• Dan123
    25
    is Dasein “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”

    I agree, surely not.
    InternetStranger

    Could you explain this?
  • InternetStranger
    155


    "is Dasein “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”

    I agree, surely not."

    Because Kant has to have the Greek teleology for his perfection of morals. Something already ready, spinning out. Ergo, "you can because you ought to". The phenomenological region is the "temporary and local" access to the perfection of the teleology in its lower stages. The basic access is active, space and time are "legislated", but from a fixed mold according to the ultimate telos. It's true, he says only God could do without this apparatus of access, which adds a certain ambiguity. As though god does not care about his own telos unfolding phenomenologicaly.
  • Dan123
    25
    "is Dasein “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”

    I agree, surely not."

    Because Kant has to have the Greek teleology for his perfection of morals. Something already ready, spinning out. Ergo, "you can because you ought to". The phenomenological region is the "temporary and local" access to the perfection of the teleology in its lower stages. The basic access is active, space and time are "legislated", but from a fixed mold according to the ultimate telos. It's true, he says only God could do without this apparatus of access, which adds a certain ambiguity. As though god does not care about his own telos unfolding phenomenologicaly.
    InternetStranger

    Not too sure what you are talking about. We are talking about what Heidegger thinks, not Kant, no? I'm not sure what God or morality has to do with what we are talking about.
  • Akanthinos
    847
    Given that we have now had more exposition of the phenomenological aspect of Heidegger's research in B&T, I now feel much more comfortable in laying down another charge at his feet. Quite simply, his methodology lacks anything more than the shallowest lip service to the practice of phenomenology. I would not necessarily feel the need to defend that this is just husserlian sectarism on my part ; I do not see why I should hide that I think Husserl in every possible manner more important than Heidegger. But I do think that it goes further than just me being triggered by Heidegger's overshadowing my favourite philosopher. The phenomenological field might be hazy and hard to define, but there still remains a core conceptual frame which enables us to say that this or that is or isn't phenomenology, and it simply doesn't suffice to say “the expression ‘phenomenology' signifies primarily a methodological conception”.

    Yes, the process of phenomenological enquiry requires a methodological conception, but at least a few steps further than the simple engagement toward the use of methodology-driven conceptions, as Heidegger does. You need an epochē, a reduction, a (somewhat) spelled out qualitative method. Otherwise, like Davidson pointed out 15 years ago, it becomes entirely impossible to warrant that your work is not tainted by reification and naturalistic thinking.

    There is very little of these required ingredients that can be detected in Heidegger's concoction. We see him at [27] make a commitment to authenticity and generality, and qualify the whole process as diametrically opposed to a technical process, something which is entirely up for debate. Of course, it'll play nice with all those Krisis types, who like to blame every modern woes on technicality. We are then exposed to a very strange and unnecessary Prolegomena, in which Heidegger, through an expose of presence as an ontological root for the motivation of phenomenology, dissociates entirely the practice of phenomenology from it's "logical" roots, under which it operated as a scientific concept. (As an aside, [34] contains another very obvious falsity : contra Heidegger, it is specifically because Logos can mean reason that we know that its function does not reside in the pure and simple revealing of something).

    As such, qualifying phenomenology as "to reveal from itself what reveals itself as it reveals itself from itself" (sorry, again, french translation) is quite insufficient. It weakens the concept as a whole such that it is then possible for Heidegger to say that "formally, the meaning of the formal or vulgar concept of phenomena allows us to call phenomenology any act of revealing of a being such that this being shows itself as itself" [35]. Or that "phenomenology is the mode of access and legitimacy of that which must become the theme of ontology" [36], which seems to mean that phenomenology is bound to circle back into naturalistic thinking at some point.

    To be fair to Heidegger, I should at this time point to what, up to [41], I can consider to be proper phenomenology in B&T. There is no phenomenological reduction as far as the eye can see, that's undeniable, and it's also why it is so goddamn puzzling that many readers here prefer Heidegger to Husserl on the basis that Heidegger was less Cartesian than Husserl : the purpose of the reduction is to show that there is no gap between consciousness and its object. There is, however, at least some impression of an epochē evoked at [34] when he states that "phenomenology does not name the object of its research, nor does it characterise them as real (reale)." This, however, was the functional framework of descriptive phenomenology, and one is fully justified in wondering how can an hermeneutical framework even avoid abusive reification. Finally, we have to ask ourselves if there is a qualitative method at work here at all. I would have to dig a bit more into the history and conditions of the redaction of B&T to make a conclusive judgement on this, as it is possible that Heidegger had a very well thought-out methodology during the early phase of the redaction of the book. It does, however, seems to me more likely that B&T was written more or less in block, and that there is simply no methodology at work at all.

    Next time on "Akanthinos bitches 'bout B&T", I'll try to work a bit more on the distinction between Descriptive (i.e. Good & Virtuous) vs Hermeneutical (i.e. Evil & Dirty) phenomenology.
  • InternetStranger
    155


    "Not too sure what you are talking about. We are talking about what Heidegger thinks, not Kant, no? I'm not sure what God or morality has to do with what we are talking about."

    In the work called Heidegger Kant is one of the Great philosophers. Which means, he is still alive as one's youth still lives in his maturity and old age.

    "not sure what God or morality has to do with what we are talking about."

    For the reason that Heidegger can only break with that view by thinking through it, and as a transformation of it. By "confronting" Kant. Heidegger is historial. In Heidegger everything depends on the History of Being.

    For example: The Greeks, the Christian age, Nihilism in Nietzsche; the End of Metaphysics.
  • Dan123
    25
    Heidegger everything depends on the History of Being.InternetStranger

    That is the Later Heidegger. Has nothing to do with Being and Time. I think.
  • waarala
    9
    Dasein has existence as the mode of being. Existence contains something like "understanding" as "existential". Therefore one has to use towards "object" like this (philosophically modified?) hermeneutics, not pure phenomenological description. Dilthey had this idea that the method of human sciences is hermeneutics. Perhaps phenomenology posits Dasein as "presence-at-hand"? Phenomenology describes the structure of consciousness or some region of being. But Dasein is not any more just a region of being among others. The ontology of Dasein is not any more ontology like other ontologies. There is something hermeneutical in being like Dasein. Daseins way of being is to always interpret or to has interpreted what it encounters. Dasein's unreflected perspective is not a phenomenologist philosopher's (or scientist's) perspective. Dasein's "reality" is on the contrary hermeneutical. Only through hermeneutics of being-understanding-Dasein we come to the phenomenological-ontological level of the whole inquiry. Dasein u n d e r s t a n d s Being i.e. it is "hermeneutically-ontological"??

    Husserl on his part didn't treat "human being" in any specific way? Human being was for him just a thing with consciousness.

    (In Husserl's Ideas, II Section 2 "The Constitution of the Spiritual World" there is however "motivations". Human being is through motivations actively engaged in the "natural-spiritual world". The natural spiritual world is contrasted with the "natural naturalistic" world where everything is encountered as causal relations between objects. This kind of phenomenology of natural attitude is inspired by Dilthey? H. refers in B&T to this manuscript which Husserl never published.)

    For Heidegger Kant was pursuing ontology not epistemology. H. said that Kant was after an ontology of nature. In this sense Critique of Pure Reason was Kant's "fundamentalontology"? Whereas Heidegger's project was the ontology of history? And which reveals the knowing subject more profoundly than Kant. The transcendental subject of natural sciences is "derivative" of this ontology of historicity? Heidegger asks how the objectively knowing or cognising subject is possible?
  • InternetStranger
    155
    " “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”"

    What does the extra phrase "a priori" do here? Isn't condition for the possibility of experience already adequate?

    Supposing these conditions read: What is necessary rather than accidental. I believe Kant meant that. So, he says, if one rolls in a carriage from one side of Koenigsberg to another, one can be sure of passing through space. In this sense, experience does not only mean conscious experience. Surely a phenomenological examiner can not grant that. He must be open to what comes up, that is the essence of phenomenological research for Husserl. Looking to see the transformation of the basic and obvious.

    In one sense, Da-sein is the "opening" and so the condition. However, what is required is to make this more sharp, to draw up what still needs to be clarified and let what is clarifiable stand over and against the genuine ambiguity of the thinking of Da-sein. Kant is almost without genuine ambiguity. Time and space are given as calculable by Newton, Kant does not simply let Newton control the phenomena, yet, he closes the range to an "a priori", he won't have an open phenomenological research project gleaming out any changes in the condition. I.e, the corollary of the changes in common sense. However, Heidegger can not have the ground of the change be permanent for Being is not a ground, it is not hypostasis. That he calls the onto-theological conception of being.
  • InternetStranger
    155


    "hermeneutically-ontological"??"

    This issue might be answered in the following way. Plato says the human being stands between knowing and not knowing, between opinion and knowledge. Phenomenology claims to go prior to opinion. To have that piercing power to drive thought to the phenomena. Opinion is what one relies on for daily life, Plato calls that pistis, reliance. One regards chimeras as false, things there to the grasp as true. This is an act of opining. Opinion is both ontological and ontic, i.e., it thinks of the whole and of this and that being (i.e. all things that somehow belong together in the whole). So is Phenomenology. Yet, phenomenology is undeniable; opinions can be false.

    True, a certain nagging doubt remains. Is phenomenology an opinion itself?
  • Dan123
    25
    " “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”"

    What does the extra phrase "a priori" do here? Isn't condition for the possibility of experience already adequate?
    InternetStranger

    The "a priori" is to emphasize a few things at once.

    First, it is to highlight the ontological difference, the difference between Being and beings. The"conditions of possibility" are themselves neither entities/beings/phenomena. For example, they are not empirically verifiable causes that can be traced forward to some later effect.

    Second, it stresses that the conditions of possibility are 'always-already along there with the phenomena, providing the things-disclosed with their meaning/Being'. It is that within-which anything is *to Dasein*. For example, the hammer is for the most part not a unified-and-isolated-hammer-Thing with discernible accidental properties existing and subsisting as it free-floats out there in reality. On the contrary, the hammer is what it is - intelligible as such and such or disclosed in its Being - because it always-already belongs to a socially-shared, transcendental matrix of referential significance that encompasses the whole of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Take a "fearsome" entity - some thing you are afraid of in your life - for example. It's neither that the scary-thing is such that 'scary-ness' is a property of the thing nor is it that there is absolutely real-but-neutral thing out-there that you dress up in a subjective coloring when you accidentally encounter it. Rather, that which is scary is immediately and urgently grasped as scary only because that which is scary is already bound up with the whole of the Being that is you. The way things matter to you, the meaning through which things make sense to, the way you understand yourself and relate to events, things, people, events, scenarios, yourself, etc must already be operative and at work for anything to be scary or fearsome: This structure that is you qua Dasein must lie a priori.
  • InternetStranger
    155


    "This structure that is you qua Dasein must lie a priori."

    If thought this way, one must regard everything said as the inevitable rubric which is not so. The bar blocking proper openness.
  • Dan123
    25
    "This structure that is you qua Dasein must lie a priori."

    If thought this way, one must regard everything said as the inevitable rubric which is not so. The bar blocking proper openness.
    InternetStranger

    ? The inevitable rubric for what? The bar blocking proper openness?

    Da-sein is "to be the open". "Dasein is its disclosedness." This is to say that dasein in its Being - in its existential-ontological constitution qua the clearing or open that makes the recursive disclosure of meaning possible - is that within which anything is intelligible. As being-in-the-world, a region of sense is opened, through which things become intelligible. No?
  • waarala
    9


    "This issue might be answered in the following way. Plato says the human being stands between knowing and not knowing, between opinion and knowledge."

    I think that Husserl transfers this distinction into "intentional acts". Husserl was interested in how opinion becomes knowledge. How opinion gets "fulfilled" by intuition and becomes knowledge. It is a dynamic process or relation within or between consciousness and its objects. Opinion is "empty meaning" (something "only intended") which requires corresponding perception/intuition to become knowledge. Heidegger says that Dasein is (ontically) "in the truth". Here could be something husserlian. For Husserl everything is however "founded" on perception/intuition including volition.
  • InternetStranger
    155


    “As being-in-the-world, a region of sense is opened, through which things become intelligible. No?”

    If one enters the hermeneutic circle starting from: Dasein, to be the opening. The opening, Dasein, one has almost nothing to work with. The circle is too narrow. It is determined by the explication of Hussrle’s reading of Descartes's ultimate doubt. Heidegger says, what is left unthought in the cogito ergo sum?, which he reads: thinking (experience) is the foundation of existence, rather than I think, therefore, I exist. This reading is spelled out in a letter of Descartes, Descartes himself did not read the “ergo” as the therfore of an inferential judgment. Adding all this we have a kind of formal structure which one might read as an “a priori”: the opening between thought and existence.

    In Kant, thought (intellect) corresponds roughly to teleology or meaning, to final causes or the ideas in the mind of god. To telos. And existence to the phenomena or actual things. The a priori refers to the sameness of the phenomena according to the way of time moving in existence. It allows for the uniformity of nature. The way Husserl and Heidegger think it there is no nature. There is not a contrast between goals and accidents. The “structure” can only be understood as a manner of getting into the circle of the thinking, it does not name anything in the way Kant wants to. It’s not part of a science. It’s part of an investigation which itself is being investigated during the investigation.
  • InternetStranger
    155

    "I think that Husserl transfers this distinction into "intentional acts".

    Consciousness (being itself, not this or that subjective consciousness) has an object for Husserl, ergo, intentionality, the phenomena think themselves. One can move into this change of what is being thought by doing phenomenology.

    In Plato knowledge is not just achieved through episteme, but also nous. Higher and lower intellect. Knowledge of ends, or the well-ordered soul, is achieved through dialectic, through speech.

    "Opinion is "empty meaning" (something "only intended") which requires corresponding perception/intuition to become knowledge."

    It's not clear what knowledge means in Husserl, opinion is something regarded phenomenologicaly. Ergo, observation of it is data as knowledge. It's not clear to me how Husserl wants to get to the answer to the question "what is the point of it all?" except by constant phenomenological practice, observing and sensing the transformation of the phenomena from century to century.
  • Corvus
    59
    I am actually with you here. I think that Heidegger's ontology is a sort of metaphysics.John Doe

    But then, they say that MH's Ontology is not Metaphysics, but is Existentialism.
  • bloodninja
    235
    But then, they also say that MH's Ontology is not Existentialism, but rather phenomenology. Heidegger writes:

    "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. And this showing-itself is not just any showing-itself, nor is it some such thing as appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that 'behind it' stands something else 'which does not appear'.

    'Behind' the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else; on the other hand, what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden. And just because the phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology. Covered-up-ness is the counter concept to 'phenomenon'."

    In my opinion, is seems from the little I know that, for Heidegger, metaphysics is a covering up of the phenomena.
  • John Doe
    84
    Gosh I had forgotten about this thread with everything going on in my life. It seems like a bit of a graveyard with Mr. Phil O'Sophy getting himself banned and the most enthusiastic people like Arne ghosting the site. Certainly there's no reading schedule going on. So what do you guys think we to do? Convert it to a general discussion thread? Or does someone want to take a go at running this thing?

    But then, they say that MH's Ontology is not Metaphysics, but is Existentialism.Corvus

    Well Heideger's no fan of the They so I think we can ignore whatever "They" say! :razz:

    In my opinion, is seems from the little I know that, for Heidegger, metaphysics is a covering up of the phenomena.bloodninja

    I think the idea is that despite all his griping about his ontology being post-metaphysical, he's really just doing more metaphysics. I'm sure a clever reader could take a whack at portraying him as the "last metaphysician of the West" by employing the same sort of exegetical viciousness with which Heidegger demeaned Nietzsche.

    (Edit: Sorry this is my first time using English today so it's a bit rough.)
  • bloodninja
    235
    Why do you think he is he doing metaphysics? How can phenomenology be metaphysics? Phenomenology and metaphysics are strongly opposed I thought...
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