Kant said the prior triad, and Wittgenstein affirmed the awe of perennial questions.

In the words of Julio Cabrera, philosophy is like my oxygen. Most everything else is nuisance.

Part of what attracts me so much to philosophy is its limitless self-consciousness. You aren't doing philosophy very well if you aren't at least somewhat conscious of what it is you're even doing. This self-consciousness is unique to philosophy, I think. I don't think you've really done philosophy as well as you could have unless you question your own foundations. Only philosophy can ask whether there is a need for philosophy.

But more importantly, it's the dedication, the passion, for critical reflection that makes me love philosophy so much. That you have to have, and be prepared to defend, good reasons for holding beliefs makes philosophy a refuge from the rabble. To not take tradition at face value, to be skeptical of cherished beliefs, and to be ready and willing to question anything and everything is what I see to be necessary traits to a good philosopher.

That you can choose to profess an ideology or system of beliefs that may be thousands of years old yet still be valid to this day. Isn't that amazing? — Posty McPostface

For me it's less about aligning with a certain tradition (most are neither fully true or false but a mixture of both) and more with realizing that these questions are perennial. The same questions that bothered Socrates continue to bother modern thinkers. Like Wittgenstein said, this ought to amaze us, not make us question the value of philosophy.

Really, I think philosophy has most of the really cool and important questions. What we ought to do, what we can know and what we can hope for are infinitely more important than anything else. I hold this view very strongly, that ethics should be the driving force behind philosophy, or anything else for that matter, and not simply a "peripheral" to the "more pressing" topics such as, the migration patterns of walruses or the next iPhone or whatever. Most of that is pointless and banal which is why I find it surprising when people are interested in it. In some ways I think modern science has corrupted our self-image, making ourselves seem to be like technological gods. Some good philosophy will temper that image.

That is, the relief knowing that they could end their suffering at any time makes the suffering much more bearable. — Bitter Crank

I live only because it is in my power to die when I choose to: without the idea of suicide, I'd have killed myself right away.

Emil Cioran, All Gall is Divided

According to Philip Nitschke (not Nietzsche), supplying aging citizens with easy means for a painless suicide will actually increase life expectancy and "happiness". Part of the reasoning is that, since there will always be an easy way out, elderly folks will become accustomed to the idea of dying and will not fear it (as much).

As it should be. It honestly baffles me how assisted euthanasia hasn't been 1.) legalized broadly and 2.) socially acceptable. The age of dying-while-shitting-your-pants-and-moaning-in-constant-pain should have ended a long time ago. I want to die with dignity, and if the state won't provide the means then I'll take the manner into my own hands when I deem the time is right.

Examples of Feyereband in action is a distraction? — tom

...from the thread, yes. Go make another thread if you want to shit on Feyerabend.

OK, so why don't you give a few examples of where Feyerabend's theory was applied fruitfully? — tom

Why would I, when that would just distract from the point of this thread?

Interesting that Edward Feser, whose Five Proofs of the Existence of God has been the topic of several threads here, accepts that the causal chain can go back infinitely in time. His arguments are quite different. — Mitchell

Yes, Feser's arguments are not focused on the temporal cosmological arguments but are focused on hierarchical arguments.

Therefore, it seems that Aquinas would be wrong in denying the possibility of an infinite regress. — The Curiorist

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought Aquinas didn't say an infinite regress was impossible? I thought he actually specifically said that it could not be shown through philosophical argument that the universe came into being due to God's creative act, and that this was a faith-based claim.

So why don't you give a few examples of your problems with Popper's "theory of falsifiability"? — tom

Why are you changing the topic of discussion? just wants other theorists that are similar to Feyerabend.

An excellent rendition of this part of intellectual history, and more, can be found in Alan Chalmers' What is this thing called Science?, which I whole-heartedly recommend. — Banno

It is a decent introductory book, but I felt Chalmer's take on Feyerabend was far too short (only a measly seven-or-so pages) and failed to charitably represent Feyerabend's philosophy of science.

And if that is the case, we might as well go on doing what we have been doing - there is no need to change our minds. That is, if anything goes, then everything stays. — Banno

On the contrary, I believe Feyerabend was all about change. To say that since Feyerabend disapproved of the hegemony of science means that he approved of traditional modes of thinking would be false. Living in a free society entails using this freedom in a responsible and intelligent way. For Feyerabend, freely choosing to utilize science is far superior than simply going into science because society has already chosen it for you, even if in the end the results are the same.

To phrase this as confrontationally as possible - an approach that both Feyerabend and Lakatos might have approved -Following Feyerabend's appraoch to method leads to Donald Trump. — Banno

No.

You've responded by merely asserting mathematics is objective while morality is not. This discussion keeps going in circles.

All scientific testing involves the use of information discovered by other scientific research. — BlueBanana

Yeah but also mathematics, which isn't scientific strictly.

Mathematics and numbers are discovered by perceiving amounts in the physical world. They're a posteriori. — BlueBanana

No. We never "perceive amounts", since we need to already have the concept of amounts before.

The answer is that mathematics can be discovered and proven by scientific testing in practice while morals can only be figured out by subjective a priori intuition. — BlueBanana

Scientific testing involves the use of mathematics that have already been discovered by synthetic a priori analysis.

It seems to me that sincere mathematical propositions have no emotional component whereas moral propositions , if they're sincere, clearly demonstrate an emotional commitment (would you accept as sincere a claim that child torture was wrong made by someone who failed to to show any personal repugnance to child torture?). — ChrisH

That may be true, but how does this alter morality's truth value? And after all, many scientists and mathematicians are deeply amazed by the beauty of certain structures. This is an emotional reaction as well, even if it's not as often.

From what? — BlueBanana

From the a priori intuition that killing people needlessly is wrong.

The only conclusion you can make is that killing makes things dead. — BlueBanana

LOL no, I'd make the conclusion that killing this person was wrong.

We can demonstrate math law by showing that 5 objects + 5 objects = 10 objects. It is rational to believe this is knowledge about an objective math law, in terms of practical knowledge, because math law is applied in our daily lives constantly empirically. The same can not be said about morality.

If you don't think it's rational to believe that 5 objects + 5 objects will equal ten this time, it's probably because your a solipcist and care only about absolute knowledge. — SonJnana

I am not a solipsist by any means. How is 5+5=10 different from saying murder is wrong?

Mathematics knowledge is about a math law. We can demonstrate that the math law objectively exists. — SonJnana

How do we demonstrate mathematical law, and how is this different to moral law?

Can you explain to me what you see to be the difference between mathematics and morality in terms of objectivity, and why the former is objectively real but the latter perhaps not?

Feyerabend is so good man, and really funny too. He's ultimately concerned mostly about morality.

He's all about keeping science separated from state so as to maintain human freedom and liberty.

Anyone can make a logical proof about anything. The question is whether it is sound. The reason for objective law of mathematics being sound is the fact that we can demonstrate it. If you say 5+5=11, I can prove to you that you are wrong by showing you that your knowledge of math is not consistent with the objective math law that is independent of whether or not people think it is true. I know that math law is objective because it can be demonstrated. — SonJnana

Yet Descartes specifically argued that an evil demon could be tricking us into believing 2+2=4.

But just because something is intuitive or not doesn't make it true. If a kid doesn't intuitively understand math, that doesn't mean that there is no objective math law. If I intuitively think what I see in a magical illusion is real, that doesn't mean that what I intuitively may think the magician is doing is actually happening. — SonJnana

Do you understand what I mean when I say "intuitive"? I'm not meaning it like some warm fuzzy feeling or whatever, I'm meaning in the same way we "intuit" mathematical truths. When you're in math class and learning math, you are doing so through the operation of reason. Math isn't science.

It is a very hard think to do. I do not believe that you've shown it to be coherent or plausible to be honest, but I do respect that attempt that you've made thus far. It's made us both think more and that's the best part about this thread. — SonJnana

Yes, indeed. As I said, it is difficult to show that moral realism is true, given how morality must be if it is real. It is not as if I would be able to show something to be incoherent in moral anti-realism and thus affirm realism. The universe would seem to be indifferent whether there are objective morals or not.

What I am aiming to show is that there aren't any good reasons to deny objective morality. Now that doesn't show objective morality exists but it does show that it is not incoherent and is at least something we can plausibly believe in. And, I think perhaps both of us will agree, there being objective morality is superior than there being none. We ought to hope there is objective morality and be disappointed if there isn't.

Are you familiar with Paul Feyerabend? Sounds like you'd like some of his stuff.

No I wouldn't because I could demonstrate it with objects and it'd be true independent of whether they think it is an objective law or not. But I can't demonstrate that killing is objectively morally bad independent of whether people think it is true. That's the distinction. — SonJnana

Now you're begging the question, though. In what way is demonstrating a mathematical proof different than demonstrating a moral proof?

How even could I go on the offensive and back up my claims when I'm not making any? It's you making the claim and me seeing if it makes sense or not. — SonJnana

Yes, I am making claims and trying to convince you of them. If you disagree you will need to give reasons why you disagree, which is just simply going on the offensive. It's just you saying that there is something wrong with my argument which is preventing you from agreeing with it.

The fact that I think morality is intuitive makes it difficult to show that it is objective to anyone who does not recognize or is not willing to recognize these intuitions. I've tried to make it easier by drawing the similarity between morality and mathematics in that both are synthetic a priori and both are grasped through reason and not empirical observation.

It may be the case that we will never be able to show that morality is objective or subjective. But this is how it is with many metaphysical debates. Oftentimes all we can hope to show is the plausibility, or at least coherence, of a view. In my case, it is particularly difficult for me to argue against moral anti-realism if the other person is reluctant to agree that morality is synthetic a priori and grasped intuitively. The best I can hope to do is to draw an analogy and say that as a child failing to understand mathematics does not disprove mathematics as objective, a person who is unconvinced of the truth of a certain moral claim (such as that murder is wrong) does not show that this claim is false or could not possibly be true.

Ultimately, probably the best I can do is to show that there are no good reasons against moral realism. But then again, that's the case for many things anyway. I don't think I could deductively prove that moral realism is true. I think I can only show it to be coherent and plausible, and that the modern scientific view is not incompatible with it.

I don't have to explain why it can't be objective because I'm not even asserting that it's non-objective. I thought we cleared my position up a long time ago. You are the one asserting why it is objective and if you can't demonstrate that, then you haven't backed up your claim. — SonJnana

Look, I've already demonstrated to you that morality can come in the form of valid logical syllogisms, and that the premises are what are being doubted here. But I've also shown that mathematics also relies on certain premises. Both mathematics and morality are synthetic a priori. And I've argued that if we see mathematics as objective then, barring any good reasons to the opposite, we should also see morality as objective. It is a point in favor, I think, of morality being real that it has this affinity to logical reasoning. It is rational, and we can form cognitive beliefs about it. More importantly, we can disagree about things as well.

If you do not recognize the concepts right or wrong, good or bad, then there's nothing I can do to convince you. Just as you could never convince someone of the objectivity of mathematics if they failed to grasp mathematical principles. Morality is, as I see it, synthetic a priori and is intuitively grasped in the same way mathematics is. Surely you would not think that a child who does not understand mathematics shows that mathematics is entirely subjective?

So I have provided what I see to be a plausible theory of what morality is. As a response you have merely asserted that morality could be something else entirely. I cannot cover all my bases, I cannot knock down every alternative you present. You need to go on the offensive and explain to me what about my theory is false, or the discussion will end as I will have nothing else to say to convince you.

Even if it was intuitive, you still have to explain that there is an objective morality that exists outside of human thinking and that it's not a case of there being no objective morality but rather that humans evolved to be predisposed to want to believe that there is an objective morality and made it a human construct because the ones that didn't committed crimes and were killed by society. — SonJnana

The same could be said about mathematics. You keep going in circles, assuming mathematics is objective and empirical.

Just because you disagree with a moral evaluation, or don't see its pull, doesn't mean morality isn't objective. To say morality has to necessarily be recognized by a mind to be objective begs the question. You need to explain why morality cannot be objective, not just state you don't "see" it intuitively. Because clearly you do see some things that are good and bad, right and wrong, or you wouldn't even know what morality is (apart from some empty commands with no content - is this how you really take morality to be?)

Proof for the objectivity of morality comes from where? Conscience isn't good enough. 5 objects + 5 objects = 10 objects even before humans were around. That's because the math law is objective. However I can't distinguish whether it is objectively morally wrong to murder independently of human thought, or if humans evolved to believe that it is wrong to murder because it's useful. You have to demonstrate that. — SonJnana

Are you not familiar with moral proofs? Moral principles are cognitive and can be manipulated in logic. We can make proofs. The question is whether or not our principles are true, principles like how suffering is bad, and needless harming wrong. But the same is true of mathematics. Again, mathematics could be nominalistic in the same way morality could be subjective. But I'll say that if we see mathematics as real, objectively, then we should also see morality as real, objectively. For it's in the same category of thought. It is now up to the anti-realist to show why, despite the fact that both morality and mathematics are synthetic a priori, mathematics is objective while morality is not.

Why do you not doubt that numbers are real but doubt that suffering is bad? Is it not intuitive that suffering is bad in the same way it is intuitive that 2+3=5?

If you agree that a person who believes 5+5=11 saw 5 objects added to 5 more and ended up with 10 should re-evaluate their reasoning based off of that empirical evidence, you agree that the math knowledge we talk about is based off of an actual objective math law. And we know math laws are objective because we see them in reality. — SonJnana

No, once again, mathematics is synthetic a priori. We don't "see" numbers. We don't "see" math. Nowhere in the sense data are you going to find that. Just like nowhere in the sense data are you going to find good and bad, right and wrong. All of this is synthetic a priori. I've emphasized this many times now: mathematics as well as morality are in the realm of reason. Just by reflection can we come to know mathematical truths, and just by reflection can we come to know moral truths.

That's not to say we are always great at doing morality. For a few simple principles or concepts might be easy enough to acknowledge but the right course of action in a specific particular situation is hardly ever self-evident. Probably in many cases we do the wrong thing by sheer ignorance.

Do you think that beliefs change objective reality? Do you think that just because people believed that 5+5=11 (and not just redefined 11 to mean 10, but they actually believed 11), having 5 objects and then adding 5 would become 11? — SonJnana

No, I don't think beliefs change reality. But I don't think you quite understand that it's not obvious to me, based on what you've said, that mathematics is objectively part of the world. And it certainly is not obvious to me that we somehow "see" mathematics in the sense datum.

Just so I can understand your position even more clear... does your claim of objective morality rely on the assumption that there is teleology, perhaps a god? — SonJnana

No, I don't think so - at least not in the sense of there being a transcendent and all powerful being. Again, my position is that if we agree mathematics is indeed objective, then we also have reason to believe morality is objective, since both are synthetic a priori.

Math statements however are grounded in reality. It doesn't matter if hypothetically everyone thinks that 5+5=11. Regardless of what people think, when you have 5 objects and add 5 more, you objectively have 10 not 11. The people that think it is 11 are wrong. — SonJnana

How do you know this? Again, you're just asserting the objectivity of mathematics.

Where are you going to check these moral principles? Where are you getting this objective morality from? — SonJnana

In the same way you would check mathematical proofs. By thinking about them, a priori and synthetically.

Unless you are solipsistic (in which case I'd end the discussion right here and now), you'd probably agree that the universe is. And mathematics can be derived from is. — SonJnana

But what I've been saying all this time is that we don't derive mathematics from the sense datum we take in, at least not in a wholly passive way.

To argue for an objective ought, you'd have to assume that there is objective purpose behind the universe, and these balls of atoms that we label as humans have objective obligations. Do you believe in God? — SonJnana

See, now you're offering snippets of the metaphysical picture of reality you think is true. That objective morality requires teleology to the universe, perhaps a God, is part of your conception of what objective morality is. You need to actually explain this though because I'm not sure I follow.

You have to prove that there is that objective morality outside of what people think. — SonJnana

But we check statements like 5+5=11 by thinking. You're just assuming mathematics is objective, but it is the person themselves that has to think about mathematical principles to derive conclusions. "Checking" mathematical proofs is not empirically verifiable or anything like that, because mathematics is synthetic a priori.

So why not think of morality like this? Why not say, I can check to see if this law is morally acceptable, or if my actions are in line with moral principles? At its base, mathematics relies on certain axioms that must be taken to be true. Why can't morality be the same?

People can be socially conditioned to think many things, but just because they think that there is an objective morality and make statements about it, doesn't mean that there actually is one. — SonJnana

People can be socially conditioned to believe in an objective reality apart from consciousness, or God, or in the objectivity of mathematics, or the realism of scientific theories, or whatever. This is a possibility of error, yes. But it's still what you keep saying - a maybe, a perhaps. That's not very convincing.

How cryptic...

Or you can perceive those amounts — BlueBanana

How do we perceive amounts? Pretty sure we're given sense data and our mental faculties organize it. Do you think we perceive space and time?

Take two objects. Take three objects. See that there are five objects — BlueBanana

How do I know what two, three, and five objects are, though? I must already have numbers as an a priori concept before.

Basically, moral principles are a priori and can be manipulated into valid logical inferences, operating similarly to mathematical axioms. Many people agree on mathematical truths, and it might surprise you how many people actually agree on moral truths as well. That needlessly slaughtering infants is wrong is going to be generally accepted by most people. We grasp moral truths, moral principles, in a similar way to how we grasp mathematical truths and principles. And so whatever it is that makes mathematical truths actually objectively true is, as I see it here, going to be similar to what makes moral truths objectively true.

The point I'm making is that I don't see morality as too much different to mathematics, and I think you don't recognize that mathematics is a priori in this sense. Empirical senses provide content for mathematical forms, and empirical senses also provide content for the application of moral principles.

If moral principles seem to you weird or not reliable (because they came from evolution, say), we need only remember that the same thing can be said about mathematical principles. Our mathematical sense is just as much a product of evolution as our moral sense would be. Yet most of us think mathematical principles are in fact objective and not a cobweb of the mind.

Mathematical principle can be proven in reality. — SonJnana

How do we do this? I'm stressing that mathematics is synthetic a priori, not synthetic a posteriori. We don't do mathematical experiments, at least not in the sense of using experiments to show 2+3=5.

Conscience is not proof that it is objectively wrong to murder. — SonJnana

I'm not associated conscience with a good or bad feeling, like a hit of dopamine. I'm associating it with the feeling that what one did was right or wrong (with the good and bad feelings, of course).

You can't group objective morality in the same group. — SonJnana

You keep asserting this but I've denied this every time. I just see moral principles as on basically the same level as mathematical principles. Forget the whole "calling" thing, because it's not even that relevant (it's just a phenomenological description with no connection to whether it's actually objective).

"If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder." Conscience is not proof that it is objectively wrong to murder. — SonJnana

But is conscience just the feeling of good or bad, or does it have cognitive content (as I've said many time already)?

k

So because a fact complicates things, we should ignore it? — JustSomeGuy

It's not a fact, it's just a useless and sneaky way for a lot of people to escape having to justify their beliefs by pretending to be the "null position" and begging the question. That's bullshit.

First of all, who is "we"? — JustSomeGuy

Presumably anyone interested in knowing whether God exists or not.

Second, the fact that you apparently think it not only acceptable, but more reasonable to ignore certain details and intricacies of an issue in favour of simplifying it is surprising, being that we're on a philosophy forum and that attitude is very un-philosophical. — JustSomeGuy

Why? I just showed how it was useless and dumb to put agnostic and (a)theism together. It's incoherent and unhelpful.

And third, I'm not opposed to have a term to describe someone who is neither atheist nor theist, but agnostic already means something else entirely, so instead of stealing the words of others, how about creating a new word to serve this new purpose? — JustSomeGuy

Well like you said, words go through changes in definition. As of now agnostic is used primarily as a middle position between atheism and theism.

Just because your "conscience" tells you something is right or wrong doesn't mean that it is objectively morally right or wrong. If that were the case then if my friend conscience tells them to donate 50% of their money then that implies that it is objectively morally good to do that. But other peoples' conscience tells them to donate 25% maybe. You can't get to objectivity from conscience. That's nonsense. It could just be a psychological mechanism that our brains developed because those without empathy didn't pass on their genes and cooperation was promoted by evolution. You can't get an objective morality from that. If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder. Also, there may be people such as psychopaths who may not even have this conscience you speak of. — SonJnana

Just because people can be mistaken in moral beliefs or moral perceptions doesn't mean morality isn't objective. People disagree about things all the time. Doesn't change anything.

What is it about a priori intuition of moral truths that you find problematic? All I'm saying is the concepts "good" and "right" are similar in kind to the concepts "number" and the specific numbers themselves.

We can know 2+3=5 because we can take 2, add 3, and see that there are 5. — SonJnana

How do we "see" they are equal to 5, if not through an intuitive, a priori understanding of certain mathematical concepts? I don't just "see" 2+3=5 when I look at some scribbles on a page or see some things put into the same bunch as other things.

We can develop proofs for mathematics that are sound. But we cant say that it is objectively true harming others needlessly is objectively morally wrong. Show me the proof for that. I've already explained why conscience doesn't work for that. — SonJnana

Well, as I've said, if we are honest and clear-headed I think it should be clear what some of these moral principles are, which we can manipulate logically. And the fact is that we can create valid logical inferences with moral propositions. Honestly I don't see your resistance to this as any more than a prejudice, a prejudice I've been trying to get you to acknowledge.