• creativesoul
    Both thought and belief consist - in part at least - of mental ongoings... that's how meaning is attributed. We think about stuff and how it effects/affects us. This happens long before language acquisition begins. Those mental ongoings consist of things that exist exactly as they are prior to our becoming aware of them.

    If your notion of "belief" contradicts this, it's wrong.
  • creativesoul
    All meaningful sense consists entirely of drawing mental correlations between things.

    Your notion of "belief" is a meaningful sense.

    Your notion of "belief" consists entirely of mental correlations between things.
  • creativesoul
    Whatever pre and/or non-linguistic mental correlations require in order for them to be realized(formed, actualized, enter into existence, emerge, etc.) so too does your notion of "belief".

    If you claim that all belief consists of propositional content, then either you deny the existence of belief prior to language, or you claim that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language. You've already claimed the former. Admitting the latter, for you, would force you to admit changing your claims in mid argument.

    Neither of those necessary consequences are acceptable.

    So, I've shown that your position suffers a number of different reductio ad absurdum, and yet you remain tried and true, tied to an argument that not only suffers such a fate, but more importantly it just doesn't have what it takes to take account of pre and/or non-linguistic mental ongoings.

    You don't want to call pre and/or non-linguistic mental ongoings "belief"? Fine by me. You want to continue to believe these things. Fine by me.

    You want to provide an example of anything meaningful that does not consist entirely of an agent drawing mental correlations between things?

    All senses of both terms "thought" and "belief" consist entirely of mental correlations drawn between things. If you agree, I suggest you follow along and object to what you disagree upon. If you want me to continue to criticize your usage of the term "belief", then either you're not understanding the faults being shown, or your conviction outweighs overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
  • creativesoul
    Jack's belief cannot contain the name we place upon toasters. Our report of Jack's belief can. Jack can be said to have belief about the toaster.

    Belief such as Jack's is formed each and every time an agent is chasing something which hides behind the toaster. An everyday occurrence. So, there are cases of non-linguistic agents' forming and/or having thought and belief about that which is existentially dependent upon language. No language, no toasters.

    But calculus... that is also existentially dependent upon language, and a non-linguistic agents' mental correlations cannot possibly contain and/or have any basis whatsoever in calculus.

    So, some things that are existentially dependent upon language can be an elemental constituent of non-linguistic mental ongoings. Other things, not so much. Here, we need a distinction of some sort in order to further discriminate.

    My report of Jack's belief is not equivalent to Jack's belief. My report needs only to draw the same or similar enough correlations to take proper account of Jack's correlations. If I accurately determine the content of the correlations being drawn in Jacks' mental faculty, I've offered a true report that is not attributing propositional content to Jack's mental ongoings.
  • creativesoul
    What type of experiment would it take to verify this account?
  • creativesoul
    I'm telling you that a properly nurtured and/or cultivated agent can and will draw mental correlations between things of our own choosing.
  • creativesoul
    These things become significant to the agent via drawing correlations between those things and/or themselves.
  • creativesoul
    Meaning is prior to language. Meaningful mental ongoings are prior to language. True mental ongoings are prior to language. It makes perfect sense to say neither meaning nor truth are existentially dependent upon language.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    What I am at pains to point out is that neither you nor I make the rules governing all mental ongoings.creativesoul

    I believe in free will. Therefore I assert that there is no such thing as the rules governing mental ongoings. Until you prove determinism, your pain is in vain. So go ahead, dismiss reality as semantic twaddle and suffer alone.

    The premise that belief consists of mental ongoings does not validate your conclusion that mental ongoings consist of belief.
  • creativesoul
    All examples of "thought" and "belief" consist of an agent drawing mental correlations between things. All examples of meaning consist of an agent drawing correlations between things. All thought and belief is meaningful. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of later qualification('real', 'imagined', or otherwise). That is the presupposition of truth(as correspondence to fact/reality) that is inherent to all belief.

    When an agent touches fire it learns that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing a causal connection between the touching and the pain that follows. That mental correlation is the agent thinking/believing that the fire cause the pain. The fire becomes meaningful to the agent as a result of this. The agent's thought/belief is true.

    In Witt's view, the agent's belief cannot be justified, nor need it be for the behaviour is the end of justificatory regress. I do not think that Witt would admit that the agent knows that touching fire causes pain, and rightly so, for such knowledge is empirical and as such it requires justification, and the agent is incapable of reporting upon it's own belief.

    On my view, that's all bound up in yet another flaw. A consequence borne of conflating a report of belief with belief. I think it's absurd to hold that knowing touching fire causes pain requires offering an account of it. All knowing that requires is an agent capable of touching fire, feeling pain, and connecting the two.

    While the justification requirement makes sense when it comes to knowledge claims, it is a fatal flaw in one's position if s/he holds that making a claim is necessary for having knowledge. JTB came as a means to discriminate between those who claim to know something and those who can provide the ground for such claims.

    The ground ends. The regress ends. It all begins at getting burned.
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