Ok. It's official. You do not know what you're talking about. Too bad, because sometimes that kind of ignorance can be a block to learning. Modus ponens, Modus tollens, as basic to basic logic as 2+2=4 to arithmetic. Learn them.

What you're not seeing - I don't know why - is that you're making two different arguments.

If john is in Tokyo, then John is in Japan. John is not in Tokyo. Maybe he is in Osaka or Yokohama.

But you're argument really is, If John is in Tokyo then John is in Japan. John is in Paris, therefore he is not in Japan. In this argument is the extra premise.

You can conclude John is not in Japan not because he is not in Tokyo, but because he is in Paris.

I thought it was proved and explained already in the previous posts, — Corvus

Your proposition as I have understood is, (P>Q) ^ (~P) => ~Q. If this is it, it wasn't proved because it is not provable. Above I briefly described how this appears in a modified Venn diagram.

Now I think it's time to stop. You've taken a turn from Mistaken Dr. onto Fool Ave., and that a wrong turn to make, a waste of time for everyone. Return as seems best to you, but if you insist on yours, I insist you provide a proof.

I submit that maybe what you're doing is adding premises/facts and then supposing you can do without them, and you can't.

You are still totally dismissing the fact P was verified as ~P from a real life event. When P is ~P, then it can be inferred ~P -> ~Q proving ~Q. — Corvus

Ok. Prove it.

Any snark and local references aside, what do you say the without-which-not difference or differences are that distinguish liberal from conservative? My own view is that a liberal asks what good he can do, and how, and then tries to do it The conservative what he can afford.

P -> Q
~P
Therefore ~Q
Truth table is for the classical logic, — Corvus

Which you apparently do not want to do. And you do not have to. But you appear also to want your "argument' to stand, somehow, and absent other premises, it doesn't. Denying the antecedent is a basic and elementary mistake. You appear to know this, but that you dismiss it means you also do not understand it. You need to understand it.

Suggestion, fwiw. A two-circle diagram, overlapping as in a Venn diagram. One circle P, the other Q. In order to illustrate P>Q, black out the portion of the P circle not in Q. Pictorially, then, if there is an X in P, then it has to be in Q also. Now if you deny Q, then it should be clear that there can be no P. Instead, however, deny P. The diagram should make clear that denying P leaves plenty of Q, and says nothing about Q other than if there is a Q, then it is not also a P.

I suppose you've left out some details. Still, though, it seems to me the liberal proposal makes more sense, the greater control over the results of giving the money coming from presumed contractual obligations on the gas power stations.

As to liberal v. conservative, liberals usually make more sense. Being one, I would know.

The reason why I am writing this thread is because I do appreciate the idea of 'the middle way' in Buddhism — Jack Cummins

So what (do you say) is the middle way in Buddhism?

They are not telling you anything about the the proof processes in the real life which you must take into account prior to examining the symbols. — Corvus

They are telling you everything about the process. Recourse to facts simply is independent of the logic. This the tension between validity and truth. You assumed P>Q. Then you note the ~P is the case. From that you conclude that also ~Q is the case. But what you have not done is specified that if P is not the case, then Q is not the case. Which, if you specified it, would yield ~Q.

(P>Q) ^ (~P) ^ (~P>~Q) => ~Q.

And without which, you have left the logic behind, not having proved ~Q, but simply having asserted it.

To my way of thinking they're a trespass, a nuisance, and a disturbance of the peace, all compelling a response. And I don't buy it that no one seems to know anything about them. Obviously some people do. But otherwise I haven't paid much attention. Be nice to know how big they are and how high they're flying.

we know ~P, hence the assumption P -> Q was not true. — Corvus

No, no, no. From the assumption that P>Q, and given ~P, you know that P is F. and with P being F, P>Q is always true, and that Q can be either T or F.

The proposition (e.g., and assuming it is true) is, if it's raining, then the ground is wet. Consider: it says nothing about whether it is raining (or not), and it says nothing about whether the ground is wet (or not). It says only that if it is raining, then the ground is wet. It does not say that if it is not raining, then the ground is dry - it could be wet for some other reason. Nor does it say, and this is a little more difficult, that if the ground is wet, then it is raining. The logic of if-then is a knot that takes some practice to get used to tying and untying. Until you get it, it can be a trap. When you get it, you will wonder what all the fuss was about.

Assuming P>Q is true, means only that the assumption applies to the whole expression. As to whether P is T or F, or Q is T or F, the assumption is silent. They can both be T; they can both be F. Or P is F and Q is T. You only cannot have P is T and Q is F. Whenever, then, P is F, the assumption is always T. And when Q is T, the assumption is always T. All this is clearer and less effort with truth tables.

It is a proof process based on the inference and reasoning. — Corvus

What this means in the context of this logic, I have no idea.

Back to the PSR. I encounter it as from Leibniz as nihil est sine ratione, fairly translated as "nothing is without reason." But what does it mean? In absolute terms, nothing absolute, because it runs into the self-referential paradox that says reason, a something, must have a reason. And on this much time and effort could be wasted, but none of it to Leibniz's point.

An illustration: "The cows are in the high pasture (and they shouldn't be)." What might be the reason they're in the high pasture? The absolute presupposition here is that there is a reason, and that itself reasonable because it would be unreasonable to suppose them in the high pasture for no reason at all. And there is a plethora of possible reasons, or "constellations" of reasons. As reasons however none (yet) constitute knowledge.

And this clarifies Leibniz's program. Reasons the frames for testable hypotheses. And some testable by reason by itself: the cows neither flew nor quantum-tunneled their way onto the high pasture. And some by experiment and observation: maybe the fencing between the lower and higher pastures was breached, let's saddle up, or walk up, or take our helicopter, or use our drone, to take a look and see.

The idea being that reasons alone are in themselves at best useful tools for testing one way or the other. But that by themselves ground no knowledge of anything at all. To become knowledge, they require an added ingredient. Mere belief, however, does not require that ingredient, with the result that mere belief can never itself be knowledge of anything.

From the proof process, we came to know that the assumption P -> Q is not true, which infers Q not true. This is a proof process, not Truth table. — Corvus

If you have P>Q and ~P, you got nothing about Q. Q can be either T or F.

if you have P>Q and ~(P>Q), you got nothing.

If you have ~(P>Q) then you may conclude that P is true and Q is false. That is, ~(P>Q)>~Q. Btw the word is implies, not infers; look it up. But this is not MT.

Since your book is misleading/confusing you, or itself wrong - which happens - I suggest you get another book. In any case it's usually good to have more than one book, one elucidating what another leaves dark.

So your comment,
R>P, then, is F>P, which is itself always true, but that says nothing about P.
— tim wood
is unclear. Could you please confirm the point? Thanks. — Corvus

In any P>Q, however simple or complicated looking, if P is false (F), then P>Q is true. And from F>Q, nothing may be concluded about the status of Q. Them's the rules.

Chain no stronger than its weakest link, and MP and MT the strongest of links. It takes a while to get used to how the if-then of logic works. Given P>Q, it is easy to suppose something about P or Q. But from just the truth of P>Q alone, nothing about either severally can be concluded.
Consider:
1) If it's raining, the ground is wet. It is raining, (therefore) the ground is wet. And this MP.
2) The ground is not wet, (therefore) it is not raining. And this MT.
3) But suppose it is not raining - denying the antecedent - it is tempting to conclude that the ground is dry. And that is a mistake. And it is a mistake because the original hypothetical speaks only about the consequence of rain. It says nothing, zero, zilch, nada about what happens if it's not raining.

This is elementary stuff; it doesn't do to be mistaken on it. On line or in many books is instruction on very basic logic, which MP and MT are. Consult them; you will be glad you did.

From Q>R and ~R, you can conclude ~Q. That's just modus tollens.

Well, then, your issue is the arguments. As such, and compelling only to people for whom they are compelling and you not such, why do you care?

To me arguments for staying alive or for meaning only work if you HAVE to live. Filling life with good things, doing what you love, all that junk only has logical weight if one is unable to die until a set time. Barring that I see no reason for living. — Darkneos

The words and usage here is slippery. What exactly is your issue? You have received answers and are dismissive. Maybe it would help if you gave closer thought either to what your point is or how you're expressing it. One approach to boil it down to a single, simple "whether" question. E.g., whether it is better to X or better to Y. Then consider, analyze, and weigh the two alternatives (rinsing and repeating as necessary).

R -> P was an assumption too. — Corvus

However, R (apparently) is not true, therefore ~R, therefore R is F.
R>P, then, is F>P, which is itself always true, but that says nothing about P.
In brief, from P>Q, all that can be known about Q from the argument is that if P>Q and P, then Q is true. Period. Btw, you infer, everyone/thing else implies.

I think this is an unwarranted assumption. Most philosophers of physics are physicists by education and work experience. The ones with philosophy PhDs often also hold undergraduate, or often advanced degrees in physics as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A fair reply to a criticism, imho. But the question really goes to who writes and publishes pop physics books and why. And not all of that is respectable.

It's useful to recall exactly what the Bell experiments do. The experiments are set up and run, and the results tabulated and analyzed. And it is found that the results are not compatible with some certain basic and fundamental assumptions that are very reasonably made. Over years the experiments have been refined to eliminate certain "loopholes," and it is claimed they have done so. What the experiments do not do is say anything about the how or the why. To date, no one has that account. My own suspicion being that once accounted for, while it may at first seem amazing, after being grokked seem simple enough.

M.P.: from (p>q) ^ p, q. M.T.: from (p>q) ^ ~q, ~p. Yours is neither, not a proof. I think it is called the fallacy of denying the antecedent. And I'm pretty sure you know this, but just got crossed up.

My reading of the PSR is that given a something, one should be able to come up with some reason for it. Thus, the reason for the volcano's not erupting is the sacrifices we make to the volcano gods. And from this it is clear that the master the reason serves is not any kind of ultimate reality - whatever that might be - but whatever works for the narrative being told.

But of course the universe is filled with somethings about which the best we can do is say, "We don't know."

But trying to sort out what it means exactly.... — Darkneos

Trying to figure out what anything exactly means is not-so-easy. As to the entanglement of things - and I suspect that entanglement is a property of everything and only emergent at the scale of the very small - it's just a mystery for which no good account yet exists. And the universe full of such mysteries, is itself the biggest mystery.

My model for the shooter is Jacques 5, from A Tale of Two Cities. And him thus a symptom, not himself the disease but a consequence of it.

Or from Aristotle's Rhetoric:
"It may be just that A should be treated in a certain way, and yet not just that he should be so treated by B. Hence you must ask yourself two distinct questions: 1) Is it right that A should be thus treated? 2) Is it right that B should thus treat him? and apply your results properly, as your answers are Yes or No. Sometimes in such a case the two answers differ: you may quite easily have a position like that in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes:
"'And was there none to loathe thy mother's crime?' to which question Alcmaeon in reply says, 'Why, 'there are two things to examine here.'
"And when Alphesiboea asks what he means, he rejoins, 'They judged her fit to die, not me to slay her.'" (Rhetoric, 1397a, 28. ff.)

Or Clint Eastwood, "Ever notice how once in a while you come across someone you shouldn't have f**ked with?" (Gran Torino.)

I don't know who Luigi is as a person or what his exact motives were - and I suppose that will matter - but depending on those motives, I would not take it amiss if a jury in essence found that while he was fit to be punished, they not fit to punish him.

The world has in it people who under colour of "law" prey on other people, taking everything they can, even their lives. And if such predation should pry or break loose from common sensibility some victim who responds with a gun, we can turn to Matt 18:7:
"Woe unto the world because of offenses for it must needs be that offenses come but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh."
And Psalm 19:9: "'the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

To those who argue it's wrong to shoot someone, the quick answer and one that leads to a much closer look and analysis is, not always.

To my way of thinking, Democracies must on occasion show both teeth and claw. And it is possible to reserve those occasions for when they are responses in kind. That is, those that venture much in trying to destroy must lose much, and more, when they fail.

I am not a fan of capitol punishment as a penalty for crimes against persons, but when the offense is against the community as a whole, the community not being itself a person and thereby having different rights, I think extreme penalties justified.

An ill-conceived and executed jibe can easily capsize a boat. The news of the moment that South Koreans have prevented a capsize and are putting their ship back on an even keel - a lesson for the world! What they do with their president remains to be seen. I hope that if punishment be appropriate, it be an appropriate punishment.

Heidegger wrote a book, The Principle of Reason. It starts,
"The principle of reason reads: nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason" (3). And then on for about 130 pages. What I get from it, and him, is that the "reason" is the story of the moment that best accounts for "why the matter has run its course this way rather then that" (119).

That is, as I understand it, given that there are things of all sorts, there is no such thing as a reason. And therefore it follows that it is a very great, fundamental, and ignorant mistake to look for any such thing. But a story, on the other hand, if it's a good story, establishes its own value by itself - and if of sufficient value, becomes regarded as a thing.

Of course, for good stories to become "things," other stories, usually, must have always already been regarded as things, like "reality" and "truth" and "logic," and others as well. Nothing wrong with this; it's the way the world works - denial a short road to madness. But sometimes it is important to remember that it is all a story, and perhaps the moral of the story being that all is contingent and provisional and that we can have practical knowledge and practical truth, but always within the context of the ground of a story, and nothing absolute.

Heidegger: "Accordingly, humans are the animal rationale, the creature that requires accounts and gives accounts," (129). He then asks if this determination "exhausts the essence of humanity?" (129). A good question, and the book worth the read.

If one were to know the truth of a significant matter, would transparency and honesty be owed to the community on said matter, even if it meant many in the community would feel harmed/ disenfranchised by it? Ie "a tough pill tonl swallow". Couldn't they declare that their autonomy in not knowing/ (their choice to remain ignorant) was taken away from them?

Can one truly have a choice in remaining ignorant as the very state is a state of not knowing what they ate avoiding?

In this case which is more important? The integrity of the truth or integrity of free will? — Benj96

What do you mean by "truth"? What exactly is your "integrity" or "honesty"? Or "autonomy" or "ignorance"? I ask because I think you might actually have meant facts for truth and some self-serving sense of propriety or correctness for integrity and honesty. And so forth. And knowledge as a sine qua non of autonomy? Whenever were there people who were not ignorant?

An interesting subject to dissect, but you need sharper tools lest it all become a mess.

For me, philosophy is not so much a search for truth or reality but a search for models and ideas that I can justify. — Tom Storm

Imho you have said a whole great lot in a few words. Many, maybe most, discussions that on their surface seem a search for some truth or reality actually are a failure to understand that these things are defined, and the argument actually over definitions and the contexts from which they came.

For the current discussion, the substance of which recurs like a chronic infection, I have one question. Before asking it, a definition of knowledge: that by and to the presentation of which a reasonable adversary accedes.

So to theists of every stripe the question, What do you know? Not for a moment to be confused with any question about your beliefs. And it is clear that theists know nothing. I'm keeping this brief: any theists thinking they know something are welcome to reply with whatever it is they think they know. But please do not waste our time and display your ignorance by proving you do not know the difference between knowledge and belief.

Kant, Lectures on Ethics. Search Amazon Kant Lectures on Ethics for different editions and prices.

I said fundamentally, which means that they have the same effect of terminating life. — Hyper

Try to be precise, philosophical even: what exactly are you saying?

''

So saying it is "glaringly obvious" that Trump committed crimes just doesn't work.... — NOS4A2

So. nos4, Trump did not and has not committed any crimes?

of an opposing opinion — NOS4A2

What opinion did you express? I respect opinions as such - not always the content - but opinion is discussable. But opinions? You don't need no stinkin' opinions; you have your lies. And that's all you got.

:100: :up:

You’re just not up to speed, Tim. — NOS4A2

Your speed? Nevah! But you are just a weasel. You wrote Jack Smith's appointment was illegal

illegally-appointed Jack Smith. — NOS4A2

It wasn't

You wrote

The corrupt, political persecution has failed. — NOS4A2

There was no corrupt prosecution. And when asked to clarify, as you usually do, you evade. You're a post-truth person, nos4, which means you lie, cheat, steal without scruple and should not be trusted even with a mop.

starting with illegally-appointed Jack Smith. — NOS4A2

Really? Do you know something no one else knows? Or is it just your usual?

The corrupt, political persecution has failed. — NOS4A2

What corrupt prosecution? By whom? What charges?
I think, nos4, you need to get your mouth checked, disgusting things keep coming out of it.

he blind leading the blind, the blind judging the blind?
You don't see just how authoritarian you are. — baker

Who is blind? And authoritarian misses the mark. What I'm about is some minimum degree responsibility and accountability, and in gentler times these things usually just flow. But not now. Where once folks were more-or-less responsible and accountable, now they're not. And either we have them or we don't. I say we should have them, and where folks deny them, to impose them.

And what Javra said

Calling people mentally abnormal because they enjoy surprise parties is quite ironic. — Ourora Aureis

Only for you and based solely on what you wrote.

Apparently Capitol police are not happy about the prospect of J-6 pardons....

I dislike if a lie affects me negatively, — Ourora Aureis

So you care about lies and dishonesty affecting you, but not about other people.

I may even like the lie — Ourora Aureis

I recommend meds and a program of therapy. And that you wear a warning label.

So according to you,

Why should we care if people lie and are dishonest? — Ourora Aureis

Does that mean you do not care if people lie or are dishonest with you?

Why should we care if people lie and are dishonest? — Ourora Aureis

I cannot think of any way to respect your comment. Whatever you were thinking, care to recast it?