In a sense you are not realy giving a counter to what I said.

Im curious. If we assume gods exist and have knowledge of their reality, dreamworld and the physical reality would they be able to construct a vectorspace that would include all aspects of reality in a single framework.

Because if you would argue for multiple realities you would need to argue that even the gods can't build one unified framework.

However if you think theres no principal reason why they can't then at it's core the reason why we can't do it is not vecause it's in principle not possible and rather human limitations.

However given those human limitations constructing an adittional framework for the reality of the gods would be futile. So you would still end up with only one framework including the properties we can reasonably talk about.

In short if you are not specifically arguing that the gods can't build a unifying framework of reality because of reason x. The entire point for different frameworks for different realities kinda falls short because you say we can know properties of the reality of the gods while simultaniously saying the opposit when a different framework is used.

Let me first clarify. When I speak of Vectorspace I do not mean the stric mathematical definition. Because else I would need to show the mathematical axioms to hold. We can go there but you would need to provide a more detailed explanation of the realities you speak of.

What I mean when I say vectorspace in following parts I mean sth along the lines of:
Vectospaces consist of variables that are either linear independant or not.
If two variables are linear independant then changing one variables value won't change the others value. If the are linearly dependant it will changing one value will change the other value aswell.
Variables in turn are properties of elements. F.e. Position, temperature, humidity, volume and so on.

With that said we can now examine the realities you presented.
Lets take the physical reality. That you refer to as 5d. We could reduce it to 5 variables that are linear independant base but we could freely add other variables that just aren't linear independant.
However we asume that we have a vectorspace here with 5 base vectors.

Now we could consider dreamworld as an emergent phenomena of the physical reality and therefore a subset of the already existing vectorspace. So any properties you would find would just result in adding more linear dependant variable to our vectorspace.

But since you constructed your dreamworld kind of different we would need to look at the reality of the gods that is as you said outside of the physical reality.
Lets first assume that the reality of the gods has properties but the reality of the gods is independant of our physical reality.
In this case it should in theory be possible to find a cobination of vectors that form a base for said reality of the gods of size n. So we would have a n-dimensional vectorspace for the reality of the gods.
Now if the reality of the gods is independant from the physical realites we can just add the different vectorspaces and creat an n+5 dimensional meta reality that includes both sub realities.

If the dreamworld is as you said a inbetween between both realities this only means that variables of the dreamworld would be vectors that are build out of vectors of both realities you mentioned.

Lets say we assume that we cant identify properties of the reality of the gods. We in theory could still expand the basic phsical reality based on variables derived from properties of the dreamworld.

In this case we wouldnt be able to create a complete model since we can not model the possible vectorspace of the reality of the gods.

However if you denie that the reality of the gods has propreties, or can be investigated you have very little ground to assume that this reality exists or that you are able to create an independant ontholgy that would be applicable to the reality of the gods. Invalidating your attempt to have multiple onthologies that describe different realities. As soon as you have valid hints for the reality of the gods like dreamworld there is no clear reason why you shouldn't be able to expand the vectorspace for the physical reality with variables that describe partially aspects of the reality of the gods.

Except you would find incompatablities that prevent you from doing so.

At least thats how I conceptualize it.
And just to have it said thebkey part is not if its a vectorspace or not. The key point is that you need a strong case that invaldiates expanding a existing framework to include new knowledge. So in a sense a systematic issue that prevents the new knowledge to in principle be included in a framework and any future expansion of it.

you are diverting and it's irrelevant.

To be able to tell if two "realities" are part of one bigger reality or uncombinable but not mutually exclusive. I would need to know different onthological models, the realties, and the specific conflict.
Since the poster did not provide that, I can't tell you, if it is a vector space or not. Or what the base vectors would be.
You are kinda asking what the solution to the math problem is that you haven't told me yet.

I also don't know how you would see the difference of two realities that aren't given.
Again it is like asking how big the weight difference of two different objects is. Without specifing the objects or the unit or the location that is used to measure.

Basically your descripition is to abstract to prompt a proper answer.
Until you provide a description of realities and the matching onthologies that can't be combined I can't help you.

Btw I tried to do your job by formulating an example for you that would argue your case but since you seemed to read straight past the point I will abstain from that and wait for your answer to the question how you know that there are two different realities and what their difference is.

I am not taking any road.

The fact that it's rather easy to combine things on an abstract theoretical level is a basic counterargument to your position and answers your question.
Basically one reality ontholgy is because of it's intuitivty and existance of dominant models the default position, so it's your job to argue against it to which counterarguments can be raised. If you don't put forward any argument or position theres no point to swap from a functioning onthology to some random different form that hasn't been spelled out or been reasoned for. So the biggest counterargument is you saying nothing about or for multiple ontohologies.


Did I say it's my position? No. Did I say it's not my position? No.

You pose a question and I provide an answer.

Also stop diverting. Maybe elaborate your view and so on. Try to use arguments like "you are taking the wrong road BECAUSE ... (INSERT ARGUMENT HERE).

I'm not sure why you ignore what I and others have told you that you should
1) clarify the terms
2) Bring forward your view

My answer is as abstract as your question and until you put forward a specific case and further discussing is pointless.

In a sense you are doing pure sophistry since you are throwing a new term around without adding anything to it and then trying to shift the burden of proof by pretending your still empty position should be the default and the default position needs to defend it's legitimacy despite there not being any other option proposed.

The burden of proof is clearly on you since you introduce a new concept. Until you realize, and accept that, I think further discussion won't provide much value.

I don't know if you are intentionaly missreading me.

You asked what the counterargument to a position that you made up yourself is. But you didn't state anything about your position.

So maybe in a first step you should actually put forward a position. By formulating two onthologies that are correct and incompatible. And therfore can't be combined.
Btw Ethics already subsumes incommensurable values. I don't see how this ethics term is relevant here.

Once you did that we can look for specific counter arguments. However till you do that a trivial counterargument is that theres no principal reason not to combine stuff in to one ontholgy.

So my answer to your question is: there is no general reason to not assume combineability in to one reality and no specifc case given. Me needing to quasi invent a cheap model to illustrate one version of your idea that you couldnt be bothered to spell out is your shortcoming not mine.

The vectorspace is a tool of humans, it does in a sense nothing other then provide a framework for subsuming content by allowing you to add a desired amount of variables.

The vector space equalizes things that cant be equalized. — Prishon

A vectorspace doesn't equalize anything. What it does it groups it into the same construct without influencing the content.

But it's not important you could also just say greek gods exist and interact with the world, quantum fields exist and interact with the world, therfore bot are things that exist and interact with the world. Again I am not advocating for a specific onthology what I am saying is that it's rather easy to combine things on an abstract theoretical level.

In a sense what I am saying is it is your job to show that two specific onthologies can't be grouped together. Since both are true but also not combinable.

And you talking about an on the fly example I did or two examples you gave cause you got pressed to do it is just diverting from the fact that you should be presenting a specific case or a general argument why I can't combine stuff on an abstract theoretical level or in a specific case. You just stating

can't be equalized — Prishon

is not an argument. It's just an empty statement without backup that can be dissmissed as easily as you positioned it. I can just say "Yes it can".

So the only reality is that of vector spaces? — Prishon

No thats not what I said.

What you propose here is a math model of how physics pro- or regresses. — Prishon

I am not proposing anything, at all.

You said:

Thats [ontological relativism] my own invention... — Prishon

So you asked us to construct a counter argument to a position you made up yourself, and that you didn't elaborate on. Neither regarding terminology nor structure. Since I am no mindreader I had to make up a very primitiv basic example myself to show that:

Creating incompatablity to be combined. — CaZaNOx

Is what your position would need to demonstrate to establish multiple realities, rather than different parts of the same reality.

The vectorspace stuff is just to illustrate the ease with wich a combination can be found. And a possibility to show what a contradiction of different frameworks thats not based on content and rather the structure of the onthologies, could look like.

In your example of physics and greek gods you coud just add them together and have a view greek god + physics and that if you only look at physiscs you only look at parts of reality.
Or you come to the conclusion they are mutually exclusive views and therefore either one or the other is false and therefore not a reality.

I'll try to answer your question in a different way the the previous replies.

What onthology basically is, is a framework to conceptualize content.
In that sense (im guessing) onthological relativism would come down to a statement of :
"we can not concepzualize some content fully with only one framework."

This kinda implies that you need at least two frameworks to conceptualize content A.
If statements about the content have no realiationship with each other there is no trivial reason why you shouldn't add the two statements up as statements about different variables about the same thing.
If they have a relation or overlap there is no trivial reason why there shouldnt be a framework that includes said relation or the overlap.

In a sense you could try to understand a framework as a basic n-dimensional vector space. If someone claims that the world needs another m-dimensional vector space to be described properly theres no reason why you can't just make an n+m-dimensional vectorspace to include both options.

So in a sense thats the most trivial counterargument. And also kind of the default position.

This in a way means theres no real counterargument to be made since the proponent of multiple ontholgies would have to show that there are two ontholgies that can't possibly be included in one bigger picture. This specific case would have very specific counterarguements.

The most basic example that comes to my mind for multiple ontholgies would be that the frameworks contradict each other.

Lets say you have two 3d vectorspaces with the dimensions w, x, y for V1 and x, y, z for V2 and you would find that in V1, w, x, y are all orthagonal but in V2 x, y, are not onthagonal. Creating incompatablity to be combined. If both V1 and V2 are consistent and applicable you have a case that said onthologies can't be combined.

So in a sense the most obvious answer is that your examples can be thought of as parts of the same reality rather then different realities.

Btw I think the question regarding reality was if you understand reality as the independant world, or as the image, in your head, of the world that you expierience.
Based on your examples I assumed you ment "physical reality" rather then "expierienced reality".
Btw2 This would be way easier if you actually elaborate on your concepts and the terminology or provide refrence sources.

I disagree.

If we keep the exact same initial conditions A will always produce the same result unlike B that will produce differenig results due to its indeterminsim.

So I disagree that they produce the same result.

In my understanding you are somehow missing certain points.

For quantum events as far as I am informed they are understood to be probabilistic in nature. However the using of bigger scales doesn't negate this it only creates a state where events thought of as inpossible in the mechanistic view have a very low probability.

However lets ignore that considering a chaotic system the scale of the system shouldn't have an influence on it being chaotic or not. Chaotic means as others have stated before a sensitivity to input/relevant factors.
This means in this example that if you role a dice with a specific force that leads to a certain result the increasing of the force by 0,00...1 can lead to a completley different result. Same for angle and all the other factors. I don't see how this should change based on scale.

However lets ignore this case aswell and assume a completley deterministic system.
If you have a set of factors (force, angle, ect) and you throw the dice it gives a specific result. If you reproduce the same initial conditions you create exactly the same output. This is technically still under the scope of probability by it being modeld as 100 % chance to get the same result. However if you just role the dice again without fixing the intial conditions it should be logical to conclude that different intial conditions can produce a different outcome.

Therefore roling a dice with not fixed initial conditions is not clearly determined and thus probabilistic. Theres a chance that you use initial conditions I which lead to specific outcome O.

So somehow I don't get what your asking.
If you imagine a scenario of throwing a rock that is soley dependant on force and not chaotic at all (more force=flies further) you seem to be asking in my understanding if I throw a rock multiple times (with different force) why doesn't it always lead to the same result. (Excluding chaos). However as soon as you include chaos (different hights different density of air, relationship air particles with object) the clear predictability is gone.
So you seem to be investigating a chaotic system however meanwhile refusing to view it as chaotic and postulating it to be clearly predictable.

Did I missread you somewhere?

I did enjoy writing it. What are you having in mind when you say:

it generates some interesting discussion. — Pfhorrest

?

Metaphilosophy

The Meaning of Philosophy
What defines philosophy and demarcates it from other fields? — Pfhorrest

Philosophy is the thing outside or on existing borders of "usefull" categories/views.

The Objects of Philosophy
What is philosophy aiming for, by what criteria would we judge success or at least progress in philosophical endeavors? — Pfhorrest

Philosophy tries to enable the expaning of borders or creating of new categories. This is mainly done by clarifing unclear concepts by creating models that aproximate roughly what is being talked about.

The Method of Philosophy
How is philosophy to be done? — Pfhorrest

Creative thinking that consists of a sufficient degree of critical thinking and rigor.

The Subjects of Philosophy
What are the faculties that enable someone to do philosophy, to be a philosopher? — Pfhorrest

Whatever faculties enable the creative and critical thinking. Further one could add containing a certain productive element that consists either of theory builiding or precise and usefull criticism.

The Institutes of Philosophy
Who is to do philosophy and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest

Whoever wishs to do so. I don't think it's reasonable to suggest a specific way of relating to others. In general one might constrain it artificially by limiting based on max number due to philosophers being not short term productive for society and thus demanding a certain wealth of a society. However I think this is done rather automatically.

The Importance of Philosophy
Why do philosophy in the first place, what does it matter? — Pfhorrest

It improves the long term development of civilizations. Like science it does not produce instant results and instead shifts the results to the future. One can imagine it this way we need food now/being active harvesting ect but improve overall foodproduction by allowing one member to be passive and think about food harvesting.

Philosophy of Knowledge and Reality

The Meaning of Reality
What do descriptive claims, that attempt to say what is real, even mean? — Pfhorrest

Such claims try to express patterns or rather metapatterns that are sufficiently accurate and therefore applieable over a long time.

Bonus question:
What do mathematical claims, about numbers and geometric shapes and such, mean, and how do they relate to descriptive claims about reaity? — Pfhorrest

Mathematical claims are claims over a specific abstracted attribute of reality that uses at least some sets. In math itself they are relational statements over properties of the abstracted attribute. Due to math containing of general relational statements these statements can be used more or less fitting to "real" sets.
Note that real is here used as percieved reality amd not as groundtruth. This is important since we f.e. could argue that every human is an individual not equal to any other human. But since our brain can abstract this individuality away and form a set "humans" with more then one entity in it we f.e. can start counting humans.

The Objects of Reality
What are the criteria by which to judge descriptive claims, or what is it that makes something real? — Pfhorrest

Long term apropriate usability of the descriptiv claim. Therefore showing to be more or less apropriate. To make this a bit clearer compare it to science where a theory that lasts very long due to no one being able to find a better theory somehow shows a certain accuracy of the theory. Obviously it is not a purley time duration based (or only if you consider a new improved theory to be able to include all events explained by the previous theory + more). I excluded the range due to a theory or concept being possibly very stable locally. Not to overextend here but I think afterall the overall symbolsystem needs to fullfill this. There range matters but the issue is more complex.

The Methods of Knowledge
How are we to apply those criteria and decide on what to believe, what descriptive claims to agree with? — Pfhorrest

I am not convinced that we are able to applie those criteria at all. I rather hold the view that they playout over time. However I think that one can approximate it by considering consistency rigorosity, adaptivness, falsifieability and other simular estimators however they are highly dependant on the topic at hand.

The Subjects of Reality
What is the nature of the mind, inasmuch as that means the capacity for believing and making such judgements about what to believe? — Pfhorrest

I think there are two key ways to view minds in generall. First of they are based on computational machines which creates a necessity for computability in reasonable time (due to the brain being a highmaintance organe) to do that Mind simplifies a complex continuous ground truth into a discrete space which is the basis for believes aswell as judgments over beliefs(binary thinking). Secondly there exists in general the usefull concepts of creative/dynamic vs static/conserving principles. Humams in general are something that tries to conserve itself this can be seen in the simularity of dna that results in children being rather simular to their parents physically speaking(both have 2 legs and arms ect) the brain and with it the mind entails the creative part such that the brain might be simular to the parents but the thoughts not as much. Furthermore the mind itself consists iteslf of the same process attributes there exist conservative structures that want to maintain usefull believes (even if sometimes wrong) and other process that want to include new believes or improve on believes. In general this is also a function of age and other factors. Depending on the specific case one might be tilted into one direction.

The Institutes of Knowledge
What is the proper educational system, or who should be making those descriptive judgements and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest

A proper educational system should be learning based and not knowledgebased (learn how to learn). How to best teach that should be left to experts. How they socially relate is not very important. However students should also get to know based on the learning what a proper authority is and what not and how to assign justified authority to people. F.e. someone who repeatedly shows to have deep knowledge in a field should therefore be justifieably be seen as authority in said field however not necessary in others. While someone just claiming authoritie should be questioned to investigate it properly.

Bonus question: How do we get people to care about education and knowledge and reality to begin with? — Pfhorrest

I think people are per default interessted in educating especially young people. As I mentioned before the brain and it's creativity is a function of age aswell. F.e. A new born child has very few believes that are not stable(pretty new) so it per default wants to enrich it's mind with believes (thats why children are curious) however old people maybe have believes that are not uptodate but served them well over their entire life and thus are not likley to just "throw them out" for new beliefs where they do not know the worth.
Simular this is true for knowledge and reality. The reason for the self intrest is that it improves the succesrate and increases the longterm gain. Once you get older this gets less relevant.

The Importance of Knowledge
Why does is matter what is real or not, true or false, in the first place? — Pfhorrest

As mentioned above the succesrate is the important factor. However it is not as clear cut with truth as one might think. Imagine having poisones(eat=death) mushrooms and healthy mushrooms. In general the best case would be that we could distinguish exactly everytime we see a mushroom. F.e. All red mushrooms are poisones. However if this is not possible snd we accept that we make errord it might be beneficial to exclude healthy red mushrooms since the risk is not worth it. Furthermore lets assume we could always clearly find out how poisones a mushroom is but for red healthy ones we would have to invest a lot of time and brainpower into it. Both last mentioned cases illustrate that a less truthfull approach can be more beneficial due to minimizing risk or effort( where effort of finding out is higher the reward of eating the healthy mushroom and we could do other things in the same time) furthermore there might be addinional time constraints.
In general it isn't about truth and rather about best workable solution

Philosophy of Justice and Morality

The Meaning of Morality
What do prescriptive claims, that attempt to say what is moral, even mean? — Pfhorrest

They are largescale statements about the best set of relationships to optimize a society. F.e. A society that kills all of it's infants wont propagate.
Or more suttle s to close border society risks of becoming to static and getting outperformed by a more dynamic system. A to inclusive society might lead to the lack/inability of establishing an overall framework and thus bursting in different parts and possibly a chaotic state.

Bonus question: What do aesthetic claims, about beauty and comedy and tragedy and such, mean, and how do they relate to prescriptive claims about morality? — Pfhorrest

Aestetic claims can either be viewed to represent a simularity regarding the combinig structure of creative/conservative and therefore are pleasing. (take the image of humans having a frequency and aesthetic objects having an own frequencies simular to the human one or one that has a special relationship to our frequency)
Or that aestethics represent/contain a lot of metapatterns that we have learned to be usefull. F.e. Simple and deep.
(note this isn't something im to intrested in so my views are a bit on the fence hence i listed both possibilities that seem plausible to me)

The Objects of Morality
What are the criteria by which to judge prescriptive claims, or what makes something moral? — Pfhorrest

As I mentioned above the optimization of society. However this is a bit more to it. F.e. The subject at hand using morals is relevant to the appropriate framework based on the dimension it is looking at it. For example i consider the individual morality that is most beneficial to use a Kantian one. (Threat other humans as if they have inherent value) else one might up killing people for personal cain resulting in trauma. However if at a higher position f.e. as a military leader it quickly can become utilitarian if it is a given that people will die it is beneficial to minimize human cost and therefore giving orders that sactifice someone to save many (violating a kantian approach) however this applies only to non personal actions. In the daily interactions the military leader should still try to use a kantian view. Further the utilitarian domain should also be limited to a certain degree such that saving a individual or spending a large sum of money should always be decided in favor of the individual at that level. However at a higher level goverments would for example limit the ammount of money the miltary gets and thus enacting a broader utilitarian framework on said individuals life.

The Methods of Justice
How are we to apply those criteria and decide on what to intend, what prescriptive claims to agree with? — Pfhorrest

What specific claims to agree with should be up to society and it's configuration to determine. However in general it is a optimization problem where we want to maximize the overall well being while simulatinously maximizing the individual well being of worst cases.

The Subjects of Morality
What is the nature of the will, inasmuch as that means the capacity for intending and making such judgements about what to intend? — Pfhorrest

I think the result is a result of culture and it's influence on the individual as well as inherent factor in individulas that ranges over a certain distribution. This is relevant due to it influencing what one wills at the first place. The will and it's strength also depends on the specific case and how one vies oneself (on what side of the maximization problem do I see myself).

The Institutes of Justice
What is the proper governmental system, or who should be making those prescriptive judgements and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking? — Pfhorrest

A democracy, a combination of the public will and reflective processes in form of checks am balances that consider a broader framework then the voter might consider. They should relate to each other via discussion and a certain form of procedure to guarantee a safeguarding of both parts of the discussion (the active part/will of the people and the passive part/reflective mechanisms)

Bonus question: How do we get people to care about governance and justice and morality to begin with? — Pfhorrest

The caring about said points is given by default, since they are influences on each individuals life. Furthermore culture and education certainly influences these aspects. However simular to the case of the philosopher and scientist it shouldn't be viewed as every member of society needing to have a to strong intrest in governance. Else we get a to big overhead of passive elements in society. The handling of this is already build in to democracy where few people get chosen to focus on the passive aspects more strongly. Creating amore specialized and proper working system.

The Importance of Justice
Why does is matter what is moral or not, good or bad, in the first place? — Pfhorrest

The idea is that it is necessary for a certain ammount of trust/cooperation in a system wich overall increases the succesrate in a system if not overdone.
I like the example of teamsport. It is important for the players in a team to trust others which allows them to share responsibility (motivates passing the ball) this trust is to a certain degree given per default since the entire team wins and therefore each player and all get the price money. However if it is overdone and there is to few competition in a team this might lead to underperformace. Since there is also a necessity that people try to score and increase their individual value. Basically we also want people to try to score and in some instances refusing to pass further and take on individual risks and benefits. (Becoming man of the match ect) Societies can be viewed as teams where morals and laws function as trust building entities that allow to form better synergizing teams rather then just be a loosly connected group of individuals.

Bonus question:
What is the meaning of life? — Pfhorrest

The meaning of life is taking local process oriented actions. Like the saying that the way is the goal.
However there is no real "the meaning of live". This can be shown by following thoughtexperiment:
Imagine god exists and you get to talk to him and you ask him this question and he says something like "to have children" or the famous "42" or any other final goal. The answer at least to me always seems unstatisfactory no matter what answer you come up with.
Furthermore any final goal (that is reachable) would implie that after reaching the goal you have per definiton nothing left to do. You did it now what?
However if it is a goal that is not reachable it basically is a description of a process you ought to be undertaking. Meaning you have local challenges, aspirations and orienting yourself based on them. This doesn't mean that the orocess should be unguided. This somehow implies that there is no real meaning of life and rather an insentive to taking meaningfull local steps that are directed in a beneficial direction.
I think imagining children might be usefull if you have a child that is drawing something it has a local goal creating a picture(which compared to pictures of professional artists isn't good) however it is learning while doing so improving it skills (long term benefits/rough direction) and the result has a lot of meaning to them or their parents.
If you want to view it evolutionary I would say creating a future that still consists of living entities furthering the overall succestory of life in general.

Ps. Obviously the answers are a) Personal views and b) drastically reduced in length and simplified to fit to your questions c) Sorry in advance for the spelling mistakes

If something is unclear or if you have disagreements feel free to respond.

Ps2 To what comes to my mind when you say "what is your philosphy" i was anticipating a question of roughly the form "how do you think reality is fundamentaly working and how would you describe it" that I spend a lot of time on felt like it was missing.

I assume so.

As you put it (I hope I am not missinterpreting here) the nature of the question is binary.
Since it is put as EITHER OR (exclusive or). This model fails to concieve a entire spectrum of statistical configurations, which would contain a degree of both at the same time.

I am not refuting the possibility to assign a determenistic view to statistical results but lets put this aside here and instead assume that there is true randomness at play.

So we have events that contain structural determined factors aswell as randomnes regarding the outcome. Take a coin toss in this example the structure of the coin (having two sides) influence the result aswell as the random nature in the variable outcomes (heads up xor tails up).

In some way we can say the result is directed/willed (by choosing a two sided coin) but free aswell because the being present of random outcome. Where the will contains an ambiguity in regard to the specific outcome but not in regard to the general outcome. We could model this ambiguity resulting out of necessity or preferability or something else.

I think this at least a possible model that can't be easily dissmised because of the advance of statistics in scientific models or chaos as a seemingly present phenomena that both can't properly be reduced to determenism in simplistic ways.

A different issue you rise and seem to ignore (not sure how conciously) is the slight of hand with wich you merge an ontological view regarding questions about determinism and a subject view depending on information.
While an purley ontological framework using determinism is not intrested in the information (assumes having all information). This is maybe best expressed in the statement that, if we knew everything we could predict everything, that determinism makes. The lack of information of a subject is at best an explanation why not everyone sees that determinsim "actually is the case".

However the subject view is highly dependant on informations present. Consider the coin toss example again but now conceptualize it as completley determined. Since you are not capable of grasping all relevant factors regarding the result the phenomena is locally random from the subjective perspective even in a theoretically deterministic reality where one theoretically could predict the result. However even if you knew the reality is deterministic it would be unreasonable that you as subject think you could gatter all information of the universe and consider them in the moment of the coin toss. (The idea of a being knowing everything is kind of selfdefeating for a determenistic framework in my view). So you would know the result is not truely random but this would be meaningless to you and it would still therefore be truely localy random since you truely aren't able to get to an information state where you can predict a specific outcome.
Btw the temporal aspect is part of the subjective view that is not necessarily used.

Btw2. A view of someone supporting complete randomness seems stramenish so if you considered that option reasonably you should already yourself came up with different options that are not stuck to the binary framework you seem to set up.

the solipsist can only doubt if and only if there is something more than the self of the solipsist in existence. — Wallows

Why can he just assume incoherence of his reasoning process or axioms or words used.
Or why can't we conceptualize the solipsist simply as having expieriences of incoherence.

In other words don't you need specific assumptions to justify your iff.

You seem to say that doubt necessitates external initators, however the loosing of consistency or coherence can be thought of as internal initators of doubt that can in principle be build into the self. In the analogy of death I used above: death as internal shortcoming/necessary-process/change from within without conceptualizing external factors that lead to death (this case gets clearer if a solipsistic position doesn't necessarily postulate a material body that could be subject to external forces.)

I am struggling with the remarks especially in your first response. Not with the content but with the relevance to the issue at hand.

the experience of the domain or 'world' of the solipsist is truth apt from within the world, and not by analysis wrt. to other domains. — Wallows

I first want to emphasize the word expierience (1) to refere to it later in my reply.

I agree that the world is not truth apt wrt. other (external) domains. This would just be misunderstanding the solipsistic viewpoint. It rather has to be as you state that it is truth apt from within.

However what seems to me especially problematic is

if I and you spoke different languages — Wallows

Lets ignore the language the other speaks and focus, from the solipsitc perspective, on the notion of there being a language at all. The key point of an (internal) language is that it names different things differently in order to conceptualize the world from within. This however needs as precondition different things/domains that are worth distinguishing from within. This analogy seems completley missplaced if one understands the solipsistic perspective to only contain one domain (the self/world of the solipsist).

Now I see no reason why a solipsist couldn't in general state that existence necessarily is given despite there being doubt because of him experiencing at all. However negate any content of his experience/statement formulated by his internal language and therefore it's validity. This could also be applied to doubt that can be understood as reasoning with/applying the internal language, that can be faulty. Therefore in principle doubting itself as process could be entirely misguided in framing the doubt. Further any attempt to state what one is doing could be misguided, including doubting itself. I obviously agree that from an outside perspective one could form that statement but not from within.

I want to point this out by referring back to experience(1).
I wrote

If we look at descartes cogito (ergo) sum (I think, (therefore) I am) — CaZaNOx

The key points for entering the brackets is that with the brackets we are applying a coherent language with coherent logical conclusions. This is not the case for the solipsist at all. For him it is somehow a experience in which he by thinking/doing sth.(whatever this is) he experiences sth. Where the experience contains the manifestation of existence of the self at a fundamental level. However in form of experience there doesn't have to be any proper realization of this as we framed it with our coherent use of language from the outside. As you surely know at this point of his work descartes already negated the conceptualizing a triangle as thing with three angles. The solipsist so to speak seems to be in an phenomenological hole where all he has is incoherent experiences. (I don't know how clear I made this point?)

However what I completely fail to grasp is why and how any of this things should refer at all to the existence of an outside world at all. Even if we assume the solipsist to be at a way better place then the self that is doubting in descartes meditations f.e. based on an approach similar to Fichte that based on experiencing consistency infers consistency that has to be explained by a certain necessary internal structure, allowing somewhat proper internal language.
This I think as you would agree leads to an axiomatic system where there is no doubt and only deductive proofs that are certain in said system. However the certainty of the axiomatic system itself build by the self is not free of doubt. Because the chosen axioms by the self are open to doubt as descartes showed. There is no reason why different solipsitic positions couldn't build different axiomatic systems or why a self couldn't swap between them if they build this system at all.
In terms of language, because the language is so to say only internal the meaning of the words would be certain. However this doesn't exclude the possibility of inventing a new language from scratch.

A solipsistic position could for example include the necessary experience of doubt. We could even translate this to conceptualizing death(as we understand it) to mean in solipsism an expierience of doubt that leads to a complete new language/axiomatic system after death. This obviously would have to be reasoned by the current language logic used by the solipsist. However I really want to emphasize again my overarching core question. Where is the pointer to an external world in this at all?

I don't see why there wouldn't be the same problems with a binary notion of certainty.
I further don't see why there should be nothing to doubt or what you are appling this to.
The main thrust of my argument im 2) was that there are parts that you can have knowledge of. To me this seems indicated by your wording of 1).

I would put it this way either their is a single domain (the entire self) to which one ascribes could ascribe certainty or there is a multitude of domains to which certainty can be attributed to. This second notion could also include the entire self.

If we look at descartes cogito (ergo) sum (I think, (therefore) I am) one can see that certainty is ascribed to ones existance. In other words even if the self knows nothing else the self is certain of it's own existence. The key conclusion is that a self that is purley based on doubt can not doubt itself at it's core. This view simultainously asserts that there seem to be other domains, being part of the self, that can be doubted. So the self would have only uncertainties no matter what is in question exept it's own existence.

I would therefore basically refuse that because the solipist is one with the world there is nothing to doubt. It evaluates different aspects differently the "Existence" as such is not doubted however any ascribed property is.

I don't see how you address my criticism regarding 3).
I basically suggested the analogy with god because he as you pointed out he/she seems to be the ultimate solipsts. His having a certain knowledge of the world(or not) doesn't shows or lead to concludimg that there is somethimg outside. Do you agree?

[1]A solipsist can never doubt, and live in a world full of certainty.
[2]Therefore, in the presence of doubt knowledge is possible.
[3]Hence, doubt is proof that an external world exists. — Wallows

I disagree despite not being a solipsist.
I accept 1).
2) The question here is what is "knowledge". I assumed it to be something along the lines of "the improvement of certainty". However I don't see why this is evidently given without further assumptions. Lets say the Self investigates a certain part of itself to increase it's knowledge of that part. This partial improvement seems possible with your conception. However there is no guarantee that while increasing the certainty in one domain by amount x there isn't a loss in (an) other domain(s) that adds up to the amount x. This would obviously lead it to be a zero sum game overall and only a shifting of certainty of different parts. To prevent this you would have to assume something along the lines that there is a net gain over time. I don't see any basis for that.
However lets assume this to be the case to look at 3)

3) I don't see/understand how the external world enters into this at all. Lets say the Self increases knowledge there is no reason why a solipsist couldn't just call this an improvement of the knowledge of the Self by the Self (since everything in this view is part of the self). Therefore gaining knowledge/certainty does not necessarily refer to an increase of knowledge of an external world and can not prove the existence of an external world.
This can be illustrated if you imagine an incompetent god that by accident creates the universe. After this god investigates said universe and improves his/her knowledge of it. There is no reason to conclude from that, that there has to be something outside of that universe.

Btw I think the approach of Fichte is interesting. His basic question is why is the "illusion" so consistent and strongly present. The approach he takes is investigating fundamentaly necessary structures/properties of the self with this. However this is only vaguely related.

Btw2. My approach is the idea of change being a necessary condition for the self preceding it. The self experiencing change requires it to change itself. On this basis in my opinion one can view change as external factor that the self has to obied by. I am aware of the fact that a solipsist could state that the self is necessary for change like change is necessary for the self. However I view it as unequal pairing since at least in principle one can imagine change without a self but not a self without change. (Since there would be no possibility to have experiences without change.)
However I don't want to divert further from your actual point I just thought it might be interesting to you.

I don't know how relevant my point is but maybe it's worth noting.

I just don't see a paradox. I think this has been pointed out already to a degree. However what hasn't been mentioned is the fact that our human brain is capable of tracking a certain amount of objects accuratley without counting (I think it's around 7-13 but am not sure). This obviously varies between humans. If the amount of elements is to big to track without counting we call it a heap or other simular concepts, that rather seem to be based on size and not ammount. It's worth mentioning that there are primate species (at least one) that seemingly can track more elements without counting. Aswell as a bunch of experiments where rats had to press a button a certain ammount of times to get a food reward. With increasing number the succes rates decrease to blind guesses. So we seem to have species related differences.

I also want to agree with the objection calling this view out for using the ad populum fallacie.

I don't see much legitimacy in using a brain mechanism used for perceptions without specific ammounts be it heaps(visual), noises, smells, touche(s?), tastes to try to establish some kind of quantity for objectivity. Because the quantity of humans beliefing a fact does not change the fact and the paradox exactly arises because one tries to applying quantity (based on countimg) to an area where it does not apply.

I don't see to much validity in his general point at all.
To preface my point: I am not a mathematician nor a physicist. Therefore I don't doubt the validity of his mathematical statements. However they seem to be rather disconnected from the main thrust of his argument.

Maybe it makes most sense to contrast his view with my understanding of math. I understand math to be a semi-language (please ignore the semi it doesn't add to the point here).
I assume this to be the case because in general natural sciences transform their observations/measurements of reality into math to be in a precise framework where predictions and models are precise and with which they are testable.
It certainly seems true that math comes to play in basically any natural science not only physics. If one does not hold the unproductive view that all science is physics which seems to be a error in categorizing and therefore setting the border of physics, it seems obvious that his statement is just painstakingly oversimplifying the question.
I want to point out that one can still endorse sub-points he raises that are due to having problems with translating physical phenomena into math or if one uses bad conceptual frameworks for some real word applications.
There is also the problem of over evaluating math, assuming it to be something it is not making it infringe on the domain of physics.

Math gains its precision from being a purely axiomatic, and therefore deductive system, in which there are valid transformations and invalid transformations. The degree of how useful specific transformations and certain areas of math are depends on the framework.
There simply aren't any experiments in an axiomatic system. Stating this painfully reveals a misunderstanding of what axiomatic systems are. This gets way more obvious if you look at logic that is an axiomatic system that is at the core of math. So I want to illustrate this point with logic rather then math because it makes the point clearer.
Take:
Socrates is a Dog
All Dogs are Mortal
Socrates is Mortal
Logic and similarly math investigates if the transformations and therefore the conclusions are valid. It doesn't say anything if it is sound. After-all Socrates could not be a dog.
Meaning logic says giving the premises are true(which we don't know for certain/could also be framed wrong) the conclusion is true. There is no statement about the concepts "Socrates,Mortal,Dog" and limits itself to interpreting "all,is" assuming that all is used correctly as all and not as most or something else.

I personally hate it when philosophers use math examples of the type "1+1=2" but here it seems to fit.
He is complaining about students transforming 2+3 into 3+2, however this is not false and the transformation signified by =(valid transformation from one side to another) holds. The kids could instead also have said 2+3=1+1+1+1+1. I make this point because it clearly shows that he is complaining about the usefulness of using this transformation. However this could be the best transformation if you want to prepare the numbers to get fed into a computing machine.

In conclusion I don't think his argument as he put it (not as I interpreted it with usefulness) is clearly wrong on so many levels. Math is not limited to physics, not everything is physics (a conclusion one would have to draw from his statement), axiomatic systems are not internally experimental in any sense(only maybe in the choosing of the axioms), he doesn't argue his point properly which also would have to be extendable to logic(and instead babbles long about non trivial concepts in math that are used in specific contexts to intimidate the inexpierenced reader and to illegitimately gain authority by over complicating things)(Note I so harshly point this out because if he takes out the right to assert inferiority complexes and other insults and uses this kind of argument I will to)

Last but not least I want to stress that his core point is correct but not because of his faulty arguments and his missuses of concepts. Take F.e. a look at his first two sentences based on my argumentation that actually addresses the issue
"Mathematics is a part of physics.(Wrong/misuse of concepts) Physics is an experimental science(what science isn't? biology?), a part of natural science. Mathematics is the part(same mistake as before) of physics where experiments(there are no experiments in axiomatic systems) are cheap.(why should cost play any role at all in his argument?)"

However it is obviously very problematic disconnecting a language from its field of application. Just like it seems to be problematic that the language experts have no proper education in the field of application leading to not useful transformations. This point seems more obvious for natural languages then math (due to it being more abstract) however it still holds.
Btw. Him mainly complaining about the french education system and extending it to an "universal hatred of mathematicians" or interpreting the pupil that transformed 2+3 into 3+2 as "not know[ing] what the sum was equal to" contains such obvious misconceptions or at best questionable rhetorical tactics that they alone should lead one to question the article.

Obviously I'm open to be shown wrong or to someone pointing out where my argument is not convincing.

In my view metaphysics is best understood as the basic framework one uses.

It therefore is a necessity for any worldview. It doesn't really matter if one is aware of the framework one uses or not. The key point is that a framework is needed.
Thinking about the framework is usefull since the framework is essential for the ascribing meaning to a given fact. Further it is clear that different frameworks create different meanings.
This can be showcased by languages that can be understood as frameworks to a certain degree. A given sound or letter structure can be meaningfull in one language and meaningless in another.

To finalize this point I want to point out that it is incomprehensible to think of a human that has no interprative overhead attached to facts.

I would add language to the list.

So in the context of competing nationalism, how do we determine which one supersedes the other? — rickyk95

I think this is usually done by power what ever form it takes. However I don't think there's a proper way with the nationalistic framework to resolve the issue.
However given the framework I think the best theoretical approaches are democratization, globalization and individualization. However if these concepts work in practice as good as in theory is questionable.
It is worth remembering that nationalism served in it's founding days as inclusive force and only later became an excluding force.It just doesn't work in timescales humans want it to work.
The EU can be seen as current approach that based on democracy, globalization(or rather stronger connectedness between the parts in question), individualism(to have a bigger scope of shared opinions and more interest for ones own life and less interest for national topics) and shared organizational structures(demanding bettering of ones live directed at said structures) is working to create a new supranational "nation"/entity.
This has led to a rather peaceful period in Europe, still there is a significant amount of opposition and distrust. We also easily see that the views don't change as quick as some pro-EU advocates would like it.
With this in mind the chances for the case Israel-Palestine case to be resolved don't look to good and the best starting point for it to happen would be an increase in economic co-dependence.

Cardinality is the generalization that allows that the concept of "ammount of elements" can be made to include infinite Sets as well.
It basically got established to say f.e. infinity of N is smaller then infinity of R ect.

What do you think "trans"-finite means?

I just don't see how you can equate the process of counting with the claim that there will be an end to the counting or not.
I also don't understand what your answer means

Are you saying the Natural numbers are
A) not countable
B) not infinite

Are you aware that this is your own position that basically no one holds? — CaZaNOx


Yes the countable numbers are countable. — tim wood

It seems that you view the Natural numbers as countable(correct me if I am wrong)
So, are you contesting the notion that the natural Numbers are infinite? If yes are you aware that no one else (I know of) holds this position?

No it doesn't. You just keep counting. — tim wood

Just to get it strait. Are you saying that something that repeats (forever without stopping) is not infinite? (Correct me if I misunderstood you)

No it doesn't. And countability just means that some set of thing can be counted, that is, set into some sort of order so that it - the elements of the set - can be paired with the integers in order. — tim wood

How is this related to the concept of infinity (=without an end). Can't you just keep on counting without end if the thing you are counting is countable but infinite?

Sorry i missed it, Where did you make that case? — tim wood

I made this case with change (I admit it was briefly) See:

I am arguing that change is an infinite property of the universe.
I would say it's continuous since the idea of turning off and on change (figuratively speaking) doesn't make sense — CaZaNOx

Note: The figuratively speaking is there because as it is written it would presuppose an agent which I am not doing.
You however are correct that I did not link it directly to real numbers. I only made a case for continuous change which I model (in my head) as Real numbers. I could however limit myself to a part of R that would contain more then one point and isn't discrete therefore still be infinite (in depth, not length).
In short I argue for continuous change, this in turn needs an continuous interval that is a subset of more then one points of R to be modeled. This would not be countable due to it being continuous.

And please try to keep straight that you're applying non-physical (i.e., mathematical, for a guess) concepts to the world. — tim wood

I disagree. I don't see change as a mathematical concept and rather a physical one. I model this however with math.
Also I have no trouble "keeping straight" that I use mathematical concepts. However I assumed this to be clear, like you assumed it to be clear that countability, or diagonalization refers to math.

if something, or any group of somethings, is discrete, then it can be counted. — tim wood

Agreed on that.

If it can be counted, then it is finite and not infinite. — tim wood

Disagree. I gave the example of the natural Numbers a countable infinite set.

You may own a lot of shoes, but for so long as each shoe can be counted and is counted, then the number of shoes you own is finite. — tim wood

I am not objecting that finite sets are countable. I am saying countable does not imply finite since we know examples that are countable and infinite. One counterexample suffices to show that the implication you are trying to establish doesn't hold.

Are you familiar with diagonalization? — tim wood

Yes but we don't need it for N. We use it for Q and Q is diagonalizable, therefore counable but also infinite.

Are you saying the Natural numbers are
A) not countable
B) not infinite

Are you aware that this is your own position that basically no one holds?

Btw: I forgot to mention that I am actually really interested in your honest opinion about change and infinity and if possible why you have those opinions and how they look in an argumentative structure. I hope this isn't being forgotten but just in case it is I wanted to state it and that it was this interest that prompted the reply.

The idea is that the universe will eventually use up all its possibilities, and at that point will start to repeat. Nothing anyone has to worry about. — tim wood

Repeating creates infinity if it never stops. The nothing anyone has to worry about is just deflecting that this is the issue that we are discussing here and that it serves as counter argument against your position.

No not really. It's about what a word means. If you're not interested in that, then you're on your own, which means that you don't make sense (because you're speaking a similar-sounding but different language from everyone else). — tim wood

Again stop dodging the point.
The point I was addressing is that the universe contains infinite's, not countability (a word you used but never explained what you meant, not upholding your own standards).

I made a case for continuous properties that I am aware are part of Real numbers and are not viewed as countable.

However I made a weaker case with the set of Natural numbers that are defined as countable but infinite.
I highlighted the infinite and let the interpretation if N is countable or not up to you since you seemed to link countability to infinity which conventionally is not done. So to not use a negative interpretation and let you freeroom with your seemingly incoherent connection of the two distinct concept I said

it is a mechanism that always adds to the currently described view. Similar to Natural Numbers no matter what number you give there's always a bigger one. (If you want to view this as countable but not finite or not is up to you) — CaZaNOx

which highlights that I strictly purpose infinity and stick to the initial topic. With referring to your definition of infinity.

something that is always greater then the thing you can specify. — tim wood

The fun introduction you made was

Now, just for fun, can you describe any aspect of the physical universe that cannot in principle be counted? — tim wood

addressed by continuity. However since this doesn't matter I used a countable claim of infinity referring to N you endorse a incoherent usage of countability.

Granted there are a lot of stars and that counting them might be physically difficult, but in principle they are countable, which means not infinite. — tim wood

So I could like you say regarding countability

It's about what a word means. If you're not interested in that, then you're on your own, which means that you don't make sense (because you're speaking a similar-sounding but different language from everyone else). — tim wood

With the difference being that I A) didn't do what you accuse me of, B)Actually presented an argument (that isn't trivally self defeating) C) Actually addressed your post, instead of just derailing the conversation to you use "this term wrong" ergo your talking nonsense without backing up your claim.

I am arguing that change is an infinite property of the universe.
I would say it's continuous since the idea of turning off and on change (figuratively speaking) doesn't make sense, I am further arguing that it is a mechanism that always adds to the currently described view. Similar to Natural Numbers no matter what number you give there's always a bigger one. (If you want to view this as countable but not finite or not is up to you)

can you describe any aspect of the physical universe that cannot in principle be counted? — tim wood

What about change. The universe is undergoing change so every description is limited and smaller then the universe plus the next instance of change

Idon't think thats the israelis core argument. It rather is a counter argument/response to the palestinian argument.

The Israeli main argument was born in the context of nationalism (every people have a right to their own nation). This is called zionism during debates on the issue it was also an idea that Israel could be founded in argentina.
The holocaust amplified a feeling of necessity for the jewish people to create a state to be secure that a similar tradegy wouldn't happen again. This was also shared by other western powers especially britain who gave land they owned in palestine for jews to create their own state.
The decision that it would be in the land that is connected to their scriptures is surley no trivial point however it shouldn't be seen as the main point.

I am aware that you can classify infinite sets via cardinal numbers. However calling them numbers seems to me a bit of a stretch.
Like I would maybe say that calling the matrix multiplication "multiplication" seems a bit dubious.
It is obviously clear why see similarity between common multiplication, scalar multiplication, matrix multiplication ect. it is also obvious that those concepts are useful.

I think this illustrates that despite similarity in concept and name cardinal numbers and common numbers are different things that one should not confuse. Cardinal numbers get used to quantify infinite sets however if you question infinity it seems problematic that you try to use a concept that is predicated on the existence of multiple infinities to refer to infinity as a number. This somehow negates your own stance, since cardinal numbers don't negate infinity. It's precisely the opposite they acknowledge infinities and try to form a new concept to work with them.

Further my point was that the argument for the existence of infinity could be located precisely in the continuous growing of the value of integer numbers as done in math. I therefore don't see how the very same continuous growing would undermine asserting the concept of infinity to reality.

I don't believe infinity is a logical concept and reality is logical so again the size of the universe is not infinite. — Devans99

I reformulate this as
1) Reality is not logical
2) Conclusion: The size of the universe is not infinite
(feel free to object to my paraphrasing your position if you think I misunderstood you)

I don't understand how you can argue(implication of logic) against or for infinity and assert and value to the conclusion if you take 1) as given.
Even if we dispense this criticism for a while I don't see how you get from 1) to 2) (due to the lack of further steps) without resorting to it being a statement of believe and you being free to believe whatever you want. (I am not opposing this statement and only trying to point out that if you resort to it being a matter of believe there is no point arguing for it.) With this in mind I assume you have a reasonable argument that leads from 1) to 2) that simply isn't spelled out here. So I would appreciate it if you could maybe provide this reasoning in more detail for me to comprehend how you arrive at 2).

1. Assume space is infinite
2. It is expanding
3. Implying it is not infinite (if it was size X, it is now size X+1, meaning X was not infinite) — Devans99

What do you think of this:
1. Assume N+ is infinite.
2. If defined recursivly (with Start n_1=1 and n_x=n_(x-1) + 1), N is expanding.
3. Implying N is not infinite (if N was size X, it is now X+1, meaning X was not infinite.

Doesn't this show the flaw of trying to understand infinite as specific value instead of using infinite as concept that is not a specific value.

Afterall in math infinite is not understood as value thats why inf +1 = inf.
Aren't you making it yourself a bit to easy by ignoring this view completley and simply stating inf is a specific value like any value in N. Basically equivicating properties of the category with the properties of it's elements?

unfortunatley this seems to be the case for some posts here. But yeah it is how it is. Afterall you don't have to reply.

I don't intend to be mean but what you are doing is inherently wrong and shows a lack of understanding of the concepts of logic.

1) A is not a premis. Instead A is a (atomic) logical formula phi. This formula contains an assignment of the binary Values True T or False F.
A specific assignment of a given Formula models a interpretationto to be True or False.
2) AvA is NOT a tautology. A tautology means that no matter what assignment we choose the Formula is ALWAYS True. An example herefore would be ¬AvA.
We can assign the Formula AvA with the value False. False or False is always False therefore the formula AvA is falsifiable. If we assign True we see the formula is also verifiable. Note: the opposit of tautology is unstatisfiable.Example A&¬A.
3) Is a reformulation of 2).
i) At this point it is worth mentioning that from a False antecedens everything follows. This is why we require the Antecedens to be True for the implication to be meaningfull. If the consequence holds True as well the implication holds.
ii) You correctly state that:

(C v D) = (¬C => D) — Emils

.
However (¬C => D) ≠ (¬A => A).
The difference is the number of assignment you can do and that there is a codependence between antecendes and consequence in (¬A => A). One could illustrate this by drawing the truthtables.
While we can make 2 assignments in the first case we can only do 1 assignment(one per letter) in the latter (creating truthtables of size 4 and 2). This leads to the situation where the implication as you use it can only result in True if we assume a False antecedens.
iii) Regarding the equality of (P => Q) = (¬PvQ).
This equivalency strongly predicates on using the assignment True for P since then ¬P is False and the final Truthvalue of the or-formula depends soley on Q. If Q is True the entire or-Formula is True if not it isn't.
However if P is False then obviously any or-formula containing ¬P is True and Q is not important. So to observe the relationship of P and Q we have to choose a method that is sensitive to P and Q. This is done by demanding that P is True and then looking at the result of the or-formula.
4) Is already explained. Basically it doesn't make sense to formulate a implication and/or a contraposition for a formula with only one truth assignment. Thats why after applying the contraposition you are at the same place you where in 3)
5) Translates to (AvA)&(¬Av¬A) which is unstatisfiable meaning no interpretation exists under which this would be true.
6) The result of 5) translates into 6)

In christian theology sin is defined as to disobey God. — hachit

She disobeyed the angle, not god.

In realty he only need to find 6, because he and his family.
Later the number was lowered to 5, so he only need to find one. — hachit

How is changing it later justified, isn't this basically stating that god said it wrong? Did gods word change? Isn't 10 like a special number in Jewish fate?
The change also seems problematic since it supposes that the family members where actually righteous people. However from the story itself at least for his wive this case seems not well grounded. Especially in regards to the fact that the principle of righteous or guilty by association is introduced. It therefore could very easily be understood that there being saved results from being associated to a righteous person and not being righteous themselves. This however would again lead to god killing righteous people in the city which only committed the mistake of being in the city.
I am myself aware of possible escape routes a christian could take however all of them seem dodgy in nature. Reframing the picture every time but I think this itself is problematic behavior.

I was furthing my point that good and evil have no objective meaning. — hachit

How can god do a final categorizing in to good and evil if those terms have no objective meaning?

As mentioned the punishment for sin is death — hachit

What exactly was the sin she committed in your view? Associating?

I'll say this thought, what is good and evil is different for everyone, there's not sum universal standard of them. — hachit

I agree to the first half but not to the second. Anyhow I would agree with the OP that there are quite a few dubious morals expressed in the bible. I don't think that Christianity can't acknowledge that but I think there's quit a bit of theological overhead to do so.
Anyhow I don't understand how you can claim that there is no universal standard when there seem to be universal categories (Heaven and Hell) that you fall into based on the judgment of your actions by God(in your view?). This is the case even if you assume God to be more forgiving torwards some people since they had it more difficult.

the church is so reliant on context I basically need the storys. But for the time being I think your using murder in place of killings — hachit

What about Sodom and Gomorrah? God specifies the number 10(why 10). If one can find 10 righteous people(I don't know if this only applies to adults/male adults) in Sodom he will spare the city.
This suggests a very strange principle if we assume there to be 9 righteous people in the city. God would punish\kill them because of association. Similarly he would spare the sinful people due to being associated by living in the city with 10 righteous people.
This seems rather odd. And just to prevent this kind of response the righteous people (Lot and family) (lets leave aside how righteous of an act it is to offer ones daughter to be raped) are saved by the angles not god. However Lot's wife turns in to a pillar of salt due to reassociating by the act of looking back.

Now I think the entire introduced concept of guilt by association is problematic. Other instances of the same principle would be original sin and the connected concepts f.e. limbo(referring to edge of hell for infant deaths)

I am writing a text about Spinozas metaphysical philosophy — marcolobo8

This should be obvious but just in case you are writing it as assignment for university, the most credible reference would be your Prof. or Assistant. So asking them is always recommended.

The paradox however, is the fact that Spinoza in no way shape or form, correlates anything religious/supernatural with this One Substance/God. He even rejects free will as he sees Causality to be included in every process whatsoever. — marcolobo8

Where do you get this from? I mean you make it sound like a trivial obvious point. However I personally would contest it.

So why use the word "God" — marcolobo8

First of I support the notion.

Some are of the opinion that he used the term God as an expedient or subterfuge. One could not at that time speak as freely as we do today. Others think that he was truly pious, a believer, only not a believer in the traditional characterizations of God. — Fooloso4

Second the general understanding of God as Substance is not really that new. In platonic Terms it would be the Idea of Ideas, which is similar to how Spinoza constructs his "God" starting of with Substances and arriving at there only being one Substance.
Historically the Newplatonians and early Christians are said to have "married" the Idea of Ideas with Personhood/Agency creating the "usual" concept of god.
The main difference I see is not the existing of such a Substance/Idea and rather the fact that there is only one Substance making everything somehow part of god differentiating from scholastic positions that emphasize the separateness of God from other Substances by using a model with multiple Substances. Connected to this one can argue that the need for agency diminishes however to come back to my contesting your point, it doesn't necessarily remove consciousness as such from the equation. If you look at Def. 3 It defines Substances as being understood (by whom) through itself.
Since there is only one Substance the by whom question could be answered as
a) by itself (substance)
b) by an Attribute (Def. 4 Attributes are what the Mind (whose mind) understands for Substance to be the constituting fact of it's essence(up to go translation important is the mind part))
c) by a Modus. But Modus also contains a part "through witch it is understood" that contains consciousness
As you see all 3 Basic termini use to a certain degree a comprehending. Where you want to locate this is one question but for me it isn't that for of a stretch to understand at least some parts of consciousness to be part of Substance which 1) creates closer proximity of Spinozas God and the classical god and 2) Is a religious/spiritual view.

Is God an actual object of reference which the sign "God" refers to? — marcolobo8

Is it a concept and not an object? — marcolobo8

I am not to used to Frege and not sure what you exactly are referring to when stating "object" or "concept". The answer to this question is highly dependent on the usage of those terms. As I understand them I don't see why the terms should be exclusive.

It seems to me that there really is no clear definition/shared sense of what "God" means. — marcolobo8

I don't know how you derive at this conclusion or what you are trying to express. Since after all there clearly is a Definition of God (Def.6) and since it's a tautological system theres no reason to care about the shared sense that people ascribe to the term "God". So you seemingly seem to speak about the conventional "God" but why you are considering this when you are trying to analyze Spinozas understanding of the term "God" via Frege is something I don't understand.
Are you trying to answer the questions in the Frege part for both usages of the term "God"?

What form of government are you having in mind?
I think it is a spectrum for both terms so it highly depends who you are referring to and the situation you are applying it to.
I further think the distinction between human (individual?) nature vs group nature is incomplete. We know of lynch mobs as well as secular governments they aren't the same thing. Especially in cases of cruel barbaric murder the government often takes a more charitable view regarding the punishment of the perpetrator (prison instead of death sentence or revenge torture) then a mob or maybe certain individuals would take.

that such an entity is theoretically logically possible, and therefore, even though I cannot imagine it, — Troodon Roar

How do you understand imagine in this context? Being able to visually represent it?
Why does "imagining" it as logical theoretical option not count? What is the difference and what is your actual point if someone would agree? Like is it an independent conclusion or do you want to use in further?

I added english to my spell check. Thank you for the tip

It certainly seems to me that you are reacting in an exaggerated manner to my comment. And you are attributing to me all sorts of intentions and actions that I do not believe I exhibited. — NKBJ

Fair point to a certain degree. I interpreted it to be written between the lines but if you say that wasn't the case I am willing to believe you and apologize for my missinterpretation and the connected statements.

As to the philosophical questions: I did actually respond already. I pointed out that philosophy covers matters from the political to religious to park benches.

Do I think there is anything that does not exist as a sub-discipline of philosophy? Not really. Or, at least, I don't think there is a topic that can't be made into a philosophical one if you try hard enough. And I also think people are often engaging in philosophy without even being aware of it. — NKBJ

I agree 100% with this and already conceded to it. Cmp:

my point would not be that they are not subdomains and rather that the subdomains should be the determing factors for topics that are well nested within the subdomain — CaZaNOx

However I specified that it's a question of focus in my view. I am not questioning the philosophical realm and rather the "being appropriate" to address it as philosophy instead of addressing it as "more" part of it's subfield. F.e. I view all sciences as "children" of philosophy but the question how to code something as better left to the specific "child" and not the mother (philosophy) despite it also being part of philosophy.

Now, I will agree that there are some subjects not interesting enough for me personally to pay much attention to. And it sounds like you feel the same way. But in such a case, just ignore the thread and pay attention to those that do spike your interest. — NKBJ

Thats what I am already doing so yeah I agree.

This often leads to me reading posts but not commenting. — CaZaNOx

I hope that adresses all of your concerns, and I too hope you have a nice time — NKBJ

Yes it does and thank you.
As I stated above my view entails that some questions aren't fitting for being placed here not just because of personal prefrence but because they are to "far away" from being what I would refer to as philosophy. As illustrated by the coding example I gave. If you want we can discuss this now that we are over the intial missunderstandings.

(Btw, is English your first language?) — NKBJ

No. It's my second or maybe 3rd or 4th language depending on how you view it. I already have dyslexia in my first language. Some things are better some are worse in english but yeah I know/assume that there are enough mistakes in my posts. Sorry for that.