• Dan123
    53
    In any case, the problem I am raising is more or less this: Any attempt at a philosophical explanation of our experience, life and world (using these words in the ordinary sense) from the perspective of articulating a formal ontological structure leads us into metaphysics and its attendant problems.John Doe

    insofar as Dasein is put forth as a formal ontological structure, then there's no real way around the fact that Dasein is a certain sort of abstract entity which can be distinguished from any given individual Dasein.John Doe

    Dasein is not a "formal ontological structure". Dasein is ontico-ontological through and through.
    Dasein is and only is a sense-maker. I am Dasein. As such, I am ineluctably a sense-maker, a world-discloser: it is the deepest and most fundamental sense of what it is for me to be. What is it to be Dasein? It is to be structured - it is to be - in such a way that I am able to make sense of tools, objects, people, myself, my life, events, words, interactions, etc in the ways that I do.

    Ontically, I am always in some particular situation or another: I am either a soldier at war, a student struggling to pass a class, a pirate dealing with a mutinous crew, a concerned father watching over my young kids at the playground, a stand-up comedian gauging the crowd's emotions, a competitive athlete trying to prove myself, a job candidate looking to make a good impression, or a jealous boyfriend suspicious of my girl as she heads out to the club without me, etc, etc. As such, I am thrown into a particular world of meaning in terms of particular possibilities that I am inexorably related to in particular ways, and not others.

    Since I am in particular ways - since I am-in a particular world, disclosed so as to be immersed-in particular ways of understanding, relating to particular entities in particular ways, concerned with my Being in particular ways, etc - then it must be the case that I structurally already am such that I can be with or as such particularity. To be X, I must already be the kind of things capable of being X. To be a carpenter Dasein (ontic), I must already be structured in the core of my Being so as to be Dasein (ontological). Dasein is ontico-ontological. 'Ontic Dasein' and ' Ontological Dasein' are one and the same Dasein. The "formal" of "formal ontological structure" is to name the 'general' ways in which Dasein already is. Dasein as finite, thrown, involved-in-the-world, being-with, spatial, disclosed-moodwise, and temporal comprise this "formal"ism, or better said, 'generality'. As ontico-ontological, I am the kind of being that dwells in particular contexts of meaning. Meaning is not 'out-there' that hangs out or does its thing even when I'm not around. It does not 'flood over me' as if the structure of what and who I am is receptive to some metaphysical-thing, substantial or not. Meaning is only insofar as I am making-sense.

    Though I think the Later Heidegger would say the exact opposite of what I am saying. And I think we might be able to interpret Being and Time in that way as well, though we would have to rework the way the book as a whole is to be understood. Though I might like it. It would be cool to work towards a less idealist, and maybe metaphysical interpretation.

    *Also, there is an important difference between "formal structure" qua categories and qua existentalia. Maybe tomorrow I'll try to tackle that.
  • Dan123
    53
    *metaphysical-meaning-Thing
  • John Doe
    161
    Though I think the Later Heidegger would say the exact opposite of what I am saying.Dan123

    Interesting! Why do you think it was such a radical break? I tend to think of it as a more subtle shift in focus and weight of argument.
  • Dan123
    53
    This kind of thoughts came to mind when I was recently reading Heidegger's lectures from 1925. There H. talks about how the Work-world (Werk Welt) is present (präsent). So the translation of Vorhandenheit as presence-at-hands is somewhat misleading? Because being as ready-to-hand is also present (Being as Anwesen includes "functional relations" or meaningful wholes too)? Ready-to-hand doesn't necessarily belong to any more "authentic" temporality than presence-at-hands? Dasein has fallen to ready-to-hand where it expects something to happen next as it has always been happened in the same way. Dasein forgetfully waits the same in the now. As "real" possibilities are experienced only those which are present as functional possibilities. Thus there is no genuine change or historicity in Dasein's work or life world.waarala

    Are you asking questions here for one of us to answer? These sentences read as claims or statements, but you have inserted questions marks at the end of most of them.

    There is a difference between presence-at-hand/present-at-hand and presence. Present-at-hand refers to deworlded or substantial entitieswithin-in-the-world, while presence refers to disclosure, un-concealment, coming-into-presence, being-available , etc. So yes, if I am in the 'Work-world' then the Work-world is present-to-me: it presences as I involve or comport myself so as to be immersed-in the work-world. So yea I guess the terminology here can be misleading.
  • Corvus
    83
    Yes I agree but we are also finite, or limited, by our ownmost projection. I.e. death. I think we can interpret this death, not biologically, or as demise, but hermeneutically and/or ontologically as a limit on sense making similarly to thrownness. However while thrownness gets at our limit of always already being in a situation (i.e. past or what he calls 'has-been'), anticipating death, as the possibility of impossibility, is a limit on sense making with regard to the future (or what he calls being-ahead-of-itself). Dasein is doubly finite as a thrown-projection.

    I'm kind of thinking aloud here. Hope I'm making sense.

    It seems like temporality is the unification of the separately considered aspects of care.

    For example this is a quote from of 371 I think, which I mentioned above.

    When we inquire about the meaning of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity of its articulation as we have unfolded it. — bloodninja


    A future and a past that unifies the being of dasein... I think that is what he is getting at here...The temporality Heidegger is thinking of is obviously not the kind of time that we ordinarily consider time to be, which is an endless succession of "nows".
    bloodninja

    What about the religious people who believe life after death? Surely for them death in this life is just beginning of the new life = after life?

    For them life is not finite, but infinite?

    What would MH say to these people? Would they be still qualified to be called as daseins, or would they be something else, such as religious or superstitious dasein ?
  • Dan123
    53
    What about the religious people who believe life after death? Surely for them death in this life is just beginning of the new life = after life?

    For them life is not finite, but infinite?

    What would MH say to these people? Would they be still qualified to be called as daseins, or would they be something else, such as religious or superstitious dasein ?
    Corvus

    Finite-ness or finitude does not mean that "Dasein is alive for a limited amount of time" as if, if Dasein were to live forever, then Dasein would be infinite. Finitude means 1) I am thrown into a particular situation or meaning framework and not others and 2) I am such that I am receptive to (or 'construct' if you think Dasein is a meaning-maker) a narrowed or limited way of understanding or letting-the-world-disclose-itself-to-me. For example, if I am thrown into the world that makes possible the understanding of myself as a chessmaster, then I am intrinsically and inexorably cut-off from other ways of making sense of things, others, my life, etc. Dasein is finite.

    So yes, for Heidegger the religious person is finite. Any 'eternally existing' person would be finite as well, for Heidegger. Though, I am not sure what effect one's immortality would have on his analysis of death and anxiety. Surely immortal Dasein would still be Dasein, but maybe some of the existentials would be different, but not in significant enough ways for Dasein to be something so different that it doesn't deserve the name "Dasein". Can't wait for the responses on this one.
  • Corvus
    83
    Finite-ness or finitude does not mean that "Dasein is alive for a limited amount of time" as if, if Dasein were to live forever, then Dasein would be infinite. Finitude means 1) I am thrown into a particular situation or meaning framework and not others and 2) I am such that I am receptive to (or 'construct' if you think Dasein is a meaning-maker) a narrowed or limited way of understanding or letting-the-world-disclose-itself-to-me. For example, if I am thrown into the world that makes possible the understanding of myself as a chessmaster, then I am intrinsically and inexorably cut-off from other ways of making sense of things, others, my life, etc. Dasein is finite.

    So yes, for Heidegger the religious person is finite. Any 'eternally existing' person would be finite as well, for Heidegger. Though, I am not sure what effect one's immortality would have on his analysis of death and anxiety. Surely immortal Dasein would still be Dasein, but maybe some of the existentials would be different, but not in significant enough ways for Dasein to be something so different that it doesn't deserve the name "Dasein". Can't wait for the responses on this one.
    Dan123

    I used to think Finite Finitude is for Dasein's limited life span as fate. But I am enlightened by your explanation here.

    Certainly I have not reached B&T yet where MH mentions about Dasein's finitude concept. Could you perhaps let me know what page MH is explaining about it? That would be great. Thanks.

    For immortal Dasein, I am sure there will be other members who would like to contribute their views I am sure. But I would have thought being an existentialist, (or was he?) MH would have been an atheist unlike Kierkegaard, hence maybe he would have said, well sorry mate Daseins don't live forever. All daseins are destined to die, and immortal daseins don't exist i.e. all daseins must die, and when they die, they are dead for good.
  • Dan123
    53
    Certainly I have not reached B&T yet where MH mentions about Dasein's finitude concept. Could you perhaps let me know what page MH is explaining about it? That would be great. Thanks.Corvus

    So most of his talk of finitude comes deep into division two. His talk of finitude is dense in those sections. I don't think I quite get it well enough to feel confident giving a meaningful interpretation of finitude through Heidegger's quotes. Nevertheless, here is one

    "In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-for-Being which it has understood. It guards itself against ‘becoming too old for its victories’ (Nietzsche). Free for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end and so are understood as finite [endliche], Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others, or rather that it may explain these possibilities wrongly and force them back upon its own, so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factical existence." (§53. H 264)

    MH would have been an atheist unlike Kierkegaard, hence maybe he would have said, well sorry mate Daseins don't live forever. All daseins are destined to die, and immortal daseins don't exist i.e. all daseins must die, and when they die, they are dead for good.Corvus

    Yes I agree I think this is exactly right. Though I still think we could validly counterfactually pose the coherently conceptual possibility of the existence of immortal Dasein ("If Dasein we're immortal, what would be the structure or Being of Dasein?"). I think, if we could follow Heidegger in his interpretive/hermeneutical analysis of grounding the structure of Dasein through the interpretation of the phenomena with regard to their Being, then the existential analytic of immortal human-being (conducted by immortal human-being) seems that it would yield different results. With regard to what would the analysis be different? - It seems that Heidegger's understanding of anxiety, authenticity, fear and mood, having-been-ness, etc depend to a large extent on Dasein being aware of its own immortality. It would be interesting how the analysis would shift. And it would be interesting to see if there is anything at stake for Heidegger in such an attempt explicate the nature of immortal Dasein with regard to its Being.
  • bloodninja
    294


    Here is my (work in progress) interpretation of death, existential finitude.

    If our thrownness is our always-already being-in the meaning or in an act of sense making (there are many different ways to describe it), death (being-towards-the-end) ought to be interpreted along similar lines.

    I could probably think of a good argument for the "why" of this statement but I don't think it's necessary as the point (that death or being-towards-the-end ought to be interpreted as very closely related to thrownness) seems pretty obvious to me and probably to everyone reading this. After-all dasein is a thrown-project.

    So the hard question for me is how is death (which remember, is very clearly not biological cessation/perishing nor a person's demise) related to thrownness?

    Here is part of the passage from B&T Dan quoted above
    Free for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end and so are understood as finite [endliche], Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of OthersDan123

    "Determined by the end" but how? Well Heidegger has a concept called the "for-the-sake-of-which".

    "Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the "with-which" and the "in-which" of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the "towards-this" as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the "for-the-sake-of-which" to which every "towards-which" ultimately goes back-all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility [Verstiindlichkeit]." (pg 119)

    The for-the-sake-of-which is related to sense making (being) in that it provides the overarching meaning to all your particular projections/possibilities. (For anyone familiar with Lacan i think the concept is similar, but obviously more original, to his "master signifier") Hubert Dreyfus gave the example of his for-the-sake-of-which of being a teacher. For Dreyfus, being a teacher organised and structured his world, made certain phenomena conspicuous, other phenomena inconspicuous, certain possibilities significant and interesting, other possibilities insignificant and boring, etc. He contrasted having "teacher" as a for-the-sake-of-which with becoming a professor. A professor is a social status and present at hand, while "teacher" (for Dreyfus's dasein at least) gets at something deeper and existential that cannot merely be be reduced to a social status. It's a subtle but profound point.

    Moreover, unlike "professor" there is not a point at which one arrives where the case is settled and one can finally say "I have now arrived at being a teacher". This is because the for-the-sake-of-which, as an existential, is only ever something that it is possible to press ahead into and is never anything like a present at hand status that you can eventually arrive at. It is thus defined by an existential nullity/limit in the same way that thrownness is defined by an existential nullity/limit; thrownness by the nullity of not being able to get behind your basis, i.e., your always-already being attuned to a meaningful space, and the for-the-sake-of-which is defined by an existential nullity/limit of a "not-yet" since, as existential, it is something that is only possible to press ahead into it, and never to arrive at.

    So what does this have to do with death, the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all?

    To be continued....
  • Corvus
    83


    For me personally, it is difficult to imagine concept of Death not same as biological bodily death. That is the primordial meaning of Death, which all human beings face as unavoidable fate.

    OK, it gets used to mean other events such as end of something metaphorically, but it is not the primordial meaning of Death.

    When people are questioning about their deaths, I am sure it is their biological death, not anything to do with the end of an era or demolition of a building or end of a season.

    But then I do understand that Dasein in BT is not a human being in biological body and form.


    And I would like to ask MH, if he was still around, what is the point of discussing about dasein, if it is not including the bodily foundation? That sounds like a slightly disguised form of Cartesian soul to me.
  • Dan123
    53


    For Heidegger, death plays a major role in the way life makes sense. Dasein lives in light of its inevitable non-existence (rather than "biological bodily death"). The fact that we will die gives us anxiety, and our life unfolds on that basis. Death gives meaning to life.

    Heidegger admits that "the body hides a problematic of its own." But that is basically all he says about the body in Being and Time.

    It is tempting to think of Dasein as some soul-thing essentially other than a physical body. But, at least for Heidegger, this temptation ought to be resisted. Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, which is wholly incompatible with the Cartesian split of mind and extension. Though there are some who say Heidegger fails to avoid falling into a phenomenological idealism of a kind of isolated consciousness.
  • Corvus
    83
    For Heidegger, death plays a major role in the way life makes sense. Dasein lives in light of its inevitable non-existence (rather than "biological bodily death"). The fact that we will die gives us anxiety, and our life unfolds on that basis. Death gives meaning to life.Dan123

    Non-existence of Dasein is only possible through biological bodily death, and it is a significant part of life of Dasein, but I feel that MH skips that part only focusing on metaphysical aspect of being.

    Heidegger admits that "the body hides a problematic of its own." But that is basically all he says about the body in Being and Time.Dan123

    I feel that statement calls for good explanation and investigation of its meaning.

    Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, which is wholly incompatible with the Cartesian split of mind and extensionDan123

    Yes, I see it, but it sometimes sounds like self-exisiting-soul, which sounds similar to Cartesian mind, because Dasein is devoid of physical body.
  • bloodninja
    294
    Non-existence of Dasein is only possible through biological bodily death, and it is a significant part of life of Dasein, but I feel that MH skips that part only focusing on metaphysical aspect of being.Corvus

    But remember that existence has a special meaning in heidegger's ontology. So non-existence would relate to his meaning of existence and not the normal meaning of the term. He says somewhere something along the lines of (inauthentic) dasein can demise without knowing anything of death. In his ontology death refers to his unique ontological meaning, he uses perishing to refer to biological death and demise is perishing modified by ontological death... hope that makes sense. And Remember this is phenomenology, not metaphysics. So the challenge is to grasp the phenomena of death somehow.
  • Dan123
    53
    Non-existence of Dasein is only possible through biological bodily death, and it is a significant part of life of Dasein, but I feel that MH skips that part only focusing on metaphysical aspect of being.Corvus

    Heidegger has little to say about the non-existence of Dasein qua "biological bodily death". Biological death plays almost no role in Heidegger's phenomenology in Being and Time. Heidegger does not say that the "non-existence of Dasein is only possible through biological bodily death." For Heidegger to not say this sort of thing is not to say that Heidegger believes there is some non-bodily, metaphysical aspect of our being called "Dasein" that may or may not endure through bodily deterioration. Dasein is not a soul or some non-physical substance. Dasein is the being who makes sense or discloses Being. The "biological body" does not escape 'world disclosure', at least for the Early Heidegger. Though there is a lot of debate over this point.

    Dasein is devoid of physical body.Corvus

    Dasein neither has nor is devoid of a physical body. Dasein is not categorical: it is existential. Yes, I have a body and you have a body. And yes you and I are both cases of Dasein. But we are each Dasein insofar as we are sense-makers. The world is intelligible or graspable. For Heidegger, the body is wholly other than sense-making. In fact, for Heidegger, the body is derivative of the way in which we make sense. As Dasein I must already be situated such that my body is grasped as a body. Since there is no getting beyond our thrownness, there is not asking about the body insofar as it lies anterior to sense-making qua Dasein. I think. Though many consider this a problem for Heidegger.
  • waarala
    11


    Personally I am not so sure if body is something derivative for Heidegger. I think that Dasein or human existence in its "aroundness" (umhaftigkeit) or spatiality necessarily "presupposes" body. Dasein presupposes something which turns (to, from), reaches (something) etc or in general moves (or is kept moving) in the world-space. Orientation in the world or "distancing" (Ent-fernung) presupposes bodily movements. So, for. H. body is essentially interlinked with meaningful events. Or that body is "equiprimordially" an essential part of such meaningful events. Of course for Heidegger Dasein as moving body is something different than a moving thing-body in the metric space. We are primarily in the "meaning-space" not in the physical space.
  • Dan123
    53


    Yes, Dasein operates or, in a sense, "moves" in "meaning-space". I think you are right there. If by "bodily movements" we mean something like "a type of worldly traversing or articulation of the meaning-space to which Dasein is already oriented to", then yes such "bodily movement" is "essentially interlinked with meaningful events." However, we must be careful, since - as you highlight - "Dasein... is something different than a moving thing-body in the metric space." For Heidegger (I think), it is not the case that there is a thing or material body which then enables or makes possible distantiality and movement in world-space, as if the body we're a vehicle that propels passenger-Dasein through, in, and between the "aroundness" of the environment.

    Now, the question becomes this: is bodily movement prior to, equiprimordial, or derivative to world-space/meaning? - What the answer cannot be is the first: "prior to". In order to traverse the space of meaning, in order for something to be 'far from the circumspection of my concern', in order to express meaning by throwing a baseball to first-base or giving out high-fives, I must be first already be open to meaning, or more relevantly-specific, world-space.

    Now of course we are going to say that one must first have a body in order to do anything. But if we take Heidegger to be talking about 'first-person experience and its structure', then we can at least side-step the problems of having an objective body and so on. Heidegger (I think), has very little to say about anything other than phenomena and the a priori/transcendental conditions that make phenomena possible. Though if we are interested in the hardcore idealist/correlation route of understanding Heidegger on the body, then I'm game for that too.
  • Corvus
    83


    Yeah I think I read somewhere that H's earth, world, being-in-the-world and using tools concepts presuppose bodily existence already. (pp.10, Embodied Mind, Meaning and Reason by Mark Johnson 2017 University of Chicago Press)

    But as you say, it couldn't be in the physical space, but in the meaning space.

    But then, isn't all meanings derivative of human brain and its mental process? But what you are saying is that H is not interested the brain part of the process? He is only focusing on the meanings themselves?
  • Corvus
    83
    And regarding the concept of space, I wonder if the word "space" could be used in any other way than physical emptiness. To hold meanings? = meaning space? sounds like illogical to me. Because space is only for physical objects, not abstract concepts.
  • Dan123
    53


    Heidegger talks about space in the "Spatiality" section of Being and Time.
  • Corvus
    83


    Yes, he does. I was trying to decipher what he is trying say about it in B&T, but it is so much abstruse to me.

    But what I would think about space or Spatiality is, that it is one space in the universe, and it is out there holding the world.

    I cannot imagine H meant spatiality as space in our head or thought or feelings or imagination, or even space as a concept. Maybe he did. I am not sure on this point. Would appreciate your elaboration.
  • Dan123
    53


    Spatiality is a big topic in Heidegger. But I'll try to shine some light on it.

    For the Early Heidegger, what we proximally and for the most part encounter is "equipment" rather than present-at-hand/self-subsisting/categorical things. Equipment is that which we encounter as we go about life in the ways that we do. As Dasein, I engage with things (so to speak) insofar as they are serviceable, useful, annoying, important, obtrusive, valuable, detrimental, scary, decorative, entertaining, comfortable, etc etc. For example, I do not grasp my house as consisting of X material formed in such and such a shape with certain dimensions to which I can categorize as 30 yrds X 30 yrds, with atomic structure Y, and with a boiling point of 222 degrees C. Rather, I grasp my house as my home and not yours, protection from detrimental weather and robbers, viable for parties, safe to raise my children, arranged so as to satisfy my wife's stylistic preferences, a burden to pay off, just the right size for me, and so on. And most of the time I make sense of my house in these ways unreflectively as I go about living my life.

    But my house as equipment does not subsist on its own: equipment "reference" or 'point to' other equipment. My house isn't what it is without the road being adequate transportation to work, the large windows allowing light to make the day enjoyable, rooms for which each of my family members can retreat to when they want to, etc. To each item of equipment there already belongs a "totality of equipment".

    Each item of equipment is defined out of a world or matrix of referential involvement structures to which it constitutively belongs, and that I qua Dasein is always-already open to. Existential/meaning space is the world that I inhabit and understand as I go about life. It is a "space" not because it is out there as a 3D container of sizable objects, but rather, because it is the arena of the ways of making sense in terms of the kind of life that I am embedded in. As I drive on the road to work, the road as a means of transportation that is a danger for me and others if I am not careful, the steering wheel as the tool for navigating my way to the places where I earn money for my family, the phone as something tempting to look at but that needs to be ignored in order to be safe and not suffer the consequences of getting pulled over, etc are "close" to me. For the person afraid of flights, the plane is horror movie, while for person moving across the globe, the plane is a signal of a new beginning. Things that are physical close can be existentially or meaningfully far, and vice versa.
  • Corvus
    83


    Great. Thanks for your elaboration.

    I am still wondering if you were living in a house, then you wouldn't be paying attention to the constructional details of the house. I would be paying attention to what works it needs to be done, and for that I would have to find out when it was built, what material it was built with, and how it was built ... etc. If I have to paint the wall, I will need to find out what size of the wall it is I am painting, so I would know the size of the can I must buy etc.

    House is not just some space that your family live and exist in it. I would think it is far more to it than that. It is more than just equipment, and it can be totally separate being from the world conceptually, because if it has leaking roof, then it would be my own problem. No one else in the world is affected etc. So depending on the situation, it could be a part of the world, and it could be totally separated from the world.

    And shouldn't space be explicated as physical base for the body's movement and its directions in it as the first point of disclosing the world? If one says well, that is presupposed, and H is only talking about meaning part, then would it not be regarded as just telling fragmented pieces of tales from the big picture?

    It seems clear that there have been some critics on B&T for neglecting importance of body and space by other philosophers.

    "Alphonse de Waelhens, for example, argued that Heidegger’s phenomenology completely overlooks the fundamental role played by perception in particular and the body in general in our everyday understanding of things. “[In] Being and Time,” says Waelhens, “one does not find thirty lines concerning the problem of perception; one does not find ten concerning that of the body.”1 Jean-Paul Sartre amplified this line of criticism when he emphasized the importance of the body as the first point of contact that a human being has with its world, a contact that is prior to detached theorizing about objects.

    Of the early French phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work has been the most influential. He laid the foundations for a critique of Heidegger through his systematic analysis of the primacy of bodily perception, particularly in terms of our spatial directionality and orientation, a sensual orientation that makes it possible for us to handle worldly equipment in the first place.2 Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment has since been developed and refined by English- speaking commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, David Cerbone, and David Krell.3 Krell formulates the problem this way:"

    - Heidegger's Neglect of Body by Aho. pp.1, State Univ. of New York, 2007
  • bloodninja
    294
    Heidegger is not denying that there are other ways to make entities intelligible, he is only saying that these other ways are derivative. And they are not derivative in some sort of weirdly deworlded metaphysical, epistemological, logical or scientific way, but only in terms of intelligibility, or in terms of how the phenomena presents itself to us.

    The Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus criticisms regarding the body, or lack of it, are less criticisms and more additions to Heidegger's philosophy. Afterall they are both card carrying Heideggerians.
  • Corvus
    83


    It is first time I am reading B&T, and as I am reading it along, I find it stating things which are too obvious in restricted and partial way. I am not criticising H at all. I don't qualify to criticise H in terms of knowledge and time of studies I have done for his system. But that is the initial feeling I get when I keep reading B&T.

    Maybe I feel different when I am reading it 2nd time, and I feel I might have to read it more than 5 times to grasp the full picture of the system. Or maybe there is not much in it, and once would be enough I am not sure now.

    But it was interesting to find some other philosophers who were critical to H, and his B&T on the points I thought were problematic.
  • Corvus
    83
    More relevant quote from the same book by Kevin Aho, 2007.

    "What these criticisms tend to suggest is that Heidegger’s proj- ect is missing an explicit recognition of how the body participates in shaping our everyday understanding of things. Indeed, if one of Heidegger’s core motivations is to reveal how beings “always already” (immer schon) make sense to us in the course of everyday life, then it appears that the body should be interpreted as—in the language of Being and Time—an “existentiale” (Existenzial), an essential structure or condition for any instance of Dasein. David Cerbone explains, “The body would seem to be immediately implicated in [Heidegger’s] phenomenology of everyday activity. . . . For this activity involves the manipulation of concrete items such as hammers, pens, doorknobs, and the like, and those manipulations are effected by means of the body.”7 While acknowledging the merits of these criticisms, the goal of this book is to address the question of why Heidegger may have bypassed an analysis of the body in the first place and where such an analysis might fit within the overall context of his project.What these criticisms tend to suggest is that Heidegger’s proj- ect is missing an explicit recognition of how the body participates in shaping our everyday understanding of things. Indeed, if one of Heidegger’s core motivations is to reveal how beings “always already” (immer schon) make sense to us in the course of everyday life, then it appears that the body should be interpreted as—in the language of Being and Time—an “existentiale” (Existenzial), an essential structure or condition for any instance of Dasein. David Cerbone explains, “The body would seem to be immediately implicated in [Heidegger’s] phenomenology of everyday activity. . . . For this activity involves the manipulation of concrete items such as hammers, pens, doorknobs, and the like, and those manipulations are effected by means of the body.”7 While acknowledging the merits of these criticisms, the goal of this book is to address the question of why Heidegger may have bypassed an analysis of the body in the first place and where such an analysis might fit within the overall context of his project." - Kevin Aho. 2007, pp.3

    However, I think the author of the book is arguing for H, why H had to bypass the concept of body and space in B&T. An interesting book also.
  • bloodninja
    294
    It's good to be critical. When you mention lack of body and space I wonder what sense you mean these in. Do you mean the physical body and space or the existential body and space?
  • Dan123
    53
    I am still wondering if you were living in a house, then you wouldn't be paying attention to the constructional details of the house. I would be paying attention to what works it needs to be done, and for that I would have to find out when it was built, what material it was built with, and how it was built ... etc. If I have to paint the wall, I will need to find out what size of the wall it is I am painting, so I would know the size of the can I must buy etc.

    House is not just some space that your family live and exist in it. I would think it is far more to it than that. It is more than just equipment, and it can be totally separate being from the world conceptually, because if it has leaking roof, then it would be my own problem. No one else in the world is affected etc. So depending on the situation, it could be a part of the world, and it could be totally separated from the world.
    Corvus

    I think that, for Heidegger, your "paying attention to the constructional details of the house", deciding "what work needs to be done", dealing with the "material [one's house] is built with" and "how it was built", etc, are all ways that you are already navigating meaning. What is it to say that "work needs to be done"? - For Heidegger, the world must already matter to you in certain ways such that "getting things done" is something urgent, necessary for how one wants to live, an attractive action to undertake, a problem if ignored, etc. What is it to say you "need to find out what size of the wall is [for painting]"? - For Heidegger, "enough" paint is grasped in the context of you living your life as a concerned parent, the kind of person you identify as, the kind of life you project upon, etc. The weight of paint, kinds of paint, the material you need, etc are, proximally and for the most part, grasped as 'sufficient for this need I have', etc which relates to the way you make sense of your life as a whole. The leaking roof is a leaking roof qua your-and-only-your-problem only because the world and your own life matter to you in such and such a way to be a problem at all. To grasp the paint or the leaking roof in the ways that you do is to invoke the whole of finite, thrown Dasein qua the way you are Being-in-the-world. Already being-open to meaning or a world is what makes possible understanding your house in the ways that you do.

    "World" does not refer to the 'globe that we humans inhabit'. World is the context or milieu of significance or meaning that Dasein is always-already related to at the core of its Being as finite, thrown, being-attuned, projective, temporal, etc.

    And shouldn't space be explicated as physical base for the body's movement and its directions in it as the first point of disclosing the world? If one says well, that is presupposed, and H is only talking about meaning part, then would it not be regarded as just telling fragmented pieces of tales from the big picture?Corvus

    I think Heidegger would say "no". Though I don't quite understand what you are asking here.

    More relevant quote from the same book by Kevin Aho, 2007.Corvus

    I have not read that book, but it seems interesting and it might be able to shed more light on the relationship between Heidegger's thinking and the body, the problems between the two, etc.
  • Corvus
    83
    "World" does not refer to the 'globe that we humans inhabit'. World is the context or milieu of significance or meaning that Dasein is always-already related to at the core of its Being as finite, thrown, being-attuned, projective, temporal, etc.Dan123

    I read an article saying that World in B&T is Dasein itself, as they are inseparable.

    I have gone and read more commentaries, your posts and listened Dreyfus and others youtube lectures about B&T, and yes I think now it is making sense.

    I think H's B&T is a great book, and his system is revolutionary. I feel I could understand why H is highly popular even now, and is one of the most important philosopher in history.
  • Blue Lux
    588
    Dasein is the being that has being as a question.

    Here is an excerpt from Heidegger on the concept of the world.
    (He uses unconcealdness to characterize truth... From the Greek Aletheia.

    And yet--beyond what is, not away from it but before it, there is still something else that happens. In the midst of beings as a whole and open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. This open center is therefore not surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know.
    That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are.

    This Open happens in the midst of beings. It exhibits an essential feature which we have already mentioned. To the Open there belong a world and the earth. But the world is not simply the Open that corresponds to clearing, and the earth is not simply the Closed that corresponds to concealment. Rather, the world is the clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies. Every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision. The earth is not simply the Closed but rather that which rises up as self-closing. World and earth are always intrinsically and essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature. Only as such do they enter into the conflict of clearing and concealing.

    Martin Heidegger The Origin of the Work of Art
  • Blue Lux
    588
    Read III The Worldhood Of The World in Being and Time

    1. World is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.
    2. World functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those entities which we have just mentioned. And indeed world can become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks of the 'world' of a mathematician 'world' signifies the realm of possible object's of mathematics.
    3. World can be understood in another ontical sense--not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. World has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here again there are different possibilities: world may stand for the 'public' we-world, or one's 'own' closest (domestic) environment.
    4. Finally, world designates the ontologico-existential concept of Worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as it's modes whatever structural wholes any special 'worlds' may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of Worldhood in general. We shall reserve the expression 'world' as a term for our third signification. If we should sometimes use it in the first of these senses, we shall mark this with single quotation marks.

    from Being and Time - The Worldhood of the world
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment