• Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    Moral non-naturalism is neither naturalistic nor descriptivist180 Proof

    Right, but I'm trying to name a specific kind of moral view that I am opposed to, so I don't want to use a name that covers something so broad that it also includes what I'm in favor of. My view is non-descriptivist, and therefore not naturalist. This view I'm opposed to may or may not be descriptivist but is definitely not naturalist. So "non-naturalism" does encompass this view I'm opposed to, but also technically encompasses my own. I'm looking for a name for something narrower than non-naturalism.

    ... "deontic".180 Proof

    That could be a good suggestion, except that it's again too broad, if "deontic" is just taken to be opposed to "consequentialist". Because my own view is also anti-consequentialist, and so deontic. The view I'm trying to name is, too, but again I'm looking for something narrower.

    I worry I may have to just make up a term of my own for this, though even then I'm not sure what a good term would be.
  • 180 Proof
    1.5k
    I worry I may have to just make up a term of my own for this, though even then I'm not sure what a good term would be.Pfhorrest
    Platonic (re: Form of the Good)? Or meontic ("beyond being")? :chin:
  • Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    Platonic (re: Form of the Good)? Or meontic ("beyond being")?180 Proof

    "Platonic" seems too broad again, but "meontic" seems a plausible option. I'll mull that over. Thanks again!
  • Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    Or meontic ("beyond being")? :180 Proof

    On second thought I'm not so sure that really gets at the thrust of what I'm aiming for.

    Something relating to "abnegation" seems like a possibility, like "abnegative", but I'm not certain that everything that falls into this category is necessarily about denial of pleasures, so much as they are about the morality of things not necessarily tracking the pleasure or pain involved with them.

    If I could solve this analogy for "xxxx", I could just term it super-xxxx-ism:

    real : physical : natural
    ::
    moral : ethical : xxxx.

    But I can't think of what could stand for "xxxx" there.

    Maybe someone like @Wayfarer who actually (I think) adheres to the position I'm against and trying to name could suggest a good name for it.

    As supernatural reality transcends the empirical, ___what?___ morality transcends the hedonic?
  • Wayfarer
    9.9k
    Apophaticism.

    One rhetorical device I've been thinking about is to ask the question: 'does reality exist'? It seems an absurd question, although it might be admissible in certain contexts: say, if you're considering the 'Matrix' scenario which posits that humans are actually elements in a simulation, so that it suggests the notion that what we take to be reality is really a simulation. Such themes are found in quite a few sci-fi movies, like The Truman Show, Matrix, Inception and others of that genre. But even so, the over-arching narrative is that even though reality is not what we take it to be, there is nevertheless reality even if we don't comprehend it.

    But, leaving those considerations aside, the question 'does reality exist?' is absurd in a Cartesian sense: that any question presumes there's someone asking the question of something. So in that sense, the question is absurd, in that every question, and every possible answer, assumes a reality. Every act presumes existence.

    I say that to bring out the sense in which the term 'existence' strictly speaking pertains only to specifics, even if the specific thing or being is conceived of as universal. Particular things and beings exist. Recall again the etymology of 'exist' - 'ex-', outside of or apart from (external, exile) and 'ist', to be or to stand. So 'to exist' is to assume an identity, to be this as distinct from that.

    And that can't be said of reality as such, because by definition it is not 'this' or 'that' but that which must be in order for there to be any 'this' or 'that'.

    And that is the sense in which apophaticism claims that God is 'beyond existence'. This is often translated or given as 'beyond being', but here is where I think the crucial differentiation need be made between 'being' and 'existence'; 'the ground of Being' is not something which has a start or end, or is composed of anything else, so cannot be said to 'exist'. Not because it's non-existent but because it's (sorry, Pfhorrest) 'super-existent'.

    This was the subject of Tillich's claim that 'God does not exist':

    Existence - Existence refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite' . Therefore existence is estrangement.")


    Although this looks like Tillich was an atheist such misunderstanding only arises due to a simplistic understanding of his use of the word "existence". What Tillich is seeking to lead us to is an understanding of the "God above God". ...The Ground of Being (God) must be separate from (or other to) the finite realm (which is a mixture of being and non-being) and that God cannot be -a- being. God must be beyond the finite realm. Anything brought from essence into existence is always going to be corrupted by ambiguity and ... finitude. Thus statements about God must always be symbolic (except the statement 'God is the Ground of Being'). Although we may claim to know God (the Infinite) we cannot. The moment God is brought from essence into existence God is corrupted by finitude and our limited understanding. In this realm we can never fully grasp (or speak about) who God really is. The infinite cannot remain infinite in the finite realm. That this rings true can be seen when we realize there are a multitude of different understandings of God within the Christian faith alone. They cannot all be completely true so there must exist a 'pure' understanding of God (essence) that each of these are speaking about (or glimpsing aspects of)...."

    Tillich was criticized or accused of atheism or being quasi- Eastern in his views but this understanding actually has a clear lineage going back to Greek-influenced philosophical theology - like for example in Scotus Eirugena and Meister Eckhardt.

    None of this is about the 'God of the popular imagination', which is, I'm sure, the subject of most atheist criticism. That 'God' only existed because the popular imagination demanded it but was never the reality in question.
  • 180 Proof
    1.5k
    Something relating to "abnegation" seems like a possibility, like "abnegative", but I'm not certain that everything that falls into this category is necessarily about denial of pleasures, so much as they are about the morality of things not necessarily tracking the pleasure or pain involved with them.Pfhorrest
    Ascetic? (à la Jainism)
  • Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    Ascetic?180 Proof

    That is another good suggestion, along the lines of ”abnegative”. I had in earlier drafts also used “austere”. All three have the same problem but I’m wondering if that’s really such a problem after all. What do you and @Wayfarer think between those three? (“Apophatic” doesn’t seem appropriate as that’s more about how you get to that conclusion than what the conclusion is).
  • 180 Proof
    1.5k
    What do you and “Wayfarer” think between those three? (“Apophatic” ...Pfhorrest
    I won't go down that rabbit-hole, but I agree that it's not relevant - certainly less so than my suggestions. Anyway, as a 'complementary opposition' re: hedonic (ἡδονή, hēdonē) - yeah, not fully acquainted with your moral understanding - ascetic (ἄσκησις, askesis) - particularly (non-naturalistic) traditions like the Jains - is probably as close as you'll get without coining a new term.
  • Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    I decided that I was unsatisfied with the lack of parallelisms between any of these (abnegative / austere / ascetic) options and "natural", so I decided to just go for a direct linguistic parallel.

    So I've coined the term "superusural", as Latin "usura" and so "usural" bears the same relation to the Greek-derived "ethics" (evidenced by many Romance languages giving their cognate of "use" as a translation of the Greek root "ethos") as Latin "natura" and so "natural" bears to the Greek-derived "physics".

    That analogy I wanted to complete earlier is thus:

    real : physical : natural
    ::
    moral : ethical : usural

    "Utor", the root of "usura", also has meanings of enjoying and experiencing, making it especially appropriate for something related to hedonism, and there are clear implications of usefulness and thence utilitarianism which, while I don't agree with it on all points, at least shares altruistic hedonism with my view.

    So henceforth, usuralism is the moral analogue of naturalism, and superusuralism its opposite, like supernaturalism.
  • god must be atheist
    2.1k
    apathetic
    anomaly
    agnosticism
    are
    apple
    Abel
    anglican
    aromatic
    azt a leborult szivar vegit!

    A- in front of a word taken from Greek negates it.

    To negate a French- or Germanic origin word, stick a non- or an un- in front of it. French: uncomplicated. German: ungestraubfuhrerinzeugholmisserandkriegestufferei. Mixed: underarm deodorant (hey! de- is another Greek prefix to negate!)

    Latin? in- for negation. For instance, "IN RI" or "incommunicado" or "incontinent" etc.
  • Pfhorrest
    2.8k
    Yeah but I’m forming an analogy with supernatural so I’m going to use “super” for that word too.

    But on third or fourth thought I’m considering maybe “nurtural” as the analogue of “natural”, for a number of reasons: “nature” and “nurture” are already juxtaposed in other contexts (where they both mean different things than they do here), their etymologies have connotations of “the way things were beforehand” and “the way we’re making them” that befit the is-ought distinction, “nurture” connotes a focus on “material” wellbeing and caretaking (as opposed to, say, obedient) and also food (obviously related to appetite) that befits the hedonic meaning I’m aiming for, and roots or cognates of “nurture” also have a meaning or “manner or character” that makes it also synonymous with “ethos” and so fitting for the physical : natural :: ethical :: nurtural analogy.

    Thoughts?
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