I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'.
— "p.18
I was struck by how confident he is about this. He doesn't seem to take into account that a description can be an explanation and can give us a new view of what we are already looking. Nor does he seem to be thinking of the ideas about interpretation (seeing as) that occur in the Brown Book and the PI. Maybe he only came up with those ideas after writing this. — Ludwig V

I’m reminded of the role of explanation with respect to the language game. There can be a language which is organized in such a way that an explanation can be an intelligible move within it. But one can only describe the language game itself, because to explain it is to do no more than to reproduce it. And , like repeating a word over and over again, explaining a form of life devolves into meaningless. To understand what the diviner means when he says he feels the object behind his forehead is to have him describe the language game, not explain it. Perhaps Wittgenstein is taking the proper subject matter of philosophy to be language games rather than the moves within them.

I’m reminded of the role of explanation with respect to the language game. There can be a language which is organized in such a way that an explanation can be an intelligible move within it. But one can only describe the language game itself, because to explain it is to do no more than to rep — Joshs

Yes, that's true. I'm not quite sure what to say.

Charles Lutwidge Dodgson published the best "argument" for this - "What the tortoise said to Achilles" - Mind, Vol. 4, No. 14 (Apr. 1895), 278-280. The form of the argument is a regress. W's discussion of "aspect blindness" is also relevant. The possibility of this "rule refusal" is always present. On the other hand, maybe in practice, cases as simple as that don't come up in real life, and in the complexities we can find the resources to help the tortoise to see the point.

There are two places we might look to understand this. One is how we actually deal with people (e.g. students) who can't "see" a logical argument. In addition, there are - let us call them - informal resources in language, which often get taken up when the standard forms let us down - notably metaphor and analogy.

I had the impression that his explanation of the temptattion is the only answer that I found in the text. I must have missed something. — Ludwig V

It’s not a matter of another general answer he gives as much as the “answer” he claims that the solipsist wants to satisfy that desire for their pure, imposed criteria. That desire causes them to see the issue only as a problem/answer dichotomy (rather than a “muddle” and “temptation”). Many readers take him to be solving (answering) that “problem” just in a different way, or dissolving it, or not taking it seriously (it’s just about language).

He doesn't seem to take into account that a description can be an explanation and can give us a new view of what we are already looking. — Ludwig V

I think people take the idea of not explaining anything a bit too far. He is of course making claims and explaining things all along. The difference between his descriptions of what we say, and the “explaining” that he wants to avoid is tied to the desire for a single criteria and working backwards to ‘explain’ the world in order to fit that goal (thus the creation of a theoretical, metaphysical perfect realm). So in this tight construct, “explanation” is almost a technical term for him, not the loose act of drawing conclusions. An “explanation” for him is driven by the desire for the kind of “answer” we want in looking at skepticism as a “problem” as above.

@Paine @Ludwig V @Joshs @Shawn @Srap Tasmaner

Section 4C (pp. 18-20] Philosophical “Attitude”

To step back just to page 18, he is I believe referring to Socrates when he asks why philosophy is “contemptuous” toward the particular case. On page 20 he says outright “When Socrates asks the question, ‘what is knowledge?’ he does not even regard it as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge.” Power (might=right) is someone’s goal of what is good. Is it the most worthy goal? No, but it still exists in the world, and it gets dismissed because it doesn’t meet the standard Socrates wants.

“The contempt for what seems the less general case in logic springs from the idea that it is incomplete.” It wouldn’t seem this equates to the logical necessity Socrates is looking for, but to me “complete” lines up with a solution (answering the “problem” again) that ties up all the loose ends and addresses every contingency before an act. As if we could determine the right thing to do in every angle up front, “completely”.

And this is a matter of method for him. Like Austin, who always investigated how an action failed in order to learn how it worked, Witt implores us to be interested in what distinguishes something rather than search for neat and tidy commonalities. “For after all, there is not one definite class of features which characterize all cases of wishing.” We can draw sharp boundaries to feel we have a complete idea, but “there are many common features overlapping.” as he seemingly first refers to family resemblances, which is important enough to be in the preface of the PI.