I only have interest in philosophy to the extent that it asks interesting questions. If it exists to undermine itself, then I'd rather waste time thinking about something else.

Relationships like e=mc2 are an expression of the functioning empirical world. To ask whether, for example, e=mc2 exists doesn't make sense. It's not a state of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Maybe. It is curious though how well something like e=mc2 works. As if there is something more than just the observables.

It's a statement that describes (and predicts) empirical phenomena. — Michael

Right, but it employs math and theoretical entities, as John mentioned.

Right, so as I said before you're adopting scientific realism. But the internal realist wouldn't adopt scientific realism. They'd adopt something like instrumentalism or model-dependent realism. — Michael

In the context of scientific laws and theories, it's more a matter of rationalism vs empiricism, where empiricism alone can't get you to something like e=mc2. And it also goes back to Plato and the universalism debate. The shadows on the cave wall don't give you the forms. In scientific terms, the empirical data doesn't provide the theory. That's something humans add to make sense of the data. The realist question is whether that addition exists independent of us, or is made up by us, or is due to our constitution as cognitive agents (Kantian categories).

E=MC2 is not an empirical statement. It belongs to the the theoretical side of science. Nobody observes an equation, or law of physics. Rather, theory is used to make sense of observation.

there is nothing about them that, in virtue of the books they've read and where they grew up, can possibly surprising about what they think or do. — The Great Whatever

I very much doubt that. It's more like the genius has the ambition to pursue whatever is surprising about them, and is able to succeed at that, such that they gain recognition. We make a little too much out of inborn talent, and not enough of motivation and hard work.

Take someone who is the world's best in chess or an athletic endeavor. How did they get to be so good? Tons of practice and love of what they do. They may have had other advantages over the average person, but you don't get to be great without a ton of effort.

That makes sense, although the explanation for the origin and regularity of phenomena is relegated to the utterly mysterious.

The part that causally explains phenomena, yes. But in contrast to the metaphysical realist, the internal realist rejects the claim that any of the more meaningful things we talk about – "the chair exists", "the cat is on the mat", "e = mc2" etc. – say anything about these non-internal parts of the world. — Michael

What motivates the internal realist to be an internal realist as opposed to a phenomenalist? Why think there is some sort of mind-independent machinery that we can't talk about? I suppose it's the same reason Kant thought there was noumena, but it suffers from the same problems.

The realist just needs to show that their conception of mind-independence isn't such that it requires an ideal theory to be completely untrue.

To put it another way, the realist does not need to maintain that our experiences and thoughts are entirely different from reality. What matters is that the world is not dependent on us.

Then you've begged the question and presupposed that the world of appearance is something like the mind-independent world. — Michael

I'm providing an argument against one of the criticisms of realism, which is that an ideal theory could be completely untrue. It's a move available for realists to make. The criticism arises from one understanding of realism. But if the realist adds that the mind is dependent on the real such that an ideal theory can't be entirely wrong, then they have a rebuttal.

Right, but I'm not arguing for noumena. That's Kant's notion, which I reject.

In which case you can't make an argument that appearances depend on something else — Michael

You need to add "entirely unlike appearance" to make that work. If reality is entirely unlike anything we perceive or conceive or talk about, then we have no basis to say there is such a reality. But I'm not stating that. I'm stating that what we perceive, think and say is dependent on that reality such that we can't be totally in the dark.

That doesn't follow. That A depends on B is not that an understanding of A gives us an understanding of B. — Michael

It follows that we can't make an argument that A depends on B if we don't understand anything about B. It's like saying we could be BIVs, but the brain and the vat aren't anything like brains and vats that we experience.

So what are they then, and how could that scenario possibly hold? You see, the BIV gets it's meaning from what we experience.

What gives the skeptical scenarios of being a BIV or in the Matrix, it's all a dream, or Descartes's demon power is that we understand well what those scenarios mean. What is problematic for the noumena is that we can't know what it is, by definition.

It could be that whatever is in the vat is nothing like the brain as we understand it and that whatever this thing is in is nothing like a vat as we understand it. — Michael

In which case I would just deny the thought experiment as being incoherent, since it can't even say what being envatted means. That coincides nicely with the OP. If mind is dependent on mind-independent reality, then you can't have an arrangement entirely outside our understanding giving rise to our understanding.

Which also means that I deny the possibility of Kant's noumena - the thing in itself of which we cannot say anything about.

If we're brains-in-a-vat then a theory "which meets all observational data and satisfies every theoretical constraint" might fail to say anything about the world outside the vat (which, according to realism, would be the real world). — Michael

Let's say that BIVs are possible. What could an ideal theory say about the world outside the vat? Well, it could say a lot, actually. Consider that the brain in a vat is like the brain in appearance fed to that brain. Which means that neuroscience, chemistry and physics are all similar. Otherwise, you don't have an envatted brain, since the notion depends on the kinds of brains the BIV has in experience, which all depend on physics, chemistry, etc being a certain way.

If we're brains-in-a-vat — Michael

Assuming we could be brains in a vat. I have my doubts.

"The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."

Yes, that seems like an accurate description of realism. — Michael

Right, but it's important because it means that our thoughts about the world can't be entirely different from the world, on a realist account. Which means that the world can't be entirely different, but not because it's mind-dependent, rather the opposite.

What I said was that the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality. — Michael

Okay fine, but that doesn't mean the same thing. Anyway, I was responding to one critique of realism, which is that and ideal theory could still be false for realists. And that's problematic.

"Realism" and "real" mean different things. The realist is free to tell us what "realism" means but not what "real " means. — Michael

The realist is certainly free to use "reality" to mean mind-independence, or verification transcendence, or whatever to mean that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes, and linguistic practices. The anti-realist might not wish to use the word "real" that way, but that's what the realist means, so it's bordering on absurd to argue over what the realist means when employing use of the word "reality".

The realist doesn't have ownership over the word "real". "Reality" isn't realist terminology. It's English terminology. — Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, the realist does get ownership over the word "real', because they are espousing realism.

Even if they don't, it's not the anti-realists job to tell the realist that they can't employ "real" the way they do to put forth their position, which is what you did in your initial response to the OP. I was putting forth a realist rebuttal to criticism of realism by virtue of an ideal argument being potentially false, and you criticized my use of the word "reality".

Well, yes. That's the disagreement; over what it means for a tree to be real. — Michael

No, that's not the disagreement! The disagreement is over whether the tree can be mind-independent, and if so, if realists we warranted in maintaining such a position.

It's a metaphysical dispute, not a semantic one, although it seems to turn into a semantic one on these forums. And the reason is because someone wants to use the other side's terminology, but with different meaning, and then a big argument ensues over who has the right to use the terminology. Which completely derails the metaphysical dispute.

The anti-realist can continue to use "real" as one ordinarily does; to describe the things we see everyday when awake. — Michael

And the discussion can become a never ending argument over what is meant by "real".

"Real" doesn't mean "mind-independent". My dreams are real dreams but they're not mind-independent dreams. — Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, realists mean mind-independence when talking about reality. Anti-realists mean something different if/when they wish to use the word "reality". Of course realists don't deny that dreams happen, but dreams have no ontological status independent of minds, and that's what matters for being real, to a realist.

The anti-realist position is that what appears to us when we're awake has the same ontological status of dreams, in that it's mind-dependent. The realist disagrees. So using the word "reality" for both is to employ different meanings.

Because they are real. — Michael

But they're not real, as in they're not mind-independent. Which is what real means in context of this discussion.

Yes. The anti-realist says that the real world is what appears, not something else. — Michael

If the real world is what appears, and the anti-realist isn't a naive realist, then the anti-realist is talking about appearances.

The disagreement is over the separation of the real world and the empirical world. — Michael

I'm not sure about that, since direct realists and scientific realists might disagree. The disagreement then would be over whether the empirical world is mind-independent.

To be an anti-realist is to be opposed to metaphysical realism. It's not to be opposed to the existence of reality. — Michael

But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence.

Anti-realism is not un-realism. — Michael

It is anti-realism, which means opposed to realism. So it's really strange to want to hold on to the word "reality" in such a discussion.

but aren't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent. — Michael

If they're not mind-independent, then why call them real?

They're saying that the world as it appears to us is the real world. — Michael

But that's abusing language in context of a discussion over metaphysical realism. The realist thinks the distinction between appearances and reality is important, because there is a real world beyond appearances. The anti-realist denies this.

Mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent things are nonetheless real. — Michael

Yeah, sure, dreams are real too, in that people do have dreams. But they're also not real, as in the things I dream about aren't part of the world. They didn't happen, except as a dream. Same with imagination. So we don't say that dreams or imagination are real. That's abusing language, even though it's true that people do imagine and dream.

They're denying the realist's account of what it means to be real. — Michael

They're denying that there is a real world, only the world as it appears to us. This is a philosophical discussion, and as such, it's important to not misuse language.

But the anti-realist is denying that things are real, in the metaphysical or ontological sense, thus it's confusing to use that language. Ant-realists aren't realists, obvously, therefore they don't get to use the word "reality" for their position in a debate over metaphysical realism.

It would be the same if someone said that dreams were real and claimed the right to use dreamland as reality in a debate over realism.

A Realist believes that it is possible, even if it is difficult, to obtain true depictions of reality. — darthbarracuda

I think the fundamental position of a metaphysical realist is the existence of a mind-independent world, regardless of whether we can truly depict or not. That's what makes someone a realist. Given the OP, I would agree that it's necessarily possible to obtain a true depiction of reality, at least in part, since the mind is grounded by reality, but mind-independence of that world is what is key to the metaphysical position itself.

What is the point in using the word "reality" in a metaphysical debate on realism to describe a position which is opposed to realism?

Do you agree that everything you can think of is mediated by a thought? That is not 'real' access, surely? — invizzy

Sure, and I agree that everything I see is mediated by seeing. As for real access, thoughts are real. People have them, presumably because they have brains, brains that are part of bodies moving about in the world. I consider being a body in the world to be real access.

here is no access to the real world, you see. — invizzy

Not really.

But presumably there is a cause; perhaps light reflecting, cones firing, the lack of tinted spectacles or water in the way, — invizzy

Which would be the real access. You can't appeal to the real world to undermine real access. If everything is a mental construct, then that includes the brain, photons, etc. As such, scientific explanation can't undermine realism if they're already ideal.

whereas living well involves commitments that must be made in virtue of being alive — The Great Whatever

True.

pleasure and pain, which have intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, value: they are never good or bad 'insofar as...'. — The Great Whatever

I guess I just disagree with this. I think pleasure or pain are only good or bad insofar as the context makes them good or bad. I can feel pain and think it's a good thing, and feel pleasure and think it's bad. I can also think that a less pleasurable state is preferable. It just depends on the context.

Anyone here want to fess up to being fully self-actualized? — Bitter Crank

No, not remotely. That sounds like a god, not a real human. Are there such people? That sounds positively transcendent. I mean, we can all be some of those things some of the time. And some people more than others. But all of that all of the time?

For example, you might be compelled by metaphysical hypotheses about the basic structure of the world because you feel uneasy when you lack understanding of something, and so have a desire to understand, or feel as though you understand, everything. But if circumstances change and so does your psychological predisposition, so that you no longer feel uneasy in these circumstances, the corresponding metaphysical hypotheses will cease to be interesting. — The Great Whatever

Or they might find such questions fascinating. It's interesting that you frame it in terms of anxiety or tradition, leaving out the obvious motivation.

Put another way, it is possible to lose interest in such questions, while it is not possible to lose interest in living well, whatever one's opinions on the matter are. Thus, only an arbitrary opinion imbues such other questions with their (extrinsic) interest. — The Great Whatever

But for some people, the thing that gives their life purpose is pursuing such questions. There was a mathematician who cared about nothing other than math to the point that he was nearly helpless in other areas of life.

They find them interesting insofar as... Remove the condition following, and they lose their interest. Their interest is, in other words, derivative. — The Great Whatever

The condition being that an individual or group finds them interesting?

And I'm not denying that living well or ethics are an important philosophical project, I'm just questioning that they are the central project of philosophy, when the evidence seems to be to the contrary. Philosophy is much broader than that, until you narrow your focus to groups of philosophers who think/thought a certain way.