probabilty/certainty) is from a deductive argument.

Also induction has fewer forms among which arguments from analogy and statistical arguments are the only ones I remember.

Deduction, on the other hand, probably has an infinite number of valid forms. If not they at least outnumber the forms available in induction.

If I recall correctly the problem of induction, although exposing a limitation of inductive logic, is more about a specific class of induction viz. science where statistics plays a huge role as conclusions about how nature works are drawn from a finite sample space of observations.

1. The present will resemble the past.

Why?

Because

2. The present has resembled the past

Why?

Because

3. The present has resembled the past

As you can see this is a circular, ergo fallacious, deductive argument.

Oh gosh, is that my fault, for suggesting that offside is about vagueness, not induction? And you thought I meant induction is about vagueness, not the opposite? Or you thought it would be just a shame to examine induction without ambiguity and vagueness in the mix (even if that was good enough for Hume, Goodman and Kripke, and probably Wittgenstein)? And hey what about Leibniz's law too?? You want it all in the pot!!

You mad fool! — bongo fury

:joke: :grin:

Well the claim seems to be that it's impossible to know whether people engaged in discourse are talking about the same thing. I agree that many, possibly infinite, rules or definitions may have enough similarities for one to pass of easily as any other in the list. However, there's got to be an underlying similarity between them that makes us not see the difference. For instance in the plus-quus example, subtraction can never be one of the other rules mistaken as plus or quus. There is clearly a limit to the confusion. That's to say, even admitting of vagueness or ambiguity or the problem of induction or whatever else, we can have meaningful discourse.

Also although some subjects involving inherently vague or ambiguous terms may be rendered difficult, if not impossible, by Wittgenstein's paradox, there are limits to the paradox which, in my opinion, provides enough room for a reasonable conversation, as this one we're having.

You can't convict Fred of murder just because the witness can't tell the difference between him and the perpetrator. Eye witnesses are known to give crap evidence. — frank

My contention is that the necessity for some alignment between different rules/definitions so that they may both apply simultaneously as in the paradox, reveals that the problem isn't catastrophic either to language or logic.

How would one go about defining the terms "simplicity" and "complexity"?

The usual interpretation of the difference between simplicity and complexity seems to be pinned down numerically or structurally or relationally. Fewer components in a system makes the system simple. Structurally, the parts are said to be simpler than the whole. The fewer the relationships between the parts the simpler the system is.

A complex system would have many components/parts and the relations between them would also be greater in number.

I guess I have a very basic conception of the words "simplicity" and "complexity" — TheMadFool

What is more complex, a cell or a mountain?...why? What is more complex, a human or the large hadron collider?...again, why? — ZhouBoTong

Great question.

That we can create a mountain and a hadron collider but not a cell or a human is clear evidence in which category these four items fall.

We can create only things we understand the mechanics of and what is beyond our understanding and therefore can't create is a sign that some stuff are just too complex.

I guess Liebniz's law of identity would apply here viz. that indistinguishability implies identity. In fact Wittgenstein's paradox admits that it's the impossibility of telling two rules apart from a fixed number of instances as the source of the paradox.

In my humble opinion the paradox requires a high degree of similarity between the rules involved but is absent when the rules under scrutiny are violently opposed in meaning i.e. there are absolutely no instances of concurrence between the rules because they contradict each other. I mean a total absence of agreements between rules would imply a clear division in the meanings of given rules. Therefore, the rules aren't so fundamentally different i.e. there are no obvious fatal contradictions in our thinking to make the paradox a real unmanageable problem for language.

Ambiguity and vagueness seem to part of the problem too but for now I'm still in the dark as to how exactly they weigh in. What do you guys think?

:ok:

What about family resemblance? Does it not afford an opportunity for export/import of words from one language game to another to allow meaningful interpretation of one game in terms of another?

How would you know you have all the required info? What fact would you point to to show that you have it? — frank

The required info would be instances where the disagreement arises, thus revealing that different rules are/were in play.

Presumably plus-quus isn't in doubt as a case of Kripgenstein, at least? But compare blue-grue if you want another (or very close).

I was questioning offside as a suitable example of (yes) generalising from limited (but presumed non-vague) information, and recommending it as a case of vagueness, specifically the ineliminability of vagueness in measurement with no margin of error. — bongo fury

I think vagueness requires a continuum to exist in. The classic heap paradox illustrates that quite well I believe. However Wittgenstein's paradox seem to be about clear and distinct rules. No continuum.

... or as many as you like. I think you're back on Plus/Quus.

Just saying, offside rule disputes may be a good example of a different (interesting) problem, but not this one. — bongo fury

I think we agree. It's not a problem with mathematics or language. It's that on reflection, we note that there's no way to verify that communication has the clarity and precision we assume it has.

More data wouldn't resolve that. It's similar to the problem of induction. — frank

I guess the example given is insufficient to capture the essence of Wittgenstein's paradox because both the off-side example and the plus-quus example are about acquiring more information.

Could you guys give me a better example? Thanks.

:ok:

Yes, but most of these permutations are useless for these parts. — alcontali

Agreed. Some permutations may be dead ends e.g. inert elements like Xenon etc.

According to game theory, these parts will only pick those possibilities that substantially improve their own stability. — alcontali

Agreed. There must be a guiding principle to interactions e.g. celestial objects tend to be spherical.

However equilibrium if it has anything to do with stability of possible permutations then it only determines/limits possibilities. Wouldn't that be against complexity by preventing all possible relationships?

You're mistaken or have misread me. — 180 Proof

That was my suspicion all along. :up:

Meaning is use', as Witty shows, so words, however nonsensical, derive or convey meaning from the context in which one uses them. Like Abracadabra ... Awop-bop-a-loo-mop alop-bam-boom ... Goo goo g'joob ... etc. Any utterance or expression can be meaningful even if it lacks informational content (e.g. I AM, I AM) or there are no facts of the matter to which it can be used to refer (e.g. round square). Like g/G. Thus, isn't it incoherent to claim whether or not to know that "g/G exists"? — 180 Proof

However if we're to put g/G in the context of a language game I believe it makes any and all claims about g/G immune to criticism. Am I right? If so then you really can't accuse anyone of incoherence.

This is probably totally unrelated to the great Nietzsche but in my opinion bad things must happen to good people in a tragedy. If not it's just comeuppance. Can you tell me what was good about what Nietzsche deemed a tragedy?

If you insist the proposition "simplicity evolves into complexity" can't be proven then let me give it a shot. You be the judge.

Essential features of complexity : numerically greater in parts and part-to-part relationships

Consider a system consisting of 3 parts a, b and c and that it is possible for all possible permutations to occur between a, b and c.

We have in the beginning, with the artificial constraint that only permutations of 3 are possible, 3 × 3 × 3 = 27 possibilities.

Each of these 27 possibilities then have further possible combinations which we can assume to be again in threes. We now have 27 × 27 × 27 = 19683 permutations possible.

The above calculation ignores more complex relationships that could be possible.

Therefore, simplicity evolves into complexity. What do you think of my "proof"?

I thought "I don't know" was/is a perfectly acceptable answer to questions of any kind.

Have you never used the words "I don't know"?

If "no" then you would be omniscient which would be quite an awkward claim in a philosophy forum.

If "yes" then just see the similarity in the situation that required you to utter "I don't know" with the God debate.

By equating g/G with z$&p@ you're implying that g/G is meaningless which is incorrect. Of course if you use an operational definition to g/G your point holds.

What is notable is we could consider the whole g/G issue as possibly similar to demons-disease. 5 centuries ago demons were the cause of illnesses but now we know microbes are the culprit. Is it not possible then that we may locate g/G in a similar fashion?

Also microbes seem to suggest what I will call hidden worlds. If the discovery of such hidden worlds teaches anything it is to be cautious about assigning 100% certainty to knowledge.

And what about consciousness? Yes, it probably has a physical explanation but we can't deny the obvious difference between thoughts and the physical world.

Hence, the answer is that there is no proof possible that simplicity leads to complexity in the physical universe. — alcontali

Am I then to conclude that the belief simplicity leads to complexity is baseless and ergo, logically, to be open to discussion?

If yes could you write some more of your thoughts on it.


Also I think equlibrium has nothing to do with the issue of simplicity and complexity. Yes equilibrium may describe a relationship between systems but it, as a concept, doesn't form part of the definition of simplicity or complexity.

You wrote a lot. I understood little. Let's not bring in other theories to make sense of what I want to discuss. Not because they aren't relevant but because I don't understand them and I am the audience. Be a good speaker (if you can).

The problem is this:

1. People believe that simplicity evolves into complexity

2. Humans can't create anything more complex than themselves

If 1 is true then 2 should be false.

The problem is compounded by the fact that intelligence should lead to greater complexity by way of knowledge. There's a difference between an amateur philosopher and a trained philosopher as an example. Yet this is obviously false in man-made creations which, as I said, are poor imitations of nature.

If you don't want to answer that then can you kindly try and provide a proof for the belief that simplicity leads to complexity or vice versa or perhaps you want to do something else.

It is really just pointing out some confusion on my part as to what exactly you are suggesting with "complex"?? — ZhouBoTong

Do you consider deleting features from my understanding of complexity and simplicity or adding other features you think are necessary?

Have a go.

Even assuming that I cannot name one man-made object that is more complex than humans, you could only achieve have not produce something more complex than humans themselves, not your desired can never produce something more complex than humans themselves. — Banno

Agreed but I did mention that limitation to my thesis. The future is open-ended as far as I can see. What bears mentioning though is the way people have sorted problems in science and philosophy. Why is consciousness called a "hard" problem and why is there no genuine AI? Why is an explanation for turbulence or the theory of everything so difficult? These should be, if complexity follows naturally from simplicity, easy. Right?

I like your thinking.

Nothing, for me, can be understood in terms of actuality, potentiality or possibility (but then, I do tend towards ‘glass half full’). When there is actually nothing, there is still the potential for something. Likewise, even when there evidently can be nothing, we could nevertheless imagine the possibility of something.

‘Absolute nothing’ is a concept that refers to an absence even of the possibility of anything. We can approach an understanding of this ‘absolute nothing’, but ultimately there is no way of fully understanding it as such.

Any concept of ‘nothing’ is relative at least to some possibility: being whatever is striving to understand it...a possible ‘something’ to which this ‘nothingness’ matters...for whom ‘nothing’ has meaning... — Possibility

How about a linguistic take on nothing.

It simplifies discourse quite a bit you know.

"I don't want anything" becomes "I want nothing"

"All things are inferior" becomes "Nothing is superior"

"Nothing" emerges when we reach limits. "Only unicorns will be discussed" becomes "Nothing other than unicorns will be discussed".

cost substantially less energy — alcontali

So the answer to your main point is that we simply cannot afford it. Biology is too cheap and efficient to be contended with in terms of raw complicatedness — VagabondSpectre

So, it's about energy expense vs return vis-a-vis efficiency. Nature, and we're part of it, is the most efficient system in existence and we simply can't match up no matter how creative we get.

I learned in biology class how living systems have in-built redundancies which take the form of multiple pathways in biochemistry that work as a fail-safe in case one chemical pathway should be obstructed, allowing life to continue. Also the fact that all life, from viruses to blue whales, is based on the four bases of DNA suggests an almost unimaginable efficiency in the system.

In the physical world, you can have simple objects of which their simple, disconnected state is much more probable than when they collectively form a more improbable, complex object. — alcontali

Reminded me of the oft bandied about but usually misunderstood (count me in) concept of entropy. I guess the difference between a closed and an open system explains the complexity, especially life, we see on earth.

There are more around 37.2 trillion cells in the human body. Perhaps we just don’t have the time. — NOS4A2

Agreed. Everything takes time. That's why I admitted that I may be speaking too soon.

But that's not true. — Banno

How? Can you name one man-made object that is more complex than humans?

:up:

TO ALL

How would one go about defining the terms "simplicity" and "complexity"?

The usual interpretation of the difference between simplicity and complexity seems to be pinned down numerically or structurally or relationally. Fewer components in a system makes the system simple. Structurally, the parts are said to be simpler than the whole. The fewer the relationships between the parts the simpler the system is.

A complex system would have many components/parts and the relations between them would also be greater in number.

I guess I have a very basic conception of the words "simplicity" and "complexity"

I think Hume thought motion was mysterious because of Parmenides — Gregory

Why?

yeah, i'm hoping our predictability is taken into account by my christian god. Just as Paul had his doubts about his faith, so do many of us. — christian2017

I thought it was doubting Thomas who refused to believe in the resurrection. I really find the painting depicting him/Paul??? poking his finger into Christ's wounds to confirm the resurrection awesomely inspiring. The quintessential skeptic.

I understand faith to be a method of acquiring belief rather than justification as your diagram seems to suggest. Perhaps people use the word "faith" in that manner and I'm not aware of it.

By definition, faith as a method of acquiring belief short-circuits the "normal" or preferred use of well-crafted logical arguments. This logical failing stands out like a sore thumb for all to see and pick apart at will.

Nevertheless I feel that faith and evidence-based reasoning differ not in type but in degrees. As @Keenan said "All knowledge is based on faith" I believe that justification doesn't always guarantee the truth because although our arguments may be valid we lack absolute certainty in the truth of our premises (faith???). Ergo the existence of a inference gap between any and all justification and the truth. In logical discourse this inference gap is minimized to the best of our abilities and is "small" but in faith-based belief it's a gigantic chasm relatively speaking.

In short the difference between logic and faith is the difference in the size of the bridge you construct to cross the inference gap. A pond is not an ocean but the difference is only in size.

Did Benjamin Button suffer from growing pains?

Statement 1:

A circle is never the same as anything that is not a circle. Therefore, a circle is something that is never anything that is not a circle. — elucid

Agreed though it appears tautological.

Statement 2:

Something existent is never the same as something non-existent. Therefore, something existent is something that is never non-existent. — elucid

Begging the question.

The word "never" is doing something odd.

In the premise it expresses the contradiction existence vs non-existence which is acceptable.

In the conclusion it makes a claim about the world viz. that existence is eternal. The premise doesn't support this conclusion.

Clever.

You got zombied. The Great Whatever got banned a couple of years ago. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Thanks. S/he makes sense though.

What is love? — The Great Whatever

I agree with you wholly about "

Love is a heterosexual social mechanism primarily designed for lower status men to aim at women. — The Great Whatever

.

After all, heterosexual love is, by definition, an inequality. A man x who loves a woman y necessarily holds y in higher esteem than himself - something to be attained, protected and hopefully mated with.

I wouldnt say so, no. That is only one type of life you are talking about, there is other life that doesn't have that appreciation as you yourself stated and therefore life itself cannot have this intrinsic value. — DingoJones

It's quite interesting that humans are considered virtuoso tool makers. We started off with simple stone axes and now we have lasers and rockets. We seem to have "progressed" even beyond that - aiming beyond life itself to something purportedly greater. Quite naturally life transforms itself into an instrument/tool to achieve that greater-beyond. "I'm alive" becomes "I live for <greater-beyond>".


When viewed like above life appears to have instrumental value rather than intrinsic value - serving only as a means of achieving the greater-beyond. Buddhists consider life, especially human life, in this way - as the best opportunity to achieve nirvana.

What may be relevant to the discussion is unlike a person using a hammer, where there's a distinction between the user and the tool, no such separation exists when life uses life to achieve the greater-beyond.

I find that kind of strange a focus because in philosophy I've always focused principally on what seem to be broader questions (like what do we even mean when we ask things like "what is real?" or "what is moral?", what criteria would we use to judge answers to those questions, what methods could we use to apply those criteria, what faculties do we need to employ those methods, who should be in charge of doing so, and why does any of it matter) and answers to questions like "does God exist?" just fall out as a consequence of answers to those questions, rather than as a principal focus. — Pfhorrest

I agree. There are concepts more fundamental than the existence of God. What does "existence" mean? What does "definition" mean? What principles do we use to prove/disprove existence? What does "proof" mean? How crucial is logic to all of this? Etc. etc.

However, people seem to consider such questions as already answered when person X claims "god(s) exist(s)". X means that there is a being who created this universe and intervenes in its affairs on occasion. Then it becomes necessary, if we're to be convinced of such a being, to ask for evidence or proof. We needn't delve too deep into the meaning of "proof" or "evidence" to make sense of the atheist who's making the request. Simply remind X of how he forms beliefs on other matters. Surely he doesn't believe everything he hears or sees. Hasn't he ever been lied to? This basic proof-requirement is all atheists need appeal to when conversing with a theist.

A Baby has free will but its actions are completely predictable. — christian2017

This is one of the oddest things about humans.


The entire structure of human civilization is based on predictability. For instance basic needs and the desire for them is universal save a few odd outliers who prefer the wilderness.

Yet, morality, therefore the law, is premised on free will. It's even stranger when we consider how "effective" the law is given that it depends on the predictability of our proclivities.

Perhaps morality grounds itself on the possibility or fact of our capacity to resist our inclinations or may be not since the law, the moral guardian, functions "only" to rearrange our priorities from, say, a quick buck to avoiding 30 years in the slammer.

I think this is a weak analogy--perhaps another one of your specialties. A child learning something for the first time has nothing in common with the process of this forum and the people who have done serious reading and in far more than a Philosophy 101 class. — uncanni

:rofl:

:up: :ok:

I don't mean to denigrate the intelligence and erudition of forum members here. However consider this from the perspective of the universe itself.

How much do we know?

Aren't we pitifully confined to this teensy rock we call earth, possibly in the backwaters of the galaxy to say nothing of our position in this vast universe? We can safely bet, despite the mountains of treatises that have been, are being and will be written, that our knowledge is relatively zero.

The same principle by which you judge this forum is more than a child's learning renders us playmates of children.

Doesn't this stuff fall under "don't know"? — jorndoe

I was just trying to make sense of the intent behind the creation of the word "supernagic".

It provides adequate room for scientists to enter into the foray of the so-called "supernatural". After all, in line with Karl Popper's falsifiability theory of science, any measurement/observation contradictory to known laws of nature would immediately fall under the term "supernatural". This wouldn't be good for science right?

So for scientists to make the distinction between the "supernatural" that needs explaining through research and the "supernatural" that's "explained" as god's handiwork we need "supernagic".

Well Antinatalism is about an individuals value assessment and I am trying to frame this at a societal level.
Also, I do not agree that Antinatalism is correct or even coherent. — DingoJones

Rationality is universal in scope. Are antinatlists just quirky, sad people or do their arguments make sense?

I don't know how far you'll agree with me but a common thread that runs through all human aspirations and objectives is a state of Awakening. Parents teach their children the way the world actually is and how to cope. Religions advertise a higher state of consciousness and philosophy tries to sell sagacious wisdom. This enlightened state of mind is the ultimate goal of every human. Yes, they differ from each other but all involve a waking up as if to say we're all in some kind of deep slumber.

Note that all I've said above are claims only about humans - all but a few awakened ones are in deep sleep. Can we not take one step further and say that among the multitude of life-forms only humans have the capacity to appreciate life and with that realization make an effort towards improving and sustaining all life on the planet? We can take this route and even claim that the universe itself has awakened in us.

Does this make life sacred or have intrinsic value?

What I mean to say is that the problem may not be with language but with the users of language. Might we be mistaking ignorance/incomplete knowledge for a linguistic paradox?

In math there's a similar problem with induction. Suppose we're given only a three numbers in a sequence like so:

A = {1, 4, 8,...}

We're asked to find the next number in the sequence.

There are two possible rules given what we do know:

1) 1 + 3 = 4 and then 4 + 4 = 8

2) 2^0 = 1, 2^2 = 4, 2^3 = 8

As you can see the problem isn't with mathematics <language> but with inadequate data.

As with the off-site rule we need some more more data points to complete our understanding of the rule being applied.

I think you're right. Natural language is in use where experiences vary (as Leo pointed out). It would take time and special personalities to even uncover this. — frank

An error in my post which I hope to "correct"...

It isn't about ambiguity as I thought. Actually it's about multiple disparate rules that concur ONLY in a particular set of instances. The effect being an inability to determine if a given number of people are actually following the same rule or not.

However it doesn't seem so bad because the relationship as in the example of "plus" and "quus" is that of containment. The "quus" rule lies within the "plus" rule. The concurrence between "quus" and "plus" is true in the specified range of numbers.

What I mean is there is no right vs wrong/true vs false in the matter of rules as far as Wittgenstein's paradox is concerned. It's more about degrees of correctness. In our example the "quus" rule isn't wrong/false which would be a real problem. Rather the "plus" rule is more correct than the "quus" rule.

In short there is no error and the difference in the rules is just a question of degrees of correctness.

There is no black and white. Simply shades of grey.