Power comes from valid cognition.
Degrees of valid cognition correlate with nobility, not corruption.
See: eugenics.

Humans have a qualio-perceptual syntax https://ctmucommunity.org/wiki/Human_Cognitive_Syntax

Individual colors are to be understood as states, corresponding to physical frequencies. Comparison between states is what gives the impression of relativity.

But the syntax, what you refer to as "code", provides an objective or absolute nature to qualio-perceptions, as it distributes the relations over the states. It's what makes the states different to one another, or provides them with "categories" a la Kant. The syntax is what distinguishes individual states in terms of the other states that they are not.

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

No. Where's the inconsistency?

God being everywhere is inconsistent with hell, as I already explained. — Agent Smith

As I already explained: God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

Why is my formulation of hell false? — Agent Smith

Hell is in God, as above.

In my universe, possible means consistent although not necessarily true à la scientific hypotheses. — Agent Smith

Hence if God exists in one universe He exists in all of them -- this is in other words, not "possible" but necessarily true.

Omnipresence is consistent with god being in all worlds, but not in hell. There are only 2 kinds of beings in hell - those who hurt and those who hurt and god can't be either of them for He is sinless. — Agent Smith

Then your formulation of God, Hell and worlds is false. God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

What did you want me to be clearer about?

However, omnipresence has a specific definition as far as I know and from that definition, your argument is a non sequitur. — Agent Smith

Elaborate?

Coming to your belief being a possibility, one among many others, to my reckoning, no contradiction is entailed. — Agent Smith

Of course it's a possibility that my belief about something is true. This wasn't what I originally objected to being "just" a possibility though. You said that the claim I put forward was a possibility; I responded by saying it isn't just a possiblity: it is certain.

As for it being necessarily true, I have my doubts (vide supra). — Agent Smith

Elaborate.

You mean to say god's everywhere doesn't entail a contradiction in any world? But it does in our world (the problem of evil). What about the omnipotence paradox? — Agent Smith

OK, so you meant that my comment entails a contradiction?
It's a different subject to that of possibility, which is what I originally commented to offer my opinion on, but I don't acknowledge that the problem of evil is based on valid reasoning. I think that belief in the problem of evil is entirely a result of those people having very particular moral intuitions about responsibility that not everyone shares.

I also don't think there's any paradox between omnipresence and omnipotence. It would seem to me that being omnipresent would be a requirement for being omnipotent, in fact. Ultimately, something has to be responsible for changing everything at every level that change occurs, by which virtue it would count as omnipotent, and no principle would stop that same thing from being present everywhere in reality.

I thought "Our God in heaven" for a good reason. — Agent Smith

God is in Heaven, but it doesn't mean He isn't anywhere else, especially if He is omnipresent.

What contradiction? — Agent Smith

You referred to the idea of contradiction here.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. — Agent Smith

So I added that I didn't say you were in contradiction about anything.

but of course it's too obvious to mention why omnipresence is much less defensible that God existing in some possible world. — Agent Smith

Why do you think so?

Clearly, God, a fortiori, can't be in hell, a legit possible world. — Agent Smith

Why can't God be present in Hell? If he built the place it doesn't seem as if there'd be a repulsive force barring any future interaction with it.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. As far as I could tell, your statements didn't imply one and hence my reply "possible". — Agent Smith

I was also using the standard definition. I didn't say that you were in contradiction, though. Only that if God exists anywhere, He already exists everywhere, in all "worlds", and this encompasses the very law by which "possibility" is generated.

Are you saying there's no alternative other than to accept your statements i.e. to reject your position entails a contradiction? Please clarify. — Agent Smith

Yes.

You made a claim and it seems possible. How did I miss the point and I couldn't possibly be begging the/any question because ... — Agent Smith

I said:

"Possible" presumes a relation or syntax in which that which is possible is distinctly identified and related to the rest of reality. God by definition would subsume the whole of that reality by dint of omnipresence, so if your conception entails God existing in any part, God by definition subsumes the whole. — Hallucinogen

You replied that it is merely "possible" that possibility is subsumed by God's omnipresence. This misses the point that actually, it is certain that it does, not just "possible". Your response is on a par with claiming it is "possible" that bachelors are unmarried, or "possible" that 1 minus 1 equals 0.

Your reply also begs the question on what determines what "is possible". My reply provided an answer to this question - it is a syntax that relates parts of reality. You then stated this "is possible", when in fact if it were not the case then this provides no explanatory framework of what possibility is and what determines it (which makes it odder that you're asserting possibility as a response).

↪Hallucinogen
Yep, that's something that seems possible. — Agent Smith

Misses the point + begs the question

"Possible" presumes a relation or syntax in which that which is possible is distinctly identified and related to the rest of reality. God by definition would subsume the whole of that reality by dint of omnipresence, so if your conception entails God existing in any part, God by definition subsumes the whole.

In a true democracy the government should serve (all) the people, so we have a system where the people are the master and the government the servant (not derogatory). — TheMadMan

Not possible because if some people want something, it has to come from someone else. Someone is always the loser in a democracy, and democratic elections are often decided by around 30% of the population.

"why do so many people continue to have a problem with it?"

Mostly because the media, and BLMs average supporters, either claim or insinuate that only black people are killed by police in the USA, indicating they don't look things up before believing them.

So, you're not really trying to understand Someone's argument. You are just looking for excuses to dismiss it. You came looking for a non-existent so-called "logical fallacy" rhetorical magic wand to wave at it and make it disappear. — T Clark

And the reason why this is actually what Someone is doing is because this appeal to the difference between methological and metaphysical naturalism is just as effete as insisting my argument can't work because of the difference between supernatural and natural.

Metaphysical naturalism says there are no supernatural phenomena. Scientific methodological naturalism says only that science is not capable of examining supernatural phenomena. — T Clark

And why should I care about this? It has no effect on my argument. It's just coming up with a distinction that I'm not logically committed into accepting and insisting it stops me from making my conclusion. Sort of like a rhetorical magic wand to wave at my argument and make it go away.

If my premises are about natural things, then God is natural. If they are about supernatural things, then God is supernatural. I made this point to someone in the argument and a couple of times here in the forum and I don't know why you're not accepting it.

I'm basing my premises on facts about physics and mathematics. If someone insists that makes it metaphysically natural, then the consequence is my argument proves metaphysical naturalism wrong. If someone insists my argument exists within the confines of methodological naturalism (which is what they insisted), then it proves that God is not one of the phenomena excluded by methodological naturalism.

"But if God doesn't exist, who wrote the laws of physics?" This is analogous to asking: if Santa didn't put the toys under the tree, then who did? In the case of the toys, it was Dad. In the case of the laws of physics, opinions vary. God is in the line-up but is only one suspect out of several mentioned in this thread. — Cuthbert

Key thing you are missing: whoever did, has to have a mind (which you already granted with your Santa-Giver analogy).

No, this is precisely what Someone is doing.

Yes, it's insisting that something I've said is in one category or equivocating it as some phenomena, then missing the point that this has no bearing, and it's all done based on the presumption of some closed, circular definition.

Ignorantia elenchi (missing the point) — Agent Smith

Yes, it's ignorentia elenchi, thanks! :up:

OK, so as I suspected, it has no more weight or relevance than the error that I made this post to point out.

Fallacies of irrelevence, I'll check it out, thanks. I was going with "fallacies of definition" but it's not obvious if it's possible to make it more specific.

If Someone failed to provide an argument that will convince you, there's little chance I will. I think how he expressed it is better than I can do it. — T Clark

You said

You don't seem to grasp the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism — T Clark

but someone didn't explain any distinction between the two and didn't explain why it would affect my argument. So you and they are claiming I've misunderstood something without any elaboration.
I suspect that whatever that distinction is, it turns out to have no more an impact on my argument than does labeling my premises natural and my conclusion supernatural and insisting I can't make the conclusion because of that.

What is it that I've failed to understand?

One in which mathematical descriptions didn't hold would be one of randomness or total chaos. Such a world wouldn't have any coherent perceptions, conceptions or events of any kind, so it wouldn't contain anything else in addition to nonexistent mathematical descriptions.

Yes that's right. I'm not saying there's no valid distinction between natural and supernatural, I'm saying you can't just insist x is supernatural and plug your ears to any natural evidence for it.

OK. You attempt to present an argument or evidence that O. J. Simpson killed his ex-wife.

I object that you won't be able to do this, because to establish such truths, we use a certain methodology, which is only applicable to beeb-bobs and excludes any proof about super-beeb-bobs.

A beeb-bob is someone who can be proven to have killed their ex-wife.
A super-beeb-bob is the opposite of this, someone who cannot be proven to have killed their ex-wife.

The evidence you're trying to present is all about beeb-bobs. But people with the name "O. J. Simpson" are super-beeb-bobs.

Why are they?

Because I JUST INSIST.

You then attempt to present the argument or evidence that you have. But I just ignore what the evidence, absent of any preconceived notions, proves. Instead, I focus on calling it a beeb-bob, so therefore it can't be used to prove anything about super-beeb-bobs.

You then reply that this beeb-bob/super-beeb-bob distinction doesn't detract from the evidence and that it doesn't matter what I call it. You say that if your evidence is beeb-bob, then whoever it proves to be a killer of their ex-wife is also a beeb-bob.

I then reply that it isn't clear who you're talking about, because anyone with the name "O. J. Simpson" is paradigmatic of such super-beeb-bobs. And I JUST INSIST that no beeb-bob evidence can evidence a super-beeb-bob.

You then say, you're talking about whoever killed O. J. Simpson's ex-wife.

I then say "your argument requires super-beeb-bobs but it only has beeb-bobs, these have no metaphysical force. O. J. Simpson is a super-beeb-bob, so your position is inconsistent, viz: 1) O. J. Simpson is a beeb-bob 2) O. J. Simpson is a super-beeb-bob 3) nothing is both beeb-bob and super-beeb-bob 4) nothing is O. J. Simpson."

Seems to me that any confusion comes from disagreements on the meanings of several words - natural vs. supernatural, — T Clark

No, I'm saying his imposition of natural vs supernatural makes no difference to the argument. I am not disagreeing at all with what they mean. I even said at least once that I'm letting him decide what they mean.

There's a dual relationship between knowing and being. For something to be, it has to be compatible with the laws of perception and attribution. Otherwise, that which perceives and knows wouldn't share a reality with what we're proposing to "be". They must share the same reality, and therefore share the same rules. So it actually isn't the object that is logically prior, it is the rules of interaction between objects and knowledge thereof that is prior.

Mathematical descriptions are capable of describing the world because they have an ontological status in the world; ie the world is mathematical in itself. If this weren't the case, mathematical descriptions would be useless.

Human language and the world likewise have a metaphysical relationship, albeit one less precise, hence the need for mathematical language.

Accepting this isn't necessary for my argument, but only necessary for the rebuttal of their objection to my premises.

This isn't what I wanted the post to be about though. I'm looking for the kind of error being committed when he's basing his disagreement on a few definitions about natural and supernatural in which they contradict and insisting that I'm concluding a supernatural thing from natural premises. I was trying to get through to him (presumably a he) that I'm letting him decide whether my arguments basis was either natural or supernatural and that it made no actual difference. If my premises are natural, then God is natural. If God is supernatural, then the very definitions he's insisting on that natural premises exclude supernatural conclusions is wrong.

"That's baloney." His reason? You've mistaken science for metaphysics. — T Clark

The relationship between physics and mathematics isn't a scientific one; it is metaphysical. This is inconsequential for my argument however (it wouldn't prove me wrong even if you or he were right about my premises appealing to "natural law" and my conclusion being "supernatural").

Please note materialism in the poll includes dualism

https://ctmucommunity.org/wiki/Distributed_solipsism

Bernardo Kastrup's paper, it's very good:
https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAOS.pdf

Definitions of words are established by humans based on a consensus of usage. There are good and bad definitions, but no true or false ones. — T Clark

You are contradicting yourself; claiming that there are no true or false definitions rests on objectively true definitions with which you make the claim.

Yours is a bad definition if for the only reason that no one else will know what you're talking about. — T Clark

My definition is objectively true, and you've got no reason to think other people won't know what I'm talking about when I offer a different definition of a word since we communicate in common definitions.

That's what my point was, which is why I was pointing out what the actual definition of reality is.

"By definition" refers to what something is, not what people conventionally think it is. E.g. Someone can say "true is by definition the opposite of false" but people merely disagreeing doesn't mean that this definition is not the case.

That is not a standard definition of "reality." — T Clark

I think in absentia of the principle Nickolasgaspar and I put forward, people don't have a coherent idea of reality. An "independent" existence of the surrounding medium isn't defensible, and what we imagine must ultimately depend on that medium just as the objects we identify as taking on an actuality do.

Your comment doesn't substantively address anything that I said.

Reality is by definition the containing medium of anything you're able to interact with.
Any member of this domain by definition attains the descriptor "real", putting it in descriptive contact with all of reality's other members.
This entails that a causal or interactive relation distributes across the whole of reality, through which members can interact across shared structure.
Objections to this principle self-contradict invariantly, as they all propose a disentangling of reality as constituting a shared medium across which members interact, from the descriptor "real"; e.g. anything proposed to be real outside reality would not be real enough to affect reality owing to not being a part of its shared structure.

https://ctmucommunity.org/wiki/Reality

You claimed passing wind is non-linguistic so I refuted this claim. Same goes for rocks.

Passing wind may convey information as may a million other non-linguistic events. — Baden

Passing wind can't be inherently non-linguistic otherwise you wouldn't be able to identify it and communicate it to us via language. In otherwords, it has to be language-like for it to enter into and be informationally accepted by your linguistic model. If the structure it exists in weren't itself a language, you would be able to say what "it" is using language, as there'd be no structure connecting it with your identification of it.