## The final theory of physics, sold here.

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• 13.7k
What's the difference between your theory (give it a name so we can use it from here on) and string theory? If I'm correct, string theory, two/more versions of it, have been proposed as ToEs, the only problem being, none of them make any observable predictions. Does your theory entail some observables that can then be verified with experimentation?

Let's discuss, as an aside, the issue with ToEs in general taking string theory as the index case of one. Why is it you think that a perfectly good theoretical candidate for a ToE viz. string theory is, for some intriguing reason, such that it fails in the practical sense by not being able to make forecasts that can then be checked for correctness and accuracy. Something really odd about that. It's like you have a bunch of keys, you take one, try it, it works, take another, it works to but when you try the master key it fails! :chin:
• 777
Can I try a more concrete explanation? What you call truth, I believe corresponds to what I call information in the system. Information is a series of yes/no* questions that allows one to uniquely build the state of knowledge from the set of all possible knowledge.

Absolutely keep trying. I will try with you as well! What is information then? I'll try to coincide it with truth. For yes or no, I'll think true or false. Reality is what exists, and is true. Non-reality is what does not exist, and is false.

But what is the state of knowledge? Is knowledge a claim about reality, that can then be compared to reality? For example, I claim the existence of a unicorn. The truth of an existent unicorn as generally described is false. But how do we know this? If I take your idea that an observer's knowledge is based upon a system of infallible conclusions, what is it that makes them infallible? Is it truth, or is it their construct of starting variables, and logical conclusion from those variables?

I believe the strength of your halting images is that they do not rely on truth. They rely on the set of premises within their own context. However, this leads to one question deeper. How do we determine if someone has made a valid halting image? Perhaps this is where truth comes in. If I were to examine all of my premises and compare them to reality, if reality did not prove my knowledge claim as false, I would have a valid halting image. If it did, I would merely have a belief. But to be clear, it is only if the observer can conclude that reality is indeed false, and negates its own conclusion. If an observer cannot observe certain portions of reality, or starts with definitions that have underlying and hidden issues to them, they could logically claim valid knowledge that is not contradicted by the reality THEY observe, but is contradicted by actual reality.

This I feel is why you needed an observer that could observe all of reality. Something that grasps the truth of the matter, even if all of humanity were gone. Something that grasps the truth even if individual people do not grasp the entirety of it. But I don't think you do. Lets continue.

First, I define the set of all infallible statements as the halting programs. These are the lego blocks of reality. But I haven't built anything with them yet.

Our infallible statements are our knowledge claims about reality. They can't be reality itself as already noted.

Now, I define a set** of some of those lego blocks, and call this set reality. So now I know what I wish to build, but I still haven't built it yet.

I believe reality would not be a set of statements. It is a set of constants that are true or false.

Finally, I define a measure that assigns information to the second set as the result of being a pick from the first. This information encodes the building instructions. It is a series of yes/no questions (incompressible and axiomatically random) that tells us how reality (the second set) is build from the first set. This interpretation is from Claude Shannon's theory of information (message received from a set of possible message => the entropy of information represents a series of yes/no question needed to identify the message from the set).

It is sort of a black box within the system as well. The only way to test these constants is to explore in the program and stumble upon them. Knowledge queries are your set of yes no questions against this black box.

As long as those constants do not contradict your knowledge claims within the limited context of the variables you have applied your statement to, you could claim some type of valid knowledge claim. Is this an infallible statement? I don't know.

The binary yes/no value of this information is what truth is, mathematically underivable and axiomatically random... it must be observed to be known. Those building blocks (after the transposition to physics via the observer) are a sequence of clicks recorded in the universe to collapse the wave-function to the state reality presently is in.

And so with this, I think we can salvage this last statement. True booleans are mathematically underivable. But truth booleans are not random. Our observations of this black box of constants are what are axiomatically random. These observations and conclusions are a sequence of clicks recorded in the universe, which brings the black box of constants (which could be interpreted as a wave-function, or a cloud of unknowns) into a state of reality that an observer can use in the world without being contradicted by that black box they have revealed.

Perhaps this helps? This gives you I think what you were trying to create with a singleton observer, which is some underlying truth. While the derivation of observers prevents an observer that can see it all, it does derive something fundamentally true. An observer needs to observer something. What is that something? The booleans of truth. You knowledge system is a combination of all observers trying to create representations of reality that are not contradicted by the underlying booleans of truth. The closest we could get to those booleans of truth is if we examined all knowledge claims from all observers, combined them all together with all of their information, and discovered what was not contradicted within the entire process.

What would this entail? I think there are things to explore here. It may very well be that there could be two or more separate conclusions based on contextual interpretation. Some may be idempotent, while others might actually be divergent, but perhaps only slightly due to observational situations, or if there are indeed variables in the universe that blink on and off over time.

Can you derive a system that would allow a set of cross observers to share information and come to a new halting image? If it is the case that observers have known limits in what they can uncover in the black box of reality, is there an optimal way the system could work? I think these would be incredibly useful, and push the field of knowledge to the next step.

What do you think? Is this something your theory could work with?
• 351
OK. This seems to make things a bit clearer. So, R. Feynman is asked to list his entire knowledge of the physical world onto computers or TMs as strings of symbols. He works with a programming specialist and completes the task after one month. Give a simple example of where this might go in the next step. Avoid technicalities if possible. Or ignore my question if you wish.

Alright, since my example had a good effect let me try to capitalize on it and make it more precise. I think the way I phrase the third step wasn't sufficiently accurate, so let me mainly focus on that and I think this may address your question. In this second take on it, we define two sets and one measure:

• (set 1): We define the set of all infallible knowledge (these are the lego blocks of possible worlds).
• - > We consider that any possible world is built from said lego blocks; that is, it is a specific subset of set 1.
• (set 2): We define the actual world as a subset of set 1.
• - > So far we haven't built anything yet; we have only defined the lego blocks (set 1) and the target end product (set 2).
• (measure): We define a builder, which we call an observer, as measure space over the pick of set 2 from within set 1.

The final step (so actually four step) is to maximize the entropy of the measure to get the building plan or schematics. The structure of those schematics is of course directly dependant upon the definition of the builder. For instance, a home building plan doesn't ask for 3D printing the house because the builder doesn't that tech yet... the building plan can only include instructions known and usable by the builder, otherwise the house is unbuildable by the builder.

In computer science and math, we often take the measure of a set. If taken over a set, the entropy relates to simply a binary search algorithm over the elements of set 1 to get set 2, and refer to a list of yes/no questions used to uniquely identify the picked element from the set.

However, the idea is to use tuples instead of set. In this case, what was simply a binary search algorithm is now the full quantum history of the system (its literally as easy as replacing sets with tuples). The building schematics automatically formulate themselves such that set 2 is indeed "picked" from set 1, and take the form of a long chain of quantum mechanical transformations and measurements, yielding the full quantum mechanical history of the actual world, as picked from the possible worlds.

The quantum history is basically the equivalent of a binary search algorithm, but instead of searching a database, we search the possible worlds and construct a world in a manner consistent with the builder being the observer.

EDIT: So all I have to do is define the lego blocks, then define the image (or picture) of the final assembled lego structure, then my definition of the observer, at maximum entropy, produces the assembly plan for this specific structure, and it takes the form of its quantum history.

Also pinging and , because I think it's relevant to their latest questions.

Edit: to specifically answer your question about Richard Feynman, in this case he simply writes it up on a computer.. nothing happens other than creating a file on a hard disk. That is because Richard Feynman did not maximize the entropy of a tuple as he did the enumeration in your example (well actually he did but on such a high level that it appears classical). If he had done the same but at the microscopic level, he would have had to use a quantum computer, and then his actions would have more closely resembled the laws of physics as I have derived them. Furthermore, he probably did not eliminate all context from his knowledge, and therefore he was able to embed what seems like a lot in a very short amount of space. Carl Sagan said, if you want to create apple pie from scratch you have to invent the universe first. So how much work Richard Feynman has to do to lay out his knowledge is dependant of whether it is context-full or context-free. I invite you to read my responsive to Philosophim just below, as it expands on that idea.
• 351
For example, I claim the existence of a unicorn.

The claim has to be infallible. Thus, if you simply claim a unicorn then nothing happens. However, if you claim a unicorn infallibly, then yes a unicorn does pop into existence (in some cases, not all)... and before any of you go all bananas, let me explain. (more on bananas, and fruits in general, in a moment).

Let's challenge ourselves to imagine how one can claim a unicorn infallibly. An infallible claim takes a context A and applies a sequence of arguments, or transformations, etc such that it ends up on B without any obscurities.

Thus, let me propose that the context will be natural selection and horses, and the final target is a unicorn. The protocol will be that of selective breading, and works as follows: For as many generations as is required, bread as many horses as you can, each time with the intend to maximize phenotype diversity; each generation selecting for higher phenotype diversity or higher resemblance to final target. Then, maybe it takes 100,000 generations or maybe it takes more, but IF and ONLY IF the universe does support unicorns from horses then you will eventually get them! However, if the unicorn is too "awkward" to be supported or derivable biologically from horse as the context then it is possible that you try forever without success... that is the nature of the non-halting problem.

Once you get a unicorn, then and ONLY THEN, is your claim "there are unicorn" infallible, because how you produced unicorns has no obscurities. Whereas if you just give a mockup, it has obscurities and is thus not infallible. For very very complicated claims, me demanding infallibility, forces you to actually do it.

There would be other ways to obtain the same knowledge, for instance you could simulate the possible evolutions of the horse on a computer, and at least the claim that your simulation produce the final product would be infallible, and depending of how accurate your simulation is it may or may not transpose to a prediction in the real world.

This is a bit less farcical than its face value would have you believe; we have artificially selected most fruits over 10,000 years of agriculture (bananas, apples, etc...) and they are way more amazing today than they used to be - you can google pictures of wild fruits such as bananas and apples and they do not look good. Even dogs as companions was the result of human directed selection over 10,000 years. An interesting story is how the Cosmic Crips apple was produced (the most recent apple variety to hit the North American market). In this case the claim "there is a perfect, or near perfect apple" to be infallible, means one has to selectively breed apple for 10,000 year up to the Cosmic Crisp. (just in case... I understand the Cosmic Crips is not perfect in the literal sense, that's not the point).
• 351
And so with this, I think we can salvage this last statement. True booleans are mathematically underivable. But truth booleans are not random. Our observations of this black box of constants are what are axiomatically random. These observations and conclusions are a sequence of clicks recorded in the universe, which brings the black box of constants (which could be interpreted as a wave-function, or a cloud of unknowns) into a state of reality that an observer can use in the world without being contradicted by that black box they have revealed.

In this case, they are random, because they are the results obtained from a wave-function collapse which is random. (For the record, I do not get any hidden variables in my theory, and I personally do not believe in hidden variable theory, local or non-local).
• 351
Question for you: Can I challenge you on your suggestion of cross-referencing observers? Can I take the "attacking side" of the argument for a little bit?
• 845
Lets say I conclude infallibly that God is real, and the rain is caused by God. Someone else infallibly concludes God is not real, and the rain is caused by some other means. Who is correct?

In this example, they'd both be wrong.

How could they both be wrong? Either the rain is caused by god(s) or it's not. What's the other option? And when you explain your answer, pretend you're talking to a 10 year old.
• 351

They are wrong on the usage of the word infallible, because neither of conclusion are infallible, not on the fact that it's a binary choice.

Edit: You cannot conclude infallibly that god is real, because infallible requires a context. You can use 'god is real' as the context then conclude other things, but then you do not know infallibly whether god itself is real or not. Alternatively, you can use another context, and then conclude that 'god is real' from that context, but then the same limitation applies to the context.
• 1.9k
Now I hope I haven't opened too many cans of worms with this summary.
Not at all. The tuple cans of worms remain securely sealed. From your introduction, I suspected that your axiom and argument might be similar to my own Information-based TOE. But I don't have the training in math & science to follow the logic. So, I'll leave it to those who do have the technical background, to provide feedback. Good luck with your daunting project. :smile:

Even for the physicist the description in plain language will be a criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached.”
— Werner Heisenberg
• 777
↪Philosophim Question for you: Can I challenge you on your suggestion of cross-referencing observers? Can I take the "attacking side" of the argument for a little bit?

Please do. Everything should be put through its paces. I will have time tonight to go over your other posts, but do not feel the need to wait.
• 777
Let's challenge ourselves to imagine how one can claim a unicorn infallibly. An infallible claim takes a context A and applies a sequence of arguments, or transformations, etc such that it ends up on B without any obscurities.

Yes, I understand that. The question is what would be an obscurity? Your example seems to point to the fact that one would have to claim there was a unicorn, and that be affirmed by reality. But what if it were neither confirmed nor unconfirmed by reality? A model might be generated, but what if our model is wrong and reality shows something different? In the end, there must be something within the system that creates a halting image versus a belief that is in error. And I think the thing you need is the concept of truth.

As I see it, an individual observer could conclude something infallible within their own context. In their mind, their definitions and logical application are sound. The only way it would not be sound, is if someone else came along and introduced them to a new concept, or showed them something they had not considered before. Even then, both observers could be wrong in comparison to the idea of what is true. An observer by nature, can be wrong. The truth has no opinion.

In this case, they are random, because they are the results obtained from a wave-function collapse which is random. (For the record, I do not get any hidden variables in my theory, and I personally do not believe in hidden variable theory, local or non-local).

True randomness would have no prediction or consistency. If the truth were random, and only made manifest by observers, then each observer would most likely see a different truth. But that's not what happens. We are all held to the Earth by gravity. We all have to breath to live. We all think and can communicate in the same language. We make random stabs at the truth, but at the end of the day, it exists despite our wishes or observations to the contrary.
• 351
Yes, I understand that. The question is what would be an obscurity? Your example seems to point to the fact that one would have to claim there was a unicorn, and that be affirmed by reality. But what if it were neither confirmed nor unconfirmed by reality? A model might be generated, but what if our model is wrong and reality shows something different? In the end, there must be something within the system that creates a halting image versus a belief that is in error. And I think the thing you need is the concept of truth.

Oh I think I understand where you are coming from...

Due to the Godel theorems on incompleteness, I do not believe in the concept of true vs false; rather I believe in provable vs non-provable which is the correct consequence of said theorems and is a generalization of the concept of true vs false. Allow me to explain.

True vs false is a special case of provable vs non-provable, and is possible only when a theory is decidable. In the general case, there is no true or false; just provable or non-provable.

Most people (including many professionals) have misunderstood Godel as having produced a sentence that is 'true but not provable'. This is incorrect, since if the sentence cannot be proven to be true then it is not true, obviously, rather it is undecidable. Why do so many people call it 'true but non-provable' if it's incorrect? Because the mind automatically assumes the consistency of Peano's arithmetic and then sees the sentence as true. But the second theorem states arithmetic can't prove its own consistency. Thinking of the Godel sentence as true but not provable is merely a mirage, or a trick of the mind if you will, because the mind automatically sees Con(PA) union PA instead of just PA. Here Con(PA) means a binary axiom that states PA is consistent. If you only use PA, as you should, the Godel sentence is neither true nor false, just unprovable.

There are whole books written which gets this wrong. Once I realized the mistake is so common I had the idea to go on wikipedia and edit it to reflect this knowledge, but surprisingly, the only source of information about Godel that nails this correctly that I ever found... was wikipedia; a random paragraph in a different style somewhere down in text already provided the correct interpretation! The paragraph has been re-edited multiple times since then, but the core idea is still in it.

The specific section of the wikipedia page that nails it is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Truth_of_the_Gödel_sentence

As an example, the paragraph linked above states that PA can be extended such that the Godel sentence is true or false depending on the choice extension; there are infinitely many extensions of PA in which a Godel sentence is true, and infinitely many in which it is false... that is what unprovable in PA entails - neither true nor false in PA, but whichever in an extension thereof.

So, one ought to no longer believe in true vs false; but more generally as known vs unknown, or provable vs non-provable.
• 351
True randomness would have no prediction or consistency. If the truth were random, and only made manifest by observers, then each observer would most likely see a different truth.

Well since this 'randomness' eventually entails the laws of physics this suggests that the laws of physics are just misunderstood to be way more special than they are... they are merely the 'boundaries' to randomness if you will, constraining it so that on the whole it corresponds to a state of arbitrary knowledge. Other than that they are highly non-special and there is nothing else to them. I know quantum gravity sounds fancy in name, but it is way less special or arbitrary than the choice of word would make you think. What we call the laws of physics are just glorified rules of statistics, and quantum gravity is the purest and most general form of such statistics - it reaches a 'maximum' and its why its the one that come out of this.

Those observers who see a 'different truth', the equations simply places them in a different universe... poof they are gone.

We are all held to the Earth by gravity. We all have to breath to live. We all think and can communicate in the same language.

Yes, but that is simply because the world must be a solution of quantum gravity. The rest is the product of natural selection, which is supported in the framework as a scientific theory and which is likely dependant upon the specifics of our universe (scientific theories are dependant on the specifics, but the laws of physics aren't.. which is why the scientific theories are falsifiable when the specifies change, and physics isn't).
• 351
How could they both be wrong? Either the rain is caused by god(s) or it's not. What's the other option? And when you explain your answer, pretend you're talking to a 10 year old.

Another way to see it is that by necessity there cannot be a conflict between two infallible statements, otherwise we have a contradiction. So if requested to pick one of two infallible statements on the grounds that they are not compatible, then by necessity one or both cannot be infallible.
• 777
True vs false is a special case of provable vs non-provable, and is possible only when a theory is decidable. In the general case, there is no true or false; just provable or non-provable.

The boolean introduction could be changed, as it was meant as an abstraction of the notion "exists" vs. "doesn't exist". But underlying the question of what exists is a set of natural numbers representing each bit of truth. What exists may or may not be provable. I was under the belief that a halting image was infallible because it was provable within the context of its observer and variables. But one could come to an infallible conclusion on their own that ended up not actually existing correct? That's why there can be halting images that may be at odds with each other in the entire formula of science.

And I believe this notion is consistent with Godel and Tsarky's undefinibility theorem. In an infallible system, you are not proving what is true. You are proving what is not contradicted by what is true. That is why science relies on falsification, and not assertion.

Circling back to why this is important, is the singleton observer is not provable as you've postulated in the paper. Truth is not provable either. But what is provable, is that truth counters our claims of knowledge.

What we call the laws of physics are just glorified rules of statistics, and quantum gravity is the purest and most general form of such statistics - it reaches a 'maximum' and its why its the one that come out of this.

Yes. There are very clear limits to our predictions and assertions of specifics at that level of physics. That is why we know its not truly random. It cannot be predicted, or made sense of. Pulling a random card out of a deck of 52 playing cards gives us a 1/13 chance. But that doesn't mean its really random. Truly random would mean the deck changed without predictive capabilities into a car, a bus, a whale, or a full deck of jin rummy cards.

The limit is what is true, because any proposal past the limit is contradicted by the fact that it doesn't exist. If you cannot prove that the singleton observer exists, and we know that truth exists by the fact of its contradiction to claims about reality, then this notion of truth holds, and trumps the idea of the singleton observer as you've been defining it so far.

If that is the case, why not add the notion of truth to your theory as science already uses it? Falsification is part of the scientific method, and your theory is not contradicting it. There's just no proposal of an entity that can have knowledge of everything that is true, just the proposal of an entity that can observe what it observes, and logically conclude what it can through those observations.
• 180
I have taken a look at the math.The five Dirac matrices ($\gamma_{0,1,2,3,5}$) are normally used as the metric of 4D spacetime. They are then used to construct the 16D space for the scalars (A), vectors (V), bilinears (F), pseudo vectors (X), and pseudo-scalars (B), correct me if I'm wrong. I can't see nowhere a concrete evaluation of spinors though. With the five forms (scalars, vectors, bilinears, pseudo-vectors, and pseudo scalars) given a concrete physical filling. The usage of double daggers as the Clifford conjugate is non-standard, though in the context of the Hermitian conjugate (single dagger) understandable. There are some issues with mathematical syntax and spelling (for example, in the appendix in Lagrangian extremization you go from q to p and back again; confusing, but it's a small difference, so understandable; or look at the definition of the Clifford conjugate of a matrix, look at the the 's; and there is more; just make-up, but nevertheless) and I can't get rid of the feeling you have brought up a self consistent, self explanatory, self fulfilling theory. If so, then you have succeded. There is no connection with physics. The 1D (2D base) might give rise to QM, the 2D (4D base) to interacting Dirac fields, but the 3D (8D base) and 4D (16D but certainly not connected with the 4D metric, or with quantum gravity which has no influence on interference).Can you give an example for a physical realization of F and Y? If so, let me know!

There are different kinds of ToE. Like religious ones, philosophical ones and physical ones. This is a philosophical one, a metaphysical one (metaphysics is just a non-physical way of explaining things, with the potential to become physical). In that sense, also string theory is metaphysical as the extra curled up spaces are purely mathematical. There are just fibre bundles, defined on a manifold, and strinģs in a quantum context vibrating on that manifold. The fìbre bundles induce a metric on the the manifold, like the components of the 4d metric in bulk space induce a metric on the bulk. Strings fall freely and quantized through the totality of the 10D space. Problems arise to let strings move in the bulk. Like in Kaluza-Klein theory, where charge is direction of motion in one direction (and when quantized, charge is quantized), in classical KK theory, a point particle falls freely through 5D spacetime, with a 4D A-vector defined as the vector-bundle (a special fibre, which be for example SU(3)) on the small circle, and the components of A part of the 5D metric. K theory emerged to harbor other forces.

Mathematical as it might be, string theory has connections with the physical world. But to the smallest scales and the highest energies. It's obviously wrong considering basic ingredients (it doesn't explain for example how strings can vibrate at all, though strings can avoid infinities due to point-like structures). I miss this reference to a physical world in philosophical ToE's. There is no hot stuff, so to speak.
• 351

You seem to be asking for a rule, "force" or some kind of algorithm to guarantee that observers live in the same universe, but the theory doesn't do that, and let me explain...

Take all possible observers from all possible worlds. Those who "see" the same halting image are placed in same universe by the equations, and those who don't are not. There is nothing that forces them to "see" to the same the halting image; they either do or they don't.

It is possible that some observers have cross-references (subsets of their halting image agrees but not all of it). In this case, the equations will place them at different points in the quantum history of the system. If one's halting image is a subset of another, but later they eventually merge into the same halting image, then the former travels towards the later and it is the light cone that eventually meet... In all cases the equations automatically takes care of all of that.

Mathematically the observer is defined with respect to the infallible statements, so if an observer misunderstands a statement, it won't place him in a different universe as its definition will not change just because he happens to misunderstand a statement. The definition is not based on the understanding, or misunderstanding of an observer. Observer back-and-forth can be used to clear out misunderstanding, but it doesn't change the mathematical definitions of the infallible statements.

There's just no proposal of an entity that can have knowledge of everything that is true, just the proposal of an entity that can observe what it observes, and logically conclude what it can through those observations.

That is what the singleton observer is; it has observed everything that it has observed... and nothing more. The singleton observer does not know everything that is true. The singleton observer is not all-powerful, hypothetically, he could be stuck in LA traffic for 2 hours every week day and owe 500\$ in back taxes.
• 180
How do you see people?
• 351
Let me ask it differently; do you think the laws of physics should work for any number of observers between 1 and infinity? If yes, then they need to work with just one too.

Maybe I should have phrased it that my theory works with one observer first and foremost, and then you can increase the number to any number you want... (by "running" the theory in parallel as many times as you want)... instead of insisting so much on just one. It supports that too.
• 1.6k
It's too bad you missed the opportunity to publish in the now discontinued Foundations of Physics Letters, which I think was refereed but catered to speculative tastes. Peter Lynds made quite a name for himself with his paper on the nature of time, a kind of reformulation of Bergson's ideas. His article was much easier to read than yours and garnered some support, but quite an array of ridicule as well. At least it came out in a sort of traditional journal.
• 180
There is no foundation of physics described. It reduces the observer, the universe, and knowledge to the math connected with STP, i.e, Hestenes' use of the Clifford algebra. QM and the Dirac and its interacting field follow in the 1D (2dimensions) and 2D (4dimensions) case. The 3D and 4D case give some weird interference, based on an Y[/b] pseudo-vector and F 6-dimensional bilinear form. The Y and F are purely hypothetically and don't relate to quantum gravity.

The math introduced already assumes a physical theory. QM and QFT. It doesn't explain it.
• 351

1. Does F=ma contains physics? Is it physics?
2. Does the Schrodinger equation contains physics? Is it physics?
3. Does a chair contain physics? Is it physics?
4. Does a particle contain physics? Is it physics?
5. Does a symmetry of nature, such as the interval between two events in special relativity contain physics? Is it physics?
6. Does ds^2=dt^2-dx^2-dy^2-dz^2 contain physics? Is it physics?

If you can just give me a binary list of answers to each question, I think I can probably wrap my head around it (unless of course they are all yes or all no, then I still won't know :)).

If you want to give me a more detailed answer, feel free to do that as well.

• 180
1.yes . no.
2.yes . no.
3yes.yes.
4.yes.yes.
5.yes . no.
6.yes/no.yes/no
• 351
1.yes . no.
2.yes . no.
3yes.yes.
4.yes.yes.
5.yes.no.
6.yes/no.yes/no

My paper is able to derive F=ma and other known laws of physics. Do I then conclude that you think it contains physics, but is not itself physics? Or maybe I missed an important subtlety with my questions?

Why does the universal verifier not satisfy you that the theory connects to the physical world?
• 180

Indeed. The formulae contain a reference to physical stuff, but are themselves not physical. Your model con derive laws but not the stuff it refers to. That is, as I define physics. The laws are imposed mathematical relations. Relations are physical, but not their quantization.
• 351

Ah okay, I see. I think there are basically two interpretations.

One interpretation is simply that 'physical things' don't exists. What exists are the laws the observer is constrained to not violate, and said laws happen to be the same that govern what we think of as physical matter and therefore we are obligated to behave AS-IF there is this matter out there regardless of whether it is or isn't actually out there... it is just a convincing game of mathematics from which there is no escape.

Another interpretation is to simply postulate that the "physical things" exists independently. It may be aesthetically more pleasing to some, but adds very little value; the physical existence of "things" is reduced to nothing more than a binary and unprovable yes/no axiom. No important theorem follows from this axiom (because everything else in physics has been recovered without it already), it is purely a crowd pleaser.
• 180

There is a third one. Physical objects exist and have to obey physical laws, which by themselves are not physical. Physical laws are normally given in mathematical form. It's what we project onto nature, and normally, nature is asked (or forced) to reply in math, shaping scientific practice accordingly.
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mention
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