Towards Quantum Integrated Information Theory

"The holistic IIT approach is in principle applicable to any information-processing dynamical network regardless of its interpretation in the context of consciousness. In this paper we take the first steps towards a formulation of a general and consistent version of IIT for interacting networks of quantum systems." — Towards Quantum Integrated Information Theory

A quantum-like information processing model with memory noise for question order effect

Recently, many studies have applied quantum mathematical formalism to the modeling of quantum-like phenomena in human decision-making — A quantum-like information processing model...

Quantum Cognition: A New Theoretical Approach To Psychology
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Quantum cognition and decision theories: A tutorial (no link)

Quantum theory provides an alternative probabilistic framework for modelling decision
making compared with classical probability theory, and has been successfully used to address behaviour considered paradoxical or irrational from a classical point of view. — Quantum cognition and decision theories: A tutorial

Contextuality and context-sensitivity in probabilistic models of cognition

In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. — Contextuality and context-sensitivity in probabilistic models of cognition

What Is Quantum Cognition, and How Is It Applied to Psychology?

In this introduction, we focus on two quantum principles as examples to show why quantum cognition is an appealing new theoretical direction for psychology: complementarity, which suggests that some psychological measures have to be made sequentially and that the context generated by the first measure can influence responses to the next one, producing measurement order effects, and superposition, which suggests that some psychological states cannot be defined with respect to definite values but, instead, that all possible values within the superposition have some potential for being expressed. — What Is Quantum Cognition, and How Is It Applied to Psychology?

Quantum like modeling of decision making: Quantifying uncertainty with the aid of Heisenberg–Robertson inequality

In the quantum-like framework the brain is a black box, such that its information processing can be described by the formalism of quantum theory. “Mental observables”, e.g., in the form of questions, are represented by Hermitian operators (and in more general framework by so-called positive operator valued measures, Asano et al., 2015). The mental state (or the belief state) of an agent is represented like a quantum state ... Therefore we can apply the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to characterize interrelation of uncertainties of two incompatible questions — Quantum like modeling of decision making: Quantifying uncertainty with the aid of Heisenberg–Robertson inequality

OK, I agree.

traditional definition of knowledge is 'justified true belief' — Janus

I'd say that belief presupposes knowledge, rather than knowledge being some condition on belief. In order to believe in something, you have to know something about that in which you believe. If you know no details about "it", you cannot rationally believe in "it". What I'm trying to say here is that we don't arrive at knowledge through belief, rather the other way around.

if we need to appeal to interpretation and belief (processing) and truth (correctness) — Janus

You mean if the definition contains these aspects?

According to Christian theology, the answer is 'humility'.

Necessity and contingency in Aquinas's sense don't exist because a thing doesn't have form\matter — Gregory

Form is what unifies some matter into a single object; it's how you can refer to something that has properties as a single thing.

An object is one thing composing necessity and contingency and everything is related to something else. — Gregory

I didn't understand this. Are you saying objects can be contingent in relation to one another?

his arguments presupposes God's existence although he is trying to prove it — Gregory

None of his arguments do this.

It says there is design which by definition means "done by an intellect". So he assumes God's mind in trying to prove it — Gregory

No, it only presupposes a relationship between deisgn and (our) intellects.

the first 3 ways assume contingency and God's necessity in the premises. — Gregory

No they don't.

I'm not sure if this gets directly at what you are asking for, but "religious particularism" is a relevant term — wonderer1

Thanks, it seems to be a variant of exclusivism.

with "ecumenicalism" having somewhat the opposite meaning. — wonderer1

Yes it's a form of reducible plurality, the view that I hold.

I think you will find most religions have a common thread under/through them. — Benj96

I agree.

There are several concepts that parallel across all religions. God is not one of them. Not all religions have a godhead. Taoism speaks in favour of flow of nature that is ultimately not reducible to human language/description. — Benj96

Indeed, but the implication we could take from this is that religions that aren't reconcilable, aren't so because they reject a feature of reality whereas the others don't. God might be that feature of reality.

I think religions as well as science are all fundamentally reconcilable with one another for a simple reason - they all study/ponder reality — Benj96

Correct.

In essence the reconcilability of the study of the universe as "self/conscious" (spirituality) — Benj96

I believe it is.

How can one reconcile Christianity with Hinduism or Islam or even Judaism? — Alkis Piskas

They all believe in spirits and the afterlife.

Words used in a theory — 180 Proof

By this, you mean atheism?

You agreed that atheism can be used to explain a particular state of affairs and you said theories are "explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work". Unless there's a distinction I'm missing, that seems to place atheism within the definition of a theory.

But you said that theories are "explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work".

Someone could coherently use atheism to explain why there are (on their view) no spirits or afterlife.

But atheism would therefore seem to be, or reliant on, a theory about what is publicly accessible and about what qualifies as a sound argument. In other words the particulars would therefore consist of "explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work"?

What does the critique consist of, and does it hold any assumptions?

If by "theories" you mean explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work, then I don't think "religions qualify as theories". — 180 Proof

Accepting this definition of a theory, would you say that (your best interpretation of) atheism qualifies as a theory?

But what about the claims of religions, are those incompatible, or are you unsure? — Hallucinogen

Usually. No. — 180 Proof

Would you say that religions qualify as theories? Would you say theories among scientific theories or theories among historical theories are incompatible with each other?
If your answers to these two questions aren't both "yes", what is the substantive difference between religion and theories (historical/scientific)?

They have the same function (re: pacifying false fears with false hopes) — 180 Proof

Would you say that they are all devoid to true content (in their claims)?

their contents may be "incompatible" like e.g. 'styles of art' or 'varieties of medicines' or 'tribal/territorial identities' throughout history and across cultures. — 180 Proof

But what about the claims of religions, are those incompatible, or are you unsure?

Would this be religious pluralism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's negative pluralism (about religons) specifically. Positive pluralism would be that they're all disjunct but they all contribute toward greater understanding / they each contain truth value. Negative pluralism would be there's lots of them and they're all veridically empty.

Indifferentism is used to describe the non-committal belief that no one religion is better than any other — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's relativism.

I am not sure if there is a specific sub-type of religious pluralism that specifies that all religions are epistemologically disjunc — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's irreducible plurality (about religions).

Interesting. Are you saying mythology itself holds this view or that the universe of each myth entails incompatability with all others?

Could you point to what the following definition, from the Oxford definition is lacking?

"Action or conduct indicating belief in, obedience to, and reverence for a god, gods, or similar superhuman power; the performance of religious rites or observances." — Oxford Dictionary

Or the definition by Emile Durkheim? "A unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them."

Thanks. What do you think the problem is with standard definitions of "religion"?

It's a view I've seen espoused in places. It also seems implicit in the "which God?" response. A watered-down version is espoused by Thunderf00t here. It also sounds very close to what Sam Harris says. But it's hard to find someone making the exact claim that there is no common framework for religions, it just seems to me to be what they're shooting at with these types of comments.

If when you said "the greatest possible vampire" you ultimately didn't mean something uniquely vampiric, but just meant a non-contingent entity upon which everything else is contingent and we're calling it "Dracula", then your analogy is just the same argument and it is valid.

It's still missing the premise that asserts that there exists something which is TTWNGCBC — Michael

It doesn't need one; the argument is still valid.

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. God is defined as TTWNGCBC — Michael

Line 1 connects anything that fits the definition of TTWNGCBC (since you're allowing it to mean the same thing as "if some X is...") with it necessarily existing. So once a concept is identified as fitting that definition, it is shown to in fact exist.

Your objection seems to me to undermine the very capacity of logical and mathematical generalizations to prove anything about the world. All I need is for God to fit the definition of something which is a valid generalization of the logical and mathematical relationships between things that I already know to exist.

1. If there exists something which is the greatest conceivable vampire then this thing necessarily exists
2. Dracula is defined as the greatest conceivable vampire
3. Therefore, Dracula exists

The conclusion doesn't follow. I'd need as a premise that the greatest conceivable vampire exists. — Michael

It's a false analogy. Vampires aren't non-contingent entities.

How does 2 differ from 3? — Michael

3 is not an axiom, just a definitional fact. 2. isn't necessary, I just left it there because you put it there. See:

If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists. — Hallucinogen

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. There exists something which is TTWNGCBC
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

But 3) is an empirical claim that needs to be shown. It's not something that's true a priori. — Michael

Oh right. But I was assuming that by "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", you meant the same thing as "If some X is TTWNGCBC," in the arguments you gave when you were previously attacking it. I wouldn't try to defend this argument beginning with "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", because of the flaw you've pointed out, so I would have to insist on going back to the way you originally simplified it, to "If some X is TTWNGCBC (...)"

Showing that "there exists something which is TTWNGCBC" is the intent of the argument, so I suppose you would have to express it in a way that does not require the satisfaction of an empirical claim, as I have done above.

Then the argument is:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

Actually it would be

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. TTWNGCBC is God (or vice versa).
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

Although it isn't optimal, it appears to be valid and sound.

Which again is invalid. — Michael

How so?

You're misunderstanding the logic. Look at existential quantification. — Michael

Could you elaborate on what I'm misunderstanding? I see that quantifier being used in the article cited to argue for the existence of certain numbers. I don't see the difference to how it's being used in this argument.

TTWNGCBC is a concept, just like numbers are, so using a quantifier that means "there exists" to express the condition that something fits the definition of that concept should not beg the question, even if the conclusion is that that something exists.

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. If there exists something which is God then this thing necessarily exists
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

3. in the above isn't in the original argument by the OP. They don't give the condition "if there exists God..." in the argument. It isn't necessary to include and I don't see a fallacy in the argument without it. All that is necessary is stating that God fits the definition of TTWNGCBC in some way, which the OP did in point 4.

No it doesn't, it asserts God fits the definition of X.

If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists
If some X is TTWNGCBC then X is God
If some X is God then X necessarily exists

Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

This is what the argument amounts to. The conclusion is a non sequitur. — Michael

I don't think that's a non sequitur, it's just not a fully formed argument. It's just 3 axioms followed by a conclusion. You could have switched "God" and "X" on the 3rd line though, that would've made it a valid and sound argument.

It could go:

If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

Not a non sequitur.

It might be referred to as negative pluralism and irreducible plurality among religions.

Thanks. Although this could provide the link to finding what I meant, I actually meant the idea that view that is critical of all religion, specifically on the basis that they're irreconciliable and that schisms aren't based on any kind of underlining logical framework.

I think you are simplifying 1) too much.

a) If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists — Michael

If TTWNGCBC existed contingently, then it would not exist necessarily, but something else would be TTWNGCBC.

Removing those parts is allowing you to make the argument look as if it's a non-argument.

Given 4), replace "TTWNGCBC" with "God:
b) If some X is God then X necessarily exists — Michael

No, the argument is "If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists".

1. If TTWNGCBC existed contingently, then there would be something greater than it (viz. a version of TTWNGCBC that existed necessarily).
2. Nothing is greater than TTWNGCBC.
3. Therefore, TTWNGCBC exists necessarily.
4. TTWNGCBC is God.
5. Therefore, God is necessarily existent. — Epicero

Your argument appears to be:

1. If God exists then God necessarily exists
2. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

Could you lay out how you arrived at this representation please?

It does not begin with "if God exists", it begins with something equivalent to saying "that which there is nothing greater cannot be contingent". What falls into this category is God, and so the set-up connecting existence with non-contingency produces the conclusion. Denying that the category exists seems a contradiction in terms, as well as raises difficult questions about what the denier thinks. It is like saying "there's no greatest number".

Why would this topic of "being given existence but only for a limited time" "only a problem for ... atheists"? — 180 Proof

Because atheists believe that it is only for a limited time.

It seems only a problem for the believer who expects there to be more to life and nature than this life — 180 Proof

Why is it a problem for believers? It should not make a believer feel powerless since physical life itself is the very opportunity to carry out God's plan and receive the reward. It's close to the opposite of powerlessness.

As a philosopher how do you reconcile these two seemingly contradictory notions of being given existence but only for a limited time? Does it not sometimes make one feel powerless or at worst nihilistic in the face of it? — invicta

Seems like another one of those questions which is only a problem for agnostics and atheists.

Strawman fallacy.

Because you allowed it. You should have repeated your original argument, not entertain a strawman. — L'éléphant

Yeah I think it is the strawman fallacy. It only seemed like it wasn't because normally strawmanning is so in-your-face and head-on, whereas this has a "sneaked-in" quality to it. The argument was months ago, but I did eventually (a couple comments later) notice what he did and when I mentioned what he'd done, that ended his attacks.

Some radical circularity here. The "law" is discovered by the repeated failure to produce perpetual motion machines, etc. The law doesn't prove anything about the world but contrarywise, the world proves the law. And there is a built in contradiction; if energy cannot be created how come there is energy? Laws have a scope; and energy is conserved in the universe; how energy got to be in the universe is necessarily beyond the scope of the conservation law. — unenlightened

Completely correct. Normally if this is pointed out, the empiricist/atheist will appeal to "we just don't know"-type slogans. So to avoid that, I pointed out that if he denies the conservaiton law has an origin, he's being inconsistent, since he who infers laws from observations in state to explain changes in those states is obliged to explain where the inferred law itself comes from. Otherwise, it is special pleading.

Is atheism then a concern of theists only, and atheists concerned only with refuting the theist conception of God? — Ciceronianus

It's a distinction which is highly predictive of a bifurcation in ethical views. Each branch defines its subsequent ethical and political views largely circularly on the reasons for that original theism/atheism distinction.

I don't feel the need for math (fields) to explain/discuss religion — Agent Smith

Presumptuous/false distinction

unless [ math ] clarifies the matter (...) That's all there is to omnipresence. — Agent Smith

Given that the former is true, the latter isn't true.

In a universe consisting of 2 points, a god that's omnipresent is in both points. — Agent Smith

You seem to be ignoring how we define "points" and which field studies them to start with.

and you insist that He's in hell too — Agent Smith

No I didn't.

I'd actually say the problem is we haven't agreed on what omnipresence is. We have already agreed that God needs to be omnipresent, and while I don't know if I agree to your exact wording (for hurting / punished + punisher) of what Hell is, I'll agree to it for the sake of argument.

The importance of what I am pointing out about omnipresence is that the "God is in x, for all x" formulation thereof is problematic, both for reasons pertaining to the "x" part (e.g. the conception of Hell which you raise), and because of the "in" part: because that automatically means that something is outside God by virtue of what "in" means. So expressing omnipresence in the above way entails that God isn't omnipresent.

The way forward is to conceive of omnipresence as equivalent to a mathematical fields closure over its elements.

a field is a set F that is a commutative group with respect to two compatible operations, addition and multiplication, with "compatible" being formalized by distributivity (...) Closure of F under addition and multiplication F or all a, b in F, both a + b and a × b are in F (or more formally, + and × are binary operations on F).

The field F itself is analogous to God, the elements a and b are analogous to any objects or locations therein, and the operations + and × are analogous to the means of interaction and relation between elements. Calling God omnipresent therefore is asserting that God is the field under which all elements that exist are closed and interrelated.

The fact that God in this conception isn't an element that can be pointed out and identified to be restricted to existing "in" anything, as well as the fact that physics is closed under mathematical operations, only provide further reasons to adopt this definition of omnipresence.

It also helps me support my earlier claims about possibility being the output of a syntax: syntaxes are composed of operations and possibilities are rearrangements of elements (products) thereof. So entertaining God to be "possible" in one world confuses the roles that fields, operations and elements play, since using the word "possibilities" to describe rearrangements of elements across all worlds immediately implies that operations exist that are responsible for all such possibilities, which in turn implies a single field under which those operations and elements are closed.

The inconsistency is that God can't be in hell and you're saying He is — Agent Smith

No I am not saying that. Did you not read the comment directly above? I just said Hell is in God. I’m not using a definition of God that makes it inconsistent with being in Hell, you are. I told you to explain why my God is inconsistent with Hell, not yours. You even said

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

You were meant to explain why my God is inconsistent. Now you switch misleadingly by replying as if you are arguing against your definition of God.
I responded to your assertion that God cannot be in Hell already, by pointing out that we aren’t committed into adopting your definition of Hell/omnipresence.

Then you changed tack - you now claim hell is in god — Agent Smith

No I did not. That is what you just did. I never replied to you as if I believed God can’t be in Hell.
The only point in this discussion I phrased the relationship as such was when I asked you “Why can’t God be in Hell?” and the only reason I referred to God being in Heaven was to save redefining omnipresence when it wasn’t necessary to do so.
The first time I told you what I thought the actual omnipresent relationship between Hell and God is in my comment before the previous one.

you now claim hell is in god (unsupported conclusion) — Agent Smith

It is no less supported than your own assertion that God can’t be in Hell. Besides, you haven’t given any reason why my definition of Hell/omniprescence is unsupported, especially since you seem to be avoiding arguing against it and prefer to switch to your own definition to argue against, even when you’re told to do the opposite.
It sheds light on why you thought that we could go back and forth with no end though: you’re subconsciously anticipating that you’ll miss the point of any premise that breaks the circularity of your reasoning.
So, back to getting you to explain why omnipresence is inconsistent. You are responding to the proposition that God is omnipresent, where omniprescence is defined such that Hell is inside God. Continue.