You're right that Dasein is an entity. But a super-entity? Dasein is certainly a special kind of entity insofar as it is a clearing, an open-space of revealing, temporal, a sense-maker, a world-disclosure, etc. — Dan123
But it would be a critical mistake that betrays everything Heidegger was arguing for to say that Dasein is a kind of monolithic metaphysical-thing that is other than us that we each participate in. — Dan123
For Heidegger, 'pure rationality' or a 'purely rationally being' is not possible without a horizon of sense or world of meaning to which one is constitutively immersed-in. So if there were "rational creatures living three galaxies away" they would only be Dasein if they essentially belong to a world of meaning that matters to them that delimits the ways they understand things, themselves, and contextual situations they find themselves in. — Dan123
So Dasein cannot be deduced from the fact that a being appears or acts rationally, as you do when you say — Dan123
The existence of any particular cannot be justified by 'the fact that a being is rational', unless you are first presupposing that 'rational' is a way of Being of Dasein. While it is true that yes rationality presupposes Dasein, the fact that a creature acts, behaves, or appears rational does not necessitate that that being or creature is in fact Dasein. So there is a crucial difference between concluding that rational beings are Dasein by way of grounding rationality in Dasein's way of Being vs inferring that a creature of being is Dasein by observing that it acts or behaves rationally. It's difficult to talk about this subject without falling into a Cartesian understandings of having epistemic access to the rational competencies of a inner subject, which should be avoided. — Dan123
There is no Dasein without language and concepts, just as (due to the formal ontological structure) there can be no language and concepts without Dasein. His anti-Cartesian account of language, concepts, rationality, Zuhanden relation to objects, etc. is interwoven with the whole account. — John Doe
There is no Dasein without language and concepts, just as (due to the formal ontological structure) there can be no language and concepts without Dasein. His anti-Cartesian account of language, concepts, rationality, Zuhanden relation to objects, etc. is interwoven with the whole account.
— John Doe
What about then disabled people like deaf and dumb? Do they get excluded from Dasein? — Corvus
Mr PhiOsophy is banned? Why? I wasn't aware of it. — Corvus
Is their a reading schedule that everyone here is following? — Dan123
What about then disabled people like deaf and dumb? Do they get excluded from Dasein? — Corvus
↪John Doe I was looking for any reference to linguistic capabilities for condition or qualification of Dasein in BT, but could not spot them. Maybe it will be there in later parts of BT?
Heidegger thematizes language in §33 and §34. His analysis in these sections builds from his ideas from the previous sections. Heidegger does not claim that "Dasein necessarily speaks a language," nor does he say that "Dasein necessarily has the ability to verbalize coherent and complete linguistic utterances." Dasein is not necessarily a language user. Heidegger's analysis, for the most part, leaves enough theoretical room to include death, mute, and disabled Dasein, I think. Dasein is able-to-navigate-and-express-meaning, which does not necessarily mean that Dasein must be able to speak a language, though being-embedded-in-meaning is a condition of the possibility for any language-user to be able speak language in any meaningful way. Dasein is fundamentally a meaning-dweller, not a language-user. Though many Daseins do navigate meaning with language/vocal utterances/words/etc. I think. — Corvus
Dasein is fundamentally a meaning-dweller, not a language-user. Though many Daseins do navigate meaning with language/vocal utterances/words/etc. I think. — Dan123
Isn't then Language supposed to be Logos, rather than speech in BT? Logos to articulate Dasein in the world, and to comprehend, dispose and disclose itself? — Corvus
This leads to the question, on the basis of what is dasein meaningful? Or what is the meaning of the being of dasein? Which leads us to the opening pages of Being and Time. A question of being rather than one of justification. — bloodninja
We can't look behind ourselves, any attempt to look-behind' would have to presuppose the very thing we are looking-behind for. We cannot encounter that which grounds my situatedness. It is a (brute?) fact of Dasein's existence that it is how it is. Dasein is a sense-maker because that is how it is. Though this sounds unsatisfying. — Dan123
how do you understand temporality's role in providing the ontological meaning of care? — bloodninja
I wonder if everyone is reading B&T translated by John Macquarrie. That's the one I am reading.
But I saw some other B&T translated by different people, and looked like more recent publication of B&T.
Which one would be the best translation of B&T? Because I find one by John Macquarrie hard going trying to get grips with it. — Corvus
Temporality is "ec-static" qua horizonal. As temporal beings, we are finite - delimited by our thrownness. — Dan123
When we inquire about the meaning of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity of its articulation as we have unfolded it. — bloodninja
Yes I agree but we are also finite, or limited, by our ownmost projection. I.e. death. I think we can interpret this death, not biologically, or as demise, but hermeneutically and/or ontologically as a limit on sense making similarly to thrownness. However while thrownness gets at our limit of always already being in a situation (i.e. past or what he calls 'has-been'), anticipating death, as the possibility of impossibility, is a limit on sense making with regard to the future (or what he calls being-ahead-of-itself). Dasein is doubly finite as a thrown-projection. — bloodninja
It seems like temporality is the unification of the separately considered aspects of care.
For example this is a quote from of 371 I think, which I mentioned above.
When we inquire about the meaning of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care, in the unity of its articulation as we have unfolded it.
— bloodninja — bloodninja
I think Care (thrownness + projection + (inauthentic or authentic) discourse) is already unified without reference to its temporal ground. Heidegger says "we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care." He is not saying that temporality is what unifies care. Temporality is what makes possible the unified structural whole of care. — Dan123
I would say that to be thrown into a situation is to be always-already in a situation in terms of projected possibilities. So yes, thrownness and projection together constitute one's finitude. — Dan123
I'm not sure that authentic Being-towards-death/anticipating death is a "limit on sense making". Though it is a way of 'making sense'. — Dan123
care is temporality — bloodninja
Fair enough. He does suggest that death is a basically limit-situation in the death chapter (a concept he borrowed from Jaspers). But a limit of or on what? Because he is discussing death to draw out the "originary future", this future must be limited in some sense. And given that he said in the quote above that "Understanding is grounded primarily in the future", it seems that understanding (or what amounts in my view to the same thing, sense making) must, by way of finite ecstatic temporality, be limited. — bloodninja
Could I paraphrase you as saying: The foreground is made meaningful only on the basis of a background? So for example the present at hand (abstract conceptual thinking and dealing with break down experiences) is meaningful only on the basis of our ready to hand understandings and this "know-how" (e.g. our everyday dealings, involvements, competencies, pre-reflective uses and understandings of languages, cultural practices, etc.) is in turn made meaningful on the basis of our ways of being dasein. — bloodninja
This leads to the question, on the basis of what is dasein meaningful? — bloodninja
I don't think that anything is made meaningful; I suspect -- though I am not a great reader here -- that the different ways of Being for Dasein simply are varieties of meaningfulness — John Doe
The meaningfulness is that which is antecedent to Dasein and is cultivated by a culture — John Doe
if we take the individualistic reading of Dasein proposed by Dan then we have to say that the world is permeated with meaning in a way that precedes the thrownness of my own Dasein and continues after my own death. — John Doe
So my care is shot through from beginning to end with meaning which is not derived from or projected onto the world but is simply that which is inherent to the structure of being a Dasein. — John Doe
Yes I think this is true. But that doesn't mean meaning comes before or after Dasein.
Many consider this to be a huge problem for Heidegger. — Dan123
I'll just quibble with the end here: I don't think that anything is made meaningful — John Doe
I should have said on the basis of our existential-ontological structure, or something similar. Because our ways of being dasein are just how we act out that structure...is in turn made meaningful on the basis of our ways of being dasein — bloodninja
I think that this probably gets to the heart of our earlier disagreement about Dasein. I agree with you that meaning is not antecedent to what I have called "metaphysical" Dasein but it certainly is to my individual Dasein. That's why I think, although Heidegger doesn't like it, he's doing a sort of metaphysics. — John Doe
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