And you are free to disagree with that premise, though I haven't a clue why you would.

I raised a similar point about this same issue here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11642/the-critique-of-pure-reason-discussion-and-reading-group

THs do, apparently

Look, people have this habit of trying to fix things that they don't understand or have any good reason to be messing around with. There's this notion, which seems to be predominantly expressed by privileged white people, that because a problem seemingly exists, this means it's their "our" job to solve it. Yes, the human species - the same species that has been the most destructive in the history of earth - will suddenly, inexplicably, do a one-eighty and not just undo everything we messed up, but make right everything that we deem to have been made wrong from the very beginning. Because fuck yeah, we can do it! - we've never done it in the past, but goddammit I'm sure we'll do it right this time!

Oh how the giraffes suffer, yes it's our duty to help them, rah-rah-rah. Pass the lube, my dick is getting dry.

It's naive and arrogant.

I'm confused by your comment, not sure what it means.

Houellebecq coined it. I think it is supposed to refer to a large shift in the way a civilization views themselves and the world.

We returned to an explanation of nature being the cause, instead of everything being the will of a God. This radically changed the West and man's understanding of his position in the world, throwing the West into progressive motion and Islam into decline. — Athena

I don't think complicated historical events can be broken down into monolithic stages like this. Metaphysical mutations don't seem like good explanations for historical events, IMO. The material basis (like advancements in trade technology) is what drives events; ideological changes are an effect, not the cause. It doesn't make any sense to me that one region of the planet progressed simply because the inhabitants started believing in something different. It just seems more like mythology than history.

I also think, as I was saying to someone earlier, people in general don't think about thinks in a philosophically "robust" way. It gives them some sort of purpose and way to fill their life. — schopenhauer1

Yeah, thinking philosophically is not always congruent with (healthy) living. Thinking too much about existence makes you depressed, yes. So what is the value of doing so? Self-delusion is how a healthy mind keeps itself intact. It's a shame that one of the things people do to delude themselves is having children (who will have to delude themselves too) - but do you have a real, concrete substitute for it?

Do you expect everyone to selflessly cancel all their hope and accept ultimate eventual annihilation for the sake of people who won't even be around to appreciate this sacrifice? That's just crazy, of course nobody who hasn't already been beaten by life will accept this. Nobody who hasn't already been stripped of their hope can truly accept this position without reservation. If you are going to destroy the values people hold, you need to give them new ones (Nietzsche).

One of the things that seems to remain for people who have failed in life is to strip the hope from everyone else, as a vengeance strategy: "if I can't be happy/successful/content, then you can't be either; let me show you how everything you cherish is meaningless, so I don't feel so inadequate and isolated." Just food for thought, I have no way of knowing if this applies in any way to you, nor did I intend to insult, just another Nietzschean observation.

@schopenhauer1 did you have any thoughts on my reply here?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/584073

I think men would start to view women more as fellow travelers in life, humans, animals, worthy of dignity and respect, as opposed to some*thing* to be had. — James Riley

Strongly disagree with this statement. Pornography does not help men objectify women less, and that's not even virtual reality. IMO this would make men even more disrespectful to women, because for many men, women would no longer serve a purpose (they wouldn't even be a thing to be used).

I mean I just can't imagine some guy blowing his load to rape VR porn and then going to a feminist rally.

Oh yeah definitely I agree, especially wrt the technological factor. Technology is no longer a tool, but an environment with an imperative of its own, requiring large bureaucratic organizations and programmed human behavior. Libertarian and egalitarian ideas are not dependent on technology to exist and are actually stifled by it.

Space is not an intuition, because all intuitions have sensuous origins, and we never sense space. Space for us is never a phenomenon. — Mww

Not sure if I agree with this exactly, since Kant says in many places that space and time are intuitions, albeit pure; they provide the form, sensation provides the matter. They aren't concepts, and because of the dichotomy between concepts and intuitions, they must be intuitions. I agree they aren't phenomena, since they aren't appearances given to us by sensation. Space is given by us in order for phenomena to be given to us.

How I am understanding things as of now is that representations can be either concepts or intuitions, and can be either pure or empirical; but a representation cannot be both a concept and an intuition for they have a different nature.

Now think away the Mars bar, and imagine the space it was in, which you should be able to do. — Mww

I only find myself able to do so if I continue to image my hand (in space), and perhaps some sense of a geometric outline of where the Mars bar used to be. If I imagine extension in its most simplest form, I think of a grid or sorts. Hasn't Kant by this point already said that geometry requires the use of intuition (lines, graphs, etc) even though it studies the pure form?

I agree that I cannot imagine objects without space, and I think that this by itself can be turned into an argument for its a priority and therefore ideality, due to its universality.

Elementary particle physics aside, of course, which we don’t care about anyway, but people like to try proving Kant wrong by bringing up such nonsense. — Mww

Yes I have heard much about non-Euclidean geometry and particle physics as arguments against the Kantian view. Got any reading suggestions on this topic?

The book is a critique of reason. Reason is what the show is all about. Transcendental is a perspective, one of four, that reason takes with respect to what it is doing at any given time, the others being empirical, rational and judicial, or, moral. Reason examines....we can examine using reason in these various perspectives....everything from one or more of those perspectives, and some require all of them, re: freedom of the will. — Mww

Very interesting, I'm not familiar with this distinction of four perspectives. Is it raised later in the CPR?

Now, such could be the case, but parsimony suggests the simplicity of just letting understanding be that faculty by which conceptions arise, and that only and always in conjunction with something else already given by the system, re: phenomenon, because in that way, the system remains a unified procedure, operating by and within itself, without the influence of that which is not contained in it. — Mww

So, spontaneity refers to the capacity for the understanding to produce new and original conceptions that were never previously thought, when given the material to work with by phenomena.

Thanks again for all the detailed responses, I am grateful.

None of you came back to this.

Curious. Why not? — Banno

Was camping.

I agree.

We need not continue with this paradigm today, having all the tools necessary to avoid it, save the ability to establish and maintain the proper social environment. — Michael Zwingli

What tools are you talking about here?

Power relies a lot less on controlling the "messages" as much as they are focused on controlling the medium (?). At least in the case of internet politics. — wanderoff

Right, like I have said elsewhere, the point is to get people to feel like they are rebelling, without them actually doing so. Give people outlets to vent their frustration (social media, professional sports, religion, elections, etc), which themselves are usually ineffectual for making any real lasting change.

the proliferation of political discourses online and offline serve their own, possibly more potent programmes of control. — wanderoff

Isn't this just another form of censorship, though? Sure, there's the 1984-like censorship, with the State literally hiding and destroying information. But with the Internet, truth gets concealed just by the sheer amount of bullshit that gets proliferated across the web.

Certainly authoritarian countries, like China, censor the Internet in the former way as well. But "democratic" countries, like the United States, rely on propaganda spread by the media in a constant torrent with the aim of keeping everyone agitated and so easy to persuade.

China achieves censorship by limiting the amount of information available. The United States achieves censorship by providing an overwhelming amount of (crap) information.

but certainly uncontestedly patriarchal nonetheless. — Michael Zwingli

And why was that? As you said, the communities were so small that stratification wasn't possible. What was it that made H&G groups patriarchal? The only reason left as I can tell is the physical nature of men, who are generally stronger and so better equipped to bash a woman's skull if she questioned his authority.

It's true that the women who raise the next generation are usually complicit with the patriarchal status quo. No wonder why motherhood is so vilified by radfems.

So... why do we not have examples of matriarchies to work with?

What's that about, then? — Banno

Good question, I think it could be that women simply haven't had the opportunity to, given that men have monopolized power structures.

Women can be scientists, athletes, philosophers, CEOs, soldiers etc just like men. It stands to reason they can also be dictators, warlords and gang leaders. The only thing keeping them from doing any of these things are the conditioning they receive during childhood, and the social pressures that limit their options.

The question of why patriarchy came first, and is so ubiquitous, seems related to the physical attributes of men, which are the clearest differences between them and women.

It is just as concievable that patriarchy has it's origin in the particularly pretechnological competitive milieu of prehistory as the other way around. For primitive sapiens and his hominid forerunners, physical/bodily strength was generally the primary determinant for survival. In such an environment, patriarchy seems nearly inevitable. — Michael Zwingli

But we already know that, generally speaking, prehistoric groups of H&Gs were much more egalitarian than any of the agricultural states. Slavery and war came with civilization.

It's hard to say what the negatives of a matriarchy would be that are specific to matriarchies, and not just any hierarchical society.

Ruthless competitions like war and capitalism are sometimes seen to have their origins in patriarchy, with the implication being that a non-patriarchal (though not necessarily matriarchal) society would not have these things. This looks to be an empirical question though, and given the paucity of actual matriarchal societies that have existed, there doesn't seem to be a solid reason to believe that matriarchal societies would be free of these things. Women can be just as capable and willing to crush and kill each other as men are, though men have had a better opportunity of doing so, given their physical biology.

:up:

Damn, that's a heavy lift. I feel a bit foolish for having started Allison's book without reading the CPR alongside it. Unfortunately, while what I have read of Allison's book has made some of the CPR easier to understand, I find myself at times reading the CPR through the lens of Allison's book. Oh well.

NKS even says the CPR is a patch work of shifting contents from Kant's previous publications. Still the significance and importance of the CPR cannot be denied in the history of philosophy. There are far more interesting and significant philosophies in the CPR than the minor inconsistencies that one should worry about. — Corvus

Yeah, I'm realizing that we can really get side-tracked by hairsplitting comparatively minor issues. Probably I need to ease off the perfectionism a bit and settle more on understanding the whole rather than each individual itty bitty detail. Those can come later with time.

I would have thought, because independently of thought, it must be sensory perception or the content of the sensory perception. Sense perception of objects would not need intuitions for perception, because it doesn't need a thinking process. It would be direct perception such as bodily sensations? — Corvus

I figured something along the same lines, immediate meaning there being no other further representation that relates to the object. The object is given by sensations, sensation is the the initial way in which objects come into awareness. After which, forms and concepts are applied to sensation, thus indirectly (not immediately) to the object.

0. "Lehre" vs. "Doktrine" (Transzendentale Elementar l e h r e in German). Both are translated as doctrine. "Lehre" can also mean something like "teaching", "(basic) lesson" or "basic knowledge" (I'm not a native speaker of German). — waarala

Cool, thanks that makes a lot more sense.

Walls are walls because of the empty space between them. What’s your point? I can imagine a space that contains no objects.

According Kant space and time are ‘Intuitions’. Think of them as the canvas upon which cognition emerges. His view here is that mentally we ‘know’ (I prefer ‘ken’) only by way of space and time. We cannot imagine without placing something in a spaciotemporal frame. — I like sushi

I am not disagreeing with Kant's claim that space is an a priori intuition, or that we can't imagine objects not in space. All I am saying is that I don't find this particular argument (that we can imagine space without objects) compelling because it's not clear to me that this is actually the case. I don't seem to be able to conceive of "extension" apart from having there be an object that is extended; while extension and the properties of the object are distinct, and may have different origins, they nevertheless appear to be inseparably conjoined when it comes to actually presenting themselves to the mind.

Yes, there is empty space between the walls, but take away those walls, what is there? A black void, which nevertheless is still something on account of it possessing color. Again I am not saying that space possesses color, just that I can't conceive of space without applying color. Obviously this will be different for someone who is blind, I just happen to depend heavily on visual sensation when thinking about objects. Point being, some kind of sensation seems to be required for space to have any presentation, probably because it is just a form, and how do you conceive of a form (relations) without anything that takes part in the relation?

The Afghanistan Papers, Craig Whitlock

You can imagine an empty room I’m sure. — I like sushi

The room is still an object, with walls that have color.

Because the Transcendental Logic is much longer than the Aesthetic, and also in order to more frequently visit this forum, I will try to break my notes down into smaller, more digestible chunks.

Second Part. Transcendental Logic

Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic

Summary

I. Of Logic in general

Human knowledge has two sources: the capacity to receive impressions from objects through affection (sensibility), and the capacity to cognize [0] by means of these representations (understanding); objects are either given through our faculty of receptivity, or thought via the production of conceptions by the faculty of spontaneous [1] cognition.

With respect to sensation, both intuitions and conceptions can be either pure or empirical. Sensation is the matter of sensuous cognition. When an intuition is independent of all matter (sensation), it is a pure intuition, containing only the form of an intuition; and when a conception is independent of all matter (sensation), it is a pure conception, containing only the form of the thought of an object. Thus only pure intuitions and conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.

Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us [3]. Through the understanding, the objects of these intuitions are thought. Only through the unification of intuition and conceptions can a cognition happen; thoughts without content are void, and intuitions without concepts are blind. The mind must make conceptions sensuous by joining them with the objects of intuitions, and it must also make its intuitions intelligible by bringing them under these concepts.

The science of the laws of sensibility is called aesthetic, and the science of the laws of understanding is called logic. Logic may be classified as either general or particular. General (or elemental) logic contains the absolutely necessary principles (forms) of thought, without which the understanding is useless. Particular logic concerns the laws of correct thought with respect to some specific class of objects; it is an organon for a science and arrives late in the maturity of the science on account of its requirement for an extensive knowledge of its objects.

General logic itself may be classified as either pure or applied. Pure general logic is that which abstracts from all empirical causes from which cognitions arise; things like sensations, imagination, memory, habit, inclinations, etc. Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content [4]. Applied general logic is that which concerns the use of the understanding under subjective empirical conditions; in other words, it is a broad and general psychology of logic, a representation of the understanding within the context of empirical conditions, which concerns things like attention, doubt, conviction, etc. Only the pure logic of general logic is a proper science [6], concerning nothing but the forms of thought, without reference to its content (empirical or transcendental), or psychological factors. The relationship of pure and applied general logic is analogous to the relationship of pure and practical ethics.

II. Of Transcendental Logic

General logic is concerned with the form of the understanding, without distinction of the origin of its representations; it does not merely abstract from all sensation (as was done for the transcendental aesthetic), but all content, pure and empirical. Not all a priori cognitions are transcendental; only those that are directed at the a priori possibility and use of cognition are transcendental. Thus the representation of space is a priori but not transcendental, while the knowledge that the representation of space is a priori, is transcendental. The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical is applicable only to the critique of cognitions, and not to the relation of these with their objects.

The science of transcendental logic is concerned with the principles of pure understanding, by which we cogitate objects entirely a priori. It is a subset of general pure logic, applying only to the a priori relations in thought of objects.

III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic

If truth is the accordance of a thought with its object, then the object of a (valid) thought must be able to be distinguished from other objects. As such, to ask for a universal criteria for truth is self-contradictory, because it is to ask for a criteria that is valid for all objects, without distinction of content, the relation to which is precisely what truth amounts to. So in terms of the matter (content) of a cognition, no universal test of truth can be given. However, with respect to the pure form of a cognition, logic presents us with universal and necessary laws of understanding which can be used for such a necessary, though not sufficient criteria of truth - for a self-consistent thought may nevertheless disagree with its object.

The study of the principles involved in this negative test of truth can be called analytic pure general logic. Thought must be at least self-consistent if it is to be true; only after this is established can the content be scrutinized. Analytic logic has applicability only to the form of thought, and not to its matter. It cannot be used to determine if the content of a cognition is true, although it is tempting to do so. When this is done - that is to say, when general pure logic is used to try to extend our knowledge of objects - it is called dialectic. Dialectic, or general logic as an organon of thought, is the art of producing ignorance!, for it improper to be applied in this way and yields absolutely no knowledge when it is

IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

Just like what was done in the Transcendental Aesthetic with sensibility, the Transcendental Logic must isolate the understanding and focus only on that which originates from it. The Transcendental Analytic is the critique of the principles of pure understanding, without which no object can be thought of, and thus is also a logic of truth. But this pure cognition requires that objects be given to it, to serve as the matter of application. When we apply these cognitions by themselves and to regions beyond experience, we make judgements of objects with no material distinction to provide the objective validity required for truth. The Transcendental Dialectic is the critique of this mistaken use of understanding and reason.


Questions:

0. Cognize, this term is used a lot, but without any definition. For a lot of these terms, I think I have a fuzzy grasp of what they mean, though a precise definition would be better.
1. Spontaneous, what does this mean?
2. Redacted.
3. How can Kant claim to know this, except by experience, e.g. it has been the case that all of my intuitions that I can remember have been sensuous up until the present.
4. By transcendental content, I take Kant to mean space and time?
5. Redacted.
6. What makes pure logic a proper science and applied logic not?

Thanks again for the responses, much appreciated :pray:

1. Immediate merely indicates systemic successions. Everything starts somewhere. — Mww

I don't understand what you mean by systemic successions, could you clarify this?

Given to us here means that which we do not give to ourselves. That which is a perception vs that which is merely thought. — Mww

"Give to ourselves" - I take this to not mean things like memory or imagination (which we present to ourselves without an external stimuli), but rather that which does not have its original origin in us?

Space is an intuition....a pure intuition only....because it is considered to be the necessary condition for the experience of objects. Space is a conception insofar as it must first be thought as both justified for, and logically consistent with, the role it plays in a theoretical system. If space could not be thought, it could never be a conception. — Mww

Okay, so just to be sure I follow, the intuition of space is not identical to the conception of space. The conception of space is just the thought of the intuition of space.

Extension is shape, neither extension nor shape is a property of black. Space doesn’t have shape, insofar as all parts of space are each themselves just space, and the shape of objects is merely the limits of the space it is in. To imply space as black or that black is extended, are a transcendental illusions of mischaracterized reason. — Mww

I get that space is not colored, but I still don't see how Kant can say we can imagine space as empty without objects. How do I imagine space without something in it? How do I imagine a representation with no object? I understand space and the objects that are in it are distinct, but it is not clear to me that space can precede objects; i.e. space and objects seem to be given always together.

Nice work here, thanks for sharing. So in summary, transcendental can mean:

1. any knowledge that is about the a priori conditions of experience and thought of objects (such that, the representation of space is not transcendental, but the knowledge that the representation of space is a priori and a condition for experience is),

2. a representation that is a priori and a condition for experience and thought of objects (such that, the representation of space is transcendental - though not transcendent, i.e. pertaining to the thing-in-itself),

3. not sure if I follow this last point.

I re-read your previous question and I'm not sure if I have the prerequisite knowledge to offer a proper response. I will say that a spontaneous intuition is intellectual, not sensible, and I seem to recall that the intellectual intuition of an object brings this object into being. Also, while it might not make sense to us to conceive of an infinite manifold of intuition, attempting to do so would involve thought, no? And thought inherently involves limitation. If God is infinite, but cannot be given through intuition, then the only other way to apprehend God is through thought, which will never achieve a full cognition of it.

But this is getting into deep waters (for me at least), I could be completely off the mark here.

Depends on the form of Christianity. Gnostic traditions of Christianity are pretty wild and have much in common with Buddhist traditions, since it is more soteriological (escaping rebirth and achieving union with the supreme) than eschatological (the final days of judgement).

So the idea that the whole movement foundered because of an obvious logical inconsistency is just bizarre (and even more bizarre when one considers that its members were all logical proficient). — Nagase

:100: This is so commonly used as a "got eem" in countless books on metaphysics today, particularly those of a religious bent.

Your commentary on the connection between LP and leftist/socialist movements was very intriguing.

Thanks very much for your response, I'll read through them more thoroughly later when I have more time.

What I don't get is how one can envision a plurality of intuitions that are unlimited, or infinite. Quantity is always finite, limited. And plurality entails quantity - hence a multitude of finite intuitions, since they're quantifiable. — javra

I recall a discussion of the infinite in Allison's book that made the point that the concept of infinite need not involve the actual presentation of an infinite number of representations, but instead just the presentation of "limitlessness", e.g. there is always more to be had, the supply of possible representations will never run out. This is how space and time are presented, as a single unified whole which can be broken down into infinitely smaller parts.

I understand Transcendental as "before experience or prior to experience", and Aesthetic as "sensory perception" in the CPR. So, transcendental aesthetic denotes a priori sensory perception or knowledge, which are non experiential sensory perception or knowledge .i.e. metaphysical perception or knowledge such as on God and Souls. — Corvus

I think transcendental has different meanings depending on the context. There seem to be at least two different meanings:

• Knowledge pertaining not to objects, but with the mode in which we perceive objects; as opposite of empirical, which pertains to objects of experience. Basically a "meta" discourse.
• That which is independent of the conditions of human sensibility.

But in general, the term transcendental is connected to the conditions of human sensibility. The pure forms of human sensibility are transcendentally ideal, and the thing-in-itself is transcendentally real.

I don't know if I would describe transcendental as before or prior to experience. That would just be a priori, I think. The Transcendental Aesthetic is one part of the general question, "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?", and it focuses on the conditions of sensibility, whereas the Transcendental Logic focuses on the conditions of thought.

Questions:

0. In the Introduction, Kant says that the Critique is not a doctrine; yet here he calls part of it the Doctrine of Elements (and later the Doctrine of Method). Why?
1. What does "immediately" mean here? Independently of thought, as in, we don't have to reflect upon it?
2. What does "object" mean here?
3. How does an intuition happen, if not in time? Unless it is that the affection of an object upon the sensibility happens "in time" (with respect to our sensibility), but "happens" in-itself in a way that we cannot conceive?
4. What does "given" mean here?
5. Kant says "But all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions". What does he mean by "signs"?
6. What does "representation" mean here? I have seen it used to describe both intuitions and conceptions. Is a representation just anything that we are aware of?
7. Does this mean the undetermined object of an intuition just is the intuition, or does the intuition contain an undetermined object? i.e. is intuition phenomena, or does intuition contain phenomena?
8. Why does Kant use this term, "manifold content", how is it different than just "matter", i.e. sensation?
9. Why does Kant call it a conception, when space is an intuition?
10. Can we imagine space without any objects? I can imagine a black, empty void, but the fact that it is black means that it is not simply extension.
11. I don't think Kant explains here why space being essentially one makes it an intuition, and not a conception. I know that he claims that that which relates to a single object is an intuition, but I guess I don't understand why concepts can't do that too.
12. To clarify, objective reality with respect to objects of sensibility basically means intersubjective agreement upon certain properties of these objects?
13. How is ideal different from subjective? Is it like essential vs accidental?
14. See 10. I don't know if we can imagine time without any phenomena.
15. Why is this proposition synthetic? I understand the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions, but sometimes I find it hard to tell if a proposition is analytic or synthetic.
16. What is a "partial representation", is it related to how concepts require an intuition for synthesis?
17. Redacted.
18. What exactly does it mean for something like time to be given "antecedently" to all actual perception. How do I conceive of this apart from some analogy to time?
19. I genuinely have no idea what this paragraph meant: "To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things containing exclusively that [...] " Any help?
20. Redacted.
21. I'm not sure if I follow the last step of this argument. Why would it be impossible to formulate synthetic propositions regarding external objects if space and time are real, objective conditions of things-in-themselves?
22. Kant asserts this is the case, but does not argue for it. Why are they not cognitions?
23. If forms do not present us with representations except when matter is given, then why does Kant say that we can conceive of space and time as empty of objects?
24. I'm not sure if I wholly follow why Kant thinks transcendental realism leads to skeptical idealism.
25. Why can't God be an object of intuition? Because this would place him in space and time, which would mean he would be limited?
26. Why does thought always involve limitation?
27. Why not?
28. What does Kant mean by "deduced" and "original"?

I compiled all my notes for the Transcendental Aesthetic and found that I had quite a bit of questions. I have used bracketed numbers in my notes to point to the associated question.

I: Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [0]

Summary:

First Part. Transcendental Aesthetic

I: Introduction

Intuition is the only means in which our knowledge immediately [1] relates to objects [2]. An intuition can only happen [3] if an object is given [4] to us, which can only occur if the object can affect the mind. The receptivity of the mind for representations through various modes is called sensibility. Objects are thought by the understanding, from which arise conceptions; but all thought must relate in some way to intuitions, and therefore sensibility [5].

Sensation is the means in which an object affects the faculty of representation [6]. Intuitions which relate to objects by means of a sensation are called empirical intuitions. The undetermined object of an intuition is called a phenomenon [7]. Within the phenomenon are its matter and its form; the matter corresponds to the sensation, and the form corresponds to the rules for the way the matter is represented. The matter of a phenomenon is given a posteriori, while the form is given a priori, for the form cannot be a sensation itself.

A representation is pure when nothing in it belongs to sensation. The form of phenomena is a pure representation which arranges the manifold content [8]. This pure form of sensibility can be shortened to simply pure intuition. There is no real object of sensation corresponding to a pure intuition, as this is a requirement for its purity.

The science of the principles of sensibility a priori is called transcendental aesthetic (the term “aesthetic” is referencing the first half of the ancients’ division of objects of cognition into the sensible and the conceivable). This forms the first science of the transcendental doctrine of elements, the second being the transcendental logic, which is the science of the principles of pure thought. To get to the forms of pure sensibility, which is the focus of transcendental aesthetic, sensibility must first be isolated from the understanding by stripping away all concepts; the raw empirical intuitions must then be stripped of all sensation. There are two pure forms which remain after all this has been done: space and time. Space will be investigated first.

Section I. Of Space

2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception [9]

A metaphysical exposition of a concept is a simple and clear representation of what belongs to the concept when it is given a priori. Space is the external sense of the mind, that being which permits the mind to represent to itself objects that are not itself. On the other hand, time is the internal sense of the mind, that being which permits the mind to contemplate itself and its states. Thus the focus here will be on determining what belongs to humans’ external sense - space - when this is given without any sensation.

1. Space is not given through outward experience, because the very notion of outward-ness (objects being separate from the mind and separate from each other) necessarily involves spatiality. Space must be prior to any outward experience for there to be any outward experience at all.

2. Thus space is a necessary condition, and not a determination, of all outward experience. To further illustrate the previous point: we cannot imagine objects that are not in space, but we can imagine space without any objects [10].

3. Space is not a discursive (or general) conception of the relations between things, but is rather a pure intuition, because there is only one all-encompassing space, which is prior to all of its parts [11].

4. Space can also be known to be an intuition, because it is given as an infinite quantity; while concepts can have infinite representations under it (it applies to an infinite number of representations), they cannot have an infinite number of representations within it (it must be defined by a finite number of representations), and the opposite is true for intuitions.

3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space

A transcendental exposition of a concept is an explanation of how other synthetical a priori cognitions are made possible through the concept. In order to do so, it must be shown that these cognitions are actually conditioned by the given conception, and further that this is only possible if the given conception is of a certain way.

Geometry will be the other synthetical a priori cognition used here, since it is the science which determines the properties of space in this way. Because geometry involves synthetic propositions, its subject matter - space - cannot be a concept, since no concepts alone cannot yield synthetic knowledge; thus space is an intuition. And because geometry is apodictic, space cannot be empirical, as apodicticity entails necessity and universality, which cannot be found through experience; thus space is a pure intuition which precedes the perception of objects. A pure intuition of external objects that is anterior to the objects themselves can only come from the subject is just what is meant by a form of sensibility - in this case, the form of the external sense.

4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions

a. Space is not a property of things as they exist apart from the mind; it is a condition for the experience of external objects, and not a determination of these objects, since a determination of an object cannot precede the existence of the object it is determined by.

b. Space is the form of the phenomena of external sense, and nothing more. It is what makes possible external intuition, and its given-ness precedes that of objects of external intuition. Outside of the subjective point of view of a human mind, space has no meaning, it is nothing. It is a predicate that is applicable only to objects of human sensibility, that is, phenomena. The form of the external sense of other beings cannot be known.

Joining the limitation of a judgement to the conception of a subject gives it universal validity. For instance, the proposition “all objects are beside each other in space” is applicable only when they are taken to be objects of intuition, whereas the proposition “all things, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space” does not suffer this deficiency. Thus the expositions before demonstrate the empirical reality (objective validity) of space with respect to objects of sensibility, but the transcendental ideality of space with respect to things-in-themselves [12].

Space is the only subjective representation that has objective validity with respect to sensible intuitions; there is no other representation from which we can derive synthetical a priori propositions, like we do in geometry. Sensations are subjective but not ideal [13], and give no cognition of objects as intuitions do. They are not properties of things, but changes in the subject, which may be different across people, and so cannot ground any objective validity.

Section II. Of Time

5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception

1. Similar to that of space, the focus here will be on determining what belongs to humans’ internal sense - time - when this is given without any sensation or inner states.

2. Time is a priori, for neither coexistence nor succession would be perceptible to us if it was not in relation to time. Thus time is not empirical, as the notion of change requires there be time.

3. Time is a necessary representation, because we cannot think of phenomena apart from time, but we can think of time as apart from phenomena [14].

4. Since time is necessary, it is also possible to make apodictic judgments regarding it, such as “different times are not coexistent but successive” (just as different spaces are not successive but coexistent). Neither necessity nor universality can be derived from experience, so time is a priori.

5. Time is not a discursive conception, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Just like what was said for space, time is given as a single object that is prior to its parts, and only an intuition can relate to a single object. Also, the proposition that different times cannot be coexistent is synthetical, which prevents time from being a concept [15].

Each part of time is given as a limitation of the one unlimited time, just as space is. But conceptions can only furnish a partial representation [16], so time must be an intuition.

6. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time

The conception of change and the conception of motion (change of place) is possible only through the representation of time; if this were not an internal, a priori intuition, no conception could make the conjunction of contradictorily opposed determinations in the same object comprehensible. Time allows for this in terms of succession, by placing one determination after another.

7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions

a. Time is not a property of things as they exist apart from the mind. For if it were real in itself, it would not present to the mind any real object; and it belonged as a determination to objects, it could not be their condition, and we could not form synthetical a priori propositions about it.

b. Time is the form of the phenomena of internal sense, and nothing more. It does not concern objects of external sense (those in space), but rather with the relations of representations in our internal state. These representations have no spatiality, so we use analogies to help describe them (such as a linear line extending into infinite). All of its relations can be expressed in an external intuition, which is yet another reason why time is an intuition [18].

c. Time is the formal condition of all phenomena, both internal and external. All representations of objects, external or internal, are determinations of the mind. They belong to our internal state, which is subject to the formal condition of internal intuition. Thus all phenomena stand necessarily in relation to time; immediately if they are internal, and mediately if external.

And just as with space, time has objective validity and a priori universality only with respect to objects of sensibility, and not with things as they are in themselves. Since all intuition is sensuous, no object can ever be presented in experience that is not conditioned by time. It is empirically real, that is to say, it has objective validity with respect to all objects of sense; but it is transcendentally ideal, that is to say, it is nothing outside of this domain.

8. Elucidation

One common objection to the aforementioned argument for the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of time is this: change is real, and is only possible through time, so time must be real as well. It is true that time is real, but only as the subjective internal sense; that is to say, it is a mode of representation of the self as an object, and not an object itself. However, that which is represented to humans by time does not stand in a necessary relation to time; if we (or another being) could intuit ourselves without time, there would be no change. Thus change is only real if time is real, and that which is represented through change need not be represented as such if time is not the condition of inner sensibility.

The reason why this argument is brought up so often is because time is taken to be an easier target than space. Objects in space cannot be proven to be absolutely real, due to the possibility of skeptical idealism; but objects of the inner sense are taken to be undeniably real. However, this ignores the nature of both objects, which is that they are phenomena. Phenomena have two aspects: the object considered in-itself, and the form of our intuition of the object. The form of phenomena as intuitions applies only because the form is provided by the subject. Space and time are the only forms of sensuous intuition, and they allow us to make synthetic a priori judgements, such as what is done by mathematics with space. Most importantly, they are only applicable to objects considered as sensuous phenomena, and not with the thing-in-itself.

If space and time are absolutely real (subsistence), then they must be eternal and infinite and exist (without being any object themselves) in order for all other real entities to exist, which results in absurdities when the understanding attempts to go beyond them. And if space and time are relational (inherence), then they are an abstraction from experience; in which case, apodictic propositions, like those of mathematics or physics, would be invalid, for experience cannot ground the necessity or universality that is required for apodicticity. Neither flaws are present for the theory of the transcendental ideality of space and time.

The Transcendental Aesthetic has only two components, space and time. All other representations of sensibility require experience. Even motion, which unites both, presupposes that there be an object (in space and time) that can move. Space and time have no such requirements. They are pure forms of intuition, and therefore require no empirical sensation for their representation.

9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic

I. In order to avoid misunderstanding, all that has been said so far with respect to sensuous cognition will be summarized. Our intuitions are nothing but the representation of phenomena; the things and the relations that we intuit are not the same (in themselves) as our representation of them in intuition. These representations - and crucially including their spatial and temporal properties - are dependent upon the subject, and are nothing without it. The nature of the thing-in-itself that is represented to us through intuition is completely unknown and can never be known; nor can it be known how it is represented to other perceptive beings with different receptivities.

Space and time are the pure (a priori) forms of intuition, the matter of which being provided by sensation. They alone can be cognized independently of experience, and in fact are given antecedently to all actual perception [18]. Only the pure forms can provide apodictic knowledge by grounding necessity and universality; empirical (a posteriori) sensations are contingent and can only provide it relatively. And no accumulation of empirical knowledge will ever yield any knowledge of the thing-in-itself, but only knowledge of our own sensibility.

[19]

The distinction between essential and accidental properties of phenomena is merely empirical, and does not represent any property of the thing-in-itself, as the transcendental object remains entirely unknown. When viewing a rainbow through a sunny shower, the empirical distinction might be to assign the rainbow as an accidental feature (dependent upon things like the geometric orientation of the person), while the raindrops are the essential feature (because they exist regardless of the rainbow existing). But the transcendental distinction would be to assign both the rainbow and the raindrops (including their spatial and temporal properties) to mere phenomena - that is, representations that are inseparable from sensibility - while the thing-in-itself remains unknown.

The theory of the Aesthetic must not just be plausible, but undeniably certain, if it is to serve as an organon for a greater Transcendental Philosophy. To do so, it will be helpful to assume an opposite view; that space and time are in-themselves objective and conditions for the possibility of objects as things-in-themselves. From where do we cognize the apodicticity of synthetic a priori propositions concerning these forms, as we do in geometry or physics? It can only be through intuition or conceptions given a priori or a posteriori. Empirical concepts founded on empirical intuitions cannot provide the necessity nor the universality required for apodicticity, so space and time must be a priori.

But conceptions by themselves cannot render synthetic propositions; the only possibility remaining is for space and time to be a priori intuitions - that is to say, intuitions are given to us by ourselves, and not through sensation. Yet if they are a priori intuitions, but did not belong to a faculty of intuition, then it would be impossible to formulate any synthetical propositions regarding external objects [21] whatsoever, because there would be no way to know if the necessity of your representation being the way it is, is also found with the object of the representation as it is in-itself. If space and time are forms of the external sense, however, then while the thing-in-itself is still unknowable, the objective validity of phenomena is retained.

II. In further demonstration of the ideality of space and time, it will be noted that all of our cognition belonging to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations (feelings of pain and pleasure, as well as the will, are exempted, since they are not cognitions [22]). The relations for space are: extension (of place), motion (change of place), and the forces of motion (the laws in which this change of place is determined). Time contains the relations of the successive, the coexistent, and the permanent (the successive and the coexistent). The things that are involved with these relations are not given through intuition. Relations themselves cannot give any knowledge of a thing-in-itself, so the forms of intuition only contain the relation between the object and the subject, and not the object in-itself.

A representation that precedes all thought of an object is an intuition, and when it contains nothing but relations, it is a form of intuition. The form presents us with no representation itself except when something else is placed in the mind [23]; in other words, the form can only be the way in which the mind presents itself with representations and is affected by itself. The subject is represented to itself as a phenomenon through the internal sense, time, and not as it is in-itself, were it to be intuited spontaneously (intellectually).

The question at hand is, how can the subject have an internal intuition of itself? It will be noted that apperception (the consciousness of the self) is the basic representation of the “ego”; and if by it every representation of the manifold in the subject were spontaneously given, then the internal sense would indeed be intellectual. But for a human, this consciousness requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which were previously given in the subject, the manner of which is called sensibility (which is the absence of spontaneity). Self-consciousness can only apprehend what is in the mind if it can affect the mind and produce an intuition of the self, which is only a phenomenon arranged by the internal sense, or time.

III. To say that intuition of objects through the forms of space and time represents objects as phenomena is not to say that they are mere illusions. A phenomena is that which is never found in the object itself, and only and always with the relation of the object with the subject and the representation of it by the subject. Phenomena truly are given, and are objective with respect to the conditions in which they are given. They are only illusory when these predicates are applied outside of this domain [24].

IV. The object of God (which can never be an object of intuition to us [25]) must have spontaneous intuitions as his only means of cognition, since thought always involves limitation [26]. This intuition must not involve the conditions of space and time [27]. But if space and time are forms of objects as things in themselves, they would also be the conditions of the existence of God, which would seem to contradict the idea of God being infinite. But if space and time are not objective forms of things, then they must be subjective and be the forms of our intuition, which is sensuous, by which we mean the subject is affected by an object that already exists.

Even if all beings have the same forms of sensibility, this universality would not change the fact that it is still sensuous, and not intellectual (it is deduced, not original [28]), which seems to only belong to God. But this is only an illustration of the Aesthetic, and not a proof of it.

10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic

This concludes one part of the solution to original problem formulated in the Introduction, that being: “how are synthetical propositions a priori possible?” It has been demonstrated that we are in possession of pure intuitions (space and time), which allow us to pass beyond a given conception and connect it with a foreign representation during an a priori judgement, and thereby form a synthesis. These judgements, however, do not apply to anything but the objects of our senses, and are only objectively valid when considered in relation to possible experience.