hat is it about (1) meaning-as-use on the one hand, and (2) abstract language features on the other, that makes the two incompatible? This is what I'm trying to get you to articulate. — StreetlightX

I'm thinking of meaning along the lines of how Gerge Lakhoff and Mark Johnson describe metaphors as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another (cross domain mapping), where the domains are based on neural mapping in the brain, wired up to how our perception and motor functions work.

So for example we talk about how we "grasp" new ideas, using our ability to grab objects as a helper for understanding learning a new idea.

What does it mean to understand each of these? What do we expect if something is to be called "understanding"? — Srap Tasmaner

That another dog walked across Lassie's grave, and if I don't go left, I'll be possessed by the spirit of the Zodiac Killer.

Unfortunately, since neither Lassie nor my cloned Neanderthal friend (DNA found mixed in with a frozen mammoth carcass a few months back, angering the ancestral spirits) can communicate that to me, I go right and then the rest is ScyFy B grade movie.

The above, although worthy of a crappy movie plot, illustrates how our language can be filled with all sorts of ideas probably missing from animal communication.

hat interested Wittgenstein were the logical features of language that make it function as a language, not the psychological conditions which allow some creature but not another to learn language - that has nothing to do with philosophy according to W'. — Fafner

Wittgenstein said that if a lion could talk, we would not understand it, because we don't participate in the lion language games. As such, there's no meaning that we could translate from our human games to the lion games in order to arrive at a common understanding.

I think that's mistaken. The real meaning is based on how a lion understands the world by virtue of being a lion. To the extent that's similar to being a human, we should be able to arrive at some common meaning, and therefore be able to translate between human and lion language.

I'm only using animal communication as a means to critique the notion that meaning is only exclusively it's use. I don't see the difference between a bird using song to woo a mate, and human using words to seduce a mate, if use is all there is to meaning.

And yet, we do acknowledge some pretty important differences between bird song (far as we understand birds), and human language. Some of those involve the use of abstract concepts, which are pretty important. A human male seducing a female might employ the concept of earning potential to interest her. Earning potential is not something animals communicate, because money isn't a concept they form.

gain, the point here is not that we have to look into the realm of psychology (as opposed to behavior) to understand language, rather I think that both Kant and Wittgenstein argued that you have to look at logic or norms, that is how we use the logical/normative system of language in our dealing with the world (or experience in Kant's case). — Fafner

But how does this explain the difference between animal communication and human?

Better syllogism:

1. Meaning-as-use is language game behavior in the world.

2. The empirical world is particular.

3. But, language employs universals.

4. Therefore, language can't just be use.

it works for metaphor, math, and other forms of language that aren't merely particular. Arguably, animal language games are solely particular (with maybe a few exceptions).

And so when Wittgenstein talks about 'use', what he means by that (among other things) is that you have to look at the use of symbols within a system or a praxis to understand their meaning, and this means that you have to consider how the symbols (to put it in a Tractarian way) are compared with reality: e.g., under what circumstances do we say that such and such is the case, what kinds of other propositions can we logically infer from it, and what sorts of language techniques ('language games') we need in order to make the talk about this or that subject matter intelligible (and there is a host of many pother questions). — Fafner

Sort of, but I think at this point one would invoke Kant, because this seems rather Humean and empirical. And Kant argued persuasively that you need categories of thought to get the empirical endeavor off the ground, otherwise you just have a meaningless jumble of sensory impressions.

Similarly, you need cognition to make language work, otherwise, you just have a bunch of meaningless behavior.

I was trying to find a quote from some behaviorist in the past (Watson maybe) that I saw a long time ago. It may have been taken out of context, but it went something like this:

"I could teach an earthworm English with the right stimui."

Which is impossible because the earthworm has no such cognitive capacity to learn English, let alone lacking any sort of body that could communicate words.

I mention that because it ties back to how animals generally lack certain linguistic features that human languages possess, and this is biologically based. Behavior can't bootstrap an ant colony to English, unfortunately, because that would be fascinating. (Did read a scifi story were wasp colonies were intelligent and figured out how to go online and tell us about it. They may have been genetically enhanced, though).

And to understand the meaning of the word "you" is to understand the use that the word "you" plays in the language. — Michael

Yes and no. If you're just talking about he English word "you", then yes. If you're talking about the meaning assigned to it, then no.

You entails understanding that other people exist with their own thoughts, feelings, desires, rights, etc. It is fundamental to human interaction.

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug. — Michael

"I greet you" includes you as a meaning. If you didn't understand "you", then there would be no such greeting. The other needs to be part of one's cognitive capacity.

When describing your visit to Rome, you create images and sounds and smells and tastes in the listener's mind which is your intent no? — Harry Hindu

It would seem that Wittgenstein's argument tends to be understood in purely behavioral terms. Notice what unlightened said about how Witty wanted to get away from the Cartesian Theater, thinking that it would be impossible to communicate your beetle in the box.

So I'm guessing the language-is-use crowd might try to deny that. But that's where the argument becomes absurd.

Notice that a severely autistic person does not greet others, because others don't exist as selves to that person. They can't use "hello", because they're mind blind, or something like that.

That should demonstrate that even with a greeting there needs to be a cognitive ability underpinning it.

So it seems to me that you (and Harry) can't reasonable reject the principle behind the claim that the meaning of a word is its use. You just reject the claim that this is the case for all (or most) words. — Michael

Notice that I never said meaning can't be use, just that meaning isn't exclusively use (and cannot possibly be as I see it), which is what Witty seemed to be arguing, or at least the people who have tended to agree with him.

Also, I would argue that there is something more to "hello" than just noticing that it's a greeting. There is some additional meaning. Arguably, when I greet someone, I do so acknowledging them as an individual deserving of some respect, unless it's done sarcastically.

I don't greet a rock or a tree (usually unless I'm being silly or just using it to talk to myself). But people (and pets) are greeted, because there is the meaning of a self that can respond or understand the greeting.

But this is just the conclusion you're trying to establish. You can't use it as a premise without begging the question. This is the very thing im looking for an argument to underwrite. — StreetlightX

Right. I would have to think about how to do that. It's always been my reaction that "meaning is use" can't be right.

But back to the OP, I could reformulate the argument as such.

2. Animals have their own language games were the meaning of signals is determined by use.

3. Animal language games lack abstract language features.

4. Therefore, there must be something about human language beyond use.

That was what I was originally arguing for.

So what are we doing when we translate the word "hello"? What does it refer to? The meaning of the word "hello" is its use as a greeting, and we translate it with this in mind; we look to see what word(s) are used in the same way in other languages. — Michael

Yeah, but not all words are greetings. All that shows is that the meaning of a greeting is it's use.

When translating words from another language, we aren't translating its use, we are translating its meaning, or what it is referring to. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. Also, if Witty is right about it being impossible for us to understand talking lions, because we're not part of their language games, then SETI is wasting their time.

What's the difference between saying "the meaning of a word is its use" and "the meaning behind a word is its use"? — Michael

The claim is that meaning is use, and that is determined by the role it plays in a language game.

I don't dispute that words have meaning in a context. I dispute that meaning is the usage. Rather, the usage assigns the meaning.

Wittgenstein was aiming for a radical redefinition of meaning, not merely pointing out that words acquire meaning by how they're used. Everyone knows that already. Wittgenstein's approach is behavioral, not cognitive, and I take issue with that.

You must have the cognitive (thought) prior to behavior, or there are no language games. Language games can't get off the ground without cognition.

The correct formulation (if we're going by Wittgenstein) is "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". — Michael

That formulation is trivial. Of course "Chair" means the universal of chairs in English, because we arbitrarily (or rather through evolution of English) decided to denote that word as being such.

That's very different from saying that the meaning behind the word is merely the use of it.

Perhaps try a syllogism? (1)Meaning-as-use says... (2)But... (3)Therefore...? Fill in the ellipses? — StreetlightX

I'll try.

1 Meaning-is-use says meaning is the way words are used in the context of a language game.

2. But, word use alone cannot explain the existence of universals, metaphors, math and logic in human language games.

3. Therefore, there is something more to meaning than use.

Admittedly, that's incomplete. There needs to be a couple more steps fleshing out how abstraction is different than other aspects of language, such as a greeting or singling out a particular.

But why not? What is it about concept use that puts the use-theory into question? — StreetlightX

I don't see how it gets off the ground. Say we want to use "Chair" to denote the category (or universal) for all chairs. Well how do we arrive at such a thing unless our brains are first capable of thinking in terms of categories, or universals?

How does number get off the ground, unless our brains have a capacity to quantify? There's a reason human language is full of these sorts of concepts that we've yet to detect in other animal communication (or not a lot, there may be some).

As an analogy, consider the argument that tools are use. We certainly use tools, but tools are more than use. Tools are objects constructed with certain form and function to help with doing certain tasks.

So even though I can use a screwdriver like a hammer, that doesn't mean that my use of the screwdriver that way makes it a hammer. It's still a screwdriver (and it makes a rather lousy hammer, for a reason).

Is conveying concepts not a use? — unenlightened

Yes, but that doesn't make concepts use. We use language to convey concepts. I don't see at all how that makes concepts the same as use.

see the Wittgenstein project here as part of his attempt to undo the Cartesian error of identification as 'thinking thing' rather than 'doing thing'. — unenlightened

I don't think human language gets off the ground without the conceptual machinery in place. Human language is different from animal communication (in part), because our brains evolved the ability to think that way. Otherwise, how do you account for animal communication being different?

We are thinking and doing things. Witty went too far with this. If you want to think about the mind computationally (not terribly fond of it, but it's better than what Witty was trying to do), then we have algorithms other animals are lacking that give us richer forms of communication.

Our computers will be able to communicate like us when they're sophisticated enough to form concepts like we do. Maybe the machine learning will get there someday. We'll see. But notice how Siri, Alexa, etc can use words, but lack understanding, and are not able to pass the Turing Test. I'm not for a second fooled by my interactions with Siri.

The real argument is whether understanding meaning as use can explain all aspects of human language, not whether animals can be said to have some aspects of language. They may or they may not, and you're right, language needs to be defined.

My suspicion is that use (alone) cannot explain abstract thought (or metaphor), and that's what I'm fumbling to get at.

When our retriever wants to go outside in the morning, the first step is a gentle whine. If nothing happens this is followed by nose poking. Then louder whining, finally a loud bark in one's face. — Bitter Crank

For some reason, it reminded me of this Calvin and Hobbes cartoon:

I'll go one step further and claim that philosophy would not exist if meaning were just use.

Maybe Witty would have been happy with that, but it doesn't change the fact that humans ask philosophical questions (and not just professional philosophers).

How is it that we are able to step outside the various language games and ask these sorts of questions? It's because our concepts allow us to.

Thanks for that link.

I would say that discreteness, displacement, and duality of patterning all rely on a conceptual underpinning which is required for those aspects of language, and cannot be relegated to use.

I'll try a different approach that has a similar critique.

The problem of universals shouldn't have cropped up if meaning was just use (I'm not saying that meaning can't be use, only that meaning is not entirely use). The reason it's a problem is because our language has lots of universal concepts, but the empirical world is particular. Use alone shouldn't give rise to universal ideas.

This needs to be further developed, but I see it as related to the difference between signalling, which lacks abstraction.

One could also argue from metaphor instead of universals. Why would use ever evolve into metaphorical speech? How does that come about?

No, the conceptual apparatus has to exist first, then the use can happen.

Why are humans so concerned about whether their many, highly elaborated languages, or even simple languages, are the sole property of themselves? "Only humans... do such and such" seems to suggest an insecurity about their worth. That bees, dolphins, parrots, border collies and the British all exhibit language seems like more a cause for celebration than unease. — Bitter Crank

I'd be excited if were shown that dolphins or birds had language. Pointing out that animals use sounds and what not for communication was just a tool to show the difficulty with meaning being use.

You tell me. What did he work out?

Oh, that we're cognitively closed to such things? Maybe so.

Perhaps you doubt too much. — Banno

Nah, I tend to be more dogmatic than skeptical, but philosophy encourages doubt.

What does McGinn list as not brute? — Banno

I don't know. Haha @ video.

I'm pretty sure most of my moral values come from growing up in the society I grew up in and not from myself. If I had grown up in ancient Sparta, I'm going to guess my fundamental values would be a little different.

So being is necessarily prior to reason, it seems. — John

Yeah, that makes sense. It's tempting to suppose the world just is how it is, while logic, math, language, and scientific models are created by minds attempting to make sense of the world. They are maps, not the territory. But we often confuse the two, and this has led metaphysics, along with plenty of scientists and mathematicians in addition to philosophers, astray for millennia.

But I'm just speculating.

But why does this reason exist? And why does the reason that this reason exist also exist? If something is necessarily existent - why is it necessarily existent? " — darthbarracuda

I'm going to guess that asking why something self-explanatory necessarily exists is a meaningless question.

Finding the explanation should dissolve the question. Of course you can always create a why question for any topic. "Why can't God create a stone that God can't move?" Doesn't mean it's any more meaningful than pondering how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists
Tractatus 6.44 — Cavacava

Maybe so, but what was Witty trying to get at here? That there is a reason why the world exists, but it's beyond our ability to know?

You're also mistaken about Humean causation too. There is not "no reason" any given event occur. The presence of particular states which case other is present defines Humean causation. Why did the sun rise? Because states, causes and effects, were such that a rising sun came to be. That's "why" some alternative outcome hasn't occurred. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But then Hume uses the turkey/thanksgiving metaphor to explain how our belief in the future being like the past is merely a habit of thought and not something guaranteed in the world. Humean causation has no necessity to it. It's just simply constant conjunction, to date. But that could all change tomorrow or a million years from now, for no reason at all.

Doesn't that make a brute fact just a true statement that is not subject to doubt? — Banno

Have to think about that. Take Humean causation. It's a brute fact that the sun has always "risen" each morning. But that leaves me doubting whether the sun might rise tomorrow. In fact, it leaves me doubting everything about the future.

I'm not comfortable with that.

The only way out that I see is some form of infinite regress out of necessity (but what is necessity if not a brute fact?) We could say that the "brute fact" is ABCD, and if we try to analyze what "brute fact" amounts to, we'll end up with ABCD as well. A circular but infinite explanation. Sort of like saying everything can be divisible an infinite amount of times. — darthbarracuda

The best attempt I've seen is trying to argue for God or the universe necessarily existing. That there is some reason why God, the universe, mind, etc cannot not exist. That a final theory of everything would be self-explanatory, and if we could understand it, then we would be like, oh so that's why there is something instead of nothing!

And then the issue is resolved without having to propose something existing for no reason at all. I prefer to think that is the case, because brute facts to me seem like should shrugging and rather arbitrary.

And if something can exist for no reason, why can't other things?

Along these lines, it seems it's always up to the individual to determine his own conception of right action. — Cabbage Farmer

Sure, but the problem with this is the same problem when everyone gets to interpret the sacred scrolls for themselves, and decide what God or the gods are about. You end up with ten thousand different interpretations.

Is that how we want morality to be? Simply up to the individual to define? One might think that is okay with faith, but do we really want everyone determining their own rules of behavior? Not everyone shares the same values. We don't do this with rules of the road, at least not in the part of the world I live in, and driving is mostly sane and relatively safe. I wouldn't want someone to decide that running red lights or driving on the sidewalk is okay for them. Of course some do, but there are well defined penalties for doing so, and everyone else is fine with this (because we do want to discourage dangerous driving behavior).

Of course the other side to this is that society's rules can be bad too. And individual deciding to exact revenge is limited in the amount of damage they can do. A group of people can do a lot more. But on the other hand, there is more wisdom from the group, and certainly over time, than one individual, with their own personality quirks and biases.

If left to my own devices, I would probably default to tribal mentality of duty, and to hell with strangers. But the society grew up in has these peculiar notions about treating people fairly and equally, and discouraging one group trying to take advantage of everyone else. That sense of societal duty has arisen over millennia of people having to live together in groups larger than tribes, and constantly dealing with strangers.

If 2 "brute facts" co-arose from nothing, each contingent upon and sustained by the other, would they be brute facts? — Roke

Would that be like the Son & Holy Spirit parts of the Christian Trinity that eternally depend on the Father or Son/Father relationship for existence?

I don't know what "arising from nothing" actually means, but it's an interesting thought.

Cthulhu — Noblosh

Yes, that. My metaphysics is Lovecraftian. Laws of nature are monstrous beings.

Instead of responding specifically, let's take an example.

One can state that constant conjunction of events is brute. It just so happens to be the case then when A & B then C. But nothing makes that be the case tomorrow. Then again, nothing keeps it from being the case a billion years from now. Humean causation it is.

But then someone else can't accept that events are conjoined for no reason, and that conjunction might not hold at any time in the future. So they propose that there are laws of nature necessitating the conjunction. And those are brute.

So how do we decide between the two? Is it a matter of aesthetics? I'm repelled by radical contingency while you're appalled at some mysterious, non-empirical laws making things happen?

That is an interesting point. But then you're putting the creationist grounds for faith on par with any philosophical considerations, just as one example.