Nominalism doesn't have to explain anything while avoiding concepts/universals/types--and after all, language isn't possible without those things. It's just we're denying type realism. — Terrapin Station

I get that, but if nominalism can't explain why we find it necessary to utilize universal types to make sense of particulars, then it hasn't resolved the universals issue.

t is dissatisfying, but sometimes some old bugger says 'I refute it thus!' and then you're stuck for an answer, and have to wander off to find questions which seem to have replies :). — mcdoodle

Or hand waving, which Landru loved to do with experience, self and language, which is odd, since Moore did it to defend realism. I mention Landru, because he was the foremost defender of anti-realism on the old forum (and was a very eloquent debater).

I wonder if the hand waving away an argument originated in response to Moore's talk.

To briefly summarize the restated problem concerning electron charge in my last post, the similarity between distinct properties is numeric, and numbers are universal concepts. That's a problem for nominalism, because it needs to be able to explain particulars without resorting to universals.

How exactly it obtains is a different issue than saying that they each have their own charge versus saying that they literally share just one charge, which is the nominalism vs. realism (on types/universals) debate. — Terrapin Station

That's a good way of explaining it. But that still leaves a question. How is it that separate properties have the same value? In virtue of what are they the same? You might respond that humans measured them to be the same, and that's the end of it.

But it's not really. The problem is how we recognize sameness. So then we ask what is it about the two properties that make them the same regarding electrons. And that will be numerical. And if anything in the world is identical, it would be numbers. So how is it that electrons have the same numbers while remaining distinct?

Or something along those lines. If the problem of universals were so easy to dismiss with, I'm guessing it wouldn't keep coming up.

Aren't you being circular though? Brute facts don't have explanations. But you want there to be an explanation for what makes a brute fact. — mcdoodle

I suppose. So the only difference between a contingent fact and a brute one is bruteness. It's just odd that some things are contingent and others are brute, but there is no reason for that difference. Maybe it's because one can keep on asking "but why?", which leaves one a bit annoyed and dissatisfied when someone else says, "just because".

Or whether each electron has its own charge, and the charges are both −1.602×10^−19 coulomb. — Terrapin Station

I accept that the electrons each have their own charge, but that raises the question of how it is that electrons would have the exact same property.

:D

So that is what nominalists are denying. — Terrapin Station

Right, so when physicists say that every single electron in the universe has the exact same charge, isn't that like saying every single person shares exactly the same slice of pizza?

And if the physicists are wrong, then why do they measure electrons to have the same charge?

That's the basic idea. Nominalism isn't at all denying this. It's just saying that no two things are numerically identical in any respect. (So |..| isn't identical to |..|--they're just similar in some respects, and more similar than |....| is in some respects to either) — Terrapin Station

So laws of nature would be ruled out. A lot of physics would be approximation. Every electron in the universe couldn't actually have the exact same charge and mass, right? It's just we can't measure the difference?

But then you're positing differences beyond observation to account for similarities that are observed to be numerically identical.

ou're not thinking that either either it's true that there are types that are (numerically) identically instantiated in multiple things or otherwise it's true that there are no degrees of similarity and everything is effectively a completely uniform soup, are you? — Terrapin Station

No, there are similarities and differences among particulars in the world. That much we clearly experience. Maybe I misunderstand nominalism as failing to properly account for how particulars also have similarity.

Before we go further with this, we should probably cement just how you're using "arbitrary." Are you using it with a connotation of "random"? — Terrapin Station

No, I mean like the rules of a game. There is nothing in nature that makes chess have the rules it has. Humans arbitrarily decided how the pieces would move, what the board would look like, that there would be two players, etc.

That doesn't work when it comes to biology. We can't just make up any categories we want and have it map onto living organisms. But we are able to create categories somehow, which would suggest there is something about living things that lends itself to categorization. We don't have to go full hog and call that something universals. But that something has to do with similarities between organisms. The details about them aren't utterly particular.

Concept-formation is something that individuals do. It's a way that individuals think about things--they formulate abstractions, ignoring some details and generalizing others, so that the "same term" (again, it's not literally, numerically the same from instance to instance) can apply to many different particulars. Indviduals do this non-arbitrarily. It's in response to things experienced. And it can't be avoided as long as one is conscious and has anything like a normally functioning brain. — Terrapin Station

I don't understand how humans generalize details in a non-arbitrary way if nominalism is the case. There must be something about certain details that makes them generalizable. That's the problem nominalism has always faced. Similarity between particulars needs to be accounted for somehow.

In my view nominalism and conceptualism aren't distinct. Nominalism isn't arbitrary. Under nominalism, universals are non-arbitrary abstractions that individuals make, where those abstractions are unique to each individual (in terms of whether they're particulars or somehow numerically identical among more than one individual). Under conceptualism, we can't have anything other than that. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how that's possible.

Obviously the ways we talk about the world are going to have some relation to the world. The error is in assuming that they're identical to the world. That's a rudimentary conflation. More specifically a reification. — Terrapin Station

So take the nominalism/realism debate about universals. Reifying universals would be mistaking the universal abstractions in our language for universals in the world. But nominalism would be the opposite mistake in supposing our abstractions are arbitrary. That would mean conceptualism would be the proper alternative, I suppose. There's something about the world (or pariticulars) that's universalizable, leading us to form universal concepts.

Your argument was that if the world itself is not x, then x could not describe the world. — Terrapin Station

How about, if there was not something related to x that is also true of the world, then x could not describe the world.

In the case of paint, that would be visual light. In the case of math, it would be quantity. In the case of physics, it would be fundamental patterns that appear to be universal. And in the case of natural language, it would be similarities between particulars.

Or something along those lines.

I believe that mathematics is an invented language we employ to talk about the world. I don't believe that the world itself is mathematical per se. — Terrapin Station

It is quantifiable, though.

I don't mind so much if they ask 'describe some causes of the Great War' although personally I prefer the talk to be about enabling conditions. — andrewk

Let's say I enable conditions for you to rob a bank. I give you a weapon, a getaway vehicle, code to the safe, and the best time to commit the robbery, and whatever encouragement I think you need.

That doesn't mean you will go through with it. Enabling conditions aren't enough to determine whether you commit the crime.

I'm afraid I don't understand these rhetorical questions, but they sound interesting. Can you explain them, and how they relate to the discussion? — andrewk

For example, isn't gravity posited as the cause of planetary orbits, black holes, the rate of objects falling, etc?

If our universe lacked the force of gravity, then none of those things would be the case. If there was no electromagnetic force, then there would be no molecules. You might wish to think of the fundamental forces in terms of their theories and how they explain things, but I don't know how you do away with causal aspect. Part of explaining how matter attracts is that gravity is the cause of matter attracting.

If we want to say that the state of the entire system at time t was the cause of the state of the entire system at time t+1 then I'd be happy to agree, but I doubt Aristotle would like it. — andrewk

Some causation involves a very complex system such that we can't exactly identify what causes what, except at a high level, such as the sun warming the Earth resulting in water evaporation which leads to rain clouds.

But other events, like throwing a brick through a window, are very straight forward Aristotelian causation, unless one wants to engage in speculative metaphysics where something else, like the code in the Matrix, actually causes the glass to shatter.

So really the issue is that Aristotelian causation doesn't scale up to complex phenomena, not that causation itself is the issue.

I don't doubt for a second that weather has causes, I just doubt our ability to accurately identify all of them at any given time.

That you can spin your wheels forever identifying 'causes' at any arbitrary level of scope is a symptom of dissonance between the paradigm and the world itself. — Roke

Do you doubt that the sun heats the heart? Is there anyway this is mere correlation (outside speculative metaphysics and matrix/God scenarios)?

We can describe the mechanism of how all the tributaries flow into one another to end up at the Nile Delta. — andrewk

Seems like causation is inherent to the concept of mechanism. Why does it rain? Because the heat from the sun evaporates water into the atmosphere. Then we can go into the mechanism of how that all works with sun's radiation, water molecules, cloud formation, etc. Every single step will have inherent to it B happening because A, even if it's some A radiation and some B H20.

The overall picture is that the sun causes the Earth to heat up, which includes bodies of water, and some of that water evaporates as a result, and the moisture in the air eventually forms rain clouds.

There is no doubt that the sun is heating the earth, and if it stopped shining somehow, the Earth's temperature would drop dramatically, and the rain cycle would come to an end once the Earth's temperature had dropped to the point that evaporation no longer occurred.

That last paragraph looks like a prediction, but it's a counterfactual, because the sun has enough nuclear fuel to burn for a long time, so we can never test the actual scenario.

There have been lottery wins and millionaire athletes who have squandered their wealth and ended up poor. And then there are those who have invested and created businesses and ended up more wealthy.

It's not all luck. Some of it has to do with being smart with what you have.

There's definitely enough for everyone to live comfortably, we have the technology and the resources to provide a high standard of living for every person on the planet, it's our current system of dollars and cents that creates the massive disparity. We could have a post-scarcity world now if we really wanted it, but most people prefer the zero-sum game of winners and losers because they believe it offers them the chance to become rich. — Sivad

Maybe in theory, but what in practice will motivate enough people to be average to make this post-scarcity world work? A lot of incentive comes from being able to start your own business, or rise to the top of a company, etc. And a lot of people do want to own more than the Smiths, or live in a nicer location, etc. Status is important to human beings.

Also, without money, how do the markets know what resources to allocate? How many widgets from factory X should be produced to be delivered to stores Y & Z? Is the government going to determine production?

And then you have to problem with different political, religious, and cultural practices. Maybe untouchables or women aren't allowed to have equal stuff. Perhaps the local leaders would rather keep their power, etc. Maybe the natives don't want to plant crop XYZ for the good of people living in region ABC.

Just heard a short interview of Peter Singer by the BBC. The interviewer asked him whether pursuing a field that could have made him a lot more money might have been a better choice. Singer responded that by being a philosopher, he is able to get his ideas out in the world and influence people.

The context of the discussion was effective altruism, where you calculate what does the most good for your contribution. If Singer had gotten a job on Wall Street, he would have had more money to give to charity, but he wouldn't have been in the same position to promote the idea behind being an effective altruist.

Life is but a game. Sometimes you win and sometimes you lose. — Harry Hindu

Life is a game, boy. Life is a game that one plays according to the rules.”

“Yes, sir. I know it is. I know it.”

Game, my ass. Some game. If you get on the side where all the hot-shots are, then it’s a game, all right—I’ll admit that. But if you get on the other side, where there aren’t any hot-shots, then what’s a game about it? Nothing. No game. — Catcher in the Rye

So...am I over-thinking this? Is it just a metaphor that went over the edge? Or does it suggest that Dawkins in spite of himself believes in an invisible spirit-world? — mcdoodle

Dawkins is trying to justify our short existence as meaningful by using such a metaphor. Death isn't so bad if you consider all those unfortunate souls who never got to exist! Except of course they don't exist, so there's nothing fortunate or unfortunate about them.

I'm an atheist, but not because I think it makes life better. I don't justify atheism by trying to argue that death is okay, etc. That we only live such a short time is aburdity. Camus was more honest.

What is the actual, practical difference between some very few exceptional individuals understanding how everything works and no one individual at all understanding how everything works, even within any given science? — John

There's no way that anyone understands everything in any field of consequence. That's certainly been true in Information Technology for a long time, even without genetic algorithms and deep learning. The field is constantly expanding, and nobody has the time to learn everything.

It's no more stupid than art, sports, music, or brewing your own beer.

So since the issue of suffering can't be resolved through voluntary extinction, it becomes an ethical imperative for some species or entity to thread that needle and reach something like Tippler's Omega Point — Sivad

Voluntary extinction was never realistic for humans, either. Best the anti-natalists manage is to convince some people not to breed. Not as if that will be a problem for continuing the species.

Good point regarding Camus, but I do like the idea of intelligent life in the universe evolving into a much better state, even if it makes us fodder. Not saying I believe it, because who knows. Maybe all life goes extinct before then. But then again, can't entirely discount what technology has accomplished so far.

LULZ!

Procreation brings it into sharp focus. — schopenhauer1

I wonder if Camus ever wrote about procreation. Is giving birth a form of rebellion against life's absurdity?

The antinatalist argument, to the extent it's anything beyond preaching to the choir, is distastefully presumptuous about the ineffable inner worlds of others. — Roke

I've made a similar argument in the past against anti-natalism. But anti-natalism is arguing against bringing more people into this life, not against lives already being lived, where you try to make the best of it.

I've asked myself the following thought experiment. If I could create another Earth-like planet, and put a new batch of humans on it, would I do it? Probably not if I gave ethics serious consideration. Because whatever inner value those humans experience, there is likely over time being a lot of war, injustice, rape, murder, discrimination, unfairness, disease, mental illness, misery, poverty, etc. Kind of like our world. And I'm not sure that world would be worth it. I'm not sure whether our world has been worth the terrible cost.

In fact, if I had to chose whether to experience my own life over again to this point, I'm not sure it would be worth it either, even though I've been spared the worst. Maybe when we wake from the nightmare of feeling that life is awful, we do so to the day dream of feeling that life is wonderful.

If you don't believe in God, then God talk isn't very convincing. — Bitter Crank

Right, particularly because the God talk very much depends on who is doing the discerning.

If we see God working in history, through actual people, places, events... then don't we have to make an attempt at a historical understanding of what God is about? — Bitter Crank

How in the world would we know what sort of working God is doing, though? Just because people put to writing claims about God doing this or inspiring that doesn't mean that's what God is actually doing any such thing.

What standard do we use to judge God's dealings in history? How do we know what God is about, anyway? Do we just use whatever we value most in this particular time? God is love is very appealing, but a Roman or Spartan God might be brave and unflinching instead, and so on. And clearly, people's views on God's nature have changed quite a bit over time.

Love exists between humans because social bonding is important to the survival of social animals. But God is not a social animal. God's not biological at all, if there is such a being.

Maybe God is Brahman is just wants us to get over the illusion of being separate beings, or whatever.

Isn't a desire by its very nature something you're aware of? What would it mean to have an unconscious desire? I have a desire for X, but I'm unaware of it. If I am aware of it, then it's not unconscious. — Sam26

An unconscious desire would be some motivation you're not aware of that influences your behavior. The psychological explanation is that what we are conscious of is only the tip of the iceberg as to what actually causes our behavior.

Human interaction can include their interactions with slabs, apples and stars. — Banno

So the interaction is what makes statements about slabs, apples and stars true?

But I don't think it will help us to do so. Very few 'Why' questions have answers. — andrewk

If we ask why water is a liquid within a certain temperature range and pressure, we know that's because of it's chemical properties. If we ask why some pattern of brain activity is conscious, we have no clear answer without biting some philosophical bullet or other the many people will find objectionable.

The thought experiment seems to want to ask how you can represent experience without having experience. I don't see how a description of anything could usurp experience. — Andrew4Handel

Sure, but the issue is that it seems like language can describe most of the world in scientific terms, so the question is what makes minds unique? Particularly given how the bodies those minds are part of are understood in scientific terms. Far as anyone can tell, there's nothing unique about the brain or body that would make it an experiencer.

Alright, so can Mary's Room be recast to ask why there is something more to the physical world than knowing all the facts?

That's what all the criticisms of physicalism qua consciousness come down to. Why is there (in the case of human brains at the very least) an experiential aspect?