• Time to reconsider the internet?
    There are so many clichés and banalities about the internet – to your points, it is possible to add that there has been an ongoing and free exchange of ideas, technologies, and knowledge (in fact, you need to pay for all these). That the internet
    brings people with different cultures and views together (actually, social networking are divided into isolated communities of like-minded persons). That the world has become the global village (very few people have been interested in and follow the global affairs). By the way, what is “the voice of the global village”?
    Has it been the voice of few media giants, dominating the cyber-space?
    I think this critique is a bit too extreme. For one free idea exchange is not limited by financial constraint - you have platforms like youtube, wikipedia, google, forums, reddit. that allow for open exposure. If anything political censorship, traditionalism, and conformist social pressure would be larger threats than financial restriction. Second there's a large body of work charting how modernization impacts social values and attitudes; for example see World values survey data comprised of social attitude and value surveys conducted in representative sample from ~55 countries as of 2014. They've been documenting since 80s. There is a general shift in the direction of more self-expressive, liberal and more rational-secularist vs traditionalist values over time. So the impact is real and not necessarily negative.

    It's certainly not a 'global village' and the cliches are mostly naiive overstatement but that shouldn't overshadow the positive trend.
  • Philosophy of emotions
    They’re not any sort of absolute authority. It’s perfectly acceptable, and even considered a good and beneficial practice, to question these worldviews.


    To accept them without question by mere authority or solidarity with the ‘group view’, especially if they appear untrue, would be more like religion.

    Firstly, I don't think the default is blind acceptance. I think there are many believers, not just converts, who have reasoned their way into religion. Irrespective of the truth of their assumptions and premises leading to their believe, that's still a reasoned method of acceptance and -at least for those individuals- there's a reasoned way out of their faith which is via rational debate. What I'm arguing here is that -for every single ideology- there is a stratum of adherents that either enter via blind acceptance or acceptance b/c of the persuasive way the ideology was presented; this is not exclusive to religious adherents.

    Secondly, It's true the philosophical process involves in it a value of critical judgement and skepticism but I don't think that stands in contrast to religion, moreso in contrast to the specific belief motivators you mentioned.... Religions are just culturally generated world-views [or, more accurately termed, metaphysical belief frame-works], under the same ontic category as secular metaphysical frameworks. You can be critical and do philosophy from within those those religious systems just like you can from within any other metaphysical framework.
  • Theories without evidence. How do we deal with them?

    I mean does the brain-in-a-vat explanation [and others like it] really serve as a theory? It doesn't provide much of any explanation, the world just jumps up a level to the vat-brain world which is left unexplained. It also doesn't say anything new about the vat-world.. if it has brains then it is constrained to operate under the same laws that allow for brains and electrode, stimulators to exist.. it's not anything new.. it's literally the same world, just with an extra manufactured world in it.

    That's the problem I think which is that speculative theories add unnecessary claims that do not serve the purpose of a theory. Sure it's true they could be true.. but by normalizing the belief of untestable claims you're effectively normalizing the belief in anything imaginatively possible that doesn't contradict what's already known about how the world works. You'd be normalizing belief in invisible, imperceivable unicorns made of undiscovered particles, in parallel imperceivable realities. There's no need to do that and, secondly, I don't think those sorts of claims, which are unverifiable, should have the same level of credence as testable theories. It's better to keep it in the same realm as other imaginative claims, why elevate it more than what's possible since, because of epistemic restrictions, they could never actually be a justified true belief.
  • Philosophy of emotions
    I think that's a certain image of philosophy. The majority of philosophers are known for their their philosophical systems, which serve as worldviews, 'answers'.


    See the SEP entry.
  • The snow is white on Mars

    a. Extend the pre-existing word-concept to cover all versions of the manifest image and restrict the use of differential vocabulary to distinguishing between the two scientific images which underlie the manifest image.
    b. Add a new word-concept in order to distinguish the manifest image by variations in the underlying scientific images.
    There is the manifest difference in temperature ranges often found on Earth where C02 ice sublimates into a gas, while H20 turns into a liquid.

    Why do you use the word "image" for the scientific understanding? I get the manifest image, because it captures the notion of appearance for humans, given how visually dominant most of us are. But science is more abstract. Is "image" another word for description or model?
    If anything option a would be more abstract in that it takes snow to mean any frosted, fluffy white powdery substance that melts in presence of heat. It's a 'descriptive'/'functional' as opposed to a reductive, concrete, substansive definition.

    You can figure the sense of a term in context of the conversation and situation, there's no context independent answer. The conversation between that astronaut and the other seems informal and so doesn't require rigid scientific formalism, it's presumably looser and more associative so I want to say the statement is true and he's using snow in a descriptive or functional sense not in a concrete, scientific sense.
  • Stating the Truth
    This. I think it's literally just what brains do. They build stable theories of the world. And it's natural for a person, when asked, to preach it. Universal self-criticality and agnosticism are something that just isn't common or completely natural

    Also, I don't think vocalizing your beliefs in that way necessarily implies they're unquestionably held. I'm sure Derrida would've been open to criticism about his personal theory
  • Is there anything concrete all science has in common?
    ^^
    I don't think science has to make any metaphysical commitment like naturalism. I think naturalism and physicalism are quite meaningless in terms of picking out entities. But is science wants to promote a metaphysics it would then become a philosophical competitor.

    Well epistemologically it's wedded to empiricism which makes it very partial toward restricting what 'is' to what can be seen and felt. There are anecdotal accounts of supernatural experiences but they don't meet the reproducibility criteria for empirical facts, the accounts aren't consistent with each other and simply can't be tested or explored.

    I don't think you have to ask questions to make scientific discoveries. Just mixing chemicals can create innovations and new phenomena can appear under a microscope or any other form of observation..

    I think most claims in evolution and cosmology are unfalsifiable because they are historical claims about one off events that can't be replicated.

    Hmm so the critical, defining feature of empirical testing is more so the confirmation of reproducibility for a given theory. It's true penicillin was accidentally found to kill bacteria in an agar plate, but what solidified its credibility as a theorized antibiotic was the subsequent testing of and confirmation of its killing capacity. Accidents can play a role in scientific progress but empiricism is always necessary to confirm the hunch.

    Also, evolutionary and cosmological theories are falsifiable, they make testable predictions. While they they make inferences about how things were in the past, those claims logically follow from the underpinning theories which themselves are testable.
  • Death: the beginning of philosophy
    Of relevance, here are some really interesting, vividly detailed coma stories [for those with a quora account]. It's really fascinating, especially the post wake-up haze.
  • Death: the beginning of philosophy
    Well I'm not sure I agree it's entirely unknowable. There are states, during life, in which you are not conscious, the most familiar being non-R.E.M. deep sleep. It's clear there is no experience in those states, no sense of time passing, no sense of any feeling, no internal or external awareness. For those lucky enough to experience other forms of unconsciousness, coma, clinical death, the experience is largely the same barring those caught in dream-like states. And you know, of course, there was no recollection of a time or existence prior to birth. You just find yourself in the body your in one day, experiencing. I think it's clear death will be something like that. Maybe I'll find myself aware in some other bodily, physical form with a blank mind absorbing experiences, maybe I'll just continue indefinitely in non consciousness. these are the only two options
  • Is there anything concrete all science has in common?
    I'm confused here. I thought it was well understood that science is rooted in metaphysical naturalism and epistemological empiricism. Empirical testing is what underlies any scientific endeavor - you have a question about the world, make a prediction about how something in the world behaves, and test to see if it reproducibly behaves that way. This is the method common to psychologists, physicists, biologists.
  • Describing 'nothing'
    @gurugeorge I'm really glad someone understands what I'm trying to convey.

    "nothing is the possibility of something."

    That's exactly it. That is the most efficient way to explain it. I wanted to have this statement critiqued but I thought it was too vague to extend to specific deductions that I've made if this statement were true.

    I agree with you fully about the paradoxical nature of the concept. For most people, it's unfortunately a non-starter. I see it as an unexplored realm and believe that the idea can be reasonably discussed given certain restrictions are put on the statements. I think that in order for metaphysical arguments to be universally true, or at least hold some sort of merit, all indivisible constituents of the statement must also be true. So let's get down to the nitty gritty.

    "But is that possibility not a something?"

    What is something? Does it require an observer to exist? For example, would you say pi exists? Why or why not?
    I still think nothing is just inherently a self-contradicting concept, it is the lack of anything and yet it's clearly something itself, 'it is a lack of anything'. It's individuated as a term precisely because it contrasts with the term something, not because it's completely devoid - i.e. it has a referent - you can picture an absence by envisioning a space devoid of anything.
  • How to study philosophy?

    There is a difference between learning to philosophize, which is much broader in scope, and learning philosophy. The former can be done anywhere and in most any context and just involves critical reflection and opinion taking/opinion defending. It's learning how to be cogently disagreeable. Learning philosophy is learning how to be disagreeable along with methods of argumentation, argument analysis, and historical or contemporary philosophical positions on philosophical topics. The classes involve reviewing, critically and in-depth, the position of early or contemporary notable thinkers on some topic or topics. You learn to philosophize through the discussions and take-home writing assignments, which involve articulating an author's argument and then forming your own on a topic or a thinker's position. You learn how to represent and dissect arguments, and how to critically reflect. If you get a really good professor, most of the lecture turns into open discussion.
  • Describing 'nothing'
    The very first sentence contradicts itself.
  • What do you call this?

    I think that would be impossible, for every proposition, there is some other proposition that contradicts it.
  • What do you call this?

    We'd know because we can contrast our consistent statements with imagined contradictions, e.g possible statements that contradict our doctrine.
  • What do you call this?
    Can you give an example of what you mean? I'm unsure I understand the issue.
  • What do you call this?
    Well yes, I think so. But what do you call it when someone commits an error in interpreting it as consistent but behaves inconsistently with regards to it? Is that some error or fallacy?
    I think it'd be an error. He may be behaving consistently with respect to his interpretation but ultimately it's an error.
  • What do you call this?
    I confess I feel rather the opposite. Why should texts obey some principle of non-contradiction? This would be the dream of an authoritarian, surely? Non-contradiction happens in logic, perhaps, but as soon as we use natural language it creeps in. And creeps, and creeps.

    Certain texts may be regarded as some sort of guidance to behaviour, but how are humans to be governed in this way? As soon as I read 'Thou shalt not'...' written say by some stuffy patriarch, I want to go looking for a fellow-transgressor.

    Hello again, btw, Posty. Hope you're well.
    Doesn't it depend on the purpose of the text? If it's an artwork then it's fine to have contradictions on the literal meaning level, the writing expresses some latent concept or emotion then it's understandable. If it's an expository work intended to communicate some specific information then it shouldn't have contradiction right
  • What do you call this?
    Well, yes. The absence of non-sequiturs implies that one understands something. Therefore, how do you lessen the chance of a non-sequitur from arising at all? Through consistency? But, how do you arrive at consistency without contradictions?
    I'm not sure I understand the bolded. Wouldn't consistency imply lack of contradiction. Also I think what's really important to avoid presence of multiple, plausible, consistent interpretations is specificity and clarity in writing as opposed to ambiguity.
  • What do you call this?

    So, the absence of contradiction is indicative of understanding a text, correct?
    I'm not sure it's indicative of understanding; maybe you can have more than one logically valid interpretations of a text but they'd all be equally plausible as the meaning. You can only have understanding if you have direct access to the author's intended meaning.
  • A Brief History of Metaphysics

    This comic makes Descarte the only dualist in the entire history of philosophy
  • What do you call this?

    Well you should just hope there's some other background information that gives clues about the author's intended meaning. Either way this idea there is no right interpretation is wrong... authors write with intended meaning - the proper interpretation is in line with whatever the intended meaning is.
  • Hume contra psychology.
    I think vales are a different subject, although values are pretty close to higher order volition's. The difference it would seem is that values are static, where higher order volitions are more inclined to be dynamic. Or in other words, values obtain from higher order volitions, I think.
    Right, I wasn't saying values were higher order volitions, I'm saying higher order volitions are determined by values. What makes you desire not to desire heroin is the fact that you value healthy living.

    Yea im finding it hard to conceptualize what exactly a value is and what distinguishes it from desire in particular. I think maybe they are different types of objects entirely, desire a mental action where as value a mental object - an abstract concept (spirituality, critical thinking, healthiness, cleanliness) that acts as a grounding for guiding principles of action. It's a grounding because it's value is intrinsic. I hope that makes sense
  • Hume contra psychology.

    Hmm, yea I think maybe it's because they're more in line with values. I can't really pinpoint why values hold the significance they do as opposed to say some passing desired object. I've always thought values partly form the self concept, they are some of what you most identify with so you are naturally inclined to be drawn to identify with desires that reflect them.
  • Hume contra psychology.
    Yes, but having higher order volition's means that some inconsistency will eventually arise. No?
    Or that at present there is an inconsistency and the higher order volition is generated to correct the first order desire. e.g. I value healthy living but I desire heroin. So now I desire that my desire for heroin reduces or is no more. I then take action to change my first order desire. Eventually, the first desire will dissipate and you are brought back to consistency.
  • Hume contra psychology.
    I don't know what you mean by that. Self consistency?
    By self consistency I mean that one's values-beliefs and actions are not in contradiction with each other, they are logically consistent.
  • Hume contra psychology.

    Yes, I do agree to some degree. I think there are higher order volition's, which seems like the apt term to use; such, as 'love' or 'envy' or 'jealousy'.
    I think it's interesting you identify love, envy, jealousy -- i.e. emotions as higher order volitions. I would've taken higher order volition to mean a desire derived from a deeply held value. Say spirituality is a value for me, then desires to meditate, pray, fast would be higher order volitions. The motivation doesn't necessarily comes from pleasure or some other basic non-rational motivator, but it comes from a desire for self consistency.

    EDIT:
    I'm wrong.. its hierarchical desiring. I'm not sure it's exactly the same with respect to its nature as a first order desire though.. Typically they hold less behavioral power, are almost always derived from a value-consistency motivator and rely on inhibitory mechanism? E.g I'm thinking of the case from wiki - of a drug addict desiring not to desire drugs. Say the person acts on his desire not to act desire drugs, he uses his self control to stop his impulse. It seems more like a meta-cognitive override capacity?
  • Hume contra psychology.

    Thanks for the clarification. I really find it interesting he doesn't distinguish between kinds of desire. I think there's a meaningful distinction between longer-term, thought out, value consistent desires and shorter-term, impulse driven desires. It's true they share components between themselves, but there there are differences. Future oriented desires are typically for abstract objects (e.g. to be a painter, sculptor, architect, millionaire, healer, monk, job, how to play guitar) and so typically involve some means-end reasoning process and cognitive energy to actualize. Present oriented desires are usually for particular objects or particular experiences (I want that cake, that toy, lets ride that coaster. Let me browse this site) and trigger habitual, automatic behavior. They don't involve much means-end reasoning and typically are independent of deeply held values (e.g. value health, but cake in front of you or value philosophy and browse philosophy forum because internet access and why not...).

    We're not completely slaves to the immediate scene, impulse triggers. We have self control for a reason and I think its significance as a concept comes from the reality of this distinction.
  • Hume contra psychology.

    A good while ago I posted some topics about CBT or in general talk therapy/rational emotive behavioural therapy/metacognitive therapy, and even logotherapy contra what Hume had to say about the role of reason being the handmaiden to the passions. Each type of therapy seems to rely on reason being able to address personal issues, shortcomings, perceived deficiencies, and other issues.

    It's my general sentiment that Hume, was in some sense wrong about his sentiment towards human rationality and emotions.

    Yet, the deeper you look into the issues, all the aforementioned therapies, in some sense have to address the emotions through reasoning. So, in some sense it's almost true of reason being instrumental to the passions; but, the distorted perception of mine is that it's only a one way street or a bottom up or top down alley where one controls the other.

    Therefore, I don't think it makes sense to talk about reason being the handmaiden to the passions; but, a more intuitive view would be to say they both work in tandem.

    Would that be a more insightful way of putting the Humean saying in context?
    I think at least in the case of CBT, what really makes it efficacious is the behavioral therapy, challenging misguided beliefs through exposure or some other behavioral method. From the literature I've seen, cognitive therapy is useful but not to the same degree as when including the behavioral component. Although, I think getting to core beliefs that underpin maladaptive behaviors and or ruminative thinking patterns is a necessary step for lasting behavioral change.

    I agree emotion and reasoning seem clearly intertwined, I actually find it hard to think of an emotion or feeling I've had that's not underpinned by some beliefs I've had about the encounter or situation. There is a difference between two things, though - there are feelings/emotions about situations and then there are 'passions' - in the sense of impulsive drives and other immediate gratification, immediate novelty seeking, or other non-rational motivator of behavior which isn't in line with longer-term goals. I think it's clear passions have a strong influence on reasoning, suppressing your ability for self control, instigating rationalization process and that it's incredibly difficult to stave off that influence by sheer will-power, unless it's boosted or still at high level. I think we are constrained by passions but not necessarily slaves to them which implies no autonomy no ability to fight their influence.
  • Should i cease the pursit of earthly achievments?
    Agreed, if you're reading Schopenhauer, stop immediately.
    :rofl:
  • Are militaries ever moral?
    Nietzsche observed that every country claim to have a military in order to prevent invasion by another country's military. Is this a vicious circular logic, or are militaries a "necessary evil"? Is this not akin to the prisoner's dilemma?
    If a nation's social contract includes a clause about providing and maintaining security then I think it's completely moral and in right business for the nation to have a military in that interest. And having a military doesn't necessarily imply the country ever intends to use force. Switzerland, for example, has mandatory military conscription for its citizens but has not really ever engaged in any combative exercise since the 19th century. I think irresponsible or excessive use of military force has more to do with the governing administration rather than the fact of there being a military.
  • Artificial intelligence, humans and self-awareness
    Sure there are other methods. But the ones that are derived from the functioning of the human brain, which generally means interconnected neurons passing on signals are usually expressed that way.
    I still think neural networks can be described as self monitoring programs - they modify their output in a goal-directed way in response to input. There must be learning rules operating in which the network takes into account its present state and determines how this state compares to a more optimal state that it's trying to achieve. I think that comparison and learning process is an example of self monitoring and modification.

    The whole program is written to fulfill a certain purpose. How should it monitor that?

    I was wrong to say it monitors its own goals, rather it monitors its own state with respect to its own goals. Still there is a such thing as multi task learning - and forms of AI that can do so can hold representations of goals.
  • Artificial intelligence, humans and self-awareness
    The AIs whose construction is inspired by the human brain are merely a bunch of matrices chained together resulting in a map from an input to an output. m(X) = Y. These get trained (in supervised learning at least) by supplying a set of desired (X,Y)-Tuples and using some math.
    algorithm to tweak the matrices towards producing the right Y values for the Xes. Once the training-sets are handled sufficiently well chances are good it will produce plausible outputs for new Xes.
    Isn't this true for only a subset of AIs. I'm unsure if this is how, for example a self navigating, walking honda robot works, or the c. elegans worm model, etc. And even in these cases, there is still a self monitoring mechanism at play -- the optimizing algorithm. While 'blind' and not conventionally assumed to involve 'self awareness', I'm saying this counts -- it's a system which monitors itself in order to modify or inform its own output. Fundamentally, the brain is the same just scaled up in the sense that there are multiple self monitoring, self modifying blind mechanisms working in parallel.

    These things do not exactly have a representation of their goals - they are that representation.
    They have algorithms which monitor their goals and their behavior directed toward their goals no? So then they cannot merely be the representation of their goals.
  • Artificial intelligence, humans and self-awareness
    Yes. That can be correctly classified as some level of self-awareness. This leads me to believe that most of what we do - walking, talking, thinking - can be replicated in machines (much like wormw or insects). The most difficult part is, I guess, imparting sentience to a machine. How does the brain do that? Of course, that's assuming it's better to have consciousness than not. This is still controversial in my opinion. Self-awareness isn't a necessity for life and I'm not sure if the converse is true or not.
    Hmm, I would think self awareness comes part and parcel with some level of sentience. I think a robot that can sense certain stimuli - etc. light, color, and their spatial distribution in a scene - and can use that information to inform goal directed behavior must have some form of sentience. They must hold some representation of the information in order to manipulate it and use it for goal based computations and they must have some representation of their own goals. All of that (i.e. having a working memory of any sort) presupposes sentience.

    I
  • Perception: order out of chaos?

    And not just! The most incredible thing is that it takes completely uncharacterized, undivided datum; identifies regularities, characterizes them, imbues them with identity, and catalogues a whole taxonomy of world that is then used to form predictions. Ultimately, all perception is inferential, I don't think there's a such thing as 'direct' perception. Rudimentary feature finding, feature stitching, and object classing happens automatically and unconsciously through dedicated circuitry. I just think it's incredible that that's happening all the time, so efficiently, on top of everything else in the forefront of consciousness
  • Game theory
    A pareto-optimal outcome in the prisoner case is one where both prisoners remain silent. Are you saying the external factor or force is the justice system? I'm not sure why it's an issue and I don't think it would have any implication for ethics as a whole-- the external factor is something specific to the prisoner case, you can model other situations which don't involve an external force or restraining authority using game theory conventions.

    I'm unsure how well decision predictions using game theory actually hold up empirically but I'm sure it's helped us make some sense of how people make decisions when they are acting in a self-interested and rational way.
  • Is destruction possible?

    In the example, it's not the ice that continues to another cycle, it's the substance it's made of, water. Ice is a form of water that can cease to be. Things, which are really differentiated by their form not their substance, can be destroyed. .

    Also, the particular matter constituting a form doesn't necessary recycle in a predictable, circular/cyclical way. For one, objects are always loosing old and gaining new material all the time, not just after they cease to be. And once their form ceases, the remaining material is scattered, it can go on to be a part of any number of other forms. There's no guarantee the same material will make the same type of form.
  • Why be rational?
    It's pragmatic. It would be, at best, very difficult to effectively communicate, build trust, and prioritize or achieve personal goals if not. I don't see how you could function as an irrational human
  • Artificial intelligence, humans and self-awareness

    What about self-monitoring programs? Ones that can modify behavior or output when certain conditions are met -- e.g a robot that self corrects its walking trajectory when it is not going in proper direction? I think that involves some amount of self awareness