• bloodninja
    233
    I cannot imagine Being or Existence without perception or mind, because without it, beings or existence have no meanings.Corvus

    On the contrary! Without being, your "perception" or "mind" has no meaning.

    Please read the book before you attempt a critique.
  • Corvus
    55
    On the contrary! Without being, your "perception" or "mind" has no meaning.
    bloodninja

    I have never said that there is no being. I said that without perception Being or Existence has no meanings. That is different.

    Please read the book before you attempt a critique.bloodninja

    I am reading the book, and also questioning if there is anything which is unclear. I think that is what the debates are about. You are not reading the book, so you can sing about it like a parrot, or play it back like a recording machine.
  • waarala
    9


    For H. there is "primordial perception" which he calls "circumspection". When the "mind" is in the "world" it is "through" "disclosedness", "understanding" and "sight" circumspection. In this kind of "practical ontology" or "the ontology of practical" there is no perception, no objects, no things. Or that when circumspection discontinues there appear objects and these objects "effect" perceptions (when those objects are "detached" or abstracted from the world).
  • Corvus
    55
    Great. Thanks.
  • tim wood
    809
    Where then is mind or soul derived from? And how?Corvus

    A rough rule of thumb: if you're asking "what is..." or some form thereof, you're out of fundamental ontology. More on the track is, "what does it mean to think or feel?"

    "Fundamental ontology" is what MH called what he was doing at first, but he gave up the phrase because people kept confusing it with some form of metaphysics. Ancient history, ontology was deemed a variety of metaphysics, but that day is long gone.
  • tim wood
    809
    .... For example, on most understandings of mind, in order to ask what a mind is, you always already have to have one. It becomes clear that a mode of "to be" is to ask metaphysical questions, but the "to be" comes first. "To be" in place of "Being" because the German word Seinv is the infinitive form of the verb to be, and "being" isn't quite right. Part of the problem is that Being in English can be and often is taken as a noun, a gerund - the being as person place or thing. MH really isn't thinking about a "being" in the sense of a "what is," rather almost as a doing as in to-be-doing. It's a translation thing, and the English "Being" pushes us down the wrong road.
  • Dan123
    20
    Does Dasein include mind or soul? — Corvus

    One way to get a hold of what Dasein 'is' is to contrast it with what it is not. Dasein is not a Cartesian subject; it is not a self-enclosed subjective sphere containing mental representations that may or may not correspond to an 'outside' world of self-subsisting extended things. For Heidegger, the Cartesian notion is grounded in the "subject-object relation", which Heidegger vehemently critiques throughout Being and Time. The Cartesian, one who takes the subject-object relation as his or her's philosophical point of departure, asks questions such as "what is the world like 'outside' or 'beyond' my perceptions?" "What is the nature of this I-Thing that seems to be something other in kind than everything else?" "Do my mental representations of things give me the 'correct' access to things 'out-there'?" "How are we to solve the mind-body problem?" Etc, etc.

    According to Heidegger, Dasein does not fit the Cartesian paradigm. Dasein is 'Being-in-the-world', essentially immersed in lived contexts of meaning through which anything makes sense. Dasein and world are not separate: they are intrinsically intertwined. While Dasein can grasp or conceive of itself as a Cartesian subject, Heidegger thinks such a self-understanding is a mis-interpretation. For Heidegger, understanding oneself as a inner subject or mind is one way of understanding oneself within the milieu or "world" that he or she "dwells" or lives in, though it is very limited. It is only one interpretation among many possible ones through which Dasein can cope and navigate life at particular historical times and contextual settings. For Heidegger, all things considered, the subject-object "conceals" or 'hides' the essential nature of Dasein's existence or Being as Being-in-the-world. All self-interpretations, including understanding oneself as a subject, is only possible because Dasein is structured in this fundamental way as Being-in-the-world (which fundamentally includes Time). So, it is in this sense - and to be unpacked more clearly and comprehensively throughout Being and Time - that "mind" and "soul" are derivative of Dasein. I think.

    Hope that helps!
  • Corvus
    55


    Great explanations. Thanks.
  • Corvus
    55
    I kind of used to believe that all problems of existence, beings and Being i.e. Ontology always belong to domain of Metaphysics.
  • John Doe
    81
    I kind of used to believe that all problems of existence, beings and Being i.e. Ontology always belong to domain of Metaphysics.Corvus

    I am actually with you here. I think that Heidegger's ontology is a sort of metaphysics.
  • John Doe
    81
    All self-interpretations, including understanding oneself as a subject, is only possible because Dasein is structured in this fundamental way as Being-in-the-world (which fundamentally includes Time).Dan123

    I don't know about this. You seem to imply that Dasein is something over and above all self-interpretations, but isn't Dasein itself a sort of self-interpretation?
  • Dan123
    20
    All self-interpretations, including understanding oneself as a subject, is only possible because Dasein is structured in this fundamental way as Being-in-the-world (which fundamentally includes Time).
    — Dan123

    I don't know about this. You seem to imply that Dasein is something over and above all self-interpretations, but isn't Dasein itself a sort of self-interpretation?
    John Doe

    Dasein is the condition of the possibility for any interpretation at all. So not "over and above" ways of interpreting, but what lies prior to interpretation. As Dasein, I must already be embedded in a world of sense or encapsulated in a lifeworld of meaning through which I understand myself and my relation to things, other people, my surroundings, values, etc in order to interpret myself as such and such. For Heidegger, the 'deworlded' subject is one such interpretation, though it misses the Being of Dasein completely.

    Now, what's interesting is that, for Heidegger, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein - the study of the being who understands Being - is an interpretation that starts from the "phenomena", whose method is hermeneutics. So, in this sense, yes, Dasein is an interpretation, I suppose.
  • Akanthinos
    826
    In any case, I wonder what you make of Arendt's criticism of the opening question:

    To anticipate, and put it in a nutshell: The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same. The basic fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model of truth. The latest and in some respects most striking instance of this occurs in Heidegger's Being and Time, which starts out by “raising anew the question of the meaning of Being”…..
    — Arendt, Life of the Mind, p.15
    John Doe



    Sorry for the long wait on the answer. I'll admit, I didn't really know what to do with that quote. Can Arendt's criticism really be applied to what Heidegger is doing in #1-4? It doesn't seem to be the type of criticism that will ever be accepted by a phenomenological thinker, either because the vulgar concept of truth is neutered, or because the "search for meaning", again in its vulgar usage, is equally as otiose to the mainstream student of Husserl.

    In the same way, one can ask how Arendt arrived at an understanding of the early pages of T&B as "the need for reason". Heidegger does not seek meaning on the order of reason, he does not puts the problems down in existential terms, so to speak, as if the question was existentially urgent to answer. He approaches the problem like any metaphysician or ontologist generally does, as a theoretical subject to be explored. Even if the question was forgotten, which leads to an urgency to treat it now, it is certainly not presented yet as a Krisis.

    I'll admit that I find the equivocation on the question of the meaning of Being to be sincerely frustrating. It would likely be one of my first targets, if I was looking for fatal weaknesses to exploit in B&T. To me, the question of the meaning of Being is fairly straightforward ; its the "client-side" portion of a specific Umwelt for a specific being. For any being, "Being" means trying and deploying a certain number of modes of interacting, interfaces so to speak, in order to... well, there's no "in order to", really, it just does. Beings are constituted as a constellation of interfaces. Which means that, imho, the priority in the ontico-ontological structure of the question rest squarely on the ontic side. The Dasein need perhaps to be thematized in order to open a phenomenological access to the heart of the problem, but that remains a theoretical requirement. Once we've arrived at an understanding of "meaning" as just one of the many possible mode of interactions of a being, the question of the meaning of Being becomes entirely too ... local and anthropocentric. Might as well speak of the question of the questions (or questioning) of Being. Or the question of [...] of Being.

    However, now that we've reached further into B&T, I think we can also state the Arendt's comment on truth does not ring entirely true either. [33-34] shows rather well that Heidegger does not posit a vulgar understanding of the concept of truth. It's not particularly rich either, but it doesn't seem to fit the role Arendt wants to put it in. For him, truth seems to be a specific mode-of-access to a being, the most simple, purified and unmediated acceptation of the being's presence. At that point, one could simply reply to Arendt that, if this is how we conceive truth, then there is actually very little differences between truth and meaning (apart that meaning will probably be constituted as much by the simplest possible presence of the being as it will be by it's most complex).
  • Corvus
    55
    In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Macmillan and Free Press,

    MH's Dasein is, human being which has nature of

    1. Facticity
    2. Exisitentiality
    3. Forfeiture

    I am not sure, if it is summary of the B&T part one. No, that is still about Dasein.
  • John Doe
    81
    Dasein is the condition of the possibility for any interpretation at all. So not "over and above" ways of interpreting, but what lies prior to interpretation.Dan123

    Ah, well my initial concern with your post was the creeping possibility of a Kantian interpretation of Heidegger so I’m doubly concerned now that you’ve characterized Heidegger in distinctively Kantian language. Perhaps you could try and piece together this position with some citations, so we have some text to work from? As far as I know Heidegger sticks to the term “conditions of existence”.

    The problem with calling Dasein the “condition of the possibility” of interpretation is that this would seem to imply that (a) Dasein is a sort of constituting subject (meaning is constituted by the existence of Dasein); (b) all of Heidegger’s methodological concerns about “formal indication” are resolved in a clean a priori that is not itself an act of interpretation but a discovery of the conditions which enable interpretation. So I think that you would need to cite where you find evidence for this in Heidegger’s explanation of his methodology if we're to go anywhere with your suggestion.

    As Dasein, I must already be embedded in a world of sense or encapsulated in a lifeworld of meaning through which I understand myself and my relation to things, other people, my surroundings, values, etc in order to interpret myself as such and such.Dan123

    In a broad sense this is certainly true, but it’s doubtless significant that Heidegger does not use Husserl’s ‘lifeworld’ (or am I missing something in the text??). Later Husserl seems to think that the ‘lifeworld’ is constituted intersubjectively through the phenomenon of empathy, which we will surely have to contrast with ‘care’ when we get to those sections.

    And of course when you say that Dasein is already embedded in a meaningful world which s/he must interpret you’re coming back around to the concern which I raised, which you seem to recognize when you say…

    Now, what's interesting is that, for Heidegger, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein - the study of the being who understands Being - is an interpretation that starts from the "phenomena", whose method is hermeneutics. So, in this sense, yes, Dasein is an interpretation, I suppose.Dan123

    …except what’s with all of the equivocation? Why does the fact that Heidegger is giving us an interpretation need to be qualified at all (“in [a] sense”)? It strikes me as important for us to understand whether Heidegger takes the notion of Dasein to be merely his way of interpreting phenomena which can never be captured conceptually (viz. admit of multiple interpretations); which can be captured in concepts which are different but, so to speak, isomorphic in their content; or whether Dasein is a quasi-Kantian notion (as it seems you wish to have it).
  • John Doe
    81
    It's a wonderful post. I hope you won't mind the couple of days or so I'll need before I have the time needed to write an adequate response. Also, I'm pretty sorry I took the most drive-by, summarizing quote I could from Arendt, which was surely a mistake--I'll take a deeper look at the chapter in which she digs in on her critique.
  • InternetStranger
    155




    “Kantian interpretation of Heidegger.”

    However justified this concern, one might say, there is a Heideggerian Kant. Kant as finitude. Heidegger was, if one looks at the opening of the later printing of the so-called Kant book, compelled to admit the “short comings” of his reading of Kant, brought out by Cassier. Ergo, a Kantian Heidegger, or a Heideggerian Kant, come to the same thing! A Kant of radical finitude.

    Cassier: Heidegger (illicitly) effaces the distinction between phenomena and noumena.

    This is licit, though, so far as one notice, in the text on calls Heidegger, there are no morals as morals, not thing-in-itself, as the ideas in the mind of god which give the moral law. Ergo = a Heideggerian Kant. This is so, too, since Kant is everywhere said to have failed to show the link to the noumena is valid. Hegel brings the noumena into the historical unfolding of the phenomena, thereby, preparing Heidegger.


    “ “formal indication” are resolved in a clean a priori that is not itself an act of interpretation but a discovery of the conditions which enable interpretation. “

    Howsofar does this mean: phenomenology is not the method of Kant; Kant did not derive the conditions for any experience through strict phenomenological means, but by way of “deriving” or “deducing” them?


    “Later Husserl seems to think that the ‘lifeworld’ is constituted intersubjectively through the phenomenon of empathy”

    Husserl criticises Heidegger for not speaking of “consciousness”, but Jean Beaufort asked Heidegger, howsofar is it possible to say Husserl does not question Being? My view is, Husserl derives his lifeworld phenomenologically, it remains phenomenological. I.e., bracketed. Ergo, it is difficult to maintain the distinction between it and being so far as being is said as phenomenological discovery and not as theoria or conception, etc..


    “except what’s with all of the equivocation? Why does the fact that Heidegger is giving us an interpretation need to be qualified “

    What does interpretation mean here? Heidegger says translations are interpretations, this comes in in his style of reading texts, which is not “close reading” (i.e., making a case, reading out from the text, making a “a case”), but reading into the text. However, this is a matter of “speaking to” the Early Greeks, and the philosopher's, e.g., the Hericlitus seminar.

    Da-sein is “inception”, because what is first is great. Ergo, it can not be interpretation. However, I (partly since I have none on hand) give no forensic evidence for this interpretation of the ergon one has long named Heidegger.
  • John Doe
    81
    However justified this concern, one might say, there is a Heideggerian Kant. Kant as finitude.InternetStranger

    Of course. There are a number of Kantian readings of Heidegger on offer, but I don't like them, and if someone here reads Heidegger in this way it's the object of a reading group to bring out what they see in the text, how that motivates their interpretation and to discuss the merits of that reading.

    As for all of the folks in academic philosophy who are now trying to revive Cassirer--my thoughts would take us far afield, but I'll just say I'm pessimistic.

    Howsofar does this mean: phenomenology is not the method of Kant; Kant did not derive the conditions for any experience through strict phenomenological means, but by way of “deriving” or “deducing” them?InternetStranger

    Sure, I mean, if you want to say that Heidegger's phenomenological method is merely another way of getting at the conditions of the possibility of experience, that's fine, but you'll have to justify that view with some text. I think it's an unfruitful (though prevalent) reading, I'll be happy to explain my disagreements if you show me the textual motivation for your interpretation.

    My view is, Husserl derives his lifeworld phenomenologically, it remains phenomenological. I.e., bracketed. Ergo, it is difficult to maintain the distinction between it and being so far as being is said as phenomenological discovery and not as theoria or conception, etc..InternetStranger

    You seem to me to be reading the early Husserl ideas into the later ones, but again this takes us far afield, since my only comment was that we should avoid using the Husserlian term lebenswelt to describe Heidegger (though I may be mistaken so if it's in the German let me know). Since this is a reading group we should talk about Heidegger in his own words.

    What does interpretation mean here?InternetStranger

    That's precisely what's at stake. Is Dasein an interpretation or an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience", if the former, how do we understand the nature of interpretation? My only aim is to raise questions. This might as well not be a reading group if everyone starts their posts with "For Heidegger..." without discussion of textual motivation and alternative readings.

    Da-sein is “inception”, because what is first is great. Ergo, it can not be interpretation. However, I (partly since I have none on hand) give no forensic evidence for this interpretation of the ergon one has long named Heidegger.InternetStranger

    I have no idea what this means and since you wish to "give no evidence" there's not much I can do with it. Evidence is all we have in a reading group; there are plenty of other (non-text) threads on Heidegger.
  • InternetStranger
    155
    “There are a number of Kantian readings of Heidegger on offer”

    But only one reading that is part of the text called Heidegger. The Kant book is the cornerstone, but in the work called Heidegger there is a pervading Kantian Heidegger.I agree so far as you mean, this or that attempt to read Heidegger as Kantian. For Heidegger “confronts” Kant, as he does, importantly, Nietzsche and Hegel. It is even more deep and large: Heidegger says, “we” are the History of Metaphysics. Our Dasein is the End of Metaphysics. Ergo, Heidegger literally is Kant is a serious sense according to the work called Heidegger.


    “ revive Cassirer”

    Heidegger accepted the critique of the Kant book. And spoke accordingly of his “shortcomings”. So, in this sense, Cassier is part of the work called Heidegger.


    “I'll be happy to explain my disagreements if you show me the textual motivation for your interpretation.”

    The Kant book and the critique by Cassier, called Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. However, once read, it is seen to pervade the whole of Heidegger. I regard this kind of superimposing or palimpsestic thinking as essential in Heidegger. This may be too crude a way to put it. Stated another way, it means the same thing as that we are the history of the Greek Dasein, come through the middle ages to ourselves. Since, the great philosophers move in the inceptional realm, even altering it decisively. More normativly (or more clearly with respect to what is in one's mind stated in the vernacular, but not thereby giving better access to the material), they state what is with the greatest clarity and fluency; they give thought its way to think the worlding of Dasein's world as what now is not only the unfolding of the past, as a non-genuine future, but also as that which is unobstructed, inception.

    This topic here raised is also linked to: a. Perpetual emphasis on the Great Philosophers. Not just anyone.

    b. The arising of the historical thinking, out of the running through the whole of thought which is “us”.

    c. The radical setting aside of the person Heidegger in the fate of Da-sein. Because, e.g., ownmost is also said of Da-sein. Not of a biographical biological individual.


    “You seem to me to be reading the early Husserl ideas into the later ones”

    That could be. The ground of the latter is obscure. The appeal to the call to philosophy as such as what lets fate not be a historical type. Is this said rigorously phenomenologically? Perhaps not.


    “Husserlian term lebenswelt to describe Heidegger”

    There’s a certain ambiguity in that lifeworld was taken over from Dilthey. And in Heidegger Dilthey plays a considerable role, but there is surely an undeniable refusal of the conception of lifeworld as understood by Husserl. However, I feel this comes into question in the Four Seminars book concerning the style of confronting Heidegger of Jean Beaufret, which is in Heidegger read as sensible, thereby admitted into Heidegger.

    This is even in the wiki-article: “Husserl's formulation of the lifeworld was also influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey's "life-nexus" (German Lebenszusammenhang) and Martin Heidegger's Being-in-the-world[citation needed] (German In-der-Welt-Sein).”

    Heidegger, it would seem, regards Dilthey as more primordial, as bringing forward a “new”, I don’t remember the word he used, I’ll say interpretation, “of existence”. The tool analysis is already in Dilthey. The underivability of basic slice of existence as it were, from anything higher in a Rationalist style.

    is Dasein “an a priori "condition of the possibility of experience"”

    I agree, surely not. This is clear in that Kant is not properly creative, the understanding is active, but it creates a priori, not for, as Leo Strauss says it, “a radially mysterious dispensation of fate”. Here, surely a line between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the one side, and Kant on the other, is legible. And yet, they talk back and flow back into Kant in the End of Metaphysics, which is our own time if we can hear its call and be drawn towards it, according to Heidegger.


    “starts their posts with "For Heidegger..." “

    I agree and yet everything depends on not agreeing here. Since a reading of Heidegger belongs to the region of a Hermeneutic Circle which can only be described by the total light of the reading of a reader. I.e., which can never be given in bits and snippets. Because of the change of the path in the rereading under greater or transformed acumen or sensitivity. Nonetheless, I also agree that in a collective effort one must have some material form which to draw.

    “Evidence is all we have in a reading group”

    Yes, but the whole of one’s reading of Heidegger must serve as evidence. Here, the Holzwege book comes in. As you will know, in a letter Heidegger speaks of the derivation of the work of art out of its inception, i.e., that the art makes both artist and work.
  • Dan123
    20
    Ah, well my initial concern with your post was the creeping possibility of a Kantian interpretation of Heidegger so I’m doubly concerned now that you’ve characterized Heidegger in distinctively Kantian language. Perhaps you could try and piece together this position with some citations, so we have some text to work from? As far as I know Heidegger sticks to the term “conditions of existence”.John Doe

    The problem with calling Dasein the “condition of the possibility” of interpretation is that this would seem to imply that (a) Dasein is a sort of constituting subject (meaning is constituted by the existence of Dasein);John Doe

    There are those who take Dasein that way. And there is great debate about this very point.

    Some quotes concerning the "conditions of the possibility of [well, that's up to the interpretation of the whole of what Heidegger is getting at]...

    Conditions of possibility of science/psychology/anthropology etc: "The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task." (§3. H 11)

    'Care' as the transcendental structure/a priori condition for the possibility of interpretation: "The transcendental ‘generality’ of the phenomenon of care and of all fundamental existentialia is, on the other hand, broad enough to present a basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view must move, whether Dasein is understood as affliction [Not] and the ‘cares of life’ or in an opposite manner." (§42. H 200)

    Being-ahead-of-oneself/projection/The future as the condition for the possibility of any self-conception/way of navigating one's life: "In Being-ahead-of-oneself as Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of Being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities." (§41. H 194)

    Not sure those will be much help before diving into the book. I think it might be better to just keep reading Being and Time and see what you make of it. It will be difficult to grasp the whole of what Heidegger is saying without first tr
    (b) all of Heidegger’s methodological concerns about “formal indication” are resolved in a clean a priori that is not itself an act of interpretation but a discovery of the conditions which enable interpretation.John Doe

    Not sure those will help.

    (b) all of Heidegger’s methodological concerns about “formal indication” are resolved in a clean a priori that is not itself an act of interpretation but a discovery of the conditions which enable interpretationJohn Doe

    For Heidegger, his analysis of the human-being is itself an interpretation. This point is implicit on basically every page of Being and Time, but he really makes it implicit in the introduction when he talks about the hermeneutic circle and in "C. The Prelimnary Conception of Phenomenology." In the latter section, though obscure, he writes

    "With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities—ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem—the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The λόγος of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ἐρμηνεύειν, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known to Dasein’s understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in theprimordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a ‘hermeneutic’ in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends. And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, “hermeneutic”, as an interpretation of Dasein’s Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein’s historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can be called ‘hermeneutic’ only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character."

    In a broad sense this is certainly true, but it’s doubtless significant that Heidegger does not use Husserl’s ‘lifeworld’ (or am I missing something in the text??).John Doe

    Heidegger does not use the term "lifeworld", so yes that was a bit mis-leading. By lifeworld I mean the "world" that Dasein is "in." It is on the basis of Dasein's essential relation to the world - denoted wonderfully as Being-in-the-world - that anything and everything, including people, things, itself, situation, and contexts, make sense and understood. Any interpretation presupposes this picture.

    What is interesting is that, for Heidegger, - his analysis itself - presupposes this picture. Not 'presuppose in the sense of 'deductively following from an axiomatic assumption' but rather in the hermeneutic/transcendental sense that Heidegger tries to unpack. Though we might still ask, "well how do we know Heidegger gets to 'correct' answers if he presupposes something, in some sense, about the answer from the start?' There are who say that and criticize Heidegger's method for that. This is a big topic that I'm not too equipped to detail.

    Now, what's interesting is that, for Heidegger, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein - the study of the being who understands Being - is an interpretation that starts from the "phenomena", whose method is hermeneutics. So, in this sense, yes, Dasein is an interpretation, I suppose.
    — Dan123

    …except what’s with all of the equivocation? Why does the fact that Heidegger is giving us an interpretation need to be qualified at all (“in [a] sense”)?
    John Doe

    I say "in a sense" because I mean "interpretation" here in Heidegger's sense. Though I admit I was far from making that clear. The interpretation that is the analytic of Dasein that begins from the phenomena to elucidate their meaning and what makes them possible. Again, a big topic.

    That's precisely what's at stake. Is Dasein an interpretation or an aprior "condition of the possibility of experience", if the former, how do we understand the nature of interpretation? I'm only raising questions.John Doe

    Dasein is me. Dasein is you. But what it is to be me or you is to be Being-in-the-world, historical, and temporal, all in the Heideggerian sense. Dasein is the condition of the possibility for interpretation. The analytic of Dasein - the philosophy itself that Heidegger is doing in Being and Time - is itself an interpretation of the human-being. Heidegger's interpretation of human-existence (with keeping Being in sight) leads him to conclude that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, or ultimately, temporality.
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