If fundamental reality wasn't inherently consistent, life couldn't exist. — RussellA

Which means that life would exist, but it wouldn't.

One cookie that first was part of the letter E, suddenly becomes part of the letter F. (And later becomes a period according to T Clark). It is clear that that only happens in our mind. — Carlo Roosen

Why would it only happen in our mind? The cookie is out there, it is a part of collection E, then a part of collection F. Collections E and F are out there too.

Fundamental reality must be the particles, the cookies AND the letters, somehow. — Carlo Roosen

In other words, reality consists of collections of collections of collections... Welcome to set theory, the instantiation of abstract mathematics in concrete forms. Every set (collection) is an object in its own right, not identical to any of its elements but something in addition to them.

It is logically possible for there to be a present King of France. That is, in some possible world there is a Present King of France. — Banno

It may be logically possible in some possible world but not in ours.

The trouble with "The present King of France is bald" is that given there isn't a present King of France, It's unclear what truth value the sentence has. If there is no present King of France, then he is neither bald nor hirsute. — Banno

Since "the present King of France" has a logically inconsistent definition (in our world), it is not an entity but nothing. Nothing has no properties, so I would say that "The present King of France is bald" is false because it attributes the property of baldness to nothing. I am not sure about negative properties though. "The present King of France is NOT bald" rephrased as "Nothing is NOT bald" seems true because it denies the property of baldness to nothing. But does that mean that nothing has a negative property of "non-baldness"?

There's nothing logically inconsistent about the present King of France, no contradiction that follows from the very idea. — Banno

It would be logically inconsistent for an entity to exist at a place and time where it doesn't exist. The present king of France doesn't exist on our planet, therefore it would be logically inconsistent for him to exist on our planet.

What if you witnessed a unicorn in fiction such as in a movie or a book, does the unicorn exist in this type of frame or it doesn’t exist because it’s not real? — kindred

In such cases, a "unicorn" can exist as an image on the movie screen or as an encoding of that image on a tape or a digital device, or as a printed word ("unicorn") on a page in a book. It can also exist as a neurological object in your brain, or as a particular object in your mind (just in case your mind is not identical with your brain). It might also exist as a general object (universal) whose instances are particular objects in minds or neurological objects in brains or printed words on pages or images on movie screens.

Do existents always have to have a one to one correspondence with reality. — kindred

In the most general sense, reality is all that exists, and all that is not nothing exists. For practical purposes though the words "reality" and "exist" are often used in a narrower sense, for example for particular objects that exist outside our heads. Or not for "unicorn" in the senses I mentioned above.

Do triangles exist in your view ? They’re not mythical but abstractions of thought. — kindred

In my view every entity that is defined in a logically consistent way exists. An inconsistently defined entity is actually not an entity/something but nothing (an inconsistent definition has no referent). Triangles may exist as particular thoughts or as universals but also as particular objects drawn on a piece of paper, for example.

After that we just have to explain what to do with the present King of France. — Banno

He doesn't exist because he's logically inconsistent. Same for the present unicorns on this planet.

For me, an existent is something that "acts". — Benj96

I think that is still too narrow a definition. For me, an existent is that which is not nothing. This might include particular things like a particular triangle that exists in a space without time and therefore cannot act, or general things (properties) like a general triangle or a general mind or number 2, which cannot act either. Plato thought that general things are more real than particular things. There are also relations, which some philosophers think are more real than things (non-relations).

Logical possibility just means it can be stated in a way that doesn't violate an axiom of logic, but metaphysical possibility requires there is a possible world where such a thing can really exist. — Bodhy

And for me a possible world is a logically consistent one, so I see no difference between metaphysical and logical possibility.

A mile high unicycle is not incoherent, but it's not metaphysically possible because of the impossibility of an actually existing infinite set of things. So it is definitely possible for something to be logically coherent but not existentially possible. — Bodhy

A mile high unicycle would be logically inconsistent in a world whose structure, including laws of physics, is logically inconsistent with a mile high unicycle. For example, if there was a world in the shape of a cube whose side is 10 yards, it would be logically inconsistent for a mile high unicycle to exist in such a world. I see no problem in the existence of actual infinity. Maybe it doesn't exist in our world but it may exist in a different one.

But do sets exist? That's an unresolved metaphysical debate. — Bodhy

Sets are collections. When there are some things, they are automatically the content of a collection (unless the collection is logically inconsistent, for example there is no set of all sets that are not members of themselves). In a special case, the content can be just one thing. In yet another special case, an empty collection has no content; it is a collection that has the property of having no content; in other words it is a non-composite thing. That is also the reason why there can't be absolute nothingness - nothingness is absence of content, absence of content is the property of an empty collection, and an empty collection is something, a non-composite thing.

. Water is not meant to be logical -- just liquid. — L'éléphant

But it must be logically consistent too, otherwise it wouldn't exist. Logically inconsistent water cannot exist, for example water that is not water, or water in a glass that is not in a glass. And that is irrespective of the evaluation of any humans.

Perhaps one object is only logically coherent, but not metaphysically possible in any possible world? — Bodhy

But what is the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility?

Such as infinitely tall unicycle. Not logically contradictory, but not metaphysically possible. — Bodhy

If such a unicycle is logically possible why is it not metaphysically possible? I guess it is not metaphysically possible in our world but that also means that it is not logically possible in our world either, because it is not logically consistent with the laws of physics in our world. But it might be possible (logically and metaphysically) in some other world.

Or the existence of literally only one thing. That's not a logically incoherent notion — Bodhy

Well, it is, because the existence of only one thing is a property of the content of another thing - a thing that contains only one thing.

I can imagine a logically consistent object and a real object. — L'éléphant

And what is the difference between them? I can't imagine the difference.

In the words of a realist, we could all be totally ignorant and illogical all we want, but the universe would be here. — L'éléphant

I asked you whether you can imagine a difference between a logically consistent object and a real object. Are you saying that if you were totally ignorant and illogical you could imagine such a difference?

And same things viewed under ordinary observation could have different relations viewed under quantum existence. — L'éléphant

So what? Two things viewed from a distance could seem the same but when viewed more closely we would see them as different. I am talking about things and relations in the ontological (existential) sense, not in the epistemical sense.

Since 'possible' objects are derived from our causal experience -- we wouldn't be able to imagine an object without the exposure to actual objects (if you want to challenge this claim, think of the actual findings about people who have no depth perception or their depth perception is skewed because they were limited in their mobility and touch) -- causal experience is prior to your imagining what's possible. — L'éléphant

So what is the difference between a logically consistent object and a real object? Can you imagine that?

Mutation is nature's way of saying that things do not have to follow the 'relations' at all times. — L'éléphant

What do you mean by 'following relations'? Different things have different relations.

You are using 'exist' loosely here and out of touch of philosophical scrutiny. — L'éléphant

According to ontic structural realism, relations are the only things that exist. I am not so extreme though, I just think that relations and non-relations cannot exist without each other and neither is ontologically prior or more fundamental.

So let's assume that object X is consistently defined by its relations to all other objects. How can you tell whether object X is real or merely possible? What is the difference between a real object X and a merely possible object X?

In my view, relations are what we conceive of objects when we try to make sense of objects. — L'éléphant

But that doesn't mean that relations don't exist, if that's what you were getting at. It also doesn't mean that when we make sense of an object by its relations to other objects that those other objects don't exist.

I would be inclined to hold this same view, the problem is, I see it as a circular response to ontology. — L'éléphant

Circularity doesn't bother me in ontology, it's like in mathematics where all mathematical objects are consistently interrelated and all of them exist necessarily, so they are all on the same ontological footing. I actually think that mathematics, with its concretization in set theory, is a comprehensive elaboration of logic, of the logical structure of reality.

Not to mention that it is ignoring the fact that it is our own perceptual interpretation why we see an 'apple' and not some collection of atoms. — L'éléphant

In addition to relations there are also non-relations, and particular (as opposed to universal) non-relations are collections. A collection is a non-relation that has part-whole relations to other objects that are its parts. Of course, a collection also has relations to all other objects (that are not its parts). A collection can be empty, which is an object with no parts, or non-empty, which is an object that has parts.

Theories of relation or properties do not hold that they have a being. They could only be present if objects of contemplation exist. Hence, they are not existent the way humans exist. 'Possible' is a relation or a property, not a thing or object. — L'éléphant

Relata cannot exist without their relations and relations cannot exist without their relata. Relata and relations are inseparable, and I don't see why one would be ontologically prior to the other.

Moreover, a possible object is consistently defined not only in its relations to other objects but also in relation to itself (if identity is a relation at all). If an object is identical to itself then it is a logically consistent object and thus exists. It is then also consistently related to all other objects because relations between objects are derived from the objects' identities, just as the objects' identities are derived from relations between them. All relations are similarity relations (they constitute the similarity of their relata) because they are derived from the (same and different) properties of their relata, just as the properties of the relata are derived from similarity relations between the relata.

By "possibility" I mean logical consistency, that is an object that is logically consistently defined in relations to all other possible (logically consistently defined) objects. How would you determine which of those objects are merely possible and which are real? Yes, some of those objects may be just in your mind and others out in the street. But your mind, including its contents, is part of reality too, part of everything that exists. So I say that all possible objects exist, in the way in which they are defined.

But, even in simpler terms if all possible outcomes are realized, and the determinism of the MWI is applied, then where does this leave the uncertainty principle in any reference frame? — Shawn

MWI interpretation is not deterministic in the sense that in a parallel world later events logically follow from earlier events and from the laws of physics. This lack of logical entailment means that we cannot predict (with 100% certainty) the future of our world. Yes, we can predict that all possible outcomes happen in various parallel worlds but we don't know which of those worlds is ours. This is our so-called self-locating uncertainty.

Ok, I didn't know this is used as an argument against causation. Of course in our life as humans we single out a particular cause or a small number of causes that are useful to us and help us navigate the world. Even in physics we usually don't need to consider the whole universe when predicting the future but only focus on those causes that have a significant impact on the matter at hand.

Or then we could dispense with the idea of causation completely except at scales where we humans live. If I punch you in the face and your nose bleeds, I caused the bleeding. — T Clark

You would not be the sole cause though. For example, planet Earth would participate in the causality too. If planet Earth didn't exist you would not be able to stand here, let alone punch anything. But we take it for granted, so we don't mention it.

Returning back to the question of how the nature of causality works, what are the leading theories of causality, nowadays? — Shawn

For me, the (deductive) inferential theory of causation seems the most elegant. It says that the structure of our spatio-temporal world contains regularities in the distribution of matter in spacetime called laws of physics, and that the distribution of matter in space at time t logically follows (i.e. can be deduced/computed) from the distribution of matter in space at an earlier time t-1 and from the laws of physics. The distribution of matter at time t can be called "consequences" and the distribution of matter at time t-1 can be called "causes". In this spatio-temporal structure of the world it is also possible to deduce causes from the consequences and the laws of physics; the crucial difference between causes and consequences is that causes exist at an earlier time than their consequences, so there must be an asymmetry in the time dimension of spacetime, the so-called "arrow of time", which differentiates between "earlier" and "later" moments on the time dimension. The prevailing explanation of this time asymmetry seems to be that the direction of time from the past to the future is identical with the direction of the increase of spatial entropy (disorder) of matter along the time dimension, which is in agreement with the second law of thermodynamics.

Fast-forward to the 20-21'st century, and we seem more concerned with probabilities and statistical likelihoods, as per the field of quantum mechanics. — Shawn

Quantum mechanics shows that the spatio-temporal structure of our world is not as deterministic as I have just described above. Which means that the spatial distribution of matter at time t does not logically follow (cannot be deduced/computed) from the spatial distribution of matter at time t-1 and from the laws of physics. The spatio-temporal regularities in the distribution of matter in spacetime are not strong enough for the logical entailment that is necessary for causality. Still, there are weaker regularities that enable at least the deduction of probabilities of spatial distribution of matter at time t from spatial distribution of matter at time t-1 and from the laws of physics. We could say that causality in the quantum-mechanical world is weakened.

To put this in simple terms, how or why does modality exist? — Shawn

I see no difference between logical consistency and existence so I think that all logical possibilities exist in reality (modal realism). This leads to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where all possible outcomes of a measurement are realized in different worlds that are apparently causally disconnected. In the macroscopic world where we can neglect quantum indeterminism, our imaginations that our world could have different futures stem from limitations of our knowlege. Those imaginations may be accurate with respect to other possible worlds though.

That seems a lot like a definition of nothing to me. — Treatid

Empty set? Emptiness is a property, which is something. And so is that which has it.

One of the sub-threads here is that all definitions are circular. — Treatid

Is that a problem? As long as all things are consistently defined, in all relations to each other, it seems fine to me. Of course, we can never prove the consistency of all things, due to Godel's second incompleteness theorem. But that's an epistemical problem, not ontological. Consistency doesn't care whether it can be proven.

As a result axiomatic mathematics cannot define the meaning of anything. — Treatid

What do you mean by "meaning"?

What can we know with certainty? What can we describe? — Treatid

We know our own consciousness with certainty. From that we form, in our consciousness, a representation of an external reality -- not with certainty but with various degrees of certainty.

A mathematical point is a definition of nothing. We can't use 'nothing' as a building block. — Treatid

In point-set topology, a point of space can be any set. The simplest set is the empty set, which is not nothing but something that has no parts.

do you think physics describes logic? — Shawn

I don't think there is any difference between logical consistency and existence, so logic describes the whole reality. Physics describes the part of reality we live in. Mathematics, with its foundation in set theory, is an elaboration of logic.

I would say the property is less fundamental than the concept it refers to; because it presupposes it. — Bob Ross

What is the difference between property and concept? Isn't it the same general/universal entity?

The interesting thing with 'being', is that it isn't really a property: that opens up the discussion to absurd ideas, like beings which themselves contain being in their essence and other beings which do not (e.g., Spinoza's view). — Bob Ross

Why would "being" not be a property? "Being", or "existence", seems to be something general/universal that is instantiated in all existing entities, including in itself. Why would some entities have being in their essence and others not?

This pecularity indicates, by my lights, that ‘being’ is a primitive concept and, as such, is absolutely simple, unanalyzable, and (yet) still perfectly valid. — Bob Ross

Existence seems to be a property of entities that exist and as a property it can be defined by its instances, that is, by entities that exist. What is more primitive: a property or its instances? I would say neither; instances cannot exist without a property and a property cannot exist without instances.

I think there are a lot of concepts that are not decomposable, that is, you cannot break them down into component parts without losing something. Perception might be one of these things. It's easy enough to describe perception. E.g., "you see a beautiful sunset over Death Valley."

If you try to decompose the experience into what causes it though, you end up losing elements. No amount of talk of neurons or light waves, B-minimal properties, etc., no matter how informative, seems to avoid losing something. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe that's because such descriptions are incomplete and even if they were complete they might be infinitely long or they might involve objects or relations that are difficult to imagine. At least neurons and light waves are 3-dimensional spatial objects so we can form some simplified picture of them, but consciousness also seems extended in time, so we might need to imagine qualia as spatiotemporal, hence 4-dimensional objects, which I don't know if anybody can. And if Gulio Tononi is right, then qualia are objects with many more dimensions in some abstract space of possible causal relations.

Right, there are some pretty good arguments out of the Thomist camp that all properties of things have to involve how they relate to other things or parts of themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Trivially, all relations between any two objects can be said to be similarity relations which specify which properties the two objects have in common and which properties they don't. Thus any object (as a bundle of all its properties) is, in principle, completely defined by its (similarity) relations to all other objects.

But then what does it mean for something to simple? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Mereologically it means that it has no parts, or set-theoretically it is an empty set. But in another sense, I would say that every object, no matter whether it has parts or not, is something simple, unstructured, a monadic quality, a whole. A whole may have relations to other objects that are its parts, but it is not identical to any of its parts, it is something else than any of its parts, something in addition to its parts, which has part-whole relations to its parts.

First of all, all definitions are essentially circular, as evidence by somebody not being able to immediately glean a language simply by by being handed a dictionary. But with some ideas, the circularity of the definition becomes very short, such as in your example. — noAxioms

I think this is a good point. Every object can be defined with its relations to all other objects. We can arbitrarily take some objects as "primitive" and define other objects with relations to these "primitive" ones. However, some objects are more frequent than others, like some words are more frequent than others in a language extract. It is useful to focus on these more frequent ones, and perhaps take them as primitive (as a basis for defining others), because it makes understanding reality easier; these are the regularities or commonalities in reality, known as fundamental (most general) concepts, or fundamental (smallest) particles, or laws of nature. It is easier to define movements of planets of the solar system with their relations to the Sun than to the Earth.

How could that be? I am definitely not conscious of my experience 10 minutes ago. Either I am, or I am not; there is no in between. And the fact is, at some point I was, but I no longer am. That's change. — Ø implies everything

You can have different experiences simultaneously, like hearing a sound, seeing something, experiencing a memory and an anticipation, and having the feeling of passage of time. Some of these experiences may feel more salient while others may feel vague or subconscious.

That still necessitates change; the change from experiencing a moment subconsciously to experiencing it consciously. — Ø implies everything

Maybe not. The conscious and subconscious experiences may be simultaneous, the subconscious in the background. Transition from moment to moment may be just an impression, a feeling.

But I think I've ruled out eternalism as self-contradictory, which means there must be real change. — Ø implies everything

I am not sure it is self-contradictory.

However, eternalism is itself very problematic, philosophically. How do you explain our changing experience? — Ø implies everything

I don't have our experience of passing time figured out, honestly it seems like a major mindfuck. I imagine myself as being extended not only in space but also in time, as having many temporal parts in different moments of time, in continuous sequence. Each temporal part od myself experiences only its moment but my whole temporal self somehow (subconsciously?) experiences itself as a whole too, which perhaps provides the impression that the different experiences at different moments belong to me as to a single object. The arrow of time according to physics seems to be provided by the rising entropy along the time dimension (2nd law of thermodynamics), which perhaps creates the impression of irreversible progression of moments from the past to the future, along with impressions of memories and anticipations.

I don't think that works, because it introduces the choice again. Since both worlds already existed separately, then they were two separate objects (despite their identicality). Thus, a paralogical choice is made between which of the two worlds gets a banana and which gets an apple. — Ø implies everything

But such a choice is never made because the apple and the banana are part of the identity of each world and the identity of an object can never be different than it is, because that would constitute a logical inconsistency. So, the world that has the apple has the apple necessarily; it is logically impossible for the world to be different.

You seem to be thinking of objects as changing in the passage of time but time is structurally (mathematically) a special kind of space, and space doesn't pass; it just exists. What appears in our experience as the future already exists, just like the past, and it exists the way it is and cannot be different, because that would constitute a logical inconsistency.

If one simply answers that the original sentience is no longer present, and two new sentiences were born (both having access to the original sentience's memories, and experiencing their birth as continuous extension of the original sentience's experience), then you have answered the question. — Ø implies everything

I think you can put it that way. Another possibility might be that there were two worlds with two sentiences where everything was the same up to a moment when an apple appeared in one world and a banana in the other world.

There can be two sentiences - one experiencing the world with an apple and one experiencing the world with a banana. After all, a sentience is just an object, like anything that exists. There can be many objects.

I don't see any mystery in why one sentience experiences this world and another sentience experiences another world. Location and experience are part of the identity of each sentience. Each sentience (each object) is what it is, and cannot be what it is not because that would constitute logical inconsistency.

Okay, now we are getting somewhere. This splitting of worlds; has it happened after sentience entered the picture? — Ø implies everything

I don't know what sentience has to do with this. This is about logical consistency: each world is identical to itself. Each world is what it is and is not what it is not. That's all.

Edit: By the way, the principle of logical consistency or identity does not pertain only to "worlds" but to any object. For example, one object cannot be both an apple and a banana because that would be a logically inconsistent object. But there can be two logically consistent objects - an apple and a banana.

Okay, let me take this step-by-step:

1. First moment in time, there is just being (I don't claim you believe this, but you have to deny it).
2. For this moment in time, due to the lack of any laws or anything specific, it would be logically consistent that a banana spawns at coordinates x,y,z.
3. By the same logic, it would also be logically consistent that an apple spawns at coordinates x,y,z.

So, in the next moment in time, what happens? Do both spawn? Well, each spawning is separately consistent, but together, they are inconsistent. — Ø implies everything

Then there are two logically consistent worlds - one in which an apple spawns and one in which a banana spawns. Both worlds exist because they are logically consistent.

Sure, but in the real world, a banana and an apple cannot exist with their centers overlapping. — Ø implies everything

Because such a world would be logically inconsistent, with respect to the laws that characterize its structure. So I state again: all logically consistent objects exist because there is no difference between logical consistency and existence.

But then everything would have popped into existence simultaneously, and contradictions would have arisen. How did the universe remove these contradictions? How did it choose one thing over the other? — Ø implies everything

In mathematics all logically consistent objects exist simultaneously and there is no contradiction.

The purely logical donkey, when faced with two equally voluptuous hay stacks, starves to death. — Ø implies everything

So what? There is nothing logically inconsistent about starving to death.